Old/New Articles and News item about PAF

[ghazi52]

Peshawar, Early 1950s, No. 9 Sqn & the Formation of Red Dragons

by Fred Isaacs

At that point in time the entire RPAF fighter air defense rested on the shoulders of number 5, 9 and 14 squadron pilots based at Peshawar. The wing was commanded by W/C Garred Cole seconded from the RAF In January 1950 those of us from 4GD assigned to fly fighters reported in to Station Peshawar and were spread thinly among the three undermanned squadrons. P/Os Kabir Khan, Fred Isaacs (writer) ‘Jan’ Janjua and M.Pir. were posted to 9(dragon) Squadron was commanded by S/L Bertie Mirza with F/L Abdul Rahim (AR) Khan the Flight Commander. Making up the rest of the complement were F/Os Trevor Gotting 2GD, and Ghanni Khan3GD, a grand total of eight pilots. From time to time Risalpur flight instructors would keep their fighter skills current by flying with the squadrons on a temporary basis. F/Os MZ (Mitty) Masud and Pat Callaghan flew with 9 squadron from time to time. Once you have met your CO and fellow pilots, cleared in to the Station, and were settled in quarters the first priority was to buy a bicycle, the mode of transport for most personnel. The daily routine was breakfast then biking down to the flight line to start the days flying. We jousted on our mounts, jumped over hurdles and flew bike formations on the way down. At about ten the tea wallah was around for the break. When summer temperatures made aircraft skins unbearable to touch all flying operations were started and ended earlier in the day. It was then quiet time indoors until tea time and the cakeman making his rounds again. His cakes tasted so good. He allowed ‘tick’ without reservation knowing the pilots were good for it and knew just when to appear with his book on paydays to collect. Hashim and Azam Khan were the squash and tennis professionals who looked after the lawn tennis courts and squash courts... These facilities were well used in the cooler evenings. The standard of squash in the Mess was high due to their influence. Most of the Mess staff were also good players. Sometime later a fund was started to fund Hashim’s first participation in the world squash championships staged in London, UK. all the officers contributed and were rewarded with a win by Hashim. The fighter-bomber Wings main objective was to be ready for any hostilities and to this end the squadrons were in constant training in battle formations, practice weapons delivery and watch and ward duties. The well used air-to-ground range at Jamrud, a few minutes flight time away provided facilities for air/ground strafing, rocket firing and dive bombing enabling young pilots to gain valuable expertise in these exercises. At this time there was not an air-to-air firing range established, air to air attacks using gun cameras was the next best thing. For watch and ward the squadrons rotated through the forward airstrip located in Fort Miranshah which was manned by the Tochi Scouts who provided a security perimeter. The aircraft hangers were located within the fort gates as was the messing and living accommodation. Physically lower in elevation than the surrounding area it was not uncommon during the rainy season to be woken up at night with water levels right up to the beds forcing evacuation. The aircraft were wheeled out on the tarmac outside for daily flight operations. From here watch and ward flights were carried out with live operations from time to time in close air support of the Tochi Scouts in their actions against the trouble maker of the time, the Faquir of Ipi. No 9 squadron flight line at Miranshah NWFP. Visiting P/O Hyat Khan handing P/O Jan Janjua a practice bomb to be mounted on his Tempest fighter-bomber. At Miranshah there was also a weapons range co-located on the airfield. The locals were avid metal scavengers. After each air to ground live firing pass they would rush out to pick up the empty shell casings then dash back under cover before the aircraft had completed a circuit and was in position for another run.. Live 500 pound bombing exercise by No.9 Squadron in 1950. L to R: P’Os M. Pir, Fred Isaacs, F/L ‘AR’ Khan, S/L ‘Bertie’ Mirza, F/O Trevor Gotting, F/O ‘Mitty’ Masud and P/O Kabir Khan. P/O Janjua was flying. Not shown in the picture above was P/O Ghanni Khan. He was killed one day performing a split S dive at high altitude, his Tempest running into high speed compressibility effects that resulted in a loss of control with his aircraft breaking up. These effects were first encountered by WW2 Spitfire pilots diving during the air battles over Britain. This drove home to us recent arrivals that apart from the thrills, fighter operations were a very serious business. In July the squadrons were equipped with the new Hawker Fury fighter bomber a development of the Hawker Tempest. With a more powerful engine, a five- bladed prop and improved technology the Furies had far better performance and were even more reliable. Besides receiving multi scratches from sharp metal edges in the wartime produced Tempest cockpit we grew to expecting engine failures in these old aircraft. An engine failure took the life of our first course fatality which occurred early in his conversion training in Risalpur, another caused Pir to make a forced landing in the Peshawar area but he was unhurt. Fate caught up with him later though when flying a Fury, he pulling too tight a turn on final approach and stalling in killing himself. The Fury had a higher wing loading. In July AR Khan was promoted to S/L becoming squadron CO. F/L Saeedullah Khan was posted in as Flight Commander. Whenever the squadron was in Miranshah we got to expect game birds for breakfast courtesy of AR , he was an avid hunter and partridge and pheasant varieties abounded in these parts. A favored flight time of his was the late evening sorties enjoying the spectacular sunsets in the hills and valleys around Miranshah when it was cooler and less bumpy. As each GD course graduated from Risalpur the squadrons strength increased. One veteran pilot ‘Boss’ Ahmad rejoined the Air force and came to 9 squadron. Some names remembered were Durrani, Akhtar, Latif and Zulfiquar. We were looking at some nine or ten pilots. Some were lost in accidents. One went in during the annual air display in Karachi getting ‘target fascination’ on an air to ground strafing run. Another needlessly killed himself showing off a slow low roll over his home town. We lost Kabir, a passenger in a Bristol Freighter crash into a mountain. Every year to celebrate Independence Day the whole wing would fly down to Karachi to participate in an air Display then back to Peshawar. Training aircraft from Risalpur were also there tasked with displaying their formations and flying skills. The fighter bombers displayed their accuracy in strafing, rocket firing and bombing targets set up in the in-field area within easy sight of the spectator stands. Mess life in Peshawar in those days included dinner and dance parties. In addition to seconded RAF personnel there was a sizable contingent of Polish air and ground crew, both officers and other ranks who had signed up for service with the RPAF. Alcohol was available in all the Messes. A group of us younger pilots formed the ‘Ragmop’ gang singing the song ragmop at the doors of the more friendly married officers who would invite us in for drinks. The Peshawar Club also held functions which were well attended. On leaving the function it was a must stop at the tikka kebab vendor’s stall parked at the gate. He did a roaring business selling us hot tikkas which were so tasty, especially after a few drinks during the night. Left: F/O TH Gotting on liaison Harvard at Fort Miranshah. A Harvard in camouflage colours was on the wing inventory based in Peshawar which was used for conveniently carrying single VIPs like Political Agents, Army senior officers etc. on trips to various destinations like Wana, Chitral, Miranshah, Fort Sandeman and other locations which had landing strips and closest to the places they had to visit in the execution of their responsibilities. It was flown generally by the more experienced pilots in the wing. In April ’51 S/L Zaffar Chaudhry replaced AR as squadron CO. A squash enthusiast he soon organized a squadron team and we would fly to Risalpur to challenge the college team. When the squadron was in Miranshah for a spell Zaffar broke the tedium by running track and field events on a squadron “Sports Day’ with participation by the Tochi Scouts as well. W/C Garrard Cole and A/Cmd ‘Barney’Keily also attended. Air Cdre Keily (RAF) presenting a prize. S/L Chaudhry at right of picture, F/L Saeedullah sitting in whites at centre. It can be fairly said that the man who pioneered formation aerobatics in the PAF was Zaffar Chaudhry. An excellent aerobatics display pilot himself in 1951 he made it happen. Informed that the outgoing CinC, AVM Atcherly (RAF), also known as a keen aerobatics pilot in his younger days, would be coming to Peshawar on his final farewell visit Zaffar started the ball rolling. Choosing pilots only from within the squadron he assembled, trained and successfully flew the first four-place formation aerobatics team demonstration, a showing never done before on the sub-continent. Putting F/O Trevor Gotting, an experienced squadron pilot in the lead Zaffar took the right wing and Saeedullah took the left in a three-plane formation. They practiced over the next few days to a comfortable degree performing loops, barrel rolls, steep turns and semi-stall turns. It was time for the slot to be filled to form the basic box. Since both Zaffar and Saeed had been my instructors at Risalpur who had given me my basic flying skills I was the logical choice, a known quantity. To ease my apprehensions Zaffar first checked me out in the dual-Fury flying the slot position behind the other two; I got the hang of it finding it not as difficult as I thought it would be. The next step was four-plane close-formation aerobatics, the historic moment or moments for the Air Force as the four Furies took off and climbed out in box formation then came back over the airfield. We went first into steep turns then barrel rolls and finally loops keeping tight station and being watched by our peers on the ground. The day was the thirteenth and Trevor joked about that being an unlucky number. The big five bladed prop disc of my Fury was just a few feet away from the other three airframes and one had to be handy with the throttle and steady with the stick to match leads attitude and accelerate or decelerate to maintain position pulling ‘G’ while ignoring the topsy turvey earth/sky spin outside. My job was helped considerably by the steady station keeping flown by the two experienced wingmen Zaffar and Saeed. Thereafter we practiced almost every day for the rest of the month of April. The ‘Red Dragons’ sitting in their box-formation positions on the tarmac outside 9 Sqn crew room - April 1951. Lead Trevor Gotting, right wing Zaffar Chaudhry, left wing Saeedullah and box Fred Isaacs. I was given a bad fright one practice day. We had completed a barrel roll and rolled out at the bottom quite low. At that point in time Trev in Lead thought Zaffar had called on the radio for another roll. In fact it had been S/L Johnny Rollo (Co 14 Sqn) in another aircraft watching the show from afar and not appreciating our low altitude. With us hanging on Lead gained as much altitude as he could before banking into the maneuver. Once around over the top inverted and rolling out right side up I got a shock to see my Fury, the lowest in the formation, almost tickling the tops of the trees. Needless to say our procedures were tightened up especially as to radio calls and minimum altitudes. The big day came on 2 May 51 when the team gave a low level formation aerobatics display for the outgoing CinC Atcherly and also witnessed by the whole Station Peshawar and Group Headquarters personnel. After the event Zaffar received the CinCs personal congratulations with pride for the squadron. To capture the team performing sometime later FS Hussain, who was then the Flight Commander of 5 Sqn. flew in another Fury mounted with an oblique camera to take a picture of us inverted at the top of a barrel roll over the historic Khyber Pass. That photo made it into the British ‘Flight’ magazine (shown following). ‘The blue sky beneath me and green earth above’, "Red Dragons" over the Khyber area. During the summer reports circulated that new jet fighters had been purchased from the UK and were arriving in Karachi. Soon postings to the newly activated No 11 (jet) fighter squadron were received at the squadron. Gotting was the first followed by Durrani Janjua and Isaacs.​

 

[GriffinsRule]

Though this is not related to the PAF directly, I didn't want to start a new thread. However the article is very informative and should inform members about the Have Glass and the reason why it is being implemented even now, in its latest iterations, for legacy aircraft.

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HAVE GLASS

You can't turn an F-16 into a stealth fighter, it will always show up on enemy radar. But, by reducing its radar signature, you can make it a lot less visible.
Jon Lake explains how the United States Air Force has set about doing just that.


STEALTH IS WIDELY hyped, but rarely well understood. Stealth, or low observability (LO), does not make an aircraft invisible to radar. However, if an aircraft’s radar cross section (RCS) can be reduced, it will appear ‘smaller’ on radar and may be detected later, at shorter range.

Today’s fifth-generation types incorporate a degree of low observability that gives them a much reduced RCS compared to conventional aircraft. But the low RCS is a function of optimized design, purpose-built structure and advanced specialized materials.

Radar cross section can be measured in dBm², decibels per square meter, or more simply in square meters. However, in the latter case, the radar cross section of an aircraft is NOT the same as its actual cross-sectional area.

Instead, the RCS is quoted in terms of the equivalent area of a metal sphere that would reflect back the same radar energy as the aircraft, when viewed at the same altitude, from straight ahead. For example, the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor has a frontal RCS of 0.0001-0.0002m², equivalent to a marble-sized sphere, while the F-35A has an RCS of about 0.0015m² – equivalent to a golf ball-sized metal sphere.

This kind of RCS makes an immediate tactical difference – an F-22 can be detected by a fighter radar, but only at ranges of 5-10km (APG-68 and APG-80), far too late for defensive systems to react.

Of course, the LO fifth-generation fighters are designed for something close to ‘all aspect’ stealth – having a low radar cross section when viewed from any angle. This is difficult to achieve, and some aircraft that are thought of as being LO aircraft are not stealthy from all angles. Even those that are, will often have to carefully calculate where they can turn and what bank angles they can use in order to remain as inconspicuous as possible.

But this kind of full-on stealth, or true LO, can only be achieved by an aircraft designed to be stealthy from the very start, with appropriate shaping, including the carefully tailored orientation and curvature of surfaces, alignment of edges and the shielding of any ducts or cavities. The LO aircraft will use carefully-selected materials, including advanced composites and radar-absorbing materials (RAM), metamaterials as well as other artificial types, and will benefit from active and passive cancellation of a threat radar’s ‘skin return’.

Conventional, non-LO combat aircraft have much larger radar cross sections – that of the B-52 has been calculated at 100m², the F-15 at 25m², the F-16 and MiG-29 at 5m², and the Super Hornet and Rafale at 1m², with the Eurofighter Typhoon variously reported at the same level, or at 0.5m² (GlobalSecurity.Org).

So, while these aircraft are visible to radar at tactically useful ranges, reducing their RCS will delay detection, and may make EW tactics and techniques more effective. If an F-16’s RCS was to be reduced to something equivalent to that of a Super Hornet, for example, radar detection range would be shortened by about 30-45% – something that could be critical to mission success, or even survival!

Legacy boost
Since the USAF has long since abandoned its once-planned ‘all stealth’ combat force, and with F-35 procurement proceeding more slowly than had originally been expected, boosting the effectiveness of legacy platforms has become a priority.

