Operation Grand Slam is best described in words of Brig Mahmud who took part in the operation as Commanding Officer of 1st Army Aviation Squadron from 1 Sept 1965 to 6 Sept 1965.
As the tanks and the infantry rolled out of their positions from the FUP, on 1 September 1965 at 0500 hours, the Army Aviation was there alongside with them.
It was a two pronged attack. In the North No. 4 Sector, under Brig. Hameed, attacked with 5 & 19 AK bn and 8 AK Bn was in reserve. An adhoc armour squadron was under command. It’s objectives in phase 1 were destruction of enemy WEST of TAWI, in LALEAL, DEWA, SAKRANA and CHAMB sectors. In the South 102 Bde commanded by Brig. Zafar Ali Khan, was tasked in the phase 1, to capture area west of Tawi, including MANDIALA-ULLAN WALI, PIR JAMA in the area. The Bde attacked with 11 Cav, followed by 9 and 13 Punjab and was to capture CHAK NAWAN-CHAK PANDIT by 0900 Hrs 1 September.
In phase 11 was the Capture of CHAMB-SAKRANA by 9 Punjab supported by 11 Cavalry by 1200 Hrs, 1 September.
The attacks from both the directions proceeded on time and some sporadic resistance and delay was caused by enemy positions and pockets at different places. The terrain posed some problem to armour and delayed the advance of 11 Cavalry initially. But the advance kept rolling. At places some strong resistance came from some locations. The accurate and effective fire of the enemy recoilless rifles took some toll of our tanks. But the operations kept making due progress. Some positions were by passed and the others reduced. The tanks, the infantry and the ground observers kept dealing with the resistance very effectively. The role of Army Aviation remained rather subdued. Some odd arty shoots were taken. Again, the role of battlefield surveillance, command and control remained at a very low key. Maj. Gen. Akhtar Malik was leading the attack himself. He remained close to the front line troops and perhaps purposely was not in communication even with his TAC HO. This did not provide any close links for the Army Aviation with the field commanders. The undulating ground provided reasonably good observation in the area and the airborne eyes were not required to supplement that.
The evening of 1 September saw some excitement for the Army Aviation. Some L-19 aircraft and H x 13 helicopters were flying in the area to have an overall view of the battlefield. The customary fog of war was there. The Army Aviation though was active but did not perceive any clear picture of the battlefield. The overall mood was sober. Suddenly there was a buzz of excitement. At about 1600 Hrs, four enemy aircraft appeared and started attacking our ground troops. As these aircraft dived in their attack runs, our own fighters majestically picked them up. Within, a very short span of time, all the four Indian aircraft were shot down. The interception of these aircraft was at such a very low altitude that none of the enemy pilots could bail out and were all killed. This thrilling encounter of the first air battle, was witnessed from an L-19 by Air Marshal Nur Khan, the C-IN-C of PAF, Lt Col N.U.K. Babar and myself, flying in H-13 hell’s, I along with Capt. Askree, the pilot of H x 13 helicopter, landed at one of the sights of the crash and picked up a piece of the wreckage. It was the insignia of the Indian Air Force. This was kept as a war trophy.
Just as this excitement was dying out, Lt. Col. N.K.Babar, who was milling around in the area in an HX13, inflicted upon himself a totally unique and an unparalleled incident. This needs to be recorded and elaborated. It was getting to be the evening of 1 Sep. Our troops had approached CHAMB. In the process of their advance, they had by passed some INDIAN positions on their way. The enemy troops in those positions were raising white flags as a gesture of their intention to surrender. 13 L and 6 FF had by-passed a position held by a company of SIKH Regiment. As both 13 L and 6 FF, were pursuing their advance to their objective CHAMB, they could not spare any effort or time to round them up, take them prisoners and then transport them to the rear. This position was POUR picket. An Hx13 helicopter, which had Lt. Col. N.K. Babar, Maj. A.L. AWAN and Capt. AKRAM on board, was looking around in the area and saw the raising of while flags from this position. The whole incident is best described by Lt. Col. N.K. Babar himself wherein the capture of 55 Indian soldiers is described. There can be no conventionally defined opinions offered on this episode. Was it initially an act of bravery or stupidity to land the helicopter in close proximity to this enemy position! Did this initial act not later assume a role of most unique form of personal bravery?
