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Operation Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan)

19 militants, six soldiers killed in SWA clashes
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Seven militants, four soldiers die in Bajaur
By Irfan Burki & Daud Khattak


WANA/PESHAWAR: Continuing their advance from three sides on the Taliban strongholds of Srarogha, Ladha and Makeen on the 10th day of the operation Rah-e-Nijat, security forces claimed killing 19 more terrorists in three separate clashes on Monday.

Six Army soldiers embraced Shahadat while 20 others suffered injuries in the fighting in Gharlai, Sarwek, Shaga and Sharkai Sar areas. Independent confirmation of the casualty toll was not possible as the conflict zone had been under curfew for the past 10 days and communication links had been snapped.

In an apparent bid to mount pressure on the government and security forces to divert focus from Waziristan, militants attacked a security post in Bajaur Agency, the stronghold of banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) deputy chief Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, and killed four security personnel in Matak village. Officials said seven militants were killed in retaliatory fire by security forces.

Thousands of people have been displaced from areas inhabited by the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan and taken refuge in parts of the neighbouring North Waziristan Agency as well as Tank and Dera Ismail Khan districts.

In their advance from three sides over the past 10 days, security forces have captured Kotkai, the village of the TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud and his cousin and suicide bombers’ master trainer Qari Hussain, along with Sherwangai, Nawazkot, Chalweshtai and some key ridges. However, the troops faced tough resistance on the 10th day in their advance towards the Taliban stronghold of Srarogha.

Tribal sources said an estimated 10,000 militants, mostly local tribesmen and some foreigners — Uzbek fighters — had gone into the mountains following the launch of the military operation on October 17. They were preparing for tough battle in the mountains, forests and narrow passes, said security officials, who expected fierce fighting in the days ahead.

The sources said a fierce clash took place when the Taliban tried to block the way of advancing troops near Srarogha. Small and heavy weapons were used in the fighting that caused casualties on both sides. Military officials said 10 militants were killed in the clash which also claimed the lives of six Army soldiers. Another 14 soldiers sustained injuries and were evacuated with the help of military helicopters.

Giving details of the advance made by security forces on the 10th day of the operation Rah-e-Nijat, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said the troops secured the Kazhakas area on the road leading to Inzar Killay and Srarogha. The troops also secured Gharlai village on Kotkai-Srarogha road.

On Shakai-Kaniguram axis, the ISPR said the troops surrounded Sarwek village, one kilometre north of Chalweshtai, and secured the surrounding ridges. Seven militants were killed and five soldiers injured in the operation in the same zone.

From the Razmak side, security forces claimed securing the village of Shaga and Sharakai Sar in the Nawazkot area. Two militants were killed and one soldier injured in the operation. The ISPR said the soldier was injured from sniper fire at Sharkai Sar.

The political administration officials said the troops had secured Moomi Karam and Sarwek villages after getting control of Chalweshtai. They said the troops would be able to reach and control the strategic peaks of Asman Manza and Karwan Manza in next two days.

Locals said almost all people had left Sarwekai and Ladha Tehsils. Only a small number of people had stayed behind to guard their houses and belongings, said tribesmen arriving in Dera Ismail Khan and Tank.

Sources said some militants had crossed into neighbouring Orakzai Agency and the fighter planes bombed some hideouts of the militants there, but there were no reports about the casualties.

In Bajaur, militants attacked a security post in Matak village in Charmang Tehsil and killed four soldiers. In retaliatory fire, security forces killed six attackers, local officials said.Militants have once again stepped up attacks in Bajaur, where security forces had conducted a massive air and ground operation in August 2008. Thousands of people were displaced from Bajaur and majority of them are still living in two camps in Katcha Garhi in Peshawar and Jalozai in Nowshera district.