Air National Guard wings in Alabama, Vermont and Wisconsin have started to receive F-35As, but about 300 Block 30 F-16C/Ds still fly with ANG and Air Force Reserve units, some of the oldest fighters in the Air Force inventory. It has been estimated that it could take more than a decade to replace them all. Nor is there any immediate plan to retire the later Block F-16Cs operated by three regular USAF units.

These are the 20th Fighter Wing at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina (with the 55th, 77th and 79th Fighter Squadrons); the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany (480th Fighter Squadron) and the 35th Fighter Wing at Misawa AB, Japan (13th and 14th Fighter Squadrons). These aircraft are also operated by the 148th Fighter Wing at Duluth ANG base, Minnesota (179th Fighter Squadron ‘Bulldogs’) and the 169th Fighter Wing at Joint National Guard Base McEntire, South Carolina (157th Fighter Squadron ‘Swamp Foxes’).

As a result, the Air Force now plans to conduct a service-life extension program on more than 800 of its roughly 900 F-16s, with only the oldest Block 25 models scheduled to retire imminently. The USAF will thus continue to rely on the F-16 for decades to come, and if those aircraft are to be as operationally useful and as survivable as possible, then they need to be as stealthy as they can reasonably be.

Surface treatments
It would be possible to drastically reduce an F-16’s RCS by making major structural changes – reshaping the engine intake and inlet ducts and revising the engine afterburner nozzle. This has actually been undertaken on various F-16 research aircraft, mainly in support of the F-35 program. But this kind of major structural modification is neither practical nor affordable on a larger, wider scale, and the incorporation of a diverterless supersonic intake into a production variant of the F-16 is not feasible, despite the RCS reductions that would result.

But surface treatments are possible and these can make a real difference. The importance of surface finish to an aircraft’s radar cross section can be gauged by the Royal Navy’s experience during the Falklands War. As the Task Force exercised while it sailed south, it became clear that there was a significant disparity between the RCS of different individual Sea Harrier airframes. Investigation revealed that this disparity was down to the amount of WD- 40 (a spray oil used to repel moisture and inhibit corrosion) applied to the aircraft. Paint contaminated by WD-40 was found to be more reflective of radar energy.

The designers of the Lockheed F-117 tackled the problem by completely coating the aircraft with 2,000lbs of RAM, while the F-35 uses a range of special techniques and technologies, including radar-absorbing structures for the fuselage and leading edges, plus paint-type RAM and an Infrared (IR) top coat. RAM is embedded into the aircraft’s skin, making the entire airframe a radio frequency grid, that behaves like a single resistance circuit pathway, cancelling the radar energy that hits it.

But treatments, and especially surface coatings and edge treatments, can be applied to existing designs in order to reduce their RCS. The F-16 has benefited from a long-running program of improvements to minimize its RCS, under the name Have Glass.

Have Glass
The first phase, Have Glass I, covered the addition of an indium-tin-oxide layer to the gold-tinted cockpit canopy. This was a vapor-deposited coating, which was applied in a similar way to the application of coatings to sunglasses. The gold tinting formed a very thin and very delicate film, which was reflective to radar frequencies, and tended to hide the ejection seat and pilot’s head from radar.

When applied to Dutch F-16As, the canopy fi lm was known as the Pacer Bond modification. The first to be modified (J-358) was delivered on September 5, 1986.

The Have Glass II program saw some 1,700 F-16s receiving further changes. Have Glass II encompassed two separate modifications, known as Pacer Mud and Pacer Gem I/II.

Pacer Mud was a modification that reduced RCS, adding FMS-3049 RAM to several areas of the airframe, including the air intake, with RAM foam installed behind the radar antenna. The RAM coating contained ferromagnetic particles embedded in a high-dielectric-constant polymer base. The dielectric material slowed down the incoming radar wave and the ferromagnetic particles absorbed the energy. The small reflection from the front face of the absorber was ‘cancelled’ by the residual reflection from the structure beneath it.

Overall, the RAM covered about 60% of the F-16's structure (mainly forward and side facing areas) in 10-12mm thickness, adding 100kg to the empty aircraft weight.

Pacer Gem entailed the application of an FMS-2026 top coat that used fiberglass particles to reduce the infrared signature. Relatively few aircraft received the Pacer Gem upgrade, because the costs were too high and the cure times were much longer.

Have Glass II was primarily applied to ‘Wild Weasel’ F-16CJ aircraft (now designated as Block 50/52 F-16CM/DMs) tasked with the SEAD role – attacking deadly surface-to-air missile sites. These were mainly assigned to Shaw AFB, Eglin AFB and Spangdahlem AFB.

The new paint had a distinct metallic sheen and was applied using the same CASPER (Computer Aided Spray Paint Expelling Robot) system used for the F-22. The use of paint-spraying robots allowed the operator to reach confined areas, such as the inlet ducts and to work without stepping on the aircraft.

Aging disgracefully
The paint looks great on first coming out of the paint barn, but does become metallic and dirty looking in a short period of time. It was also not very resilient, and Have Glass aircraft often had a grubby, faded appearance with a flaking finish. It remains unclear as to whether that was due to the paint itself, or to new ‘environmentally friendly’ primers used on the aircraft.

This original Have Glass I/II phase was estimated to reduce the RCS of an F-16 by about 15%, but more was to come. Since 2012 (and possibly a little before), USAF F-16s have started to receive a new, singletone, dark-gray color scheme, similar to that applied to the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter.

The new, single-color paint scheme marks a departure from the two-tone gray scheme long associated with the F-16, and the new ferromagnetic paint, which can absorb radar energy, may be more robust and less prone to deterioration than the previous Have Glass I/II paint.

Some Have Glass V aircraft may appear to have a different colored nose, because radar-absorbing paint cannot be applied to the dielectric radome (nor indeed can most conventional aircraft paints), as it may disrupt the signals from the F-16’s own radar.

But while there are clear similarities with the F-35 color scheme, Have Glass V is not an attempt to match the F-35’s low-observability characteristics – which would be impossible without a groundup redesign. It will, however, deliver a significant boost to the F-16’s survivability and operational capability, and it promises to deliver a performance advantage over competing fighter aircraft, with several reports suggesting that a Have Glass V F-16 will, on average, have a 1.2m² radar cross section, compared with about 5m² for an ‘untreated’ F-16, straight off the line.

This new Have Glass V, or ‘Have Glass 5th-generation’ paint, was initially applied to the SEAD-assigned Block 50 F-16CM (formerly F-16CJ) aircraft, but, in December 2019, the first Block 30 F-16 to receive the Have Glass V paint was rolled out from the Iowa Air National Guard Paint Facility in Sioux City. The aircraft was assigned to the 149th Fighter Wing, Texas ANG, flying out of Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland. Interestingly, the two-letter tail code, serial number and squadron markings were all applied in black instead of light gray.

Less detectable signature
In Europe, the new Have Glass V paint scheme has been applied by SABCA at its Gosselies (Charleroi) facility, in Belgium. SABCA is responsible for depot-level MRO work on USAF F-16s operated in Europe, and for the maintenance and upgrade of the type from nine different operators.

Apart from surface treatments, one of the most crucial things that can be done to make a fourth-generation fighter stealthier is to better manage its electronic signature, making it less detectable through the emissions that it puts out. This means using secure, frequency-agile communications systems and datalinks, and sensors which incorporate LPI (low probability of intercept) technologies.

This is one of the most significant advantages of modern AESA radars and it is no coincidence that in December 2019 the US Air Force awarded a contract to Northrop Grumman to install the company’s AN/APG-83 SABR (scalable agile beam radar) AESA radar in some 72 ANG F-16s, with an eventual requirement for 372 radars.

Fighting Falcons at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland received the first AN/APG-83 radars in January 2020 and in July, the Operational Flight Program Combined Test Force, 40th Flight Test Squadron and the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron at Eglin AFB, tested the APG-83 in a four-ship formation for the first time. This mission included F-16s and F-15s, with 12 fighter pilots participating, including Active Duty, Reservist, Guard, civilian and contractor aircrew.

None of these improvements will turn the F-16 into a fifth-generation fighter, and none will render it invisible to enemy radar, but they will make it less visible and they promise to make it a whole lot more effective operationally.

 

[ghazi52]

The Scud Missile Syndrome

Columnist Col (Retd) EAS BOKHARI
discusses the various aspects of the Russian SCUD missile

I have somewhat deliberately chosen the Scud missile for this presentation for its notoriety, waywardness in accuracy yet at the same time being the forerunner of many a missile in the Third World. Scud B/C are older Soviet missiles with range up to 1000 Km - but some countries have tried to reverse engineer these missiles - and even traded range for warhead to reach out to specific targets - the case in point being the use of the missile Al-Hussein by Iraq in the Gulf War 1991.
A list of the countries which have/had possessed this missile during the heydays of Soviet Union is a long one, and is indicated separately.

Perhaps the biggest users of this missile were Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Iraq and Iran used this in the battle of cities and Afghanistan tried to target POF Wah during the Afghan War - but the wayward missile landed somewhere near Havelian. (May be they might have tried to target Havelian where there is a large explosive factory producing propellants for the weapons produced in the POF.) All the same, the Afghani intention was not quite clear - and only a marginal damage was done which was not serious at all. So the CEP of the Scud could be many hundred meters - and at the best the missile could be used for engagement of area targets.

India is not listed by famous Aaron Karp in his book 'Ballistic Missile Proliferation - the Politics and Technics' - but I have a strong suspicion that the Indians must have benefited from Soviet assistance in their missile fabrication - especially the earlier ones like 'Prithvi' et al.

Writing about the Scud B - Karp says '.... The Russian Scud B (R-17) missile is the very symbol of ballistic missile proliferation. Scud technologies, relatively simple and widely available, pose the most serious challenge to international control of ballistic missiles in the post cold-war world. Essentially a perfected V-2 (German) rocket, the Scud missile was developed in the mid-1950s for the Soviet Army and improved to reach its most successful form in the mid-1960s. Unlike the V-2, the Scud can be stored for years. It can be transported fully fuelled and set up and fired in 90 minutes. The Scud has been used in the six regional conflicts since 1973 ... Currently deployed by at least 17 countries, it remains in production in North Korea. Despite its age and accuracy it can be mastered by emerging powers, whether they seek merely to deploy it operationally, to modify its capabilities or to reverse engineer it for local production....'

Scud therefore may be considered as a basic model for missile production for most of the Third World - and of course every new manufacturer tries his best to inject some variation for improvement and tinker with the basic ballistic performance of the Soviet (Ex) missile. Just to illustrate this point - the much trumpeted Iraqi Al-Hussein and the Iranian Oghab - are variations of the Soviet Scud. These variations at the very best have proven a deterrent - and nothing else. They did not improve its ballistics.

Here is a pertinent para from Karp about the Scud and its variations '... At the maximum ranges of Scud technology, nuclear weapons cease to compensate efficiently for missile's low accuracy (Iraqi Al Hussein and North Korean Scud - C have a CEP of about 2 Km) ... Using the missile like the Iraqi Al-Abbas or North Korean No Dong I with a CEP of 3 Km at a range of 900 Km, and armed with a 20-Kt nuclear weapon, the chance of destroying even an unprotected target is less than 27 per cent. Destruction of a city centre or an unsheltered military target under these conditions would require at least five (5) missiles despite their nuclear armament.' For more hardened targets even more than a dozen Scuds are needed - which indeed is not cost effective. The use of aircraft - and if the conventional gun batteries could be used is perhaps the real answer.

Scuds can be used both emplaced in well protected bunkers as well as on mobile launchers - in fact the latter is the more normal way of using these missiles - and the Iraqis did use these while firing from mobile launchers. There may have been a few cases where the missile was kept in a fixed place and probably the missile site was demolished by incessant and massive Allied aerial engagements.

It is interesting to see how the Iraqis used their Scuds. In this context the book 'Desert Warrior' by HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan cites many examples of the Iraqi innovation. This of course is their trading off of weight of warhead with range. (See Graph) There is no doubt that the Allies if at all they had any worry then it was the use of Scuds and Chemical/Biological weapons by Iraq. Scuds of course were used by Saddam. No chemical weapons were used.

It is generally accepted that the Iraqis used their Scuds behind a cloud cover - and perhaps most of these were mobile. There is an interesting - though not very convincing statement by Gen Schwarzkopf made on 18 January, 1991. This runs as below:

'... This morning, the United States Air Force found three mobile erected launchers with missiles on board inside Iraq ... Those three mobile erected launchers have been destroyed ... In addition to that, at the same time we found eight more mobile erected launchers in the same location. We are currently attacking those launchers, and we have confirmed the destruction of three more of those mobile erected launchers and we are continuing to attack the others....'

According to Gen Khaled - a member of his staff who had a very considerable experience with Scuds expressed skepticism about the US General's statement. 'It was most unlikely, he wrote that Iraqis would move their launchers during the day and expose such a highly valuable asset to air attack. In his view, the American pilots probably destroyed decoys, rather than launchers ... Or if they were not decoys, they could have been long-bed vehicles used to carry missiles and which are similar in shape to launchers ... he conceded that there was just a chance - one in a thousand - that the pilot had destroyed real launchers and the Iraqis had simply lost their heads.' The American General has insisted on such statements and has even said this in his book '...Our bombers had obliterated every known Scud site in Western Iraq, destroying thirty six fixed launchers and ten mobile ones....'

The above statement does not look to be true - for one thing there is no such thing as a ' fixed launcher' as all Scuds are mounted on long wheeled vehicles.

Gen Khaled writes about the Iraqi use of Scuds thus '...In the 'Great Scud Hunt' - the Coalition was defeated by the ingenuity of Iraqi Scud crew - but also by weather. Iraq launched Scuds only in bad weather, when the cloud ceiling was 3000 feet or below ...The US Combat Air Patrols did not have the accuracy to detect the exact launch point through the cloud cover - and transmit it to the pilots waiting above.'

And then of course there is the promotional episode of the performance of Patriots which I have already covered in one of my previous presentations. This is corroborated by Mark Crispin Miller writing in International Herald Tribune of 25 January, 1992 when he said 'Desert Scam - Not one mobile Scud Launcher was destroyed....'

A Saudi Arabian officer who had the experience of Scud operations for about two years in Egypt has suggested the following procedure for location of Scuds - which appears to be the standard procedure. (In the procedure outlined below - Al-Riyadh is the Scud target.)

Riyadh should be placed on the arc equal to the maximum range of Scud.

