Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat)

[DarkStar]

Today Islamists amongst us say they are proud of our Pakistan army for killing the islamist insugents - whom do they think they are fooling? We know that they are seeking to confuse and to distort history, and like the talib, they will be held accountable:


Politicians and Rah-e-Raast
Monday, July 13, 2009
Talat Farooq

While our politicians are quick to criticize the role played by the military establishment in the making of the Taliban they have never had the moral courage to confess to their own contribution to the phenomenon. The scourge of terrorism that has hit us in the face is the outcome not only of the short-sighted policies of the establishment but also the support lent to these policies by the politicians. During their alternate stints in the 90s both the PPP and the PML, despite their heavy mandates, were busy settling personal scores rather than questioning and holding serious discussions on the aftermath of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, in parliament. But more than the PPP and the PML, it is the religious parties that are today in the process of having their cake and eating it too.

Both the JI and the JUI are opposing the ongoing military operation with their senators terming it as “drama” during a recent senate debate, declaring that it was the military that had created the Taliban in the first place. What they failed to mention was their own contribution to the phenomenon first by actively assisting the military establishment in the 80s and 90s and later continuing to use the institutions of the mosque and madressah to create sectarian and ideological divisions leading to militancy within the society.

The JI, whose anti-military stance today is aired with nauseating repetition, was hand in glove with Ziaul-Haq with Maudoodi himself endorsing Zia’s initiatives for Islamization in Pakistan. The JI, influenced by the Maudoodian concept of militant Jihad, assisted the Zia regime in conducting the Afghan policy and fighting America’s war in Afghanistan. The mess we are in today is the fallout of the same guiding principle. The JI had no qualms in fighting America’s war in the name of Afghan jihad because, besides the fact that dollars were pouring in, it meant more political power to the mullah in Pakistan. The JI, although at loggerheads with the JUI politically, never breathed a word against the rise of the Taliban from the JUI administered madressahs and training camps after the Soviet withdrawal, nor did it ever denounce them as they fought fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. It is therefore rather hypocritical of them to condemn the ongoing military operation on the basis of “killing Muslims” and fighting “America’s war” in Swat and FATA.

The Taliban policy was executed in the 90s during the PPP government with the support of their political ally Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman whose Saudi funded madressahs, with the blessings of the ISI, trained both Afghan refugees and Pakistani youngsters in the art of militant jihad besides indoctrinating them into one-dimensional bigots. The Pakistani students from JUI-run madressahs were fed as fodder to buttress the fighting cadres of Mullah Omar, himself a product of Maulana Sami-ul-Haq’s madressah. The Taliban in Afghanistan were reinforced with manpower, funds and weapons from Pakistan as they fought and massacred fellow Muslims. The present cold and calculating Taliban leadership that has unleashed terror on the Pakistanis consists of the same battle-hardened, madressah-bred warriors, whose ruthlessness in spawning sectarianism and terrorism in Pakistan is justified in the name of religion by their supporters. Having grown up in refugee camps and then trained in the JUI-run militant madressahs following the Deobandi brand of education that is sympathetic to Wahabism, the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani brethren have nothing to do with the egalitarian traditions of the Pashtuns and are in fact the perfect reflection of the Quranic version of “mufsidin”.

After 9/11 the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements, supported by their Pakistani sympathizers, crossed over into FATA as a result of Musharraf’s two-faced policy that strengthened the Pakistani Taliban. This particular policy was never criticized by either the religious or the conservative parties, such as the PML-N, even as they criticized Musharraf for everything else, with the result that the militants have grown in power with the help of local criminals, drug mafia, arms dealers and foreign ‘hands’ that have joined them along the way. The latest turn of events has proved unfavourable to them. The bomb blasts in NWFP and the Punjab targeting law enforcement agencies and the civilians as well as the ongoing violence in Karachi are desperate attempts by them to distract the Pakistani army so that local and foreign militants and other criminal elements can continue to use Pakistani tribal territory for their respective vested interests.

Today, the JUI leadership is unanimous in condemning the military operation against their protégés. One would like to ask them why it was okay for Pakistani jihadists to wage war against the non-Pashtuns and Shia Muslims of Afghanistan and why it is wrong for the Pakistan army to dismantle the TTP. Is it that when the maulvis agree to fight it is jihad but when the military takes on the enemy in keeping with its constitutional obligation it is murder? Similarly, the incumbent amir of the JI minces no words in expressing his admiration for the Taliban style of governance in Afghanistan in the 90s. His party is taking out rallies against the ongoing operation, making one wonder why it never protested or held seminars to condemn religious extremism since the start of suicide bombings in urban Pakistan. Is it that to them the lives of the inhabitants of FATA and PATA are more important than the rest of Pakistanis?