19 militants, six soldiers killed in SWA clashes
 
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Around 200,000 people flee South Waziristan

ISLAMABAD: Around 200,000 people have been displaced since August from South Waziristan, where Pakistan Army launched an anti-Taliban offensive 10 days ago, the military said on Monday. “As of today, 26,165 families have been registered,” Colonel Waseem Shahid said, adding the army used a working average of eight members to each family. Tensions have soared between the incoming families and locals who consider the displaced Mehsuds of South Waziristan a security threat. The Red Cross warned last week that relief workers were being kept out of South Waziristan and that the civilian toll is believed to be mounting.

afp
 
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“”Around 200,000 people have been displaced since August from South Waziristan, where Pakistan Army launched an anti-Taliban offensive 10 days ago, the military said on Monday.””
“”The Red Cross warned last week that relief workers were being kept out of South Waziristan and that the civilian toll is believed to be mounting””.

While we are waging a phony war on Pakistani soil to convince our boss the USA that we are “Doing More”, and conquering our own territory racking up needless casualties; the plight of the civilian population has been deliberately kept out of public view.

We are daily treated to the dog and pony show of visiting Army commanders “encouraging the troops on the frontline”; they do not exhibit the basic courtesy to visit the displaced population and do something to alleviate their misery.

Our commanders claim that FATA people once held as hostage are being “rescued”; but these “rescued” people flee the area rather than living under the bountiful mercy of their “saviors”.

If the situation in “liberated” areas of Swat and Bajaur is any indication, we are in for a long haul amidst a permanently alienated population. Then we wonder what breeds and nurtures terrorism!
 
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Pakistan: The South Waziristan Migration


By Scott Stewart

Pakistan has been a busy place over the past few weeks. The Pakistani armed forces have been conducting raids and airstrikes against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other foreign Islamist fighters in Bajaur Agency, a district inside Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), while wrapping up their preparations for a major military offensive into South Waziristan. The United States has conducted several successful missile attacks targeting militants hiding in areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border using unmanned aerial vehicles.

Threatened by these developments -- especially the actions of the Pakistani military -- the TTP and its allies have struck back. They have used larger, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in attacks close to their bases in the Pakistani badlands to conduct mass-casualty attacks against soft targets in Peshawar and the Swat Valley. They have also used small arms and small suicide devices farther from their bases to attack targets in the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad, the respective seats of Pakistan's military and civilian power.

Initially, we considered devoting this week's Security and Intelligence Report to discussing the tactical details of the Oct. 10 attack against the Pakistani army headquarters. But after taking a closer look at that attack, and the bigger mosaic it occurred within, we decided to focus instead on something that has not received much attention in the media -- namely, how the coming Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan is going to have a heavy impact on the militants currently living and training there. In fact, we can expect the Pakistani offensive to cause a large displacement of militants. Of course, many of the militants who are forced to flee from South Waziristan, the epicenter of Pakistan's insurgency, will likely land in areas not too far away -- like Balochistan -- but at least some of the militants who will be flushed out of South Waziristan will land in places far from Pakistan's FATA and North-West Frontier Province.

The Coming Offensive

The Pakistani military has been preparing for the coming offensive into South Waziristan for months. They have positioned two divisions with some 28,000 troops for the attack, and this force will be augmented by paramilitary forces and local tribal militias loyal to Islamabad. As seen by the Pakistani offensives in Swat and Bajaur earlier this year, the TTP and its foreign allies are no match for the Pakistani military when it turns its full resources to address the problem.

The Pakistanis previously attempted a halfhearted offensive in South Waziristan in March of 2004 that only lasted 12 days before they fell back and reached a "negotiated peace settlement" with the militant leaders in the area. A negotiated peace settlement is a diplomatic way of saying that the Pakistanis attempted to pay off Pakistani Taliban leaders like Nek Mohammed to hand over the foreign militants in South Waziristan and stop behaving badly. The large cash settlements given to the militants did little to ensure peace and instead allowed the Taliban leaders to buy more weapons, pay their troops and essentially solidify their control in their areas of operation. The Taliban resumed their militant activities shortly after receiving their payments (though the most prominent leader, Nek Mohammed, was killed in a U.S. missile strike in June 2004).