A careful study of the circumfer-ence of this arc - especially the availability of roads/potential hiding places should be made.

As discussed above and as the Iraqis did not move launchers during the day time the most probable time of Scud attack would be between nightfall and first light. But within this time frame and taking into account various other procedures and movements et al the most likely time could be between 1910 to 0520 hours.
The Scud launch - having been completed the launcher took 7 to 10 minutes to vacate its posi-tion. While the US satellites took two minutes to report the loca-tion of the missile site. Thus the Coalition had just 5 minutes time to react i.e. the Coalition bombers must be somewhere 35 to 70 miles away from the Iraqi site. This normally did not happen.

I suppose this simple procedure was not really adopted by the Coalition planners.

Finally - though I cannot be absolutely sure that the new crop of missiles, like Prithvi, Ghauri, and Shahab-3 et al are in some way descendants of the age old and durable Scud - these are definitely its derivatives in a big way.

It is known for certain that large scale tinkering and doctoring with the original Soviet missile has been done by many countries - but the ballistic results achieved were not satisfactory.

 

[ghazi52]

PAF - Quality if not quantity!

Lindsay Peacock visits the Pakistan Air Force as it attempts to modernize its front-line inventory in the face of tight defence budgets. ​ Over the past decade, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has undergone a quite significant transformation with regard to the equipment that it operates. Gone are many of the Shenyang F-6s that once constituted the backbone of its air arm, their place having been taken by a mix of 'high tech' western warplanes like the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon and less sophisticated hardware such as the Nanchang A-5-III Fantan and the Chengdu F-7P ‘Skybolt’. Valuable though this infusion of new equipment is, Pakistani air power is still in the unhappy position of being quantitatively inferior to neighbouring India, which is still perceived as posing the biggest threat to the nation's well-being. Looking at the qualitative situation, the picture is hardly any brighter, especially now that the USA has opted to suspend Foreign Military Sales (FMS) assistance as an expression of its displeasure over Pakistan's nuclear power programme. That decision probably didn't come as too great a surprise to Pakistan but it is certainly a serious blow to PAF plans, for the service had anticipated taking delivery of a further 71 F-16s with effect from 1992. Now, unless there is a major change of American policy, these will not materialise and it is hardly surprising that there are some in the PAF who perceive the USA as being purely 'fair-weather friends'. Pakistan's difficulties are compounded by the fact that it is far from being a wealthy country and is therefore not in a position to simply throw money at a problem until it goes away. Cash that is spent on defence could be employed equally well on a score of other projects so it is clearly a case of ensuring that whatever money is available is spent as wisely as possible and in a way that offers the best 'dividend'. That naturally exerts influence on procurement policy and the PAF is now well versed in steering a careful course between the super-sophisticated and highly desirable but inordinately expensive and the considerably less costly but much more numerous 'kits'. ​ Another way in which the PAF satisfies this requirement is in the pursuit of excellence with regard to its combat echelons. Paradoxically, though, that pursuit is by its very nature an expensive procedure and there is a high wastage rate as pilots progress through the training system, with individuals being weeded out all the way along the line. The end result is felt to be well worth the expense involved, however, and personal observations have certainly convinced the author that the average PAF pilot is almost certainly possessed of superior skills when compared with, say, an average American pilot. As to those who are rated above average, they compare favourably to the very best in a host of western air arms. PAF organisation has also been subject to change during the past ten years, with one of the most important occurrences relating to the move of Air Headquarters from Peshawar to Chaklala in March 1983, so that it might be closer to the seat of government in Islamabad. Today, the PAF is headed by an Air Chief Marshal who occupies the post of Chief of Air Staff. Assisting him are the Vice-Chief (an Air Marshal) and four Deputy Chiefs (all Air Vice Marshals) who specialise in the areas of operations, administration, training and engineering. ​ Shortly before the headquarters was relocated, three regional agencies were created in 1981-82 so as to facilitate command and control in peacetime. Specifically, these are the Northern Air Command (with headquarters at Peshawar), the Central Air Command (Sargodha), and the Southern Air Command (Faisal). Each is headed be an Air Vice Marshal and they posses a fair degree of autonomy with regard to the planning and execution of routine operations. One other vital link exists in the higher levels of the PAF hierarchy, namely the Air Defence Command (ADC) with headquarters at Chaklala. Again headed by an Air Vice Marshal, in time of peace ADC functions mainly in an advisory capacity, monitoring activity and looking after StanEval (Standardisation and Evaluation) matters which are directly concerned with air defence. In the event of war, however, ADC would come into its own, its personnel very quickly being assigned to the Chief of the Air Staff's Battle Staff and assuming responsibility for directing the air defence of the entire country. Operational resources It is at the operational level that the last decade has perhaps been most exciting, with the new equipment alluded to earlier allowing the PAF to greatly update its combat line-up. As far as tactical resources are concerned, these are distributed amongst a total of seven major air bases, each of which is home to a 'numbered' Wing organisation. In practice, the number of squadrons assigned to a particular Wing may vary considerably, but this is probably driven as much by geographical constraints as by meeting anticipated threats. By way of illustration, No. 33 Wing at Kamra has only two squadrons while No. 32 at Masroor has five. Some attempt at consolidation of particular aircraft types at particular bases does seem to have occurred but this is far from universal, with, for example, the four tactical units at Masroor flying a mix of hardware that includes the A-5-III, F-7P and Mirage. ​ At the sharp end, some 20 squadrons presently exist, but only 12 of these are fully-fledged combat-ready units. Of those 12, two have F-16s (Nos 9 and 14 Sqn), three have F-6s (Nos 15, 17 and 23), three have F-7Ps (Nos 2, 18 and 19), two have A-5-IIIs (Nos 16 and 26), one has Mirage IIIEPs and IIIRPs (No 5) and one has Mirage 5PA2s and 5PA3s (No 8). The remaining eight squadrons are all concerned with training but that commitment varies according to the demand for pilots and almost all of them do also have operational roles to fulfil. As a consequence, staff continuation training is usually a feature of the routine flying programme. Five of these squadrons are commonly referred to as Operational Conversion Units and a good proportion of their effort is directed towards providing a steady stream of qualified aircrew to front-line outfits. Each of the five major types in the PAF inventory is supported be an 'OCU squadron' and these units comprise No 7 (A-5-III), 11 (F-16), 20 (F-7P), 22 (Mirage) and No 25 (F-6). Harking back to the varying amounts of energy directed towards training, with only some three dozen F-16s on charge, the need for new pilots in any given year is modest and No 11 Squadron is unlikely to find this task too taxing. As a result, it is therefore able to devote time to operational duties, such as annual gunnery qualification at Masroor and, on occasions, air defence alert. Conversely, the No 25 Squadron's brief is almost entirely concerned with training, for virtually all PAF pilots will begin their operational flying careers on the F-6 although a change may well come about in the next year or two as this veteran continues to decline in importance. The remaining training establishments are aimed at pilots of markedly differing levels of skill. At the top end of the scale, there is the Combat Commanders' School which is responsible for disseminating advanced fighter tactics and doctrine. This has two subordinate units, specifically the 'Mirage Squadron' (with Mirage 5PAs) and the 'F-6 Squadron' (with F-6s). Instructor staff with the CCS are generally acknowledged to be the 'best of the best' and would also have a war role to fulfil in the event of conflict. Finally, there is No 1 Fighter Conversion Unit at Mianwali. This is the first stop for students fresh from the PAF Academy at Risalpur and it is here, on the Shenyang FT-5, that they begin the process of learning how to become a fighter pilot. In theory, the FT-5 could be called upon to participate in combat - it has a 23mm gun plus a simple radar-ranging gunsight and can carry two AIM-9 Sidewinder infra-red homing air-to-air missiles - but one is inclined to think that there wouldn't be too much enthusiasm about the prospect of going to war in it. Support elements Support elements in the PAF fulfil a variety of roles. Some make a definite contribution to tactical readiness while others are engaged on tasks of a secondary nature. ​ Quite clearly falling into the first category are the brace of Falcon 20Fs that are flown by No 24 Sqn at Sargodha, for these have been heavily modified in order to provide electronic warfare training support. Also in this category are a small number of Lockheed T-33As which undertake target-towing for units detached to Masroor for gunnery training as well as for the Pakistan Army and Navy. Unusually, though, these are actually assigned to No 2 Sqn which also operates the F-7P, necessitating the creation of separate Flights for each type. As a result, 'A' Flight has the F-7Ps while 'B' Flight looks after the 'T-Birds', its modest complement including a couple of RT-33As which are mostly employed on civil-orientated duties such as mapping and aerial survey. Airlift resources are consolidated within No 35 (Composite Air Transport) Wing at Chaklala, conveniently close to the Air Headquarters where the Director Air Transport looks after tasking matters. As it has done for many years, the Lockheed Hercules serves as the PAF's work-horse, No 6 (Air Transport Support) Sqn operating a mixed fleet of C-130Bs, C-130Es and former PIA L-382B-4Cs, some of which have been in service for the best part of three decades. As its title implies, No 12 (VVIP Communications) Sqn is concerned mostly with moving high-ranking officials and dignitaries and its assets include the Presidential F27 Friendship and Falcon 20 as well as a solitary King Air 200 and a pair of Boeing 707s. The latter were also obtained from the national airline, one having a VIP interior while the other is mainly used on long-haul cargo trips. Transport elements are completed by No 41 (Light Communications) Sqn which operates single examples of the Beech Baron and Piper Seneca as well as a trio of Cessna 172s, but mention should also be made of the Transport Conversion School which provides qualified aircrew for the Hercules as and which required using aircraft 'borrowed' from No 6 Sqn. Finally half-a-dozen squadrons (No 81 to 86) provide local search and rescue cover at the air bases at Peshawar, Sargodha, Rafiqui-Shorkot, Masroor, Samungli-Quetta and Mianwali. In each case, two Alouette IIIs are operated, these being the only helicopters flown by the PAF. Pilot Training In much the same way as Cranwell occupies a prominent position in RAF history, so does Risalpur with the PAF, for it is here that students take the first tentative steps towards mastery of the air, courtesy of the PAF Academy. Responsibility for transforming raw cadets into potential officer material and imparting basic flying skills is entrusted to the College of Flying Training (CFT). A long-time resident of Risalpur, the CFT controls two separate and distinct training organisations, namely the Primary Flying Training Wing (PFTW) and the Basic Flying Training Wing (BFTW). Respectively operating the Mushshak and the T-37, each has two subordinate squadrons. ​ Candidates for pilot training with the CFT (which typically has two 80-student intakes per annum) actually spend well over three years at the Academy, beginning with a two-year BSc (Bachelor of Science) degree course. During that time, they will study a number of aviation-related disciplines such as aerodynamics, engines and navigation but the course also includes general subjects like English language, physics and mathematics as well as specialised interests which embrace topics like Islam's philosophy, Pakistan's history and international affairs. After attending no fewer than 2,640 academic classes, cadets sit the final examination which is set and conducted by Peshawar University. Only on successfully negotiating that hurdle are they permitted to move on to flying training, beginning with a one-month grading course which will entail some 7-10 hours of flying. Accomplished on Mushshaks of the PFTW, this is designed to establish whether they have the aptitude (and even the stomach) for a flying career and somewhere in the region of 20-25 per cent are 'scratched' at this point. For those who remain, the next four to five months will prove highly testing, for the rest of the PFTW course requires them to log about 50 hours on the Mushshak. Perhaps the most notable highlight is going 'solo', which should ideally be accomplished in 12-13 hours although it can be extended to 14 hours if the cadet is particularly keen and shows considerable promise in other areas such as academic studies. Failure to 'solo' in this time inevitably results in suspension and wastage is still quite high, generally being of the order of 20 per cent during the PFTW phase, which also includes some simple navigation exercises, simulated 'engine out' recovery procedures and, as a preliminary to the next stage of training, a few hours of basic instrument flying. By the time they reach the BFTW, it is not unknown for half of the initial intake of 80 to have fallen by the wayside. Those who remain are now introduced to the Cessna T-37 and in the next year those who stay the course will accumulate some 130-135 hours on this long-serving trainer. Again, 'solo' flight should be accomplished in 13 hours, after which the syllabus includes instrument, night and formation flying as well as some aerobatics, medium and low level navigation and a considerable amount of 'circuit bashing'. Wastage in this period is lower but typical attrition rates are around 15-17 per cent and may go higher - as an illustration, of 17 students who began a recent course with No 1 Basic Flying Training Squadron, only ten eventually qualified. One other important agency come under CFT control, this being the Flying Instructor’s School (FIS). As its title implies, it is responsible for 'teaching the teachers' and is mainly concerned with turning out Qualified Flying Instructors (QFIs) for service with the PAF as well as the Pakistan Army and Navy and some friendly countries. FIS graduates are usually posted first to either the PFTW or BFTW so as to build up instructional experience. Later, many move on to No 1 FCU, to one of the OCUs or even to the FIS itself. In addition to its teaching task, the FIS ensures that standards are maintained and it achieves this by periodic StanEval checks of instructional staff at Risalpur and Mianwali which are the PAF's two principle flying training establishments. Candidates for the FIS course are drawn from across the PAF, since it is usual for a pilot to complete one three-year tour of duty as an instructor during his flying career. Course duration is 22 weeks and features three distinct phases. Academics almost inevitably play a part, as does flying, with about 80 hours being logged. Perhaps most important, though, is the matter of instructional technique and much attention is devoted to the honing of teaching skill. Nevertheless, there are failures, for good pilots do not necessarily make good instructors. Intakes vary from 18 to 25 students and these are usually split fairly evenly between the Mushshak and T-37 although a particular course may be 'weighted' towards a particular type, depending on the need for qualified instructional personnel at the time. Flying instruction is by no means the only training activity that is undertaken at Risalpur, for the College of Aeronautical Engineering (CAE) is also here. A long-time resident of Korangi Creek on the outskirts of Karachi, the CAE actually moved north in May 1986 and is now an important part of the overall PAF Academy organisation. Basically, it has responsibility for the training of officers who will specialise in the fields of engineering and avionics and it normally offers two courses per annum with a typical intake numbering some 60-65 students. After some three-and-a-half years of study, the successful students leave with a BSc degree in their chosen field. In addition, the CAE also provides an extensive selection of specialist short courses for PAF officers and individuals from friendly nations. Lasting from one to seven weeks in duration, these cover a variety of technical subjects and disciplines, with aerospace engineering and avionics engineering being prominent among the list. Advanced training At Risalpur, students learn to fly, with those who are successful earning their cherished 'wings' as well as the lowly rank of Flying Officer and orders to move on to Mianwali. There, they will begin learning how to fly and fight, under the tutelage of the instructors of No 37 (Combat Training) Wing. The process of transforming the still basically raw Flying Officers into fighter pilots occupies just under a year and this period of advanced training starts with No 1 Fighter Conversion Unit (FCU). This usually runs two courses of about 20 students per course during a typical year but there is sufficient flexibility in the system to permit that level of activity to be increased. However, since the FCU is dependent upon the PAF Academy for its 'raw material', the likelihood of that additional capacity being taken up seems slight, unless there is a drastic revision of the PAF's entire training system. ​ On arrival at Mianwali, students must first complete two weeks of ground school before they are introduced to the two-seat Shenyang FT-5. A somewhat unattractive but very durable machine, the FT-5 has been in use since 1975 and the PAF is generally quite content with it. Perhaps the greatest reservation voiced by some personnel of No 1 FCU related to the fact that it is 'short-legged', with the result that training sorties seldom exceed 40 minutes. In the early stages of the course, when the learning curve is at its steepest, that is probably more than enough but as the students progress and gain confidence in the FT-5 and their own ability, longer sorties would almost certainly be beneficial. Over a period of about five months, the log approximately 85 sorties on the FT-5, the course being broken down into a number of distinct phases. These consist of transition (24 sorties), instrument flying (16), close formation (14), battle formation (6), high level navigation (3), low level navigation (2) and advanced handling including aerobatics (20). Finally, it is common to fly five or six 'flex' sorties as a lead-in to the next phase of training. Inevitably, there is wastage, the level presently running at a rate of around 15-20 per cent - understandably, FCU instructors are far from happy with this situation and efforts are being made to cut the failure rate and obtain greater return on investment. One thing the PAF will not do, however, is lower its standards. The final stage of advanced training is the prerogative of No 25 (OCU) Sqn, which, at the time of my visit, was flying a mixture of Shenyang F-6s and FT-6s, it being PAF policy to assign all first-tour pilots to a Chinese system (ideally the F-6 but also including the A-5-III). In the past, when the F-6 constituted the backbone of the PAF, that wasn't too difficult but this type is now very much on the way out and is unlikely to remain in front-line service much beyond 1994. In view of that, a policy change seems certain to occur in the near future. Currently, there is (or, at least, there appears to be) some uncertainty as to the best course of action to pursue but it is likely that the Chengdu F-7P will take over from the F-6 as the principle type flown by 'first-tourists'. Evidence to support that contention is provided by the fact that No 25 Sqn is due to convert to the F-7P (and its two-seat version, the FT-7P). If present plans are adhered to, this transition will involve nothing more than a simple renumbering exercise. To expand on that, Mianwali's other fighter unit (No 19 Sqn) was in the process of receiving the F-7P during February 1991 and had a total of eight aircraft on hand, with more in prospect. As to those additional machines, nine are expected to be FT-7Ps and it seems that on completion of the transition process, No 19 Sqn will metamorphose into No 25 (OCU) Sqn. Simultaneously, the present No 25 (OCU) Sqn will adopt the identity of No 19 Sqn, but it is not clear whether the 'new' No 19 will continue to function as an OCU or whether it will dispose of most of the FT-6s and become a purely operational outfit. However, in view of the plans to dispose of the F-6 and the diminishing need for first-tour aircrew, the latter seems most likely, especially as there are plenty of experienced F-6 pilots about who could fill executive positions until such time as the type is finally retired. In its present guise, No 25 has the F-6 and it is this unit which is responsible for the final phase of advanced training, taking students from No 1 FCU and putting them through about five weeks of ground school followed by five to six months of flying in which some 70-80 sorties are logged. Just over 30 are on the two-seat FT-6 and aspects of the syllabus include basic skills like instrument work, formation flying and navigation. Operational-type flying also figures prominently, with students being coached in air-to-ground weapons delivery techniques (including live firing of guns and rockets), 1-v-1 and 2-v-2 air combat manoeuvring (with cine film assessment) and low level and tactical strike. At the end, those who remain - normally around 75 per cent - will receive a posting to an operational squadron, but they still have plenty to learn before they can be declared truly combat-ready. The path of promotion With very few exceptions, PAF fighter pilots obtain their first taste of squadron life flying a Chinese system. Relatively unsophisticated it may be, but the F-6 (and, to a lesser extent, the A-5-III) has the advantage of being familiar and the three-year duration of this all-important first tour allows an individual to be brought on steadily and build a solid foundation of experience that will stand him in good stead later in his PAF career. At some stage, that career will usually include a tour of duty as an instructor pilot and a spell with a squadron flying a western type like the Mirage or the F-16 Fighting Falcon. After that, the path to command begins to open up and it is usual at this point to return to a Chinese system in a middle management capacity. This is usually accompanied by promotion to the rank of Squadron Leader and it allows promising individuals to obtain some first-hand knowledge of the demands of leadership. When it comes to moving further up the ladder, PAF policy seems to be rather ruthless and it is very much a case of 'up or out'. Those who are adjudged worthy to occupy more senior positions must first negotiate the hurdle of the Combat Commanders' School (CCS). In a perfect world, career officers would ideally attend the CCS after completing 12 years of service - in reality, though, they can go there at any time between nine and 12 years. If they graduate, they can expect to lead a squadron in the rank of Wing Commander. If they fail - and some inevitably do, for the CCS course is exacting - they will make no further progress. Subsequent promotion becomes ever more difficult to achieve, for the number of billets are fewer and the competition is ever more intense, since the PAF believes firmly in the pursuit of excellence. As a consequence of that belief, it is only the best and the brightest who can look forward to going right to the very top. Flying posts along the way include command of a Wing in the rank of Group Captain, and command of a Base in the rank of Air Commodore, interspersed with staff appointments. For the elite few, a limited number of Air Vice Marshal slots exist, typically as a Deputy Chief of Air Staff or as an Air Officer Commanding of ADC or one of the regional air commands. Above that, it gets very lonely indeed, with the most exalted ranks of the PAF being confined to one Air Marshal (the Vice Chief of the Air Staff) and one Air Chief Marshal (the Chief of the Air Staff). PAF operating philosophy With only a somewhat limited quantity of combat aircraft at its disposal, the PAF is very much orientated towards multi-mission capability although the geographical area of operation and the equipment that is assigned do exert influence on the nature of those missions and to some extent the amount of time that is dedicated to training for them. Regardless of the type that they fly, all PAF aircrew are expected to be proficient in air-to-air combat and all types do, as a matter of routine, pull their fair share of air defence alert (ADA) duty, although obviously, the F-16 is rather more potent than, say, the A-5-III. For a start, it has its own radar, which allows the pilot to assume responsibility for an intercept at a much earlier stage than an A-5 pilot who will be dependent upon GCI (Ground Control Intercept) support until such time as he is able to obtain a visual contact. The F-16's superior capability as an interceptor is one reason why some of these machines are maintained on alert on a year-round basis and it also helps to explain why they were able to account for several Afghan and one Soviet aircraft in the mid-to-late 1980s when airspace violations were an irritatingly frequent occurrence. As far as the F-16 is concerned, ADA duty is mostly undertaken by Nos 9 and 14 Sqns, aided occasionally by No 11 Sqn when it can be spared from OCU tasks. Armament carried by the F-16 comprises a mix of AIM-9L and AIM-9P Sidewinder missiles and the integral Vulcan M61 20mm gun. The trusty Sidewinder also features prominently in the air-to-air armoury of most other PAF types but the number of missiles carried is limited to two AIM-9Ps in the cases of the A-5-III and F-6. Two missiles - either the AIM-9P or the somewhat similar Matra Magic - can also be carried by the F-7 while the Mirage's air-to-air weapon load is dependent upon variant, with the dwindling number of IIIEPs being compatible with either the radar-guided or the IR-homing Matra R.530 and the Magic, unlike the 5Ps which can only use the latter. ADA duty periods usually involve three aircraft, with squadrons at a particular base taking turns when it comes to responsibility for this task. In addition to air defence, all units train in air-to-surface missions as a matter of course, although the types of target that they might be called upon to engage vary. For the most part, PAF squadrons operating the F-6 and A-5-III are tasked to operate in support of the Army with close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) missions absorbing much of their energies. Neither machine is able to deliver 'smart' ordinance but the arsenal of the A-5 includes conventional bombs as well as cluster bomb units, unguided air-to-surface rockets and the Durandal runway cratering bomb, which, while it may not be 'smart', is at least 'reasonably intelligent'. In addition, both types have gun armament for strafe attacks on 'soft' targets, the A-5 relying on a pair of Type-23-2 23mm cannon while the F-6 has three Nudelmann-Richter 30 mm guns, the heavier calibre of this weapon to some extent compensating for a slower firing rate. Annual training places considerable emphasis on air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery and each squadron undergoes two weeks of live aerial firing over the sea near Masroor every year. Standards of accuracy appear comparable to those of the west and may surpass them, one F-6 pilot of No 15 Sqn having recently put 20 out of 25 shells through a banner in four successive passes. The author can vouch for this, having inspected the banner at Kamra and even more remarkably, the pilot responsible for this impressive shooting was a 'first-tourist'. Deep penetration attacks would mainly be the preserve of the Mirage and the F-16 and, yet again, it is fair to say that the latter is the most potent type in the PAF inventory, since it is compatible with both 'dumb' and 'smart' weapons and has the ability to operate effectively by both day or night. Ordnance which may be delivered by the Fighting Falcon includes the AGM-65 Maverick TV-guided air-to-surface missile, 'slick' and 'retard' bombs (mainly Mk 82s and Mk 84s) and the Mk 20 cluster bomb unit. For precision attacks against 'hard' targets, it may also use laser-guided munitions like the Mk 84 2,000 lb bomb. PAF capability also extends to maritime operations in support of the Navy but the amount of resources committed are far fewer, being limited to a single Mirage unit. This is No 8 Sqn at Masroor and its complement includes about a dozen Mirage 5PA3s with Agave radar, these being configured to carry and launch the AM.39 Exocet anti-ship attack missile. No 8 also uses some examples of the non-Exocet capable Mirage 5PA2. Other missions undertaken by the PAF include tactical reconnaissance, about a dozen long-serving Mirage IIIRPs being the sole assets assigned to this role but even these are likely to have a secondary attack capability.