As the Pakistani nation suffers, the politicians cannot be absolved of their complicity in the rise of the Taliban in both the tribal and the urban areas of Pakistan. In the present scenario the PPP has had to take the bold decision to take on the enemy while the main factions of the PML continue to sit on the fence. The only two parties who have come out strongly against the Taliban, the MQM and the ANP, are at daggers drawn in Karachi instead of rising above their personal agendas.

The country is at war and the entire political leadership, including the religious, the conservative and the secular, should be addressing the pressing issues of defeating religious extremism, rehabilitation of the IDPs and reconstruction in the war zones, while devising practical strategies for ensuring the writ of the state in the country. They should be seen as building both bridges and consensus by going to their voters. The truth of the matter is that the nation expects the politicians to launch their own operation Rah-e-Raast by retracing their footsteps to the straight path after publicly confessing their wrong doings and then compensating by genuinely working toward a unified ideological front against the Taliban mindset in the tribal and urban areas of Pakistan.

The writer is executive editor, Criterion. Email: talatfarooq11@ gmail.com

The article has so many factual mistakes, and inaccuracies, and a lot of hearsay.

I would have expected a better critique than the above.

 

[Kasrkin]

Which bit are you talking about DS?

I found the claim of JUI-F having trained the present leadership of the Pakistani Taliban (which is tribal) a little hard to swallow. But I agree with the larger context, the politicians, especially the religious parties, are nasty and dirty hypocrites for accusing the Army of ‘making’ these guys.

 

[fatman17]

COMMENT: Suicide bombers —Syed Mansoor Hussain

Whatever the Taliban ‘fellow travellers’ in the Pakistani media and public might have to say about them, they have not proven to be an effective fighting force. Their primary military strategy can be summed up in the old saw ‘he who runs away lives to fight another day’

Death is terrifying for most of us: one moment you are living a life perhaps full of fun and games, and the next moment, nothing. No wonder that from the dawn of sentience, humankind has tried to make death less terrifying. To do so, most religious systems offer some form of life after death, its quality tied into the sort of life we lead in this world.

Our system of belief is rather explicit about what life after death will be like, for the good guys as well as the bad guys. Thus the great need to be good that permeates our religious ethos. The only problem being that the good part does get a little blurry, especially under the diverse exegeses and interpretations available.

In a simple and perhaps more understandable way, death is comparable to what happens to the likes of senior bureaucrats and army generals at the end of their period in positions of power. Factota at their service, minions in the multitude awaiting their command, ‘thine wish is my command’ they insist, and yet the morning after: nobody.

Such perhaps is death, except, of course, for the jihadi. The jihadi suicide bomber is the opposite of our retiring senior bureaucrat or general. He is a nothing and a nobody but the mullah promises him that if you blow yourself up in the name of your religion, you will have everything you could possibly ask for.

While blowing one’s self up for the cause of religion is the most ‘good’ thing one can do in the mullah’s book, the one thing that I often wonder about is why all suicide bombers in our part of the world are very young men. Most, according to published reports, are either in their teens or very early twenties. I do not remember any suicide bomber that was reported to have been married with children.

That, considering the large number of very devout men of all ages in the Taliban-Al Qaeda ranks, is indeed strange. Would it then seem that the older religious militants are not really imbued with the desire for martyrdom, and that for them it is really all about things like power and money and the ‘worldly’ pleasures that they bring?

This is important in trying to figure out what it is that drives religious militancy. Most of our pro-Taliban types in the media as well as in the political parties insist that it is all about religion and the promulgation of sharia law. Now if that is indeed true then why are the most effective weapons at the disposal of these sharia ‘enforcers’, the suicide bombers, pubescent boys and post-adolescents? Where are all the older men and why are they not blowing themselves up?

Could it be that the older religious types, after having tasted the pleasures of this life, have lost some of their religious fervour? Or, as Bertrand Russell said, ‘I would never die for my beliefs because I might be wrong’. Dying for ones beliefs is of course a lot different than killing for them. Killing others, and that includes convincing others to die for you, is what happens in every political confrontation.

It seems that the Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus in Pakistan, and possibly in Afghanistan, is like any other political movement in the world: it has one purpose and that is to gain political ascendancy and control of the state apparatus. Unlike other political movements, though, this one does not have a ‘manifesto’ or plan of government except of course the ‘imposition’ of sharia law. And that is as vague as things can get.

Many would insist that Pakistan is already ruled by sharia since no laws can be made or exist that are contrary to it. The argument is of course about the interpretation of sharia, and consequently what exactly sharia means when it comes to governing a diverse country like Pakistan in the world as it exists today. But that is not an argument that religious extremists wish to join. For them there is only one sharia and that is the one they believe in.

