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1965 Pakistan-India War:​

Three AAAs that saved Pakistan – ALLAH, Artillery, and the Air Force​

Admin PSF
September 7, 2021

1965 war witnessed the rattling of two air-forces ratioed 1:5 means every single fighter aircraft of Pakistan Air Force was had 5 opponents to fight against. No other option was there other than to defend the homeland from the cowards who opened the war front in the darkness of a night.

They aimed to capture Lahore in a day, but they underestimated the sons of soil, the rigid nerves of men in uniforms, ready to embrace death in the defense of the motherland. The intense air battles resulted losses on both sides but the heroics of PAF were remarkable enough to be mentioned in the books of history.

Although the war broke out on 6th September, but PAF was put on red alert by the visionary leadership of Air Marshal Nur Khan. This helped PAF attaining upper hand and virtual control of whole war, it greatly facilitated in preparing the PAF for imminent war. As the war broke, PAF adopted a very offensive strategic plan of crippling IAF on ground through air strikes on their airfields.

Meanwhile they also carried extensive ground support by pounding the advancing armored columns of Indian Army. IA opened fronts at Lahore, Kasur & Sialkot with tanks, artillery guns, armored vehicles, and infantry support. On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Niranjan Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank BRB Canal. He made two attempts to cross the canal and enter the Lahore city but was stopped by resilience and resistance of Pakistan Armed Forces. 3rd Jat division of Indian Army was able to cross the BRB and capture the village of Batapur near Jallo-More of Lahore, but the sharp shooters of PAF destroyed their ammunition stores and armored vehicles, which shattered their morale and they had to retreat.
PAF had F-104 starfighters for high altitude flight and to provide cover to the low flying F-86 Sabers. PAF had 125 F-86 Sabre, a dozen or so F-104 Starfighters and around 27 B-57 Canberra Medium Bombers.

IAF possessed some 26 fighter squadrons and four medium bomber squadrons. It deployed IAF could deploy only one MiG-21 squadron which had only a handful of aircraft on its strength; five Mystere Ground Attack squadrons, three Hunter Fighter G/A squadrons, three Gnat Mk1 Air Defense squadrons; three Canberra medium bomber squadrons and two reformed and merged Vampire squadrons, which were withdrawn when four Vampires were lost on the first day of operations against Pakistan.

The employment of PAF assets was accomplished in a very innovative and professional manner. Single squadron of PAF F-104s managed to attain and maintain air superiority throughout the conflict. The Star Fighters were employed as top cover for the F-86s representing a threat to the IAF fighter fleet. Resultantly, brilliantly flown PAF Sabers inflicted more losses on the IAF Hunters, Gnats and Mysteres.

The employment of the Bomber fleet was also very well panned by the PAF top leadership. Besides the fighters, the bombers also made significant contributions by undertaking regular night bombing operations against several Indian airfields, damaging most of them. PAF leadership also exhibited a classic example of unconventional means of utilizing its C-130 fleet for night bombing.

The speed with which the idea was adopted, and the necessary modifications incorporated reflected the PAF’s pilots and engineer’s genius for improvisation
PAF was outnumbered in comparison to the IAF, yet it had superiority in terms of training which pilots were undergoing for 8 years with Americans. PAF’s B57s were also better than the Indian English Electric ones with superior avionics and upgradation package.

Prior to the full front war, Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Ahmad Bhatti and Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmad Rafiqui gave a bloody nose to IAF Vampires on September 1, when two PAF F-86 Sabre shot four IAF Vampires, when they were attacking army in Chamb area. Post this, no Vampire was seen in the rest of the war.

Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmad Rafiqui was in command of three F-86 aircrafts in the strike against Halwara airfield on September 6. His guns were jammed for some unknown reason, Rafiqui, unarmed as he was, refused to give up and continued instead to provide protection to his co-fighters while ordering his wingman to take over as leader. Although, his aircraft was shot down. However, he did allow others to hit three more of hunters of IAF, which had intercepted them in their strike. Given his exemplary leadership in each of his exploits, he has been honored with Sitara-i-Jurat and Hilal-i-Jurat. In another heroic attempt,

PAF Pilot Muhammad Mehmood Alam shot Five IAF Hawker Hunters in less than 60 seconds, making it a world record yet to be broken. He was awarded with Sitara-e-Jurat

In reaction to the Indian thwart against Lahore on 6th September, PAF responded with preemptive attacks on Indian airfields at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. Pathankot was a great success for PAF as around 10 Indian aircrafts were destroyed on ground by PAF pilots.