 

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Acquiring The Punch: Cobra Gunship Helicopter


Admin PSF
November 26, 2020





Acquiring The Punch: Cobra Gunship Helicopter


Genesis

In the wake of 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as a front-line state against the communist expansion. Europeans and the Americans were now trying to win over Pakistan to their side in this Great Game.

American President Jimmy Carter (former peanut farmer) first offered $ 40 million of military and economic aid which was refused by President Zia-Ul-Haq terming this as ‘Peanuts’. President Reagan however improved the offer by raising it to $3.2 billion. As Pakistan joined the US camp against Communist Block, it started drawing up a list of equipment to prepare itself.


Selection of Cobra Helicopter

The two important items on the Pakistan wish list were F-16 for PAF and Cobra helicopters for the army. There were at that time three schools of military thought. One lobbied for raising another armored division, other supported multi-mission helicopter and then there was a strong side for a dedicated antitank platform. Army Aviation was with the last group spearheaded by Brigadier Mokeet. He prevailed upon others and managed to convince the decision makers in GHQ to opt for AH-1F dedicated anti-tank helicopter popularly known as Cobra.



The Contract

In the last week of 1981, a high-ranking military team including technical and ordnance officers apart from army flyers arrived in America. They went around different training facilities and finalized the modalities of training.

It was on the last day of 1981 when Major General Aslam Beg signed the contract on behalf of Pakistan Army. The deal was worth $300 million.


Arrival of Cobras, Dawn of a New Era

On 9th January 1985, the first batch of AH-1F Cobra helicopters arrived at Karachi by a special chartered flight in a semi-knocked down (CKD) state. The first helicopter to be flight tested was No.786-007 on 31st January 1985.

On 15th February helicopters were shifted to the Faisal Base from where on 16th February 1985 all the choppers in two batches of five each were airborne at 0705hours proudly led by Colonel Riffat Beg Humayun, after refueling at Sukkur, Cobras landed at Multan at 1300hours. A warm welcome headed by the Chief of General Staff Major General Aslam Beg, awaited them. Cobras initially flew a march past.


Raising of Squadrons

31 and 33 Squadrons were raised on 12th March 1985. Both squadrons remained under officiating command, 31 under Major Saleem Akhund and 33 under Major Asad Kamal. 17th March 1985 On 17th March 1985, a formal induction ceremony for the Cobra helicopters was arranged at Qasim Base where the Vice Chief of Army Staff General Khalid Mahmood Arif was the chief guest. During the same month, the Cobra helicopters participated in the fly past of the Joint Services Pakistan Day’s Parade for the first time.
First Firing First aerial firing of AH-IF in Pakistan was carried at Muzzaffargarh Ranges between 13th November – 6th December 1985. Exclusive firing range was selected for this purpose. There were four Cobras who took part in this firing, two each from each squadron.

The first tube launched optically tracked wire guided (TOW) missile was launched by the crew of 33 Squadron.

Arrival of Second Batch of Cobra Helicopters (October 1986) The second batch of ten Cobra helicopters arrived at Karachi in semi knocked down (SKD) condition. After assembly by the team headed by Lieutenant Colonel Asif Javed Ghori, helicopters were ferried to Multan in two batches on 10th and 18th October 1986, respectively.

This time ferry team consisted mainly of 31 Squadron pilots. First Accident On 31st December 1988, AH-1F #020 of 33 Aviation Combat Squadron, piloted by Captain Nayyer Iqbal and Major Mahmood Ul Hassan crashed in the training area, while carrying out autorotation.

Miraculously both the pilots suffered no major injuries, but the helicopter was damaged extensively. Well-earned credit must be given to the Engineering Group for rebuilding the smashed attack helicopter with intensive care and single-minded effort.