This time, the South Waziristan offensive will be far different than it was in 2004. Not only do the Pakistanis have more than four times as many army troops committed to it, but the Pakistani military has learned that if it uses its huge airpower advantage and massed artillery, it can quickly rout any serious TTP resistance. In Bajaur, the Pakistanis used airstrikes and artillery to literally level positions (and even some towns) where the Taliban had tried to dig in and make a stand. Additionally, in January 2008, the Pakistani army conducted a successful offensive in South Waziristan called "Operation Zal Zala" (Earthquake) that made excellent progress and resulted in the loss of only eight soldiers in four days of intense fighting. This offensive was stopped only because Baitullah Mehsud and his confederates sued for peace -- a truce that they quickly violated.

The lessons of past military operations and broken truces in South Waziristan, when combined with the recent TTP strikes against targets like the army headquarters, have served to steel the will of the government (and particularly the military). Pakistani government sources tell STRATFOR that they have the intent and the ability to "close the case for good." This means that there should be no negotiated settlement with the TTP this time.

Of course, we are not the only people who can anticipate this happening. The TTP and others like the al Qaeda core leadership know all too well what happened in Bajaur and Swat. They have also been watching the Pakistani military prepare for the South Waziristan offensive for months now. The TTP leadership realizes that if they attempt to stand and fight the Pakistani military toe-to-toe they will be cut to shreds. Because of this, we believe that the TTP will adopt a strategy similar to that used by the Taliban in the face of overwhelming U.S. airpower following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, or that of the Iraqi military following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Rather than fight in set-piece conventional battles to the bitter end and be destroyed, after some initial resistance the TTP's fighters will seek to melt away into the population and then conduct insurgent and terrorist strikes against the Pakistani military, both in the tribal regions and in Pakistan's core regions. This is also the approach the TTP leadership took to the Pakistani offensive in Swat and Bajaur. They made noises about standing and fighting in places like Mingora. In the end, however, they melted away in the face of the military's offensive and most of the militants escaped.


Contrary to popular perception, the area along the Afghan-Pakistani border is fairly heavily populated. The terrain is extremely rugged, but there are millions of Pakistanis living in the FATA, and many of them are extremely conservative and hostile toward the Pakistani government. This hostile human terrain poses perhaps a more significant obstacle to the Pakistani military's operations to root out jihadists than the physical terrain. Accurate and current population numbers are hard to obtain, but the government of Pakistan estimated the population of South Waziristan to be nearly 500,000 in 1998, although it is believed to be much larger than that today. There are also an estimated 1.7 million Afghan refugees living on the Pakistani side of the border. This human terrain should enable many of the TTP's Pashtun fighters to melt into the landscape and live to fight another day. Indeed, the militants are already heavily embedded in the population of South Waziristan, and the TTP and its rivals have controlled much of the area for several years now.

We have seen reports that up to 200,000 people have already fled areas of South Waziristan in anticipation of the coming military operation, and it is highly likely that some TTP fighters and foreign militants have used this flow of displaced people as camouflage to leave the region just as they did in Swat and Bajaur. Whether the coming offensive is as successful in destroying the TTP as our sources assure us it will be, the military action will undoubtedly force even more militants to leave South Waziristan.

The Camps

In the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the many militant training camps run by al Qaeda and other organizations in Afghanistan were destroyed. Many of the foreign jihadists who were at these camps fled to Pakistan with the Taliban, though others fled to Iran, Iraq or elsewhere. This migration shifted the focus of jihadist training efforts to Pakistan, and South Waziristan in particular. Quite simply, there are thousands of foreign jihadists who have traveled to Pakistan to receive paramilitary training at these camps to fight in Afghanistan. A smaller number of the trainees have received advanced training in terrorist tradecraft, such as bombmaking, in the camps.

Due to the presence of these transplanted training installations, South Waziristan is "jihadist central," with jihadists of all stripes based in the area. This confluence will complicate Islamabad's attempts to distinguish between "good" and "bad" Taliban elements. Both the good Taliban aligned with Islamabad that carry out their operations in Afghanistan and the bad Taliban fighting against Islamabad are based in South Waziristan, and telling the difference between the two factions on the battlefield will be difficult -- though undoubtedly elements of Pakistani intelligence will attempt to help their Taliban friends (like the Haqqani network and Mullah Omar's network) avoid being caught up in the coming confrontation.