My intention is not to discuss the intricacies of the sharia for I am clearly not qualified to do so. But I do want to talk of suicide bombings and bombers. They indeed pose a serious threat to the life and well being of ordinary citizens in Pakistan and now in Lahore. The amount of security being imposed is indeed reaching absurd levels.

Those in power seem these days to spend their lives being miserable while waiting for the next suicide bomber, hiding behind walls and barricades, literally frightened out of their ‘wits’, their fear wafting like an unpleasant miasma over my city.

Concerning the fight against the Taliban in the field, the Pakistan Army is doing a great job. Whatever the Taliban ‘fellow travellers’ in the Pakistani media and public might have to say about them, they have not proven to be an effective fighting force. Their primary military strategy can be summed up in the old saw ‘he who runs away lives to fight another day’.

But the suicide bombers are of a real and immediate concern for me. And I am convinced that they are not doing what they do in the name of Islam but rather for what they expect in the life Hereafter as promised to them by their handlers in the madrassas.

Syed Mansoor Hussain has practised and taught medicine in the US. He can be reached at smhmbbs70@yahoo.com

 

[fatman17]

South Waziristan poses harsher test for Pak Army

ISLAMABAD: After relative success against the Taliban elsewhere, the Pakistani military faces its toughest test yet – a surgical operation against the country’s most dangerous warlord in a region of harsh terrain and fierce tribal rivalries.

The target of the air and ground offensive, now in its early phases, is Baitullah Mehsud – the leader of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Baitullah is believed responsible for scores of suicide attacks – possibly including the December 2007 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

Pakistan considers Baitullah its greatest domestic threat. The US views him as a danger to its war effort in Afghanistan because his base in South Waziristan harbours Taliban fleeing across the border.

For years, Washington has pressed Islamabad to go beyond half-hearted offensives and fragile peace deals to root out the Taliban from FATA.

Now it appears Pakistan may be heeding the call following major ground operations against the Taliban in Bajaur Agency and Swat. But taking on Baitullah and his force of up to 10,000 followers in South Waziristan would likely prove tougher.

Roughly half the size of Connecticut, South Waziristan is a mountainous, underdeveloped territory. It has a leaky border with Afghanistan, barely any government infrastructure and fiercely independent, heavily armed Pashtun tribes hostile to interference by outsiders – including the Punjabi-dominated army.

Already, army officials are stressing that the operation would be limited – focusing on capturing or killing Baitullah and destroying his terror infrastructure rather than targeting other groups.

“Baitullah is the main centre of gravity. He is a leader who has declared himself the emir, the ruler of the other factions, also. He has been the main source of terrorism in Pakistan,” Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, the army’s chief spokesman, told The Associated Press.

As it ramps up its offensive, the military is trying to choke off sections of South Waziristan under Baituulah’s control. Major roads are being cleared and potential escape routes sealed off to isolate the Taliban before the army’s campaign takes off, said Abbas.

“We want to create certain effects in the area, like softening the targets, targeting their training centres, their suicide-bombing centres, and also hit hard their logistics. That will reduce their force capability,” said Abbas.

By limiting the scope of the operation, the Pakistanis hope to avoid alienating other tribes, whose support – or at least neutrality – would be crucial to eliminating Baitullah.

The key to that effort is to cut deals with other militant leaders such as Maulvi Nazir, who recently agreed to a ceasefire. Nazir’s fighters maintain a significant presence along the Afghan border and could help restrict movements of pro-Mehsud Taliban to and from Afghanistan.

“They cannot afford to alienate every single militant,” said Kamran Bokhari of STRATFOR, a private security think-tank in Austin, Texas. “The tribes, the militia leaders, they are adjusting day by day. It’s an issue of sorting out the baddies from the ones who aren’t fighting the Pakistani state.”

In February, Pakistan said it had defeated the Taliban in Bajaur after a six-month offensive, and it is now winding down a nearly three-month battle in the Swat Valley. But violence occasionally flares in Bajur – which, while also a rugged border area, is smaller than South Waziristan. And in Swat, several insurgents are believed to have fled to the hills.

Other differences add to the South Waziristan challenge. Swat does not have as strong a tribal structure, and it was legally a full-fledged part of Pakistan with government presence. Bajaur tribes are not as well off as those in Waziristan and appear more willing to work with the military, even setting up their own militias to take on the Taliban. Aside from the porous border, South Waziristan’s terrain poses other problems.

The Pakistan Army is organised and trained to fight its traditional rival, India, on the eastern plains rather than guerrillas entrenched in mountains. The army, with US assistance, is improving its counterinsurgency capabilities, but is far from being as nimble enough. Several factors have contributed to growing public anger against the Taliban, including their foray into a district just 100 kilometres from Islamabad, and a video showing Taliban militants flogging a young woman.