It took some time, but the mission was accomplished with ease and efficiency. To show the immense confidence in his engineering team, the rebuilt Cobra was test flown in 1991 by none other than the incumbent commander of the Combat Group, Colonel Ashraf Chaudhry.


Pressler Amendment

At the close of decade, the World in general and Pakistan underwent dramatic changes whose vibrations are still being felt. In 1988 President General Zia was killed in an air crash at Bahawalpur, resulting in political changes which brought Mrs Benazir Bhutto as the first ever female Prime Minister of not only Pakistan but of Muslim World. When she went on her first visit to America, she signed what was at that time considered to be the biggest arms deal in the history of Pakistan. It included another 20 Cobras for Army Aviation, unfortunately Americans later on imposed sanctions in the form of Presseler Amendment which not only put this newly agreed arms deal into forlorn but also put an end to Cobra conversion and simulator training abroad.


Years later, on a holiday, Major Mirza Aslam landed near Samundri, to drop Major Hameed. Unluckily he transmitted on Guard Frequency which was monitored by the American satellite and through American Military Attaché, Pentagon informed out of goodwill, to General Headquarters about this emergency. When Major Aslam landed back at Multan, almost whole base was there to receive him. This affair is known as ‘Clinton-Pressler’ saga.


First Blood (UN MISSION)


On 21st September, two Cobras and two Scouts of the Combat Group were given the task to locate and destroy the militia jeeps mounted with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons which had earlier fired at a Pakistani convoy in Mogadishu City. The mission was successfully completed, and one jeep was destroyed and other damaged. This was the first engagement carried out by Cobras.

 

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New round of Indo-Pak Ballistic Missiles ​

Lt Gen (Retd) SARDAR FS LODI Examines the new missile race in SOUTH ASIA

On April 11, 1999 India found it necessary to test her new longer-range ballistic missile Agni-II in complete defiance of world opinion which is moving towards the possibility of eliminating further nuclear and missile testing. The test was also a harsh reminder to India's neighbours about her future offensive capabilities and intentions. Which do not augur well for sustainable peace in South Asia. Indian Information Minister Mr Pramod Mahajan called it a 'historic feat' and a 'golden effort' of the BJP-led coalition government. The Prime Minister of India Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee called it a 'defensive step' which was not meant for aggression against any country. The question is was it necessary when peace talks were in progress between India and Pakistan and India's security is not threatened by any of her neighbours including China. India's latest IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) Agni-II has an announced range of 2,000 kilometres but is capable of reaching 2,500 kilometres with a nuclear payload. Is 20 metres long and weighs 16 tons. It is a three-stage solid-fuel missile with the latest navigation and guidance control systems on board. Acquisition of a weapons system which is capable of delivering a nuclear payload 2,500 kms away certainly shows an aggressive intent on the part of India. Her intentions therefore do not seem to be honourable. There are certain defence and security implications of a serious nature after India was able to acquire the capabilities generated by the longer-range Agni-II missile. It has enhanced India's military capability by adding to its offensive reach. India now possesses a missile system that is more reliable, has a greater range and is less vulnerable being comparatively more mobile than the previous one. India has now acquired the knowledge and expertise necessary to build and operate a three-stage ballistic missiles using solid-fuel. It is therefore evident that missiles of longer range are in the offing. The greatest advantage that accrued to India after launching her Agni-II missile with a longer reach was the capability of deploying the new missile in South India, outside the range of Pakistan's Ghauri-I missile, and still be able to hit targets in the whole of Pakistan territory. This would enable India to eliminate Pakistan's second strike capability in a nuclear conflict, as India's missile launchers would be invulnerable in South India to a Pakistani counter attack. A second strike capability meaning the ability to counter attack, is essential to maintain the credibility of a nuclear deterrent. By acquiring the ability to stand back at a safe distance outside Pakistan's missile range to fire her nuclear missiles without the fear of a retaliatory strike at her own missile capability, India deliberately upset the nuclear balance in South Asia to her advantage. For peace to have a chance in the region it was essential to regain the balance without much loss of time. A suitable response from Pakistan was a need of the hour and consequently inevitable. Pakistan's response came three days after India took the initiative. On April 14, 1999 Pakistan launched her longer-range missile Ghauri-II from Tilla near the city of Jhelum. After a 12-minute flight it hit a target 1150 km away near the coastal town of Jiwani on the Balochistan coast. It has a planned range of 2,000 km, weighs about 13 tons and can carry a payload 1,000 kg. It was test-fired with a reduced range owing to space limitations. It may later on be tested to its maximum range over the Arabian Sea. The range can be extended to 2300 km by reducing the payload. Ghauri-I tested last year has a maximum range of 1500 km and can carry a payload of 700 kg. It is comparable to India's previous ballistic missile the Agni-I. Both helped to maintain a military balance in South Asia until India tilted it in her favour by launching the longer range Agni-II when there was no military requirement of doing so. On April 15, Pakistan was able to launch her short-range ballistic missile Shaheen from Sonmiani coastal testing base, which is located about 60 miles North West of Karachi. The missile covered a distance of 600 km before hitting its target. It has a planned range of 750 km. The missile uses solid-fuel which was considered superior to the conventional liquid fuel. It is the opinion of defence experts at home and abroad that the only protection against a nuclear threat is to acquire nuclear weapons for a counter stroke. Similarly the only defence against an incoming ballistic missile is to possess similar ballistic missiles of comparable characteristics and destructive power to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary. When this destructive equilibrium has been attained, a viable and credible deterrent to war and hostilities is said to be in place. This will eventually tend to eliminate armed conflict as an instrument of state policy particularly that of India which has used force against all her neighbours including China. The military advantage of launching the Ghauri-II is to give Pakistan a greater reach to cover the whole of India. It would therefore eliminate the safe areas in the South and East of India which were the result of the previous missile Ghauri-I owing to its shorter range. In other words Pakistan's counter stroke or second strike capability in nuclear parlance, would be maintained. The test-firing of Shaheen missile gives Pakistan the technical knowledge of a solid-fuel rocket motor which can be used in future missile technology. A solid-fuel missile has comparatively greater mobility and takes lesser time to prepare and launch which is an added advantage in active operations in war. The testing of new missiles will also contribute to the further development of Hatf-II and III short-range battle field ballistic missiles which are at present progressing very well. I was asked as to why Pakistan was resorting to a tit-for-tat strategy with regard to nuclear and ballistic missile launching by India. The answer is clear and simple. Pakistan is a small peace loving nation which has no aggressive designs or intentions against any country. On the other hand India's plans are aggressive as her past record shows it up very well. India has gone to war with Pakistan three times and provoked a border conflict twice. The one at Siachin glacier still goes on. In 1971 India used force to split Pakistan asunder while the Security Council stood back and watched. It is essential to have the capacity to defend the country without the false security of outside assurances. It is therefore as a purely defensive and protective measure that Pakistan is forced to respond to any Indian initiative which tilts the defence advantage in India's favour. The object being to regain military balance in South Asia. The balance will accord security to Pakistan and other small states of South Asia which will augur well for future peace in South Asia essential for prosperity and economic development of the region. I was also asked with some degree of concern whether Pakistan would respond in kind when India tests her Surya ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) which is being developed and has a planned range of 10,000 km and above. I do not think it would be essential at all for Pakistan to respond with a missile of comparative range for the reason that Pakistan has no aggressive designs or a desire to become a major power in the region and beyond, dominating the Indian Ocean. A threat to Pakistan's security emanates from India only as is evident from the adversarial relations between the two countries since the last 52 years. Therefore as long as Pakistani missiles cover the whole of India, they can ensure Pakistan's security, there would be no further requirement to enhance the range and lethality of her missiles. In view of the proliferation of ballistic and other missiles across South Asia, some armed with nuclear missiles, it is now becoming increasingly essential for India and Pakistan to conclude some form of Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR). This has been suggested by Pakistan as part of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between the two countries. The SRR would also be required to define and lay down the minimum level of deterrence in nuclear and conventional forces required for the genuine requirements of defence and security of each country. This would also help to prevent a form of arms race in the region while catering for defence needs. India does not seem to be amenable to this suggestion so far, probably owing to her future plans in the nuclear and missile fields, which are bound to prove detrimental to lasting peace in the region. Inspite of the substantial nuclear and conventional forces now available in India and Pakistan, the first priority for the region continues to be peace and economic progress. This is the desire of the people in India and Pakistan which has been very well reflected in the recently concluded Lahore Declaration to solve all differences by peaceful means without recourse to force. It is therefore hoped that peace talks between India and Pakistan will continue apace with the new government in India.

 

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Redefining Pak-US relations


Zahid Hussain
Published June 2, 2021 -


WITH the last of the American soldiers packing to leave Afghanistan, post-9/11 US-Pakistan relations have come full circle. Originally touted as a strategic alliance, it morphed into a transactional one over the years. With American forces leaving Afghanistan, there is now a move to reset the alignment. There is, however, no indication yet of the relationship moving away from the Afghan pivot.

While the foreign policy priorities of the Biden administration are more or less defined, there is no likelihood of any major shift in its policy towards Pakistan. For the past several years, Washington has seen Pakistan purely from the Afghan prism and there is no indication that the Biden administration will be deviating from that policy approach.

Relations are likely to remain largely transactional with some convergence of interest between the two in the Afghan peace process. Pakistan’s support remains critical for America’s exit from Afghanistan and to bring to an end the two-decade-long war in the region. Fast-changing regional geopolitics including Pakistan’s growing strategic nexus with China may also cast a shadow over the Biden administration’s policy towards Islamabad.

There is no likelihood of any major shift in American policy towards Pakistan.

It has been six months since the Biden administration took over, but there has not been any contact between the two erstwhile allies at the highest level. Except for a few telephonic conversations between senior American officials and the Pakistani civil and military leadership that largely revolved around Afghan conflict, there have not been any serious negotiations that could define the framework of the future course of bilateral ties.

Lot of importance has been attached to the recent meeting between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and his Pakistani counterpart Moeed Yusuf in Geneva. It was the first face-to-face high-level official contact between the two governments. The meeting was reportedly held at very short notice. Jack Sullivan was attending a conference in the Swiss city.

A short joint statement issued after the talks said: “Both sides discussed a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues of mutual interest and discussed ways to advance practical cooperation.” There is, however, no indication yet of the Biden administration willing to redefine its relationship with Pakistan beyond America’s regional security prism.

Pakistan is not only still important for the US for a smooth exit from Afghanistan but also for its post-withdrawal security plans in the region. In a recent statement, a Pentagon spokesman said that the Biden administration is in negotiations with Pakistan and other regional countries on the option of having US bases there.

Apparently, the US wants a presence in the region as part of its efforts to counter the global terrorist groups making Afghanistan the centre of their activities after the withdrawal of foreign forces. Washington also wants Pakistan to continue providing the US overflight access to Afghanistan after the troops’ withdrawal. Surely after entering into an alliance with the US after 9/11 Pakistan did allow the use of its airbases for US planes in the invasion of Afghanistan. But those were closed down several years ago.

Pakistan has also provided ground and air lines of communication for supplies to Nato forces operating in Afghanistan. But they were closed for the supply of weapons. Pakistani officials have denied that any negotiation on military bases is being held with Washington. But the controversy over the issue refuses to die.

It remains unclear whether or not US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin raised the issue of bases in his last telephonic conversation with army chief Gen Qamar Bajwa. The US officials would not comment on whether any serious negotiations on a ‘possible basing agreement’ is underway.

But it is very clear that the US wants to ‘stay in the game’ in Afghanistan and sees a role for Pakistan in this game. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a recent interview to BBC declared that it was in Pakistan’s own interest to do so. He made it very clear that the US was only withdrawing its troops from the country and was not leaving Afghanistan.

This makes Pakistan’s predicament more serious. The Afghan endgame remains tricky with the postponement of the peace conference in Istanbul after the Afghan Taliban’s refusal to attend it. This has jeopardised the possibility of the Afghan government and the insurgent group reaching an agreement on the future political set-up in Afghanistan before the American withdrawal. The situation has become more complicated with the insurgents continuing their military offensive as the US is expected to complete the withdrawal of forces by July 4, weeks before the Sept 11 deadline.

Inevitably, the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan will have a huge impact on regional geopolitics. The country’s strategic location has historically made it vulnerable to the involvement of outside powers and proxy battles.

A major concern has been that the American military withdrawal could lead Afghanistan to further descend into chaos fuelling a full-scale civil war with India, Russia and Iran backing different factions and dragging Pakistan into a protracted conflict. The spillover effects of spiralling instability and conflict in Afghanistan could be disastrous.

Meanwhile, changing regional geopolitics have created a new alignment of forces. The growing strategic alliance between the US and India and the China-Pakistan axis reflect these emerging geopolitics. Pakistan needs to tread a cautious path as it seeks to reset its relations with the United States.

Surely we must cooperate with the US in achieving peace in Afghanistan but it’s not in our interest to become part of any new US ‘game’ in the region. The use of Pakistani soil for America’s post-withdrawal counter-insurgency strategy could suck the country into yet another conflict.

We certainly need to have a broad-based relationship with the US but should not get pulled into any new ‘game’ on America’s behalf. The resetting of our relationship with America will certainly not be easy. We need to be extremely clear about our interests and priorities when negotiating the terms of the relationship.

The writer is the author of No-Win War — The Paradox of US-Pakistan Relations in Afghanistan’s Shadow.

zhussain100@yahoo.com
Twitter: @hidhussain

Published in Dawn, June 2nd, 2021

 

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The Rafale Factor and Options for the PAF

February 19, 2020





Source: AFP

Air Cdre Jamal Hussain (Retd)


The setback suffered by the IAF at the hands of its arch-rival the PAF on 27 February 2019, has led to serious introspection by the Indian government about the efficacy of the IAF in dealing with the PAF in any major, minor or even miniscule level air encounters between the two.

The much-touted SU-30 of the IAF fleet considered vastly superior to anything the PAF could field was bested by the adversary’s fighters, and in the short sharp engagement, a Mig-21 bis and one SU-30 of the IAF were shot down by the PAF while one IAF MI-17 helicopter was lost through fratricide. The Indian claim of downing a PAF F-16 during the combat has been conclusively disproven by independent international defence analysts and observers.

Despite making tall claims about having vanquished the PAF in the Balakot and post Balakot aerial raids and engagements, the lament about the absence of the next generation of fighters of the Rafale class, particularly by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a tacit admission of their failure in the February air encounters.