There are literally thousands of Arab, Uzbek, Uighur, Chechen, African and European militants currently located in the Pakistani badlands, and a good number of them are in South Waziristan. Many of these foreigners are either teaching at or enrolled in the jihadist training camps. These foreigners are going to find it far harder to hide from the Pakistani military by seeking refuge in Afghan refugee camps or small tribal villages than their Pashtun brethren.

Some of these foreigners will attempt to find shelter in North Waziristan, or perhaps in more heavily -- and more heterogeneously -- populated areas like Quetta (Mullah Omar's refuge) or Peshawar. Others may try to duck into the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, but there is a good chance that many of these foreign militants will be forced to leave the Pakistan-Afghanistan area to return home or seek refuge elsewhere.

This exodus will have mixed results. On one hand it will serve to weaken the international jihadist movement by retarding its ability to train new jihadists until replacement camps can be established elsewhere, perhaps by expanding existing facilities in Yemen or Africa. On the other hand, it will force hundreds of people trained in terrorist tradecraft to find a new place to live -- and operate. In some ways, this migration could mirror what happened after the number of foreign jihadist began to be dramatically reduced in Iraq -- except then, many of the foreigners could be redirected to Pakistan for training and Afghanistan to fight. There is no comparable second theater now to attract these foreign fighters. This means that many of them may end up returning home to join insurgent movements in smaller theaters, such as Chechnya, Somalia, Algeria and Central Asia.

Those with the ability and means could travel to other countries where they can use their training to organize militant cells for terrorist attacks in much the same way the foreign fighters who fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and left after the fall of the Soviet-backed government there went on to fight in places like Bosnia and Chechnya and formed the nucleus of al Qaeda and the current international jihadist movement.

The Next Generation

There is a big qualitative difference between the current crop of international fighters in South Waziristan and those who fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s. During the earlier conflict, the foreigners were tolerated, but in general they were not seen by their Afghan counterparts as being particularly valiant or effective (though the Afghans did appreciate the cash and logistical help they provided). In many engagements the foreigners were kept out of harm's way and saw very little intense combat, while in some cases the foreign fighters were essentially used as cannon fodder.

The perception of the foreigners began to change during the 1990s, and units of foreigners acquitted themselves well as they fought alongside Taliban units against the Northern Alliance. Also, following the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the foreign jihadists have proved themselves to be very effective at conducting terrorist attacks and operating in hostile territory.

In fact, over the past several years, we have witnessed a marked change in the ways the Afghan Taliban fight. They have abandoned some of their traditional armed assault tactics and have begun to employ al Qaeda-influenced roadside IED attacks and suicide bombings -- attacks the Afghan fighters had previously considered "unmanly." It is no mere coincidence that the number of suicide attacks and roadside IED attacks in Afghanistan increased dramatically after al Qaeda began to withdraw its forces from Iraq. There is also a direct correlation between the IED technology developed and used in Iraq and that now being employed by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

All this experience in designing and manufacturing IEDs in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan means that the jihadist bombmakers of today are more highly skilled than ever, and they have been sharing their experience with foreign students at training camps in places like South Waziristan. Furthermore, the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has provided a great laboratory in which jihadists can perfect their terrorist tradecraft. A form of "tactical Darwinism" has occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan as coalition firepower has weeded out most of the inept jihadist operatives. Only the strong and cunning have survived, leaving a core of hardened, competent militants. These survivors have created new tactics and have learned to manufacture new types of highly effective IEDs -- technology that has already shown up in places like Algeria and Somalia. They have been permitted to impart the knowledge they have gained to another generation of young aspiring militants through training camps in places like South Waziristan.

As these foreign militants scatter to the four winds, they will be taking their skills with them. Judging from past waves of jihadist fighters, they will probably be found participating in future plots in many different parts of the world. And also judging from past cases, they will likely not participate in these plots alone.

As we have discussed in the past, the obvious weakness of the many grassroots jihadist cells that have been uncovered is their lack of terrorist tradecraft. They have the intent to do harm but not the ability, and many times the grassroots cells end up finding a government informant as they seek help acquiring weapons or constructing IEDs. When these inept "Kramer terrorists" manage to get linked up with a trained terrorist operative, they can cause considerable damage.