The best day for PAF was to defend Sargodha, the central fort for the Air Force, against the Indian charge and thwart to destroy the center of operations. PAF defended the fort with a great courage, a small force against a 3-5 times larger enemy in numeric, but it was the training of PAF Pilots, the spirit of Eeman and the patriotism which made them a rigid wall of defense and Indian attempts were neutralized.

All in all, the war was ruled by PAF virtually in the skies as India lost around 75 aircrafts (110 claimed by Pakistan) in the cost of mere 20 aircraft losses by Pakistan. There is a famous saying of an Indian Pilot:

Four 'A's, forgetting Amreeka.

 

[Breeze63]

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Peshawar, Early 1950s, No. 9 Sqn & the Formation of Red Dragons

by Fred Isaacs

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At that point in time the entire RPAF fighter air defense rested on the shoulders of number 5, 9 and 14 squadron pilots based at Peshawar. The wing was commanded by W/C Garred Cole seconded from the RAF In January 1950 those of us from 4GD assigned to fly fighters reported in to Station Peshawar and were spread thinly among the three undermanned squadrons. P/Os Kabir Khan, Fred Isaacs (writer) ‘Jan’ Janjua and M.Pir. were posted to 9(dragon) Squadron was commanded by S/L Bertie Mirza with F/L Abdul Rahim (AR) Khan the Flight Commander. Making up the rest of the complement were F/Os Trevor Gotting 2GD, and Ghanni Khan3GD, a grand total of eight pilots. From time to time Risalpur flight instructors would keep their fighter skills current by flying with the squadrons on a temporary basis. F/Os MZ (Mitty) Masud and Pat Callaghan flew with 9 squadron from time to time. Once you have met your CO and fellow pilots, cleared in to the Station, and were settled in quarters the first priority was to buy a bicycle, the mode of transport for most personnel. The daily routine was breakfast then biking down to the flight line to start the days flying. We jousted on our mounts, jumped over hurdles and flew bike formations on the way down. At about ten the tea wallah was around for the break. When summer temperatures made aircraft skins unbearable to touch all flying operations were started and ended earlier in the day. It was then quiet time indoors until tea time and the cakeman making his rounds again. His cakes tasted so good. He allowed ‘tick’ without reservation knowing the pilots were good for it and knew just when to appear with his book on paydays to collect. Hashim and Azam Khan were the squash and tennis professionals who looked after the lawn tennis courts and squash courts... These facilities were well used in the cooler evenings. The standard of squash in the Mess was high due to their influence. Most of the Mess staff were also good players. Sometime later a fund was started to fund Hashim’s first participation in the world squash championships staged in London, UK. all the officers contributed and were rewarded with a win by Hashim. The fighter-bomber Wings main objective was to be ready for any hostilities and to this end the squadrons were in constant training in battle formations, practice weapons delivery and watch and ward duties. The well used air-to-ground range at Jamrud, a few minutes flight time away provided facilities for air/ground strafing, rocket firing and dive bombing enabling young pilots to gain valuable expertise in these exercises. At this time there was not an air-to-air firing range established, air to air attacks using gun cameras was the next best thing. For watch and ward the squadrons rotated through the forward airstrip located in Fort Miranshah which was manned by the Tochi Scouts who provided a security perimeter. The aircraft hangers were located within the fort gates as was the messing and living accommodation. Physically lower in elevation than the surrounding area it was not uncommon during the rainy season to be woken up at night with water levels right up to the beds forcing evacuation. The aircraft were wheeled out on the tarmac outside for daily flight operations. From here watch and ward flights were carried out with live operations from time to time in close air support of the Tochi Scouts in their actions against the trouble maker of the time, the Faquir of Ipi. View attachment 743119 ​ No 9 squadron flight line at Miranshah NWFP. Visiting P/O Hyat Khan handing P/O Jan Janjua a practice bomb to be mounted on his Tempest fighter-bomber. At Miranshah there was also a weapons range