The Rafale deal with France was concluded several years ago, and the first batch of four Rafales was inducted in September 2019. In addition, Lockheed Martin, the world’s largest defence manufacturer, has proposed joint production of their F-21 advanced fighter jets, considered F-16s on steroid, with Tata, India’s premier industrial house. To sweeten the deal further the company is willing to give an assurance to India the F-21s will be developed and produced exclusively for the IAF and if the deal materialises, the sale of their truly fifth-generation platforms, the F-35 stealth fighters would be on offer.

According to the Indian Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh the full complement of 36 Rafales will be operational by February 2021, and the likelihood of the F-21s being added to its inventory in future cannot be ruled out. Both the Rafales and the F-21s are not strictly fifth-generation fighter platforms in that they are not genuinely stealthy. Rafale acquisition, however, would provide a significant boost to India’s dwindling aerial capabilities, considering that it is a twin-engine multi-role fighter with a wide array of weapons. While not a full-fledged stealth aircraft, it offers reduced visibility in the air due to many changes to the aircraft’s external parts like the fuselage, tail-fin, engine air inlets and many more.

The F-21s, on paper, would be superior to the F-16 Block-52s of the PAF. In fact, equipped with an Advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) System, developed uniquely for India, that provides enhanced survivability against ground and air threats, Long-Range Infrared Search and Track (IRST), enabling pilots to detect threats without being detected and Triple Missile Launcher Adapters (TMLAs) allowing the F-21 to carry 40 per cent more air-to-air weapons, the F-21s will be superior to any F-16 block variant, including the much-famed Block 90s.

With the induction of Rafales in the IAF by September 2019, the PAF’s task to keep the IAF at bay in any future conflicts will become more challenging. Better training, morale and professionalism of its personnel, when compared to those of the IAF, have always been the service’s forte and it should be able to maintain the lead in these critical areas. By themselves, they may not be sufficient to ensure victory if the technology gap between the PAF and the IAF widens further.

Rafales are considered slightly superior in aerial duels to the current lot of PAF fighters, and with all factors being equal they would enjoy an edge—but all factors are rarely equal. Experts opine if the aerial engagement is to occur inside Pakistan, the Pakistani fighters would be at an advantage because of better ADGE and also because the PAF would hold the initiative of where and when to launch the counter strike, as was witnessed during operation ‘Swift Retort’. In such brief engagements, the Indian numerical superiority and better war stamina would be of little consequence. The numerical superiority in all probability would be enjoyed by the party with the riposte option as it would decide how much resource it needs to employ for the mission after carefully assessing and analysing the adversary’s aerial defence layout in the given sector.

For the general public in Pakistan, it is essential to understand that both the PAF and the IAF can successfully undertake a surprise air raid on targets close to the international border during peacetime without the likelihood of being intercepted. Neither has the capability, stamina or wherewithal to maintain a 24/7 aerial vigil over the entire length and breadth of the very long international border. The temptation of India carrying out another aerial assault of a similar nature as was witnessed over Balakot after yet another False Flag operation where Pakistan is blamed once Rafales become operational remains a real danger. The additional steps the service ought to initiate to defeat any such misadventure even with the presence of the Indian Rafales need greater reflection.

The nuclear factor has made the likelihood of an all-out war between India and Pakistan remote, although it cannot be ruled out. Even a limited war, as was envisioned by the Indian Cold Start/Proactive doctrine, has been effectively checkmated by the introduction of Nasr, the TNW armed warheads short-range ballistic missiles by Pakistan.

The flimsy botched up Balakot raid and its aftermath failed to achieve even the very limited military objectives and has severely dented the reputation of the IAF at the international level. That said, the Indian media gave it the necessary spin projecting Modi as the country’s strong man, the national chowkidar (watchman gatekeeper), who has repeatedly stood up to Pakistan and by his actions punished it for its alleged interference in the Indian Held Kashmir uprising. Did the spin work in his favour? Apparently, it did, given the landslide victory, the BJP under his leadership has won in the just concluded general elections in India.

Will the humbling and humiliating experience of the Balakot raid and post-Balakot aerial engagements deter India from conducting similar style operations in the near future? Now that Modi is safely ensconced as the Indian Prime Minister for the next five years and the need for Pakistan bashing is no longer necessary to boost his faltering popularity, would one see a more tolerant Modi? Perhaps for a brief while but once the Rafales become operational, the Indian government could be tempted to conduct another false flag operation to justify military aggression of the Balakot nature, particularly if Modi’s reputation again nosedives domestically. Pakistan ought to keep a close watch on the Indian actions, and the PAF must keep the powder dry for any eventuality.

Source: MilitaryWatch


Options for the PAF

Air superiority platforms that display overall superiority over their adversaries in airborne intercept radars, BVR air-to-air missiles, ability to counter the opponents’ avionics (ECM) and protect its own (ECCM) would enjoy a decisive edge in aerial combats. The PAF’s efforts to further improve the airborne intercept radar and BVR missiles of its JF-17 fleet have to be maintained while upgrades on the F-16 fleet should also be pursued. Indigenous development and/or improvement of existing ECM/ECCM pods are areas that can be usefully exploited by the employment of local talents.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be the key determinant in the efficacy of future aerial weapon systems, and the service should promote the study of AI by selecting and sponsoring talented Pakistani youth and enrolling them in AI Masters and Doctoral studies in-country and abroad. These youngsters would then form the crux that would propel the indigenous production of fifth and sixth-generation fighters.

The team effort was the key to the success of operation ‘Swift Retort’. The IAF must have studied the PAF game plan minutely and are taking steps to counter it. All efforts to enhance the capability of the support elements of the strike package like the AEW platforms, the ground-based radars and airborne spoofers should continue.

The service has a rich history of encouraging innovative, fresh ideas based on real-time intelligence on how to handle various combat situations and their validation through realistic aerial exercises by competent formations. This practice should be maintained and continued with full vigour.

The employment of ALCM minimised the threat posed by the Indian ground and air defence elements to the strike package and allowed the PAF in achieving its mission objectives during operation ‘Swift Retort’ without incurring any casualty. Cruise missiles of the U.S. Tomahawk variety would be an attractive alternative for offensive strike missions, given their longer ranges and pinpoint accuracies, particularly when the Indian Rafales and S-400 air defence systems achieve operational status.

Hatf 7/8 ground/underwater-launched Cruise Missile Babur/RAAD are already a part of Pakistan missile inventory that can be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads. Their accuracy can be enhanced to the JDAM standard provided necessary space satellite services are made available. The Chinese satellites are an option that should be explored unless this feature has already been built in the Hatf 7s/8s. With that degree of accuracy, cruise missiles would become an even more attractive strike option than the manned strike platforms.
Three caveats before the decision to use cruise missiles are taken should be kept in mind. First, because the missiles can be armed with either nuclear or conventional warheads, there is the danger the adversary could mistakenly assume it as a nuclear attack and order a nuclear riposte under the ‘use it before you lose it’ dilemma. If their launch becomes inevitable, the message these are not nuclear-tipped should preferably be conveyed to the enemy in advance.

Second, once the ALCM carrying platforms are airborne and even after the H style missile has been launched, the flexibility of aborting the mission or ensuring the missiles are deliberately made to miss the targets is available—no such option can be exercised once the Hatf 7/8 or Tomahawk class cruise missiles are fired.

Third, a cruise missile raid by Pakistan will automatically trigger a similar reprisal attack by India using their supersonic Brahmos, which like Hatf 7/8 can be armed with either nuclear or conventional warheads. Cruise missile launch by either side would invariably result in a swift acceleration up the nuclear escalation ladder.

For Pakistan and the PAF, before a decision to retaliate to another Indian Balakot style incursion with cruise missiles rather than manned aircraft is taken, these aspects should be borne in mind.
While the presence of Rafale fighters and S-400 air defence system in a given
sector would provide a stiff challenge for any PAF strike package engaged in a retaliatory strike armed with ALCM, there are options which would reduce the risk substantially.

Assuming a situation similar to the Balakot raid occurs again and Pakistan as per its stated policy opts for a quid pro quo attack response, the choice of targets to be engaged and the time would be with Pakistan and the PAF. Rafale fighters and the S-400 missile system cannot cover the entire length of the India – Pakistan border. There would be many areas and targets to choose from where the Rafale and S-400 defence umbrella coverage would be missing. This option is especially important if similar to the operation ‘Swift Retort’ the PAF intends to teach India a lesson, yet keep the crisis from escalating further. The ground based cruise missile option, on the other hand, would almost guarantee a steep spike in the crisis, enhancing the risk of a nuclear conflagration.


The present lot F-16s and the JF-17s and their later models would serve the PAF well for another decade, and the service should be able to give a befitting response to any sneak IAF incursion. However, given the rapidity with which the IAF is planning to upgrade its fleet with technologically advanced platforms and systems, there would still be a need to procure fifth-generation fighters with stealthy features.

The American F-22s and F-35s, the Russian Mig-35s, SU-35s and SU-57s and the Chinese J-10s and J-20s are currently the stealth fighters available in the market. Of the lot, the F-22s, F-35s, SU-57s and J-20s are considered the truly fifth-generation combat aircraft while the others are rated as Fourth Generation ++ by some commentators. The next batch of sixth-generation fighters is already on the drawing board. Latest reports indicate the Russian SU-57 project is in the doldrums and very likely they would be focusing on the sixth-generation platform, the Mig 41.

The USA similarly has unveiled the Next Generation Tactical Aircraft (NextGen TACAIR) project while Japan is working on the Mitsubishi F-3 and Britain and France are developing the Tempest. Both the F-3 and BAE Systems Tempests are considered as the sixth-generation fighters, also known as Future Combat Air System (FCAS). Conceptually FCAS would feature stealthy air-frame, long-range missiles that can fly with or without a pilot on board.

The F-22s, F-35s and the BAE Systems Tempests may be ruled out by the PAF for the present because of financial and political constraints while the Chinese, Japanese and Russian models may be within reach. The Air Staff must be minutely studying the performance, economic and political factors of the available options to determine the type most suitable for induction in the service.


Recommendations for Pakistan

The economy is the lynchpin on which all key dimensions of a nation, particularly national security and well-being rest. Pakistan’s economy for the past decade has survived through borrowing from the allies, IMF and the World Bank to avoid a default. Such a state of affairs undermines national sovereignty and makes the nation vulnerable to exploitation. To be able to stand up and ward off the Indian hegemony and aggression, the state must stabilise the national economy. Saddled with a failed and bankrupt economy, no amount of professionalism of the armed forces or its nuclear arsenal can avert national disaster—the example of the breakup of the erstwhile Soviet Union is the most recent.

A sound economy not encumbered by foreign support would be able to meet the PAF force goals necessary to ward off the IAF challenge as it continues to update and modernize. CPEC is crucial for the future of both China and Pakistan. China’s hopes and ambitions to be able to challenge USA’s sole superpower status within the next decade or two rests on the completion of the CPEC projects which would ensure a secure and much shorter logistics supply chain for its current and future energy needs besides providing an easy and economical access for its exports to the lucrative African, the Middle East and European markets. For Pakistan, CPEC has the potential to lift the national economy from its current crisis and all measures to implement CPEC goals must continue to be pursued with full vigor.

The U.S. anxiety as it views the CPEC projects as the springboard that would further propel China’s rise as an economic giant and its growing military might is apparent. Efforts to allay their fears that at least the Pakistani aspects of CPEC would in no way be detrimental to the U.S. interest must continue. In dealing with the USA, while ensuring no measures detrimental to the Chinese interest are even considered, Pakistan has to ensure a balance is maintained in its dealings with the USA. That is the challenge for the country’s foreign policy and its Foreign Office has to contend with.

Air Cdre Jamal Hussain (Retd) is a former fighter pilot from Pakistan Air Force. The article was originally published in STRAFASIA, an online publication on strategic and foreign affairs, and is being republished with permission.

 

[ghazi52]

Will The Real “8-Pass Charlie” Stand Up

February 26, 2021
Editor

I have deliberately resisted for a long time joining the debate about the identity of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) bomber pilot whom the Indian Air Force (IAF) started calling “8-Pass Charlie” during the 1965 India-Pakistan air war. My natural aversion to publicity and self-promotion has, for many decades, prevented me from doing so. Soon after retiring from the PAF, I migrated to Canada where the demands of the new environment kept me very busy.

Over half a century later, I feel the history of the PAF’s B-57 operations would remain incomplete without clearing up this interesting mystery. Bowing to persistent demands by several colleagues and seniors, I have reluctantly decided to pen these lines. I was the Squadron Commander of No 7 B-57 Squadron when the 1965 war broke out. Our mission was to disrupt operations at the IAF bases along West Pakistan’s eastern border from Pathankot in the North to Jamnagar in the South.

Our bomber operations were directed at preventing the IAF from the critical preparatory work during the night for launching missions the next morning in support of the Indian Army and strikes against the PAF bases. To this end, B-57 aircraft were to carry out strikes at regular intervals throughout the night cratering the runways and attacking other targets, thus forcing the maintenance crew to remain in the trenches rather than on the flight lines and in the maintenance hangars.

The IAF’s bases were strung all along the border, and to easily reach all of them, a part of our bomber force operated from the staging base of Peshawar while the rest flew from their home base at Mauripur (now PAF Base Masroor). On the afternoon of 6 September, I repositioned with three other B-57s to Peshawar, to await our night tasks. I had barely switched off my aircraft at Peshawar when I saw the base commander climb up the cockpit ladder to hand me a small note. Without saying a word, he then climbed down and got back to his waiting Jeep. I looked at the chit and saw three words on it — “Adampur 1700 hours”. The message did not need any elaboration, and since we were running a bit late for a meeting that messaged time-on-target (TOT), we rushed things as much as possible.

Flying low level as we crossed the border into India, the sky darkened; I asked my formation members to stagger behind me at 10-minute intervals. As the lead aircraft in the stream, I pressed on towards the target on our first real-life war mission. It was no longer the usual low-level approach to the bombing range; this was going to be the real thing. At that stage, our primary concern was accurate night navigation to reach the target (no super inertial systems or GPS in those days), my navigator and I concentrated on that critical task. Soon the moment of truth arrived, and I pulled up for the attack.