As these first excitements were dying out, 11 Cav had reached Chamb. The accounts are rather conflicting, but it appears that between 1100- 1200 hrs they had reached the out skirts of Chamb. The enemy RR’s which had been well sighted in the Chamb area had knocked out a few of our tanks. At what time Chamb was captured, it is not clear. But by far from all accounts, the area West of River Tawi was captured by the evening and the operation for the establishment of a bridgehead across Tawi had started. By first light 2 September, some elements were struggling to make a foothold across the Eastern Bank of River TAWI. There was a lot of confusion as many vehicles had bogged down in the bed of River TAWI. There was no enemy resistance, but the Bridge Head had not been fully established.
On the morning of 2 September, COC 7 div was flown from his HQ at Jalalpur to BHOJPUR which was the location of TAC HQ 102 Bde in an H x 13 helicopters. From there the pilots of the two helicopters, along with me flew to Kharian. Gen. Musa, C-in-C, accompanied by Brig. A.A. Bilgrammi arrived in a U-8F, flown by Maj. Kureshy and. Maj. Madni. From Kharian, Gen. Musa and Brig. A.A. Bilgrami, were flown in 2 H x 13 helicopters to HQ 102 Bde, The GOC 7 Div, had been earlier dropped there. On arrival there, Gen. Musa tried to contact Gen. Akhtar Ali Malik, GOC 12 Div. GOC 12 Div was not in communication with any one, either on the wireless or on line. After a lot of hectic efforts, he finally was traced in the area of Chamb, where he was busy expediting the re-deployment of the guns of 4 Corps Artillery. This re-deployment was urgent as after the crossing of River TAWI and for advance beyond that, the range of the guns was required. With a lot of efforts, a message was finally conveyed to GOC 12 Div through the Headquarters 4 Corps Artillery, to come to HQ 102 Bde. Very reluctantly he arrived. At the HQ 102 Bde, Gen. Musa gave the orders for GOC 7 Div to assume the Command of the operations. After receiving the orders of the change over in command, Maj. General Akhtar Ali Malik appeared out of the Bunker. I along with a few other officers’ was standing there. As he approached us, he had tears in his eyes and remorsely he said; “I wanted to conduct the operation to its fateful conclusion. I have been told to proceed to Murree and take over my command of 12 Div.” The change of Command took place quite smoothly and the Army Aviation did facilitate in the change over. But this change did result in some delay in the execution of the operations. The orders for establishment of Bridge Head, as planned earlier and under execution, were further elaborated by GOC 7 Div. By 19.15 Hrs on 2 September, the bridgehead was establishment by 10 Bde, with 6 FF and 13 Lancers in the South and by 4 Sector in the North.