co-located on the airfield. The locals were avid metal scavengers. After each air to ground live firing pass they would rush out to pick up the empty shell casings then dash back under cover before the aircraft had completed a circuit and was in position for another run.. View attachment 743116 Live 500 pound bombing exercise by No.9 Squadron in 1950. L to R: P’Os M. Pir, Fred Isaacs, F/L ‘AR’ Khan, S/L ‘Bertie’ Mirza, F/O Trevor Gotting, F/O ‘Mitty’ Masud and P/O Kabir Khan. P/O Janjua was flying. Not shown in the picture above was P/O Ghanni Khan. He was killed one day performing a split S dive at high altitude, his Tempest running into high speed compressibility effects that resulted in a loss of control with his aircraft breaking up. These effects were first encountered by WW2 Spitfire pilots diving during the air battles over Britain. This drove home to us recent arrivals that apart from the thrills, fighter operations were a very serious business. In July the squadrons were equipped with the new Hawker Fury fighter bomber a development of the Hawker Tempest. With a more powerful engine, a five- bladed prop and improved technology the Furies had far better performance and were even more reliable. Besides receiving multi scratches from sharp metal edges in the wartime produced Tempest cockpit we grew to expecting engine failures in these old aircraft. An engine failure took the life of our first course fatality which occurred early in his conversion training in Risalpur, another caused Pir to make a forced landing in the Peshawar area but he was unhurt. Fate caught up with him later though when flying a Fury, he pulling too tight a turn on final approach and stalling in killing himself. The Fury had a higher wing loading. In July AR Khan was promoted to S/L becoming squadron CO. F/L Saeedullah Khan was posted in as Flight Commander. Whenever the squadron was in Miranshah we got to expect game birds for breakfast courtesy of AR , he was an avid hunter and partridge and pheasant varieties abounded in these parts. A favored flight time of his was the late evening sorties enjoying the spectacular sunsets in the hills and valleys around Miranshah when it was cooler and less bumpy. As each GD course graduated from Risalpur the squadrons strength increased. One veteran pilot ‘Boss’ Ahmad rejoined the Air force and came to 9 squadron. Some names remembered were Durrani, Akhtar, Latif and Zulfiquar. We were looking at some nine or ten pilots. Some were lost in accidents. One went in during the annual air display in Karachi getting ‘target fascination’ on an air to ground strafing run. Another needlessly killed himself showing off a slow low roll over his home town. We lost Kabir, a passenger in a Bristol Freighter crash into a mountain. Every year to celebrate Independence Day the whole wing would fly down to Karachi to participate in an air Display then back to Peshawar. Training aircraft from Risalpur were also there tasked with displaying their formations and flying skills. The fighter bombers displayed their accuracy in strafing, rocket firing and bombing targets set up in the in-field area within easy sight of the spectator stands. Mess life in Peshawar in those days included dinner and dance parties. In addition to seconded RAF personnel there was a sizable contingent of Polish air and ground crew, both officers and other ranks who had signed up for service with the RPAF. Alcohol was available in all the Messes. A group of us younger pilots formed the ‘Ragmop’ gang singing the song ragmop at the doors of the more friendly married officers who would invite us in for drinks. The Peshawar Club also held functions which were well attended. On leaving the function it was a must stop at the tikka kebab vendor’s stall parked at the gate. He did a roaring business selling us hot tikkas which were so tasty, especially after a few drinks during the night. View attachment 743115 Left: F/O TH Gotting on liaison Harvard at Fort Miranshah. A Harvard in camouflage colours was on the wing inventory based in Peshawar which was used for conveniently carrying single VIPs like Political Agents, Army senior officers etc. on trips to various destinations like Wana, Chitral, Miranshah, Fort Sandeman and other locations which had landing strips and closest to the places they had to visit in the execution of their responsibilities. It was flown generally by the more experienced pilots in the wing. In April ’51 S/L Zaffar Chaudhry replaced AR as squadron CO. A squash enthusiast he soon organized a