As the field of vision expanded with rising altitude, I looked out for the target. In a picture-perfect manner, Adampur airfield emerged into view exactly where it was supposed to at 10 o’clock about 3-4 miles to the left. By now it was quite dark, and we didn’t think the Indian fighter pilots or ack-ack gunners would be able to spot us easily. As I maneuvered to position for attacking the beginning of runway 31, I was surprised to see that all lights at the base, including the runway lights were on. The runway was an easy target lengthwise, but its limited width still required lateral accuracy.

For this mission, we carried 4 x 1,000 lb bombs, and we dropped one bomb in each dive to increase the chances of scoring direct hits. When I exited after spending about 8 minutes over the target, all the lights were still on. The remaining three aircraft had no difficulty reaching the target as the exploding bombs of the aircraft ahead acted as homing beacons. Having delivered our attacks, all four aircraft returned safely in just under two hours. Our first mission had gone on perfectly. It seemed to be a lot simpler than the one we had visualized before taking off.

However, it was not risk-free, as we soon found out. The ground crew discovered a 40 mm hole in the wing of the second bomber, between the fuselage and the left engine, about five feet from the cockpit. On seeing it, we realized it was a close call indeed. Luckily the shell had missed both the cockpit and the engine and pierced the wing at a point where there was nothing between the top and bottom layers of the wing’s skin. The maintenance crew quickly patched up the holes, and the aircraft was ready to fly again. Happy with the way we had breezed through our first war mission, we did not make much of this incident at the time. Encouraged by our first successful mission, we prepared for our next tasks, entering the first night of our routine of two sorties per night. That was the usual tasking for each bomber team, night after night. As the war progressed and as a Squadron Commander keen on improving bombing accuracy, I decided to experiment with some reasoned tactics and to set an example of how our missions could be made more effective.

All pilots who have done dive-bombing with WW2 vintage (dumb) bombs know that steeper dive angles tend to improve accuracy. So, it stood to reason to make the dive angles substantially steeper than usual. However, steeper dive angles made the aircraft accelerate rapidly towards the ground and severely limited the time available to the pilot during which to maneuver the B-57 bombsight onto the aiming point. Equally, steep dives tended to expose the pilot to more risky pull-out heights.

To solve the two issues, it was necessary to slow down the closure rate to the ground. To that end, I decided to reduce my dive-entry speed and to pull the throttles back to idle while entering the steep dive, and use recalculated bomb trajectory and bombsight settings. For some attacks with dive angles of 55-60 degrees, it was necessary to extend the speed brakes to control the bomber’s rapid acceleration towards the ground. This technique gave me the required additional seconds for proper aiming on the chosen target. As soon as I had pressed the bomb release button, I would shift my focus to pulling out of the dive. Once the B-57 was safely pointing towards the sky and still climbing under the energy it had gained during the dive, I would move the throttles to full power to gain height and re-position for the next attack.

Encouraged by the success in the just-completed attacks, we would eagerly maneuver to enter the next. The sight of the secondary explosions and fires that we had set off gave us a fair idea of how our bombing had improved. On some occasions in the pitch-dark blackout nights, the fires that we started serving as a welcome navigation aid to the B-57s following ours at 15-30 minute intervals.

Ground intelligence from one of the targeted airfields reported that one morning, an IAF Station Commander had even gathered his pilots on the runway targeted by the B-57s on the previous night. He then pointed to the craters on the runway, and demand from them a similar quality of attacks on the PAF airbases. In other cases, the damage and disruption of high-value targets have also been described by the IAF’s senior commanders. In yet another case, intelligence conveyed that after the bulk fuel storage was hit at Adampur, the station was forced to relocate its aircraft to another base where fuel was available. Although with the modified parameter change in the dive angle the bomb impacts became more accurate, I shared this method with only the most experienced pilots, to avoid exposing younger pilots to unnecessary risks. This care was necessary also because no central briefings could be held as our bomber teams operated from busy and dispersed sites. There was also no time for additional supervised training during the war.

It was more than a decade later that I learned from several personal accounts how the IAF pilots were impressed by the persistent and rather unique profiles of my raids. The repeated experience – from the Indian trenches – of an enemy bomber’s engine noise cycling between the roar of full throttles to eerie silence every three minutes left the witnesses guessing about what the pilot was trying to do. I knew, of course, but even now can fully appreciate the confusing effect that the sounds of my bombing profile must have been causing below! Meanwhile, unknown to me, the IAF pilots sheltering on the ground and not knowing who it was, had given me the nickname of “8-Pass Charlie”. Over several nights, they learned quickly to recognize me by the sound of my attacks whenever I was targeting their base. As time passed,

I found it fascinating to come across many Internet and other media messages from those IAF witnesses who had lived through my attacks. I was told that while in the trenches, some of them had developed a sense of respect for the grit of the unknown enemy pilot. A few soft-hearted ones among them admitted even to secretly hoping that the PAF pilot would escape the scores of ack-ack guns that would be continuously firing at his plane. The accounts of Wing Commander Paddy Earle of the IAF and Indian war historian Samir Chopra have highlighted yet another facet of this story. I think it was Wing Commander Paddy Earl who conferring on me the Americanized title of a “cool dude” – even suggested that I was pulling my throttles back to idle before entering a dive to deceive the antiaircraft gunners about my actual position in the sky.

I must admit that those anti-aircraft gunners still did their best. I do recall seeing anti-aircraft shells catching up to my wingtips in volleys of four, and then lagging behind as my aircraft seemed to out-climb them under full power. In conclusion, this writing is to unmask the anonymity of the “8-Pass Charlie” for the sake of putting the historical facts in a proper perspective. It also serves as a long-delayed admission on my part of being the one – the only “8-Pass Charlie” – recorded in the IAF history. It is quite a unique distinction for combat pilots to be bestowed with such catchy titles. The two nicknames were exceptional because both came voluntarily from the enemy camp while acknowledging high military daring and professionalism.

On the formal side of history, the role played by No 7 B-57 Squadron is well illustrated by the award of 14 gallantry medals to its aircrew. All those medals were won for performance under fire, and all were Sitara-e-Jurats (or SJs, equivalents of the British DFCs) – a record for the 1965 War. In the broader context of the 1965 B-57 operations, including my role in it, there is ample evidence from ground intelligence as well as postwar accounts were written by the IAF’s senior commanders and others. The comments and writings of Indian authors and the IAF pilots highlight an aspect of my missions that would have passed unnoticed had they not commented on it. The IAF’s interpretation of my motive came as a complete surprise to me since I hadn’t ever thought that diving with throttles at idle would deny the ack-ack gunners the ability to fix the location of my bomber by the sound of its engines. My power-less dives did indeed deny that advantage to the Indian gunners, however unintended that effect was on my part. But ack-ack gunners don’t stop firing just because the target’s volume of sound suddenly drops. In reality, I saw that they continued to fire relentlessly and locked on to the sound of my engines as soon as they picked it up again. While concentrating on my dive and aligning the bombsight with the target, I was aware of the hundreds of shells forming a sphere of glowing red balls over the airfield. The shells fired from numerous points on the airfield perimeter crisscrossed in front, on the sides, above and below me forming a lethal red dome over the airbase. All those gunners who were pointing their guns at me were obviously hoping that some of their shells might cross paths with my B-57.

My reaction to this display of fireworks was to tell myself “Ignore, and do your job”. The observers on the ground could understandably think that my use of dives at idle power was merely stealth to become invisible to the gunners’ aim. However, my motivation for doing so was a different one: As a professional in the line of duty, to focus intently on making my mission as effective as I possibly could, in the righteous defense of my country.

Written By
Air Cdre (R) Najeeb A. Khan, SJ, TBT.

 

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Pakistan & UAE: Building a Community of Power ​

Contributing Editor Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI discusses the strong relationship between the UAE and PAKISTAN

In March there was news that Pakistan and the UAE were involved in a cooperative dialogue. This was a positive development in the region which should bode well for both countries. Given this author's premise that global relations will, in the future, evolve around the concept of Communities of Power, an evolving cooperative framework could be the beginnings of a community of power in this region. What exactly is a community of power? As defined by this writer, it describes interstate relations at multiple levels encompassing economic, social and cultural linkages and interdependence, where the military factor is one of the inputs. It is this level that is becoming increasingly more important, with states grouping together after identifying multiple levels of congruent interests. And it is this multiple-level state interaction that is going to define international relations more and more - where the military factor, while still an important part of the equation, will be simply one of the factors defining global relations. Within such a framework what one will see are not 'poles' of power or 'centres' of power, but communities of power - where 'community' denotes multipolarity of interests and 'power' denotes the element of military and/or economic force. For Pakistan, it is this framework that must be developed, regionally and globally - and for the UAE such an option means a multiplication of power potential within the global and regional system of states. From a Pakistani perspective, there are minimal grounds of dissension with the UAE and numerous factors of commonality, and the same is true for the UAE in relation to Pakistan. Apart from the underlying Islamic bonding, there is already a history of military cooperation between the two countries and Pakistan has provided a spate of advisers to the ruling houses of the Emirate Kingdoms. In addition, there is a personal affinity between many of these ruling families and Pakistan and private visits to this country are frequent for members of the ruling families. On the other side, Pakistanis form a large chunk of the massive expatriate community in the UAE - from workers to businesspeople to technocrats. And the element of military cooperation still remains active at various levels, including the presence of officers from the UAE at the various military academies and colleges in Pakistan. So the question then arises as to why Pakistan and the UAE should seek the building of a community of interest which would involve more formalised cooperation at the economic, social and military levels? Rationale for Pakistan From Pakistan's perspective, a cooperative relationship with the UAE forms an ideal basis for developing a larger community of power in West and Central Asia over the long term. Pakistan would eventually offer the ideal bridge between these two regions. And of all the possible partners for the building of a community of power, the UAE is in many ways the most ideal choice for Pakistan. One, there already exist many levels of formal and informal interaction and cooperation between the UAE and Pakistan. So Pakistan can build on these foundations. Two, despite all these linkages the UAE on many fronts continues to tread a very careful path on conflictual issues between Pakistan and India. For instance, on the issue of Kashmir the press in the UAE has strict instructions to follow a moderate middle path so that neither the Pakistanis nor the Indians have reason to be 'upset'. This is because the Indians have a greater degree of penetration into the UAE - at the unofficial level especially. Indian business has a massive presence within the UAE that penetrates all sectors from industry to the press. Indian workers and technocrats are also present in huge numbers and the Indian entertainment industry has already invaded UAE society. And the Indian government has very successfully compelled the UAE into adopting an 'even-handed' approach on issues such as the Kashmir issue. So, despite all the economic assistance that the UAE is ready to dole out, Pakistan needs to move towards a more encompassing formal alliance with the UAE to move the latter away from the so-called 'even-handed' approach. Three, the location of the UAE offers a natural basis for a security alliance in the region, offering Pakistan a strategic rear in terms of naval and air power. Also, the British-Pakistani organizational structures of the armed forces of both Pakistan and the UAE would allow a natural military cooperative base. Four, with no outstanding political issues or competing political ambitions, it would be relatively easy for the two countries to move towards formal alliance-building. Five, Pakistan can - if it can overcome its own sectarian divides - act as a natural bridge, over the long term, between the UAE and Iran through into Central Asia. With the economic power of the UAE and the military power of Pakistan, a viable community of interest can be built up beginning with a cooperative alliance between the UAE and Pakistan. Pakistan can provide the base for a security arrangement for Central Asian states as well as West Asian states. After all, if the Germans and French could resolve their very substantive political differences, and Christian sectarian issues died a natural death within interstate relations of Christian Europe, there is no reason why Pakistan cannot act as an arbiter to resolve any Arab(UAE)-Iranian differences. Given the new notion of communities of power, Islam is now a critical factor to be considered in power formulations - and, given the military weaknesses of most West and Central Asian states, Pakistan is ideally placed to be the focal point of a defence pact along the lines of NATO. After all, if the West considers NATO not only a continuing viability but also within an expanded framework, then the model is also viable for other regions where a core military power exists. The strength of this core state will be relative to that of the other regional states - with no need for a comparison between the NATO core state and this state. Rationale for UAE If the UAE wants to move beyond simply being an oil-rich entity, which for the present attracts Western indulgence, and convert its economic might into overall multiple levels of power to become a significant regional actor, then it needs to evolve formal alliance structures with other states of the region. That it has the economic base to evolve a community of power should not be wasted, but why should it look towards Pakistan? One, Pakistan has already proved to be an ideal partner for military cooperation with the UAE, in a limited fashion. also, Pakistan has a natural respect and affinity for the rulers and people of the UAE and the relationship has many substantive levels at which it now operates. Two, a nuclear Pakistan offers the professional and military inputs needed to build a community of power. Three, such an alliance will, over a period of time, reduce the UAE's technological and military dependence on the West. In other words, it will simply be looking to the West as a buyer with other choices - and will not need to have a security dependency on the West which it has at present. Four, not only does the UAE need to diversify its oil-based economic power, it can, with Pakistan, become a critical regional actor so that it can fully exploit its geopolitical potential. Five, it can act as the base for a further nexus of alliances with the rest of the Arab world from a position of strength and solidity. Moreover, within a community of power framework it can also become an effective actor within the global arena of international institutions. Six, it has the potential to become an important regional power only within such a framework as so many smaller Western European states have done through the EU, NATO or the notion of the Nordic Council. In one shape or another, it has been not simply a community of interest that has made these groupings influential, it has been a community of power in one form or another - based of course on a commonality of multiple levels of interest and coalescing identities. For the UAE, there is more potential in a formal alliance and commitment in a community of power with Pakistan than in simply walking the diplomatic and political tightrope between Pakistan and India. Also, it needs to become less dependent upon the West both militarily and economically and, on both these counts, a nuclear Pakistan allows the UAE greater choices. After all, simply becoming a financial magnet in the region is not enough - look what happened to the economically prosperous and developed Lebanon as it was rent apart by external armed interventionist forces. Finally, for both Pakistan and the UAE, uniting together in a formal community of power will mean less manoeuvrability for obscurantism forces. In fact this will hold true as more and more Islamic states coalesce together - and as the Arab world and Iran reach a substantive base of understanding and cooperation which is a real possibility within the community of power framework. So what would be the blueprint for such a Community of Power? Blueprint The multiple levels of interlinkages between Pakistan and the UAE that identify a sense of 'community' of interests have been identified above. As for the underlying 'power' element needed for the establishment of a community of power, Pakistan's nuclear capability provides a solid dimension to the military element of power - with the UAE buttressing this power foundation with the required economic strength. So how does the community of power translate itself into a reality? Building the power base The first formal structure that needs to be created is a military alliance since that is the base of the community of power. Between Pakistan and the UAE such an alliance would in many of its dimensions simply be the formalisation of multiple levels of military cooperation that has existed between these entities. Also, the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) provides a limited military cooperative framework which could be transformed into a wider military alliance between the GCC members and Pakistan. Of course, in such an instance the Western military inputs would be reduced and eliminated and replaced by a Pakistani military presence. A formal military alliance between the UAE and Pakistan would need to comprise inter alia the following terms and commitments: One: That the alliance would be a collective defence pact in keeping with the terms of the UN Charter, where an attack or intent to attack any one of the member states would be seen as an attack against the whole collectively. Two: The geographical framework of the pact would have to be defined clearly and would include the entrance to the Persian Gulf as well as a reasonable security zone beyond Pakistan's territorial waters. The land frontiers of the pact members would be the other geographical bounds of the pact. Three: There would need to be a built-in provision for the natural expansion of this community of power at a later date to eventually include - if those states so desired - other states of the Arabian peninsula and Iran. Or there could be an arrangement between this community of power and another one which could evolve between Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian states. With Pakistan as the common denominator, the suspicions and antagonisms between the Arab World and Iran could be mitigated over a period of time. Four: There would be joint command of the alliance military forces, but if at a future date nuclear weapons were deployed on UAE soil, military control would rest solely with the Pakistanis. Five: That there would be standardisation of all military hardware and weapon systems as well as force structures. Six: A first step in building a formal military alliance would be the establishment of a Pakistani military presence in the UAE in terms of bases and weapons deployments. The geography of the pact would demand a greater investment and focus on naval and air deployments - with a blue water navy becoming a necessity over a period of time. Seven: The economics of such an alliance would be worked out keeping in mind some of the earlier arrangements that involved limited military cooperation between Pakistan and the UAE. For the UAE, such an alliance would allow it to end Western military intrusions from Britain and the USA - and that would have a financial aspect also. Included in the dynamics of such an alliance would be the technical infrastructure which could be located in the UAE and in Pakistan. Also, an extensive intelligence gathering network would have to be set-up in the UAE. By its very nature, such an alliance would expand the power projection of both the UAE and Pakistan, especially given the economic dynamics of energy and oil that emanate from this region. The UAE would not be seen as it is presently seen - as a unidimensional oil-rich state that also provides a pleasurable lifestyle but little else in terms of international political weightage. For the location and economic potential of the UAE should translate into a more substantive international presence. Economic cooperation Building on the military power base, economic cooperation leading to an eventual common market would be the thrust of the community of power. Luckily, in the case of the UAE and Pakistan the private sector is already heavily involved in cooperative ventures - especially Pakistani technocrats and business people moving into the UAE market. However, a major drawback is the unwillingness of the UAE government to allow foreigners to own property. Eventually, within a community of power, the UAE will have to liberalise many of its present laws relating to business and property. On the other side, UAE nationals, including their ruling families, already own property in Pakistan and are involved in social welfare projects around the areas where they own major real estate. The exact nature of how the ownership rights have been worked out are not public knowledge, but there is a feeling that the UAE ruling families have a fair amount of freedom of action in this field. Pakistan has to clean up its infrastructure to attract economic investment - and merely having formal alliances will not do this unless the indigenous climate is investor-friendly. Such an alliance should be a strong motivating force for this clean-up. Free movement of peoples - especially professionals - will evolve once Pakistan is able to curtail the problem of illegal migrant workers. A formal community of power will also act as a strong deterrent for obscurantist proselytising forces as well as reducing safe havens and refuges for terrorists. Again, a more formalised cooperative framework would enable the UAE and other Gulf countries to send oil pipelines across Pakistan into South Asia within a secure security arrangement which would also address Pakistan's problems on that score. Political & social sector cooperation Political cooperation in terms of coordination of foreign policies would give both Pakistan and the UAE a weightier presence in international organisations and in other international fora. Within the UN, this community of power could be the beginnings of seeking to restructure the UN along the lines of giving such groupings permanent representation within a completely revamped UN system. Again, Pakistan could also give the necessary weightage to a collective Arab world approach to the whole Palestinian problem including recognition of Israel. And there are many more opportunities for similar collective policy formulations within the regional and global levels. Moving beyond the purely political, Pakistan can also offer the skilled manpower in many fields where presently the UAE employs Western professionals at very high cost - such as the medical and teaching professions. Cultural affinities also add to the benefits from such cooperation. All in all, by building a community of power Pakistan and the UAE can evolve a progressive Islamic polity which can be a forerunner for other such communities of power. In the post bipolar world, what is not being grasped by the Islamic world is the fact that gradually the West is building up a psychosis in its polities against Islam - very similar to what Hitler did in relation to the Jews. This is what a sensitive Westerner married to a Pakistani and living in Pakistan pointed out last week after witnessing an anti-Muslim tirade from a UN employee. And unless the Muslim world is prepared, it will be overwhelmed by this anti-Islamic onslaught of the West. After all, lessons of history must be learned, not ignored. And since Pakistan is the only Muslim country to have a nuclear capability, it must use the opportunities that the capability offers to forge a sense of community amongst the Muslim countries of the region - but this sense of community can only become effective when it is backed by power. Hence the need to build communities of power which are founded on a power base and reflect multiple levels of cooperation and interaction.

