Offensive in Swat boon or bane for Taliban?
By Zaffar Abbas
Wednesday, 13 May, 2009
MondayS suicide attack that killed and maimed a large number of people at a paramilitary checkpost in Darra Adamkhel was not entirely unexpected. Perhaps the only surprising element was its timing and location.
Civilian and military authorities had been bracing themselves for a series of retaliatory attacks by the militants, mostly in the form of suicide bombings at security installations, ever since the launch of the offensive in the Malakand region.
In the past, extremists associated with the outlawed Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of Baitullah Mehsud have been quick to hit back as a riposte to military operations in Swat and its adjoining areas and/or in Waziristan.
On this occasion, they not only waited but also appear to have chosen a target randomly. But this does not mean that in the days to come, especially when the military offensive in Swat is expected to pick up pace, there wont be more targeted retaliatory attacks.
In fact, if the TTPs claim of involvement in Mondays bombing is true, it could mark the beginning of a fresh series of attacks. While this may not be a surprise to those who have been keeping an eye on the growing militancy in the troubled Fata-Malakand region, what has puzzled them was the absence of a justifiable reason for a rather belated response by the militants.
Is it indicative of the weakening of the militants organisational structure or hints at possible differences between the TTPs main leaders and Maulana Fazlullahs Swati fighters? Or was it because until now the Pakistani Taliban have not viewed the current Malakand operation as a real threat to their existence, and have only just realised that this time the army means business.
Baitullah Mehsud is still regarded as the biggest and the most powerful of the tribal militants who wants to be recognised as leader of the united Taliban movement in the country.
However, to date he has mostly preferred to go with a loosely-knit grouping in the form of TTP, with a number of mainstream and splinter groups within Fata, NWFP and Punjab as its affiliates. But it cannot be regarded as a united, monolithic, entity.
Even his earlier attempts to bring other major tribal militant factions, including the one led by his one-time rival Mullah Nazir, from within Waziristan, under one umbrella was not very effective.
Experts believe there are about 12 militant outfits in the Fata region that are either closely associated with Baitullah Mehsuds TTP, or have some kind of loose arrangement to operate in their respective tribal territories.
His support was further increased following his decision to either back or own the militant groups involved in sectarian violence, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and those involved in the Kurram agency.
Among the so-called Punjabi Taliban who have used Swat and the Mehsud territory either as their operational base or as sanctuary or to provide support to local militants are mostly breakaway or splintered factions of some of the pro-Kashmir jihadi organisations or sectarian groups.
These networks include the Ilyas Kashmiri group, Badar Mansoor group, Qari Zafar group and Asmatullah Mauavia group. Almost all of them also have a loose operational arrangement with Baitullah Mehsud.
Commander Nazir and some of the leading groups in North Waziristan, including that of Siraj Haqqani or Gulbuddin Hekmatyars Hizbe Islami and others operate on their own, mostly concentrating on operations in Afghanistan, and generally follow a policy of live and let live with Mehsuds band.
FOREIGN GROUPS
Among the foreign militants, the biggest group is still believed to be that of the Uzbeks, who are associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) of Qari Tahir Yaldashev.
Since they were cornered in and driven out by Wanas main militant leader, Commander Nazir from the Waziri territory, they have been given refuge by Baitullah Mehsud.
Recently Yaldashev also issued a message through a DVD, calling for attacks on Pakistani security personnel, thus making it clear that his movement was not just about Uzbekistan but was working on al Qaedas overall goal.
Among the other foreign militant groups are networks of some number of isolated Chechens, Libyan Islamic Group and Chinese Uighar militants from East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Members of ETIM are largely believed to be dormant in the area since the last beating they got about a year ago.
The Arab militants, mostly from Yemen, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, are directly associated with al Qaeda, but during the last one year or so they have not been able to work as a coherent force.
Estimates of their strength in the tribal areas have also remained vague. Intelligence assessments of both the western and Pakistani governments are that since the operational head of al Qaeda for Pakistan, Usama Al-Kini aka Azmarai, was taken out in one of the drone attacks, one Abdullah Sudani appears to be in charge.
But it cant be said with certainty who this person is and if hes actually providing effective leadership to the Pakistan wing of the pan-Islamic terror network.
Assessments also suggest that though Baitullah Mehsud has kept some kind of an ideological and material link with the Swati Taliban, Maulana Fazlullahs group not only remains Malakand-centric, but has so far tried to maintain a distinct identity of its own.
And this has been the cause of friction between the two sides, as despite Baitullahs best efforts, Fazlullah has not been prepared to weaken his own direct control over the 4,000-odd Swati militants.
So much so that he was not even prepared to lower his guard on the request of the founding leader of the Malakands Sharia movement, Sufi Mohammad.
Some of his leading commanders active in Swat, Dir and Buner include Mufti Aftab, Shah Duran, Muslim Khan, Sheikh Rahim, Mehmood and a few others. They also have clear links with Bajaurs most wanted militant Maulvi Faqir, and certainly with leaders of some splinter factions of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, who have either used Fazlullah- controlled territories as a safe haven or use their expertise to train local militants in guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism.
Experts are still trying to assess the significance of the Darra Adamkhel bombing in terms of inter-militant relationship in the Taliban-infested region of Fata and Malakand.
It is being said that if the suicide attack was really part of an organised retaliation by the TTP, it means Baitaullah Mehsud has decided to put aside his differences with the Swati Taliban because he was viewing the current military operation as a major threat to the militant movement in the tribal region.
Security experts believe that although there is evidence to suggest that most of the tribal or foreign militants groups have tried to benefit from each others resources and expertise, they are neither a united lot nor have similar aims and objectives or philosophy.
While it may look a bit far-fetched at this stage, the thought troubling the counter-terrorism experts is that the rapidly changing ground reality and the battle for survival may create a more direct nexus even a unified command between al Qaeda, Taliban and local networks of militant groups.
Thats why they say so much hinges on the fate of the current Swat operation. If it is able to break the back of the militants quickly, demoralisation may set in the ranks of the Taliban.
Otherwise, they may take heart from the situation and perhaps unify their command structure and better coordinate efforts.