squadron team and we would fly to Risalpur to challenge the college team. When the squadron was in Miranshah for a spell Zaffar broke the tedium by running track and field events on a squadron “Sports Day’ with participation by the Tochi Scouts as well. W/C Garrard Cole and A/Cmd ‘Barney’Keily also attended. View attachment 743113 Air Cdre Keily (RAF) presenting a prize. S/L Chaudhry at right of picture, F/L Saeedullah sitting in whites at centre. It can be fairly said that the man who pioneered formation aerobatics in the PAF was Zaffar Chaudhry. An excellent aerobatics display pilot himself in 1951 he made it happen. Informed that the outgoing CinC, AVM Atcherly (RAF), also known as a keen aerobatics pilot in his younger days, would be coming to Peshawar on his final farewell visit Zaffar started the ball rolling. Choosing pilots only from within the squadron he assembled, trained and successfully flew the first four-place formation aerobatics team demonstration, a showing never done before on the sub-continent. Putting F/O Trevor Gotting, an experienced squadron pilot in the lead Zaffar took the right wing and Saeedullah took the left in a three-plane formation. They practiced over the next few days to a comfortable degree performing loops, barrel rolls, steep turns and semi-stall turns. It was time for the slot to be filled to form the basic box. Since both Zaffar and Saeed had been my instructors at Risalpur who had given me my basic flying skills I was the logical choice, a known quantity. To ease my apprehensions Zaffar first checked me out in the dual-Fury flying the slot position behind the other two; I got the hang of it finding it not as difficult as I thought it would be. The next step was four-plane close-formation aerobatics, the historic moment or moments for the Air Force as the four Furies took off and climbed out in box formation then came back over the airfield. We went first into steep turns then barrel rolls and finally loops keeping tight station and being watched by our peers on the ground. The day was the thirteenth and Trevor joked about that being an unlucky number. The big five bladed prop disc of my Fury was just a few feet away from the other three airframes and one had to be handy with the throttle and steady with the stick to match leads attitude and accelerate or decelerate to maintain position pulling ‘G’ while ignoring the topsy turvey earth/sky spin outside. My job was helped considerably by the steady station keeping flown by the two experienced wingmen Zaffar and Saeed. Thereafter we practiced almost every day for the rest of the month of April. View attachment 743112 The ‘Red Dragons’ sitting in their box-formation positions on the tarmac outside 9 Sqn crew room - April 1951. Lead Trevor Gotting, right wing Zaffar Chaudhry, left wing Saeedullah and box Fred Isaacs. I was given a bad fright one practice day. We had completed a barrel roll and rolled out at the bottom quite low. At that point in time Trev in Lead thought Zaffar had called on the radio for another roll. In fact it had been S/L Johnny Rollo (Co 14 Sqn) in another aircraft watching the show from afar and not appreciating our low altitude. With us hanging on Lead gained as much altitude as he could before banking into the maneuver. Once around over the top inverted and rolling out right side up I got a shock to see my Fury, the lowest in the formation, almost tickling the tops of the trees. Needless to say our procedures were tightened up especially as to radio calls and minimum altitudes. The big day came on 2 May 51 when the team gave a low level formation aerobatics display for the outgoing CinC Atcherly and also witnessed by the whole Station Peshawar and Group Headquarters personnel. After the event Zaffar received the CinCs personal congratulations with pride for the squadron. To capture the team performing sometime later FS Hussain, who was then the Flight Commander of 5 Sqn. flew in another Fury mounted with an oblique camera to take a picture of us inverted at the top of a barrel roll over the historic Khyber Pass. That photo made it into the British ‘Flight’ magazine (shown following). View attachment 743110 ‘The blue sky beneath me and green earth above’, "Red Dragons" over the Khyber area. During the summer reports circulated that new jet fighters had been purchased from the UK and were arriving in Karachi. Soon postings to the newly activated No 11 (jet) fighter squadron were received at the squadron. Gotting was the first followed by Durrani Janjua and Isaacs.