It was a fateful decision! Was it with any specific intent? Did it have the purpose to glorify Major General Yahya Khan, who was already being groomed as the next C-IN-C? Was General Ayub under some specific instructions, from his masters, not to push the advance so far as to result in the inevitable capture of AKHNUR? Could it possibly be that if Maj. General Akhtar Malik had captured AKHBUR, he would have become a National Hero! Did this impose any alarming signal for General Ayub? They all defy answers, as no one has ever explained the reasons for it. However, inalienable fact is that it did cause a definite delay in the progress of the battle. Major General Akhtar Malik had envisaged in his planning, the capture of AKHNUR within 72 hour’s of the start of the operations. In my estimation it was possible, as Akhtar Malik had clearly shown all his intents and posture of his aggressiveness in command. How critical was this delay, is a mute point, as no definitive yardstick is available to determine this. It is only a guessing game! A copy of a letter which Maj General Akhtar Malik wrote to his brother from ANKARA, gives some idea of his frustrations, Attached as ANX 3. It suggests that the change of command, which he describes as defecto, had already taken place at the very first day of the operations after the fall of Chamb. He describes this to the fact that Brig. Azmat Hayat, Brigade Commander of 10 Brigade, had broken of all wireless communications with him. He further describes that as he tore into him the next day, he sheepishly and nervously informed him, that, “He was Yahya’s Brigadier”. He classifies it as a betrayal of many dimensions. I am personally not inclined to agree with this assessment and analysis. I was a privy to and was in close touch with Major Gen. Yahya Khan. I believe no such instructions were given by Maj. Gen. Yahya to Brig. Azmat Hayat, not to receive any further orders from Maj. Gen. Akhtar Malik. The conduct of Brig. Azmat speaks for it all. Not only he remained out of communication with GOC 12 Div. on first September 1965, but he kept repeating the same practice and act even with GOC 7 Div. later. In my presence, Maj. Gen. Yahya, on 3rd September 1965 rebuked him in the foulest possible language for remaining out of wireless contact with him. That he pleaded with Gen. Musa and Maj. Gen. Yahya that he is allowed to go up to AKHNUR, even under the command of Maj. Gen. Yahya, is most probably true. There was a vociferous and I assume even heated discussions inside the bunker, close to which we were standing. There is no doubt that the change of command definitely delayed in the capture of AKHNUR.
On the morning of 3 September, GOC 7 Div gave orders for the break out from the bridge head. He ordered 10 Bde to secure Jaurian by last light on 3 September. Out line plan of Commander 10 Bde was as follows: -Anx 4
a. 6 FF (Northern Bn) sp by 13 L less Sqn to breakout from area
PALANWALA at 1300 hrs along gen axis CHAMB-
AKHNUR. Initially mask KALIT and adv up to nullah/rd
June 7367 and sweep southwards to secure JAURIAN.
b. 14 PUNJAB (Southern Bn) sp by one Sqn 13 L to breakout at
1230 hrs. Initially secure NAWAN HAMIRPUR and there
After adv eastwards along the river to threaten the enemy left flank
In order to facilitate securing of JAURIAN.
c. 13 PUNJAB in res.
In the North 6 FF and 13 L met increasing resistance from enemy armour, RR’s and infantry. It advanced beyond PALANWALA. The opposition stiffened as own troops approached TROTI. Enemy had flooded the paddy fields which made the movement off the roads difficult for both A and B Ech vehicles. But despite the odds, 13L GP contacted TROTI posn. by 1730 hrs.
In the South 14 Punjab gp met light opposition from NAWAN HAMIRPUR. The progress was also slow because of the bad going and flooded fields which separated infantry from FEch vehicles. During the night ¾ September, they could not reach far enough beyond NAWAN HAMIRPUR to influence the situation at TROTI. The Brigade Commander 10 Brigade, Brigadier Azmat, showed total lack of will. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the responsibility for the delay in the capture of AKHNUR Bridge, laid directly on the shoulders of Commander 10 Brigade. He exercised no command and control, lacked all initiate and was acting as a silent bystander to the events. He just allowed the operations to drift along and take its own course. He showed no sense of purpose and urgency in his command as was dictated by the situation.
Since a stalemate had ensued at TROTI, GOC 7 Div ordered 6 Bde to take over defense astride River TAWI from 102 Bde. 102 Bde was ordered to concentrate at PAHARIWALA 6363 and Commence advance through the gap in the 10 Bde positions and the hills to its North.
In the South, 10 Bde was ordered to continue clearing en opposition in area Jaurian and clear the line of SAHABANWALA KHAD without delay. 102 Bde in the North and 10 Bde in the South were further instructed to secure the line of KANGAR NALA by last light 4 September and the line GARAH- FATWAL Pt 968(8063) by first light 05 September.