Whether the support would survive a long and bloody fight in South Waziristan is unclear.

Some analysts suspect the US and Pakistani governments have a secret deal allowing the US missile strikes, even though Pakistan publicly protests them, saying they anger the tribes.

Bokhari said the Pakistani military has weeks, not months, to make an impact in South Waziristan because public support for the operation could fade. Even if it never captures or kills Baitullah, the army needs to be able to say it has destroyed his network.

“Now you have momentum,” said Bokhari. “You don’t want to drag it out too long.”

ap

so much for my knee-jerk reaction! its a totally different ball-game!!!

---------- Post added at 06:35 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:32 PM ----------

Course on terrorist financing, money laundering begins

Aaj Kal Report

LAHORE: A five-day course on ‘Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering’ will begin at the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Academy in Islamabad today (Monday).

Source told Aaj Kal that 26 officers of the Interior Ministry, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), FIA and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) will take part in the course. A notification, marked with the stamp and signature of FIA Academy Commandant Capt Usman Zakria, has been circulated in the concerned departments.

 

[fatman17]

12 militants killed in SWA

Three security personnel martyred

Agencies

WANA/RAWALPINDI/MANSEHRA: At least 12 militants were killed and score others sustained injuries while three security personnel embraced shahadat on Sunday.

As many as 11 militants were killed in Sarokai of South Waziristan while 1 terrorist was killed near Churkhai. According to the sources, the security forces backed by gunship helicopters pounded militants' hideouts in Sarai, Sarokai and Maula Khan of South Waziristan leaving 11 militants dead and injuring several others. The militants were hiding in a school in Maula Khan when the security forces launched attack against them. The school was also destroyed in the operation, sources said.

According to ISPR, the security forces conducted a search operation at Churkhai Talang and Saddo Khan and destroyed five caves, killed one terrorist near Churkhai and apprehended one suspect. Security forces conducted search operation at Udagai near Takhtaband and apprehended few suspected persons for screening. Search and clearance operations were conducted in Swat and Malakand. Security forces carried out search operation at TV booster ridge near Mora Kandoa and apprehended 12 suspected terrorists. Another operation was carried out at Tangbanr near Shalpalm and three terrorists were apprehended.

A remote control bomb exploded at Levies Force vehicle near village Thana, Bakhtkhela. Resultantly 7 levies personnel were injured.

A jirga of notables of Tehsil Lal Qilla near Maidan met officials of the security forces and discussed matters related to security and administration.

Terrorists fired at security forces' check post at Dar-e-Nishter Fort. During the exchange of fire, one soldier embraced Shahadat. A bomb, planted by unidentified terrorists in Spina Thana, exploded, resultantly two soldiers embraced shahadat and two were injured.

Meanwhile, 125,397 cash cards were distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand. IDPs' return would start from Monday according to a comprehensive plan chalked out by provincial government in coordination with Special Support Group and security forces.

The militants martyred five police officers and a forestry official when they ambushed on the police van in a forested area in the Mansehra late Saturday night, police said on Sunday.

The ambush took place late Saturday in a forested area in Mansehra. A bullet-riddled body of an unidentified man was also found at the scene, police officer Rashid Khan said. The gunmen also set fire to the responding police van and took the victims' weapons, Khan said. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

fair enough but lets review the swat ops (including Buner etc). it was a conventional op barring a few high profile CI ops conducted by the SOF. the biggest mistake the taliban/militants made was confronting the PA in the "open" where they got hammered by gunships, tanks and artillery. 20,000 regulars were used in the swat campaign with ~800 SOFs.
when it came to "urban warfare" where the militants hid themselves in small villages and towns - the PA did not go after them on the ground but resorted once again to pound them with jets, gunships and artillery. the dreaded hand-to-hand and house-to-house battles never materialised as the taliban realised their mistake and fled the prized city of mingora which was captured without a real fight. there has been a lot of infrastructure destruction (which was un-avoidable) by the PA/PAF/PAA bombings.
Swat and Waziristan are not the same. I have mentioned in numerous posts that waziristan poses a different threat and I am sure the PA high command also is quite aware of these dangers. the TTP is not going to confront the PA out in the open and that is the reason the PA/PAF have resorted to hit them in the mountains, cutting off their entry and escape routes - the army will be waiting for them patiently if they come down the hills and will be eliminated.
We have to admit that the plan for waziristan is based on the premise that the army cannot commit its SOF assets (1 brigade strength) to chase the TTP in the hills and further the PA is trained to fight conventional battles and its CI capability is being ramped-up slowly. i never said that the PA completely lacks this capability.