What year was this interesting article on the PAF and Red Dragons originally published?

 

[Breeze63]

The Scud Missile Syndrome

Columnist Col (Retd) EAS BOKHARI
discusses the various aspects of the Russian SCUD missile

I have somewhat deliberately chosen the Scud missile for this presentation for its notoriety, waywardness in accuracy yet at the same time being the forerunner of many a missile in the Third World. Scud B/C are older Soviet missiles with range up to 1000 Km - but some countries have tried to reverse engineer these missiles - and even traded range for warhead to reach out to specific targets - the case in point being the use of the missile Al-Hussein by Iraq in the Gulf War 1991.
A list of the countries which have/had possessed this missile during the heydays of Soviet Union is a long one, and is indicated separately.

Perhaps the biggest users of this missile were Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Iraq and Iran used this in the battle of cities and Afghanistan tried to target POF Wah during the Afghan War - but the wayward missile landed somewhere near Havelian. (May be they might have tried to target Havelian where there is a large explosive factory producing propellants for the weapons produced in the POF.) All the same, the Afghani intention was not quite clear - and only a marginal damage was done which was not serious at all. So the CEP of the Scud could be many hundred meters - and at the best the missile could be used for engagement of area targets.

India is not listed by famous Aaron Karp in his book 'Ballistic Missile Proliferation - the Politics and Technics' - but I have a strong suspicion that the Indians must have benefited from Soviet assistance in their missile fabrication - especially the earlier ones like 'Prithvi' et al.

Writing about the Scud B - Karp says '.... The Russian Scud B (R-17) missile is the very symbol of ballistic missile proliferation. Scud technologies, relatively simple and widely available, pose the most serious challenge to international control of ballistic missiles in the post cold-war world. Essentially a perfected V-2 (German) rocket, the Scud missile was developed in the mid-1950s for the Soviet Army and improved to reach its most successful form in the mid-1960s. Unlike the V-2, the Scud can be stored for years. It can be transported fully fuelled and set up and fired in 90 minutes. The Scud has been used in the six regional conflicts since 1973 ... Currently deployed by at least 17 countries, it remains in production in North Korea. Despite its age and accuracy it can be mastered by emerging powers, whether they seek merely to deploy it operationally, to modify its capabilities or to reverse engineer it for local production....'

Scud therefore may be considered as a basic model for missile production for most of the Third World - and of course every new manufacturer tries his best to inject some variation for improvement and tinker with the basic ballistic performance of the Soviet (Ex) missile. Just to illustrate this point - the much trumpeted Iraqi Al-Hussein and the Iranian Oghab - are variations of the Soviet Scud. These variations at the very best have proven a deterrent - and nothing else. They did not improve its ballistics.

Here is a pertinent para from Karp about the Scud and its variations '... At the maximum ranges of Scud technology, nuclear weapons cease to compensate efficiently for missile's low accuracy (Iraqi Al Hussein and North Korean Scud - C have a CEP of about 2 Km) ... Using the missile like the Iraqi Al-Abbas or North Korean No Dong I with a CEP of 3 Km at a range of 900 Km, and armed with a 20-Kt nuclear weapon, the chance of destroying even an unprotected target is less than 27 per cent. Destruction of a city centre or an unsheltered military target under these conditions would require at least five (5) missiles despite their nuclear armament.' For more hardened targets even more than a dozen Scuds are needed - which indeed is not cost effective. The use of aircraft - and if the conventional gun batteries could be used is perhaps the real answer.

Scuds can be used both emplaced in well protected bunkers as well as on mobile launchers - in fact the latter is the more normal way of using these missiles - and the Iraqis did use these while firing from mobile launchers. There may have been a few cases where the missile was kept in a fixed place and probably the missile site was demolished by incessant and massive Allied aerial engagements.

It is interesting to see how the Iraqis used their Scuds. In this context the book 'Desert Warrior' by HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan cites many examples of the Iraqi innovation. This of course is their trading off of weight of warhead with range. (See Graph) There is no doubt that the Allies if at all they had any worry then it was the use of Scuds and Chemical/Biological weapons by Iraq. Scuds of course were used by Saddam. No chemical weapons were used.

It is generally accepted that the Iraqis used their Scuds behind a cloud cover - and perhaps most of these were mobile. There is an interesting - though not very convincing statement by Gen Schwarzkopf made on 18 January, 1991. This runs as below:

'... This morning, the United States Air Force found three mobile erected launchers with missiles on board inside Iraq ... Those three mobile erected launchers have been destroyed ... In addition to that, at the same time we found eight more mobile erected launchers in the same location. We are currently attacking those launchers, and we have confirmed the destruction of three more of those mobile erected launchers and we are continuing to attack the others....'

According to Gen Khaled - a member of his staff who had a very considerable experience with Scuds expressed skepticism about the US General's statement. 'It was most unlikely, he wrote that Iraqis would move their launchers during the day and expose such a highly valuable asset to air attack. In his view, the American pilots probably destroyed decoys, rather than launchers ... Or if they were not decoys, they could have been long-bed vehicles used to carry missiles and which are similar in shape to launchers ... he conceded that there was just a chance - one in a thousand - that the pilot had destroyed real launchers and the Iraqis had simply lost their heads.' The American General has insisted on such statements and has even said this in his book '...Our bombers had obliterated every known Scud site in Western Iraq, destroying thirty six fixed launchers and ten mobile ones....'