In support of this operation elaborate artillery support had been planned. Enemy positions at TROTI and JAURIAN were to be softened by heavy artillery support, before attack by 10 Bde on first light 4 September. The earlier plan of capture of JAURIAN By 10 Bde, by last light 3 September, could not be accomplished. The main factors impeding the progress were lack of detailed information about the enemy strength and dispositions occupying TROTI and JAURIAN positions, the flooded paddy fields, lack of adequate Communications within the formation, lack of functional chain of Command and Control and above all the timid mind of the Brigade Commanders.
On first light 4 September, I along with GOC 7 Div flew in an H x 13 helicopters from his HQ at JALALPUR to CHAMB. At the helipad, Commander 4 Corps Artillery, Brig. Amjad Ali Chaudhary met GOC 7 Div. When the GOC inquired about the position on the ground, Commander 4 Corps Artillery explained that the fire plan was fired on time. After the lifting of the own artillery fire, the main attack had to go in at first light. But according to his information, there was no movement on the ground. GOC 7 Div inquiringly looked at me. I told the GOC, that I will go and carry out a detailed recce. Flying in the H x 13 helicopter, I and Capt Askree, the pilot of H x 13, flew across TAWI to the TROTI position. As we approached the area, we found the whole position of TROTI and JAURIAN completely covered under a smoke and dust umbrella caused by our heavy artillery fire. We carried out a detailed recce of the entire positions at TROTI and JAURIAN. Through the gaps in the smoke and dust, devastation caused by own artillery fire on the enemy positions was clearly visible. A lot of vehicles and other equipment were still burning and there was hardly any movement in the area. We flew very low over the enemy position and made a very brief touch down in an open area. It was rather amazing and surprising that we did not attract any ground fire. The estimate and assessment was that as a result of the heavy artillery fire, Enemy positions at TROTI and JAURIAN had been pulverized and paralyzed. Whatever, their strength left behind in these positions; the enemy was in no position to offer any stiff resistance. An overall opinion and appreciation was made. It suggested, that these positions must be by- passed from the North and the South. Whatever, enemy positions had been left behind in the areas; they could be reduced and mopped up later. With this clear perception made of the position as obtained on the ground, I first landed near TROTI and met 21 C, 6 FF. On inquiring, Maj. (Later Brig) Anwar-ul-Haq (ND) told me that their F echelons had not arrived and because of that, they were not in a position to attack TROTI as planned. I then flew to South. There we first met Lt Col ATA, CO 8 Med and through his guidance later located Commander 10 Bde, Brig. Azmat. When I asked him about the progress on the ground, he explained that 14 Punjab was ordered to advance along River Chenab, but his HQ had lost contact with them. With this breakdown of communications and lack of adequate information about his units, he was in no position to advance any further. We then flew and landed in the positions of 13 Lancers. They were all lined up in a nullah. The CO 13 Lancers explained that there was heavy enemy fire coming from TROTI position and as such their advance was held up. I then flew North and met Lt. Col. Siddique CO 8 Baluch and Brig. Zafar Ali Khan in Command 102 Bde. I was briefed by them that due to rough terrain and light enemy resistance their advance was becoming increasingly difficult. I gave a detailed report and my assessment of the enemy positions in the area of TROTI and JAURIAN, to all the Bde Comd’s/Co’s that I met. I particularly apprised them of the devastating effect of own arty and tried my best to influence the minds of these Bde/unit commanders. It was strongly being advised to them, to by pass TROTI and JAURIAN positions from the RIGHT and LEFT flank. But there was no positive response coming from any one. Seeing this stalemate on the ground, I flew back to CHAMB. At the helipad, the GOC 7 Div and Commander 4 Corps Artillery were anxiously waiting for me. On arrival at the helipad I gave a detailed report of the recce carried out by me. I particularly emphasized the devastating effect of the artillery fire at TROTI and JAURIAN positions. I clearly gave out my assessment. In my opinion, which I perceived as a result of a detailed recce carried out, I was sure that enemy positions and whatever enemy troops were in the area, they were truly shell shocked by the pounding of the Artillery. In my opinion, I felt that these enemy positions could not offer any stiff resistance. I strongly suggested that we need not waste time in launching any fresh attacks at these positions. It was clearly advocated, that these positions be by passed, by 10 Bde from the RIGHT and 102 Bde from the LEFT flank. It was my clear assessment that any enemy left entrenched in the area, was in such a state that they cannot pose