The possibility of these militants conducting attacks or bringing much-needed capability to grassroots cells means that the South Waziristan migration, which has almost certainly already begun, will give counterterrorism officials from Boston to Beijing something to worry about for the foreseeable future.

Pakistan: The South Waziristan Migration | STRATFOR
This article is from stratfor so i think it provide significant insight into whats happening in SWA
 
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Fred Kagan, Charles Szrom, and Rezi Jan of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) have weighed in with what I believe might be the first American analysis of Rah-e-Nijat-

Pakistan Shows Mettle in Waziristan Center For Defense Studies

Here is the full PDF analysis for week one of the operation-

The War In Waziristan: Week 1 Analysis of Operation Rah-e-Nijat-IranTracker

Meanwhile, Jane Perlez of the NYT offers this in today's paper-

Pressure From U.S. Strains Ties With Pakistan-NYT Oct. 27, 2009

What's most interesting about Perlez's article is the indication that the objective of this latest operation is essentially punative with no indication that the P.A. intends to "hold, build, and develop". Further and most important, the article suggests that clear may only apply to clearing away a militia leadership and finding new leaders more malleable to Pakistan's near-eternal objectives of proxy war in Afghanistan-

"In all, of the roughly 28,000 soldiers, there are probably about 11,000 army infantrymen, said Javed Hussain, a retired Pakistani Army brigadier. Instead of a ratio of one to one, he said, the ratio should be at least five to one.

The army appeared to have no plans to occupy South Waziristan, but rather to cut the militants 'to size,' said Tariq Fatemi, who served briefly as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States in 1999.

With the uncertainty of American plans in Afghanistan, and the strong sentiment in Pakistan that India was 'up to no good' in the restive province of Baluchistan and the tribal areas, Mr. Fatemi said, the army would not abandon the militant groups that it has relied on to fight as proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir against India.

The goal in South Waziristan, Mr. Fatemi said, was to eliminate the leadership that had become 'too big of their boots' with the attacks on Pakistan’s cities. The army would like to find more pliant replacements as leaders, he said."


Now please don't go looking to kill Ms. Perlez for the words of your own Fatemi and Hussain.

I remain stunned, however, by the naivete displayed by our senior leadership-

"When Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton arrives in Pakistan this week, as she is scheduled to do, she will find a nuclear-armed state consumed by doubts about the value of the alliance with the United States and resentful of ever-rising American demands to do more, the officials said."

She'd do well to save the American tax-payer the expense of her entourage and herself, instead focusing their perceptions analysis right here at this board.

I do, modestly, a superb job of bringing Pakistani feelings right up to the visible surface without noticably deviating from generally-stated American objectives. As such and if correct, the feelings expressed HERE are an accurate reflection of what she'll travel 6,000 miles at great expense to hear.

Never before has this board, IMHO, had more value and it would do our S. Asian desk at the Dept. of State well to monitor this activity and even join their PRC representatives from the foreign ministry in conducting our own psych-ops campaign.

What a laugh that would be...:lol:

Enjoy.

Thanks.:usflag:
 
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Never before has this board, IMHO, had more value and it would do our S. Asian desk at the Dept. of State well to monitor this activity and even join their PRC representatives from the foreign ministry in conducting our own psych-ops campaign.

So, S-2 are you able to "out" the PDF members here who are really USA government agents engaged in psych-ops? I assume they are too sophisticated to display US flags (;)) ..... What "false" flags do they carry?
 
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Fred Kagan, Charles Szrom, and Rezi Jan of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) have weighed in with what I believe might be the first American analysis of Rah-e-Nijat-

Pakistan Shows Mettle in Waziristan Center For Defense Studies

Here is the full PDF analysis for week one of the operation-

The War In Waziristan: Week 1 Analysis of Operation Rah-e-Nijat-IranTracker

Meanwhile, Jane Perlez of the NYT offers this in today's paper-

Pressure From U.S. Strains Ties With Pakistan-NYT Oct. 27, 2009

What's most interesting about Perlez's article is the indication that the objective of this latest operation is essentially punative with no indication that the P.A. intends to "hold, build, and develop". Further and most important, the article suggests that clear may only apply to clearing away a militia leadership and finding new leaders more malleable to Pakistan's near-eternal objectives of proxy war in Afghanistan-

"In all, of the roughly 28,000 soldiers, there are probably about 11,000 army infantrymen, said Javed Hussain, a retired Pakistani Army brigadier. Instead of a ratio of one to one, he said, the ratio should be at least five to one.