The above statement does not look to be true - for one thing there is no such thing as a ' fixed launcher' as all Scuds are mounted on long wheeled vehicles.

Gen Khaled writes about the Iraqi use of Scuds thus '...In the 'Great Scud Hunt' - the Coalition was defeated by the ingenuity of Iraqi Scud crew - but also by weather. Iraq launched Scuds only in bad weather, when the cloud ceiling was 3000 feet or below ...The US Combat Air Patrols did not have the accuracy to detect the exact launch point through the cloud cover - and transmit it to the pilots waiting above.'

And then of course there is the promotional episode of the performance of Patriots which I have already covered in one of my previous presentations. This is corroborated by Mark Crispin Miller writing in International Herald Tribune of 25 January, 1992 when he said 'Desert Scam - Not one mobile Scud Launcher was destroyed....'

A Saudi Arabian officer who had the experience of Scud operations for about two years in Egypt has suggested the following procedure for location of Scuds - which appears to be the standard procedure. (In the procedure outlined below - Al-Riyadh is the Scud target.)

Riyadh should be placed on the arc equal to the maximum range of Scud.

A careful study of the circumfer-ence of this arc - especially the availability of roads/potential hiding places should be made.

As discussed above and as the Iraqis did not move launchers during the day time the most probable time of Scud attack would be between nightfall and first light. But within this time frame and taking into account various other procedures and movements et al the most likely time could be between 1910 to 0520 hours.
The Scud launch - having been completed the launcher took 7 to 10 minutes to vacate its posi-tion. While the US satellites took two minutes to report the loca-tion of the missile site. Thus the Coalition had just 5 minutes time to react i.e. the Coalition bombers must be somewhere 35 to 70 miles away from the Iraqi site. This normally did not happen.

I suppose this simple procedure was not really adopted by the Coalition planners.

Finally - though I cannot be absolutely sure that the new crop of missiles, like Prithvi, Ghauri, and Shahab-3 et al are in some way descendants of the age old and durable Scud - these are definitely its derivatives in a big way.

It is known for certain that large scale tinkering and doctoring with the original Soviet missile has been done by many countries - but the ballistic results achieved were not satisfactory.

 

[ghazi52]

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[ghazi52]

Second to None ...

 

[ghazi52]

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[ghazi52]

PAF books .....................

 

[ghazi52]

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[ghazi52]

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https://twitter.com/x/status/1670021537540489217

 

[ghazi52]

1965 War ...
Usman

@usman_cph

The PAF's touch and go with the Il-28 -

During 1965–71, the Pakistan Air Force had to absorb, at the cost of significant combat capacity, five years of the US arms embargo which was imposed on Pakistan at the start of 1965 Indo-Pak war.

The older F-86s and B-57s were being supported with difficulty by clandestine and piecemeal purchases of spares and by some indigenous manufacture. To support the dwindling numbers of B-57s, it was decided to procure additional aircraft of similar category to supplement the bomber force.

The Il-28 (a Soviet aircraft to be supplied by China) was selected, primarily because it was readily available from a friendly source and also most likely due to its very affordable cost.

A team of three experienced B-57 aircrews led by Gp Capt . Rais A Rafi, a B-57 veteran from the 1965 war, along with Flt Lt's Khadim ul Bashar, Sikandar Mehmood and navigators Flt Lt's Muhammad Akhtar, Salah ud Din Qazi, and Iftikhar Ghauri proceeded to China for conversion on the Il-28 and their subsequent ferry to Pakistan.

The tail gunners were NCOs of the Armament trade. The team also included two engineers and about 15 airmen from different trades. The aircrew flew to Beijing via Dacca and then onwards to the airbase at Xinjian where PAF pilots had already been trained on the F-6 and seemed to have created a very good impression of their abilities.

The Chinese hosts were very courteous, friendly and keen on training PAF aircrew and also at the same time wanted to learn from them. Rais A Rafi takes up the story: "They had selected Muslim Kitchen staff from Sinkiang province who prepared food according to our Muslim requirements.