much threat. I also told GOC 7 Div that I had tried my best to influence the minds of all the field commanders in the area of operations. It was further suggested to GOC 7 Div, that only he could personally influence the situation. Maj. Gen. Yahya clearly understood the situation and spontaneously decided to act. He immediately flew out in the chopper with me to meet the Bde Commanders. After taking off from the helipad, GOC was first given a very clear and broad aerial view of the ground, enemy dispositions, location of own troops and the big gap between JAURIAN and River Chenab on the RIGHT and JAURIAN and KALI DHAR feature on the LEFT. Very quickly the GOC sized up the situation. He agreed fully with my earlier assessment that was given at the CHAMB, helipad. The helicopter first landed near the TAC HQ of 10 Bde. GOC was very upset and annoyed with the slow pace of the advance. His tone was rather harsh. In fact he used most abusive language. He told 10 Bde Commander to go in the helicopter with me and have the aerial view of the area. He further told him that I will be showing the big gap between JAURIAN position and River Chenab. He ordered that 10 Bde should by pass JAURIAN and after having out flanked the enemy position there, they should proceed along the road JAURIAN- AKHNUR. He further emphasized, that any pockets of resistance at TROTI and JAURIAN, will be mopped up later. GOC 7 Div then flew to the position of 13 Lancers and 102 Bde. Co 13L, while explaining the situation on the ground informed Major General Yahya, that the enemy fire from TROTI position was holding his advance. Admonishingly, GOC 7 Div told Co 13 Lancers, “The enemy will not be throwing roses petals over you”. He firmly ordered him to resume his advance immediately. His orders were clear and precise. 102 Bde along with 13 Lancers less one sqn, were to by pass JAURIAN position from the LEFT flank. Soon after these precise orders, the advance was resumed. It did not proceed at the pace that it was envisaged but a clear outflanking maneuver was developed.
While 102 Bde was developing the flanking movement from the NORTH and 10 Bde from the SOUTH, Army Aviation remained actively and closely involved with the operations. At this stage heavy enemy gun fire was successfully holding the advance of own troops. G-II (ops) 4Corps Artillery, Major Aleem (Later Colonel) ordered the pilot who was flying in the air, providing close support, to silence these guns. As the pilot Capt. Khalid Saeed, gave the grid reference and started adjustment of arty fire to those positions, G-II Corps Artillery, Major Aleem Afridi recame very perturbed on the wireless. Rebuking, he was telling the Aerial observer, that own troops had gone beyond the line of this grid reference. He counter post reminded him that this cannot be the Grid Reference of the enemy gun position, which was holding up our advance. The pilot, Capt. Khalid Saeed, very coolly answered, that since some doubt had been created, and he will fly over the position just to confirm. As he flew overhead the enemy gun position, small arms and automatic weapons opened up. The aircraft was riddled with bullets. The right fuel tank was badly hit and ruptured. The fuel started profusely gushing into the cockpit. Capt. Khalid Saeed, kept his nerves and cool composure. He told Major Aleem, “Now there is no doubt in my mind. This is the position of the enemy guns, which is withholding the advance of own troops. Now concentrate all the available guns on this position, at which I have already adjusted the fire and bring down maximum fire”. He also mentioned, “My aircraft has been hit and that the fuel is gushing into the cockpit. I am now rushing back to the landing strip lest the aircraft catches fire”. Capt. Khalid Saeed was lucky that he landed safely and the aircraft did not catch fire. The intensive and accurate concentration of own guns on this position had its telling effect. As a result of this fire and also the outflanking moves of 102 Bde and the 10 Bde, the enemy abandoned these positions. They left behind a complete compliment of 24 guns of their field regiment. Eight guns were still hooked behind their towers with their engines running and sixteen guns remained deployed in their original positions. The enemy abandoned them in great haste. In addition, the en left behind AMX tanks, a lot of other equipment, vehicles and ammunition. For this gallant act of Capt. Khalid Saeed, his citation for the award of SJ. Was initiated by me # Where this citation was lost, one did not have the time to follow up. But the deed of Capt. Khalid Saeed did Army Aviation proud. The events of 4 Sep turned out to be very momentous in the operations of JAURIAN. This position was very strongly held by the enemy. From some estimates, it was composed of 2 Bn’s, a regiment less one Sqn of AMX tanks and supported by a field regiment located in the JAURIAN area and additional medium guns deployed behind that position. Maj General TIKKA KHAN, along with Lt Col (Later Brigadier) Nur Hussain, went into the area and collected all the booty.