The army appeared to have no plans to occupy South Waziristan, but rather to cut the militants 'to size,' said Tariq Fatemi, who served briefly as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States in 1999.

With the uncertainty of American plans in Afghanistan, and the strong sentiment in Pakistan that India was 'up to no good' in the restive province of Baluchistan and the tribal areas, Mr. Fatemi said, the army would not abandon the militant groups that it has relied on to fight as proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir against India.

The goal in South Waziristan, Mr. Fatemi said, was to eliminate the leadership that had become 'too big of their boots' with the attacks on Pakistan’s cities. The army would like to find more pliant replacements as leaders, he said."


Now please don't go looking to kill Ms. Perlez for the words of your own Fatemi and Hussain.

I remain stunned, however, by the naivete displayed by our senior leadership-

"When Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton arrives in Pakistan this week, as she is scheduled to do, she will find a nuclear-armed state consumed by doubts about the value of the alliance with the United States and resentful of ever-rising American demands to do more, the officials said."

She'd do well to save the American tax-payer the expense of her entourage and herself, instead focusing their perceptions analysis right here at this board.

I do, modestly, a superb job of bringing Pakistani feelings right up to the visible surface without noticably deviating from generally-stated American objectives. As such and if correct, the feelings expressed HERE are an accurate reflection of what she'll travel 6,000 miles at great expense to hear.

Never before has this board, IMHO, had more value and it would do our S. Asian desk at the Dept. of State well to monitor this activity and even join their PRC representatives from the foreign ministry in conducting our own psych-ops campaign.

What a laugh that would be...:lol:

Enjoy.

Thanks.:usflag:

u like rats don't u :coffee:
 
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Oh S-2, what ever do we'll make sure US bleeds in Afghanistan as long as it has hostile intentions regarding Pakistan.You can't do anything.What you have done in last 8 years anyway?We're just enjoying the show.Pakistan has faced tougher times (92 Karachi Insurgency) So we'll pass along just fine but get ready for lots of dead bodies of ISAF Personal and hope you are having a beer with USAF helicopter crash news.Enjoy..Anyone who goes against Pakistani State will be taken care off.Be it Taliban or your ANA crooks.They will be paid in the same coin trust me.
 
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"So we'll pass along just fine but get ready for lots of dead bodies of ISAF Personal and hope you are having a beer with USAF helpicopter crash news"

I feel sorry for your sick soul.
 
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and i feel sorry for you.Wasting your energy all day long on this forum.Shitting in your pants even if some member says something against US.You just sound like defence.pk Bill O Riley.I suggest you stop worrying about Afghanistan.Coz you will get heart attack soon if you keep worrying old man.
 
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I don't think S-2 reflect US as they are not P@ki hater's like him, Clinton visit reflect friendly relation ship between both.
 
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and i feel sorry for you.Wasting your energy all day long on this forum.Shitting in your pants even if some member says something against US.You just sound like defence.pk Bill O Riley.I suggest you stop worrying about Afghanistan.Coz you will get heart attack soon if you keep worrying old man.

against Israel, so seems. :agree:
 
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Lol S-2 is one of those Team America Members..America this, America super, America that..We can't win in Afghanistan so Team America will blame Pakistan for it...When reality hit them they just can't accept it.
 
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Lol S-2 is one of those Team America Members..America this, America super, America that..We can't win in Afghanistan so Team America will blame Pakistan for it...When reality hit them they just can't accept it.

Pakistan and US team was so good in defeating USSR in 80's and now US and Indian team suck in defeating Taliban so both need a escape goat for ego :coffee:
:pakistan: + :usflag: = win
:usflag: + India = ????
:pakistan: + :usflag: + Indian = there is a chance all win
 
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