I remember the name of the cook, Abdul Hye. We often called him HYE and would respond by answering HAAYE, which in Chinese or Uighur language meant” YES SIR”. It was great but innocent fun.

Only the interpreter “friends” knew English. But soon we could talk to each other in sign language. After formal receptions and “Kumbais” of “Maut Aiees”, which some of us enjoyed, we settled down to normal life. They operated the Air Force like the Army, based upon the Soviet system.

Most of the senior commanders were serving Army. But squadron commander downwards were Air Force. The Base Commander often sat in the mobile. The morning briefing started with reading of Mao’s sayings from the Red Book. Everyone had to fly strictly according to the briefed exercise; not a slight diversion was allowed.

Our instructors sitting by the side and interpreter, often a woman, sitting in the tail gunner’s cockpit had no problem in teaching us. We could have gone solo after one dual [flight] but had to do four sorties as per the syllabus. Result were very good. Their flight safety and maintenance record was outstanding.

Throughout our flying, we could not put a single unserviceability on their Form 781. No accidents either. Amazing. At the end of the course their senior officers from Beijing HQ with Gp Capt Inam ul Haq, our Air Attache, visited us. I was asked to give my impressions. After consulting Gp Capt Inam, I pointed out to our friends that they ought to give more freedom of flying to their pilots. This was appreciated."

The aircrew returned to Pakistan after completing their conversion and after approximately a month proceeded back to Hotien in a C-130 and this time lead by Air Commodore F.S. Hussain, along with several F-6 pilots to ferry the aircraft to Pakistan.

After the usual Chinese welcome, the F-6s took off under the leadership of Wg Cdr Mian Sadruddin. The three Il-28s, to be officially known as B-56 in PAF, took off for Pakistan, led by Wg Cdr Rais A Rafi. The aircraft flew in trail with no radar coverage, and only relying on radio compasses, joined over the clouds and flew over the Himalayas, which they could not see due to extensive cloud cover, hoping to home to Gilgit.

The navigators took a sigh of relief when Gilgit beacon responded. The aircraft maintained a strict RT silence, so there was no contact with the F-6 formation and while the F-6s landed in Peshawar due to their short range, the B-56s pressed on to Sargodha.

After a quick refuelling stop, the three aircraft took off for Mauripur where they landed just before dusk. Next day Rais A. Rafi gave a dual check to Air Cdre Masroor Hussain, the Base Commander. After an assessment of the aircraft based on aircrews’ feedback, it was decided not to fly this type against heavily defended targets.

The Il-28, being a first-generation makeshift light bomber, had hard controls and was found to be very unmaneuverable. It was difficult to fly at night, particularly at low level and was deemed no match to for the B-57.

In PAF it was nicknamed by the pilots as TONGA (horse cart), who had hoped that they would not be required to fly it over AAA-infested IAF airfields as that would be a one-way journey.

However, No. 8 Sqn was converted to B-56 and started operating the type along with B-57s. The squadron carried out some day and night skip bombing attacks at Sonmiani using B-56s and also took part in a PAF level day and night exercise, while deployed at Mianwali air base.

The aircraft was deemed very reliable from the serviceability point of view but considered a dead duck operationally. It was kept for use in emergency situations and that too against only lightly defended targets.

An idea to use these aircraft for maritime roles was conceived and considered but abandoned quickly as the aircraft presumably did not offer much space and flexibility to house the required equipment.

Due to their limited operational utilisation the aircraft were retired after just a few years and well before they could be used in the 1971 war.

The three aircraft were seen parked at Mauripur for several years.

 

[ghazi52]

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Air Operations Syndicate

@AirOpsSyndicate

In an interview for Air Force Monthly with PAF Dett Commander Air Cdre Asad by Alan Warnes, the Air Commodore said that hopefully in near future PAF J-10CE will attend Anatolian Eagle Exercise. He also clarified that there are no restrictions on PAF's use of these fighters!

 

[Clairvoyant]

Paf Mirages at war.

Falcons at Anatolian Eagle from Combat Aircraft magazine.

 

[ghazi52]

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[ghazi52]

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Aurangzeb, the Hawker Sea Fury (Serial-K857) named after the Prince of Swat State in 1949 to honour the Wali of Swat's contributions for the Royal Pakistan Air Force during its early stages. Gives you an idea of the bond between the Pakistani nation and her Air Force.

 

[ghazi52]

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