The outflanking moves of 10 Bde from the RIGHT flank and 102 Bde from the LEFT flank, in addition to the direct attack at TROTI and JAURIAN by 6 FF and 13 L had unnerved the enemy. Its position at TROTI and JAURIAN began to crack. The enemy started to abandon these positions and retreat in great haste. The earlier arty fire also had a devastating effect on the en position. By the evening of 4 Sept, enemy had started it’s withdrawal from TROTI and JAURIAN. By the morning of 5 Sep, TROTI and JAURIAN positions had been captured and our troops were advancing on to AKHNUR. Anx 5
In the development of the out flanking move, Army Aviation had played a very central role. First through a detailed, intensive and most accurate assessment of the battlefield situation, Army Aviation had performed the key role of battlefield surveillance. With this accurate information of en disposition, Army Aviation had also very clearly perceived the tactical planning of by-passing these positions, rather than attack these frontally. The stalemate that had ensued at TROTI and JAURIAN had brought about a somewhat break down of command and control of the formations. The F Ech of some units was lost, the Bde commanders had lost contact with some of their units and the momentum of attack at TROTI and JAURIAN had not been fully developed.
Army Aviation had truly provided the most precise and clear picture of the situation. It helped in developing a realistic, dynamic and bold plan of dealing with the enemy opposition at TROTI and JAURIAN. By flying the GOC 7 Div into the area, giving him a professional briefing along with the aerial view of the battlefield, all customary elements of fog of war were cleared very rapidly. In restoring the vital links of command and control, Army Aviation, greatly helped in bringing cohesion of `command and thus further building the momentum of attack. No other examples could better describe the role of Army Aviation in support of Battlefield Surveillance and bringing in the necessary linkages in the effective exercise of Command and Control. These roles were fully complimented by the classic role of Army Aviation in the adjustment of arty fire. The area was kept under surveillance all the time. All demands of aerial observation and
Adjustment of arty fire was promptly and effectively answered. The capture of 24x25 Pdr guns and a squadron of AMX tanks were the climax of the heroic deeds and the dedication of the Army Aviators in performance of their main missions, i.e. adjustment of Arty Fire.
Earlier in the day, Comd. 4 Sector, Brigadier Hameed, was given the task of capturing the Kalidhar feature on the left flank of the route leading to AKHNUR. Wireless messages kept pouring in about the progress being made. It was very heartening and Major Gen. Yahya Khan was very happy at the rapid success that was being achieved. It was towards the mid day that the Brigade Comd personally gave the message of having captured the peak of the Kalidhar feature. He was professedly congratulated by Maj. Gen. Yahya Khan. A little later, a call was made about the heavy enemy counter attack on the positions recently captured on the main feature. Sometimes later the news was sent that in the face of heavy Indian Attack, the top of the feature has been abandoned and our own troops were now occupying lower slopes on the ridge. Then again there came the news of another enemy attack at those positions now held by own troops and the story of having to abandon this was repeated. Alarmingly, further messages kept coming in of our own troops retreating back. Towards the evening, 4 Sector troops seemed to have returned to the same point from where they had launched their attack in the early morning. At this stage Maj. Gen. Yahya Khan, suddenly got into hysterical rage. He was on the wireless himself. He was shouting at Brig. Hameed, “You (adjectives used which cannot be repeated here). It is now clear to me that you have been doing picture painting to me the whole day. You never ever moved out of your location. The whole operation was a farcical description”. Why he did not remove him from his command, I could not personally understand? But the most ironical thing was that when General Yahya Khan assumed the Command of the Army, he promoted him as Maj. Gen. and then later as Lieut. Gen. I was totally disillusioned! In utter shock and disbelief my confidence in the higher command of the Army was shaken.