All the stuff about Swat is valid, but my point remains - how can you conclude that the Army is not proficient in COIN when it has displayed success against an asymmetric foe both in some 'conventional engagements' and 'guerrilla engagements'?

While the Taliban did not put up much of a fight in Mingora, that does not shed any light on the proficiency or lack of on the Amy in FIBUA. Units in the SSG have trained in FIBUA for years now, and the Army has expanded the training for all units, and going by the 'We are Soldiers' documentary, the training seems quite comprehensive.

While you suggest that the Taliban in Waziristan will not come out of the hills to fight, what sort of training is needed exactly to fight them? I would imagine this is more Mountain Warfare, which is also something many PA soldiers will be familiar with given the hostility with India and deployments along the mountainous LoC and Siachen, as well as experience from fighting the insurgency in the mountains of Baluchistan.

What is so special about fighting guerrilla's in the mountains (not talking about the entire range of COIN - reconstruction etc.) that the PA is not already proficient in?

I understand equipment limitations, and I understand their strategy as has been explained in terms of wearing down the militants and possibly reducing local support for them, but I do not see justification for the argument that PA soldiers are somehow not trained enough in mountain warfare tactics given the plethora of experience we have doing exactly that.

P.S: I read the AP article, but it does not answer my questions. And I am not questioning the fact that S Waziristan is a different ball game, but the argument the PA is not 'proficient'.

 

[ajpirzada]

Committee constituted to restore industrial sector of Swat PDF Print E-mail

ISLAMABAD, Jul 13 (APP): Minister for Industries and Production, Mian Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo Monday constituted a high powered committee to restore and rebuild the industrial sector of Swat valley which has suffered massive destruction at the hands of insurgents.

“Swat Valley is rich in mineral resources and has immense potential for industrial growth”, the minister said in a statement issued here.

Most of the minerals in Swat are valuable and internationally recognized that unfortunately the menace of terrorism has played havoc with the economic progress of the valley which was right now at stand still, he added.

Wattoo said the committee will visit the area and will finalize proposals for industrial uplift in consultation with local businessmen, entrepreneurs and common people.

The minister said that Swat is rich in china clay, marble, emerald, limestone, granite, feldspar, mica, quartz, barite, pyroxenes, garnets, magnetite, tourmalines, vermiculite and kainite and all these substances posses huge industrial potential and are heavily used in production of various high end products.
Associated Press Of Pakistan ( Pakistan's Premier NEWS Agency ) - Committee constituted to restore industrial sector of Swat

 

[fatman17]

All the stuff about Swat is valid, but my point remains - how can you conclude that the Army is not proficient in COIN when it has displayed success against an asymmetric foe both in some 'conventional engagements' and 'guerrilla engagements'?

While the Taliban did not put up much of a fight in Mingora, that does not shed any light on the proficiency or lack of on the Amy in FIBUA. Units in the SSG have trained in FIBUA for years now, and the Army has expanded the training for all units, and going by the 'We are Soldiers' documentary, the training seems quite comprehensive.

While you suggest that the Taliban in Waziristan will not come out of the hills to fight, what sort of training is needed exactly to fight them? I would imagine this is more Mountain Warfare, which is also something many PA soldiers will be familiar with given the hostility with India and deployments along the mountainous LoC and Siachen, as well as experience from fighting the insurgency in the mountains of Baluchistan.

What is so special about fighting guerrilla's in the mountains (not talking about the entire range of COIN - reconstruction etc.) that the PA is not already proficient in?

I understand equipment limitations, and I understand their strategy as has been explained in terms of wearing down the militants and possibly reducing local support for them, but I do not see justification for the argument that PA soldiers are somehow not trained enough in mountain warfare tactics given the plethora of experience we have doing exactly that.

P.S: I read the AP article, but it does not answer my questions. And I am not questioning the fact that S Waziristan is a different ball game, but the argument the PA is not 'proficient'.

if we feel that 400 FC (now maybe 500) men and 1 Brigade strength of SSG (of which all cannot be committed to this front & of all the losses suffered by the PA, the SSG has borne the brunt of) is sufficient COIN capacity, capability and proficiency, then who am I to complain!.
CI trg dosnt happen overnight - it took the US army 5-6 years to ramp their COIN trg and expertise in the Iraq theater - it will take the PA probably as long to train their regular army (read infantry troopers) to be "proficient" in FIBUA/CI/COIN/Mountain warfare call it what you may.
equipment like helos, wheeled APCs, wheeled Howitzers, NVG etc is a seperate issue. for eg. one squad in the PA has 1 NVG to be shared by all !!!
N/S waziristan is once again totally different than Saichin/Kargil/LoC.