 

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Space Weapons: A Rapidly Evolving Threat to South Asian Strategic Balance (Review)

Admin PSF
January 14, 2021




Space Weapons: A Rapidly Evolving Threat to South Asian Strategic Balance


Struggle for outer-space militarization has emerged during the cold war era when both the Soviet Union and USA were busy trying out match each other in the space race. Now China as an emerging state in terms of economy and military is has also joined the race to become a superpower besides Russia. India has also tried to gain such a status but as of right now is not far enough to be fit in that race. The Indian economy, military technology, and struggle for getting a permanent membership of UNSC is proof of India wanted role in world order. Space weapons have become an important factor for states in power politics and gaining influence in internationally.

Space weapons have been a key concern for arms controllers as this is a sign of worry because some major states have turned their attention towards space militarization. It leads to more competition and conflicts globally between states.

In case of South Asia, India in leading enormously in terms of economy and militarily. In near future India will have a role in global decision making because it has achieved much a notable status in international community. Indian media, public and military leadership is craving for outer-space capabilities. Outer Space capabilities will be a benefit for Indian state because it will be a sign of worry for the enemy to go in for a conflict. Indian space weapons technology has created tension for Pakistan.

Pakistan as being Indian main adversary has considered this space militarization as a threat for itself and regional stability in South Asia. Pakistan movement for the outer-space program is just started yet and has taken time to complete. Pakistan should have a strong outer-space program for maintaining its deterrence. The outer-space assets should be reliable to prevent an attack.

Indian space weaponization is a proof that India wanted to be regional power with the help and support of United States. USA is supporting India to become a regional player to counter its adversary China. India also has conflict with China but the trade volume between both states is exceptional. India wants to gain influence in South Asia as it is developing its armed capabilities and taking hawkish positions against Pakistan. India becoming a member of MTCR could be a problem in future for Pakistan outer space program. This space race has opened a new door of competition between India and Pakistan as both states are looking to develop their space programs and to compete each other for influence in South Asian region.

The Chinese ASAT test in 2007 became a sign for India when it gears up itself for space program. Indian strategy of space weaponization has changed after China demonstrated its ASAT ability. The Indian strategic thinkers are urging India to conduct space test to show its space capabilities and sign of warning for Pakistan.

Indian strategists are looking forward to getting ASAT capabilities. Indo-US deal in 2008 has been a remarkable effort of India for getting help in nuclear technology and outer-space programs. The development of Artificial Intelligence could be huge factor for Indian war strategy.

At the end Indian struggle for development of outer space program is their policy to gain influence over the Asian region, it wants to get power and wants to be in front of Asia decision making policy. On the other hand, Space capabilities will increase its reputation and respect in international community.

However, this will be a challenge for Pakistan security because the balance of power between both states will be disturbed and the quest for power struggle will lead to more competition and managing territorial disputes.

Article by: Ahmed Saeed Minhas

 

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Radar Warning Receiver, its Working, Purpose & RWR Systems in Use with PAF


Admin PSF
June 14, 2020





Radar Warning Receiver is an instrument used to detect the presence of any airborne or ground based radar. This system can be mounted on variety of platforms i.e Aircraft, Naval Ships, Ground Systems etc. The warning can then be used manually or automatically, to evade the detected threat. Depending on the RWR system, it can be as simple as detecting the presence specific radar band. For more critical situations, RWR systems are often capable of classifying the source of the radar by the signal’s strength, phase, and waveform type, such as pulsed power wave or continuous wave with amplitude modulation or frequency modulation. The information about the signal’s strength and waveform can then be used to estimate the most probable type of threat the detected.


Working

Radio waves originated by radars have a wide range of frequency bands. The frequency used by airborne and ground based platforms may be different to detect a similar target. More-ever there are other parameters i.e Pulsed Signals, Continuous Waveform, Amplitude which are task and system specific. An aircraft was several antennas onboard that are used to detect the presence of radar waves in the surroundings. These antennas scan periodically full range of frequency bandwidths to detect the specific frequency present around the system. The resonance of the source frequency with the one in the antenna of RWR creates audio signals, which are different with respect the to amplitude, direction of origin, waveform shape etc. These signals provide the pilot situational awareness and helps him to deviate the threats.

The noise tones are fed into the headphones of aircraft pilot, if changes to continuous beep, means his aircraft has been locked and is being tracked by a radar which may fire a missile to down the hostile. RWR integrated with onboard systems can provide estimated distance of radar battery or airborne system along with the location on MFDs in the cockpit. Autonomous missile and radar jamming techniques may be applied to safeguard own-self. RWR on modern platforms provides 360* of coverage.


Special Purpose

Apart from general purpose RWR integrated within the aerial systems, there are also special purpose RWR pods available for SEAD operations in which there are plenty of tracking and fire-control radars along with SAMs. In such scenarios, detection of multiple frequencies and jamming them is a necessity to avoid tracking which can result in the form of firing of SAM and costing life of pilot as well as machine. i.e The AN/ASQ-213[1] HARM targeting system is a targeting pod mounted to the side of an F-16 aircraft that enables the aircraft to track the location of hostile radar systems that can then be engaged with AGM-88 HARM or other air-to-surface weapons. These special purpose RWR pods help in firing of Anti-Radiation Missiles. More-ever they also help the pilot to do excessive maneuvers and specifically jam the fire control radar of an air defense system if a SAM has been fired.
Examples of RWR systems in service of PAF



JF-17 Thunder

BM/KJ-8602 RWR is being co-produced in collaboration with M/s CEIEC China and is designed to provide the pilot with real time and unambiguous threat warning over 360 degrees thus reducing vulnerability of the combat aircraft to radar associated weapons. Currently two different models of RWR are available i.e. BM/KJ-8602 RWR and BM/KJ-8602A RWR. PAC also provides the life cycle maintenance of these two RWR models to PAF.
Appended below are salient features of the system

• Multi-signal Capability.
• Integration with Chaff/Flare Dispensers.
• High MTBF.
• User Programmable Threat Library.
• Built in Self-Test.

F-16 Fighting Falcon


The Loral AN/ALR-56A RWR is designed to detect incoming radar signals, identify, and characterize these signals to a specific threat, and alert the aircrew through the TEWS display. The AN/ALR-56 system features four external antennae mounted on each fin tip and on both wingtips, with a fifth blade-shaped antenna underneath the forward fuselage. The solid state ALR-56 is based on a digitally controlled dual channel receiver that scans from 6-20 GHz, while changes in the threat can be accommodated by software modifications.

 

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Foreign Encounter - PAF Vs IIAF

In 1977, the PAF had a rare opportunity to demonstrate its marksmanship prowess in a competitive encounter with another air force. Group Captain Safdar who was then commanding No 23 Squadron narrates the story: "While visiting our base Masroor in September 77, the CAS mentioned that during his recent visit to Iran, the Shah had inquired whether the PAF would be interested in hosting an armament competition with an Iranian Air Force fighter squadron. The CAS asked me if I would take on the Iranian squadron. Needless to say I was excited by the prospect. As a side issue the CAS promised a reward of Rs. 10,000/- to 23 Squadron if we won, and God help us if we lost! "He instructed the ACAS (Ops) to extend all possible facilities to us in preparing an 8-member team which comprised myself, Squadron Leaders Javed Latif, Javed Qazi, Tahir Hussain, Imtiaz and Shams, and Flight Lieutenants Farhad and Khalid. Every F-6 Squadron was asked to lend 2 aircraft to 23 Squadron for the exercise and very soon we had nearly 30 F-6s at our disposal. I allotted two aeroplanes to each team member and instructed them to harmonize their aircraft themselves. Somiani range was reserved for us and each pilot was scheduled to fly two ground attack and two air-to-air missions per day. Within a month our performance improved significantly and we began to average 90% scores in strafing and over 50% direct hits in rocketry. Our air combat scores also improved proportionately. "In October the Iranians flew into Masroor with their beautiful F-5Es. Compared to the F-6 the Northrop F-5E was a pretty sight, and incorporated the latest American technology of that time. I could sense that my pilots were a little apprehensive, but their urge to 'have a go' was stronger. The competition started and I led the first ground attack mission, followed by one of the Iranians; and thus we alternated through all the events. When final scores were declared we were delighted, for we had beaten the Iranians hands down both in air combat and ground attack. "The next day we received a signal from the CAS congratulating the squadron and saying that we could collect Rs.10,000/- from the base accounts officer. But the base commander told me that since the competition had been a collective effort, the money would be claimed by the base. I was quite disappointed, as I had been planning to purchase some new furniture and rugs for the squadron for our forthcoming move to Samungli. I mentioned this to the ADC to the CAS, and told him what my base commander had said. Next day the accounts officer came and handed over Rs. 10,000/- to our squadron adjutant!" (Taken from the book "The Story of Pakistan Air Force 1948-1988) ​