Soon after JAURIAN position was captured / by passed on the morning of 5 Sept, the advance to AKHNUR proceeded. 10 and 102 Bde spearheaded the advance. In the South, 13 PUNJAB (10 Bde) made a swift movement along the northern bank of River Chenab and cut the road JAURIAN-AKHNUR in the area of DALPAT (10 Bde obj) by 0915 hrs. The adv. of 6 FF and 13 L on FATWAL was held up by enemy rear guards. These enemy posns had to be rounded up through the advance of 14 PUNJAB from the SOUTH. Line of MAWAWALI KHAD was reached in the evening of 5 Sept. It was estimated that all the enemy, which had fallen back from CHAMB, TROTI and JAURIAN positions, would have taken positions in the foothills of AKHNUR. It was also estimated that at AKHNUR, we would be up against the main def position. Under this misconception, the infantry advancing to AKHNUR, failed to carry out any aggressive patrolling. The Army Aviation was also handicapped. It was getting dark and the observation was very limited. No clear positions regarding en defenses at AKHNUR emerged. The lack of this proper information, proved to be one of the most vital factors of the 1965 war. We had reached within 3-4 miles of AKHNUR Bridge at River CHENAB. Anx 6 The basic principle, of ruthlessly and aggressively following the retreating enemy, was ignored and not followed. The forward elements failed to have any zealous approach. Major General YAHYA KHAN was not forward enough, to personally influence and push them to move on. It is the irony of fate again, that Comd, 10 Brig, Brig. Azmat was in the lead. True to his performance on 1, 2, and 3 September, he failed to aggressively pursue his advance to capture the bridge at AKHNUR.
The retreating en had not picked up the courage to take positions at AKHNUR. In fact they with-drew across the bridge at River Chenab. AKHNUR was abandoned and left empty and un-occupied during the night of 5/6 Sept. It beckoned just moving in and just capturing the area. It is unfortunate that we failed to achieve our vital objective which had
been so clearly enunciated in all our operational plans and orders... A crucial mistake was made... Enemy realizing this, occupied AKHNUR positions on the morning of 6 Sep. Maj Gen YAHYA, GOC 7 Div, later realizing this, said that it was the biggest mistake that he hade made in this war. After this detailed and precise description of the events at AKHNUR, my remarks made in the earlier chapters, would stand out in their correct perspective. Col Aslam Cheema while attending the staff coverage at camberly met with an Indian officer. He told him that they could not understand as what prevented the Pakistan Army from capturing the AKHNUR Bridge. Cheema also had answered no explanation for that.
On the first light of 6 Sept. I as per the routine of the last few days, I was going to the mess to have my breakfast. GOC 7 Div came rushing out of his caravan. On seeing me, Gen YAHA said that the C-IN-C, Gen Musa was on the line a short while ago. He informed me that Gen Musa had just told him that the Indians had attacked PAKISTAN across the International line. The attack had come at the JASSAR Br, BURKI and KASUR Sector. Gen YAHYA, further said that the C-IN-C had informed him that JASSAR Br had been captured by the enemy. While conveying this news to me, GOC did not believe that the JASSAR Br could have fallen and captured so easily by the enemy. On my inquiry as to why he did not believe in this, GOC 7 Div remarked that we were too strong in that position. Since this doubt was created, I suggested to GOC 7 Div, that I will go and fly over the area to see the position on the ground. GOC 7 Div gave a very enthusiastic approval of this. When I flew over the JASSAR Br, I clearly saw the fighting taking place across the Bridge; beyond our enclave on the INDIAN side of the Bridge. I flew over the whole of the position of 115 Bde. The close aerial view gave a very re-assuring picture. The assertion of the C-IN-C was proved to be wrong and the assessment of GOC 7 Div, turned out to be correct. The Bridge was intact and in firm control of own 115 Bde.