 

[fatman17]

Six Taliban killed in clash with troops in S Waziristan

* Five suspects arrested in Swat search operations

TANK/ISLAMABAD: Six Taliban were killed and 10 others seriously wounded in a clash with security forces at Rustam Adda in South Waziristan on Monday.

Local administration officials and tribal elders said the Taliban had attacked the Sur Pul checkpost near Wana. Security forces retaliated and the fighting continued for several hours, resulting in the death of six Taliban.

Political administration officials confirmed the clash, saying that several Taliban had been injured in the attack. No security personnel were martyred.

Making arrests: Meanwhile, security forces continued their search operation in parts of Swat and Malakand, arresting five suspects.

According to an update issued by the ISPR, security forces conducted search operations near Matta and Shahdono Sar, and recovered three small machine guns, two pistols, one rifle and two IEDs.

Searching the Kandla village in Utror valley near Kalam, security forces apprehended two terrorists and seized two machine guns.

app

---------- Post added at 03:41 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:39 PM ----------

‘Top Taliban commanders killed, Fazlullah injured’

* Interior minister says some pockets of dissidents still in NWFP
* Says military, civilian government coordinating to defeat Taliban in Swat

By Fazal Sher

ISLAMABAD: Several top commanders of the Taliban have been killed and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Fazlullah was among those injured during the military operation in Swat and Malakand Division, said Interior Minister Rehman Malik on Monday.

“Our security forces have successfully contained the situation and targeted the extremist commanders. Most of the top commanders were killed and Fazalullah was injured," he told reporters after addressing a ceremony held by the Islamabad Traffic Police (ITP) in connection with launching new initiatives such as the ITP FM radio channel. Discussing the situation in Swat, he said the enemies of Pakistan have been evicted from the area. However, he added, there were still some pockets of dissidents in the NWFP. “The cancer of terrorism has negatively affected both our economy and the law and order situation. Islamabad police have managed to arrest 31 people, including suicide bombers, handlers and planners, and averted six suicide attacks during the last six months. These bombers are in police custody," he added.

Coordinating efforts:

Malik said the terrorists arrested by the police belonged to South Waziristan, adding some were from Buner and Rawalpindi. To questions, he said the Pakistan Army is working for Pakistan and there is strong coordination between the military establishment and the civilian government. He said the government was maintaining a close watch over the remnants of the Taliban in Swat to ensure no untoward incident occurs in the country. All four provincial governments are doing their best to foil terrorist activities, he said. He said conspiracies against Pakistan would not succeed due to the bravery and valour of the nation’s armed forces and law enforcement agencies.

The interior minister said his ministry had launched a campaign against the spread of profane and provoking comments about the country's political leadership through email and SMS. He said they had already traced some elements responsible, adding it had been revealed that such emails were being sent through foreign countries.

 

[fatman17]

Pakistan plans air assault in Waziristan

Lauded for a 'boots on the ground' Swat Valley offensive, the country's latest strategy will likely disappoint

Islamabad — Special to The Globe and Mail

Last updated on Tuesday, Jul. 14, 2009


Pakistan's coming military operation in Waziristan will rely on air power rather than ground forces, a strategy that is unlikely to eliminate the extremists and would disappoint Western allies.

Pakistan is wrapping up an operation against Taliban militants in the Swat Valley, in the country's northwest, and will shortly commence a move against the fountainhead of the Pakistani Taliban movement in Waziristan, a part of the tribal area that lies on the Afghan border, a region that plays host to al-Qaeda commanders and is used as a safe haven by Afghan insurgents.

However, while the much-lauded Swat operation saw some 20,000 ground troops sweep across the area and surrounding districts, the plan for Waziristan is a wholly different type of military operation. It will use artillery, jet fighters and attack helicopters to pound the Islamic guerrillas, with limited use of "boots on the ground" in the treacherous terrain of Waziristan, where the Taliban are deeply entrenched in mountainous landscape that strongly favours guerrilla warfare.

U.S. pilotless drone aircraft, armed with missiles and sophisticated technology to home in on individuals, are likely to also be used to augment the Pakistani air power.

Such an operation is unlikely to destroy the enemy, analysts believe, and it will leave in place some Taliban warlords that international forces in Afghanistan regard as a significant cross-border threat. It will also raise questions about the seriousness of Pakistan's fight against insurgents after the country won international praise for its efforts in Swat.

"The nature of the operation is totally different to what we did in Swat," said a senior Pakistani security official, who could not be named because of the sensitivity of the issue. "It is just blocking the entrance. Nothing goes in, nothing comes out. We'll keep punishing [the enemy] with long arms, air [power], cobra [helicopters].

"The tactics have been reversed. Initially they [the Taliban] used to wear us out, now the army is planning to wear them out."