I then flew to SIALKOT. On my arrival at HQ 15 Div, I noted total confusion about the position at JASSAR. The GOC Brig Ismail, an officer of Army Supply Control, whose only claim and experience to Command was, that he like General Musa was Persian speaking. Col S.G. Mehdi, who was my Company Commander at PMA, was Col G.S. When I informed them both that I had just flown over this position, there was a hush of restless await on their faces. On being told, that the Bridge was intact and that the fighting was taking place across the Bridge in the area of enemy enclave and that 115 Bde positions were firmly intact, there was a sudden gush of exuberance. Col S.G.Mehdi picked up the phone. He was calling DMO at GHQ. He told him that he had disobeyed the orders of HQ 1 Corps for the blowing up of the Bridge at JASSAR. He further told him that he may be Court Martialled, but he had willfully disobeyed these orders. He was strongly pleading with the DMO, that the HQ 1 Corps had under some misinformed judgment, given these orders. Brigadier Ismail, was just a passenger at Div HQ and Col Mehdi appeared to be in command. I had known him and I hoped that with his background, he could grapple with the situation and bring in sanity and composure at the Div HQ. It was immediately clear, that there was a total lack of proper communications and understandings between Corps HQ and the Div HQ.
On hearing the news of JASSAR, the telephonic conversation with the DMO and the re-assuring discussions of the overall situation, normalcy was suddenly writ large in the atmosphere of the Div HQ. Col Mehdi told me that on 5 Sept, a DR of the enemy was captured. In the mail that was carried by the DR, there were some letters addressed to the 1 Armd Div. He strongly emphasized that it was clear that the enemy 1 Armd Div, was now located in this area. Col staff gave some important letters and documents in support of it to me and asked me to fly these out to GHQ. It was done promptly. GHQ now had this information on 6 Sept that the enemy 1 Armd Div was in the area SAMBA. But at GHQ there were some apprehensions, lest it was a ploy. Col Mehdi further told me that I should re-assure Maj General YAHYA that his old formation will not let him down.
I flew back to TAC HQ 7 Div at CHAK PANDIT. GOC 7 Div was waiting very anxiously for the news. When he was informed that his appreciation of our own strength at JASSAR was correct and that the bridge was intact, he very excitedly exclaimed, “Did not I tell you that”. He further said that he as GOC 15 Div had planned the entire defense of the area. He also explained that he had walked the entire area on foot and that he had conceived and planned the defensive plan of the area to the minutest details. He then
Remarked that these people are fools, who believe that any major enemy offensive will come at JASSAR Emphatically, he explained, “The logical line of the enemy attack will be CHARWA-CHOBARA-PHILLORAH-CHAWINDA”. The mention of the names of these places did not ring any bell in my ears, at that time. The names on 6 Sept were totally unfamiliar to me. But how prophetically it was correct. It came known only truly as the events of the coming days unfolded themselves. When I transmitted the details of my discussions at 15 Div HQ and specifically Col Mehdi’s message to him, he just scoffed it away. Obviously Col Mehdi, for what reasons I do not know, had fallen down in his eyes and estimation.
SIALKOT SECTOR
With the INDIAN attack across the International Boundary, some immediate re-grouping and re-organization of troops was ordered. 1 Army Aviation Squadron was ordered to move to SIALKOT. They were to support the operations of 15 Div and 6 Armed Div.