The operation is limited to the South Waziristan area, leaving alone North Waziristan, even though it is also controlled by Taliban. In South Waziristan, the offensive is aimed solely at the large area controlled by warlord Baitullah Mehsud, head of the main faction of the Pakistani Taliban. Already, ground forces have been sent to surround the area.

"Waziristan is a management issue, a containment issue, even during British [colonial] times. It has never been controlled," said Khalid Aziz, chairman of the Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training, an independent think tank in Peshawar. "Any commander with any sense would not use ground troops - you'd be entrapped. Waziristan can swallow six or seven [army] divisions."

The aim of the South Waziristan move is to "disrupt" and "punish" Mr. Mehsud's network, not to get embroiled in a ground battle that risks escalation and would probably result in significant casualties among soldiers. Ground troops would be used for "search and cordon" incursions against high-value targets - Mr. Mehsud and his senior commanders.

Pakistani jets have been pounding militants positions now for almost four weeks in South Waziristan. There has also been a marked increase in the use of U.S. drone aircraft, seemingly co-ordinated with Pakistan, to target Mr. Mehsud's group, killing dozens.

"There are no plans to extend the operation into North Waziristan," the army's chief spokesman, Major-General Athar Abbas, told a news briefing in Islamabad last week. "The operation in South Waziristan is against a terrorist group, not against a tribe or an agency [area]."

Last month, the perils of operating in Waziristan were again laid bare, when a Pakistan army convoy was ambushed in North Waziristan while passing through a valley, resulting in the death of at least 23 soldiers. It was moving through an area controlled by a supposedly "friendly" Taliban warlord, Gul Bahadur.

"If it's not going to be a ground-forces operation, then the foot soldiers of the Taliban will remain. They have to go in, quickly and efficiently, do the job, and then pull out to re-establish the civilian writ," said Javed Husain, a retired brigadier formerly with the Special Services Group, a Pakistani commando unit. "It's a ridiculous thought that air power [alone] can win it."

News - The Globe and Mail

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

if we feel that 400 FC (now maybe 500) men and 1 Brigade strength of SSG (of which all cannot be committed to this front & of all the losses suffered by the PA, the SSG has borne the brunt of) is sufficient COIN capacity, capability and proficiency, then who am I to complain!.
CI trg dosnt happen overnight - it took the US army 5-6 years to ramp their COIN trg and expertise in the Iraq theater - it will take the PA probably as long to train their regular army (read infantry troopers) to be "proficient" in FIBUA/CI/COIN/Mountain warfare call it what you may.
equipment like helos, wheeled APCs, wheeled Howitzers, NVG etc is a seperate issue. for eg. one squad in the PA has 1 NVG to be shared by all !!!
N/S waziristan is once again totally different than Saichin/Kargil/LoC.

Fatman,

Do we only have SSG deployed along the LoC, Siachen and chasing insurgents in the mountains of Baluchistan?

If not then I would argue that there are plenty of non-SSG troops familiar with mountain warfare.

As far as FIBUA, yes I agree that it will take time to get a significant part of the Army trained, but the whole point of this discussion was the assumption that in Wazristan the Taliban were not going to be putting up any 'conventional military' defense, and would run to the mountains.

If so, then the debate comes back to why you think the PA lacks in mountain warfare 'proficiency'.

The whole discussion over COIN (in terms of all of the requirements - local trust, development, security etc.) is a different one - the US, for all its experience in Iraq, has been unable to translate that into success against the insurgency in Afghanistan, so one could argue that neither the US nor Pakistan are very 'proficient' in COIN.

But I am speaking more to the tactics and strategy required to win military victories in the mountains - is the lack of 'proficiency' here more a function of inadequate equipment and resources, or training and experience?

If the latter, what exactly are we looking at, and why, given our experience in Mountain warfare?

 

[blain2]

if we feel that 400 FC (now maybe 500) men and 1 Brigade strength of SSG (of which all cannot be committed to this front & of all the losses suffered by the PA, the SSG has borne the brunt of) is sufficient COIN capacity, capability and proficiency, then who am I to complain!.
CI trg dosnt happen overnight - it took the US army 5-6 years to ramp their COIN trg and expertise in the Iraq theater - it will take the PA probably as long to train their regular army (read infantry troopers) to be "proficient" in FIBUA/CI/COIN/Mountain warfare call it what you may.
equipment like helos, wheeled APCs, wheeled Howitzers, NVG etc is a seperate issue. for eg. one squad in the PA has 1 NVG to be shared by all !!!
N/S waziristan is once again totally different than Saichin/Kargil/LoC.

FM,

At least FIBUA training is not limited to SSG/FC only. Over the past 2 years, almost all of the PA infantry battalions have rotated through FIBUA training. In my opinion its a mistake when CI is linked with FIBUA. The two are different things. First one requires a mindset change and this is what takes time (PA is going through this phase currently). The FIBUA training module is like any other conventional training. You have procedures, tactics etc. all laid out and the troops have to be put through the course and then you run refresher courses. There are a lot more FIBUA ranges built in Pakistan than before (I was aware of the one for the SSG in the mid 90s).

The COIN piece is more tricky. This is what will take time but from a public affairs standpoint, PA has done a commendable job in Swat.

On the issue of equipment, its a question of funding and supply. As more NVGs become available, they will be allocated accordingly.

 

[Elmo]

But I am speaking more to the tactics and strategy required to win military victories in the mountains - is the lack of 'proficiency' here more a function of inadequate equipment and resources, or training and experience? If the latter, what exactly are we looking at, and why, given our experience in Mountain warfare?

Strictly speaking about mountain warfare, there is a deficiency on all four counts, which both the PA and FC face.

For instance, a significant basis of mountain warfare involves securing heights. You don't have enough aircraft to airlift troops (equipment), but before that you need intelligence (resources) which is not forthcoming either. Besides a sizeable number of strategic hilltops that need to be secured are populated and you can't carpet bomb them to secure them. You have to be careful about civilian casualties as well — Pakistan Army has significant experience in operating in plain areas but not in mountainous terrain (hence lack of training and resources). Indeed most of the army's focus is on defending its eastern borders, which is plain.

We did inherit a pamphlet the Frontier Mountain Warfare from the British and it has been amended and refined from time to time. According to it, mountain warfare involves high altitude, placing your machines and weapons on terrains, war of ambushes, fighting, blocking avenues so that the insurgent surrenders. It’s a totally different war that you would fight when you are fighting on ground.

Lastly, the insurgent is twice as skilled as a regular army man in such warfare. He is the first fighter on his own terrain, much better than anybody else. We saw this in Waziristan and we are seeing this in Malakand as well.

 

[blain2]

Fatman,

Do we only have SSG deployed along the LoC, Siachen and chasing insurgents in the mountains of Baluchistan?

AM, SSG is employed as and where needed. SSG is not used in the role of regular infantry which sits and holds positions. Siachen was the only case where SSG had maintained a limited presence in the past, currently SSG elements may or may not be at Siachen due to the relative peace presently.

If not then I would argue that there are plenty of non-SSG troops familiar with mountain warfare.

The entire FCNA is a Mountain Warfare capable/equipped formation. So the problem for well trained, acclimatized troops is not the issue. It has more to do with what the achievable goals are vs. the losses you are willing to incur.

As far as FIBUA, yes I agree that it will take time to get a significant part of the Army trained, but the whole point of this discussion was the assumption that in Wazristan the Taliban were not going to be putting up any 'conventional military' defense, and would run to the mountains.

I think the Army is trained in FIBUA and we know this based on the way the entire Infantry has been schooled and put through courses along with AC people. COIN is something that will take time but the Army has done a pretty decent job in Swat at least.

If so, then the debate comes back to why you think the PA lacks in mountain warfare 'proficiency'.

PA does not lack in Mountain Warfare proficiency. We probably have as much or more experience in Mountain warfare than anyone around.

The whole discussion over COIN (in terms of all of the requirements - local trust, development, security etc.) is a different one - the US, for all its experience in Iraq, has been unable to translate that into success against the insurgency in Afghanistan, so one could argue that neither the US nor Pakistan are very 'proficient' in COIN.

But I am speaking more to the tactics and strategy required to win military victories in the mountains - is the lack of 'proficiency' here more a function of inadequate equipment and resources, or training and experience?

If the latter, what exactly are we looking at, and why, given our experience in Mountain warfare?

Not all Mountain warfare is similar. What we face around the LoC and at Siachen is very different from the types of operations needed in FATA. In FATA, you do not know who the enemy is. Secondly, its so vast and sparsely populated that you cannot be looking everywhere and have presence everywhere. Besides helicopters, you have no other way of getting to and from because any other mode of transport would take a very long time. In FATA, the key is to keep the other side suppressed. Not let them train and build out training camps. For this you need ISR and human intelligence and then use assets in the air and limited numbers on the ground to take action against them. Conducting search and destroy type of operations in FATA is fairly impractical simply because you have to use a large # of troops for this and secondly, Pakistan is fairly limited in terms of transport.

The focus should be on tribal resurgence. Giving the tribes backing and resources to face off with the militants and then letting them take over the security of the area while ensuring that we keep an eye on the area for training camps etc.

 

[Patriot]

PA Units stationed at Kashmir side are certainly not trained to fight in Plain Areas so i am sure they have considerable exp in Mountain Warfare.