Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani nuclear forces 2009

[jawadqamar]

Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani nuclear forces 2009

This time article is less detailed when compared to the past. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ article “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani nuclear forces 2009” by Robert S. Norris & Hans Kristensen contain lot of intentional and unintentional mistakes specifically designed by the authors to underestimate the potential destructive power of our current nuclear weapons program. I will try to cover few obvious mistakes of the article

Pakistan is thought to have produced approximately 2,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 90 kilograms of separated military plutonium by early 2008.

While we do not know the skill level of Pakistani bomb designers, medium technical capabilities certainly seem plausible, which would require approximately 20 kilograms of HEU and 3 kilograms of plutonium for a warhead designed to have a yield of 10 kilotons.4 Pakistan’s weapons have been estimated to have yields of between 5 and 10 kilotons, judging by its few nuclear tests.

With warhead production probably well underway, if not already completed, for the Shaheen II medium range ballistic missile, and deployment of the Babur cruise missile anticipated within the next few years, we estimate a current Pakistani nuclear stockpile of about 70–90 warheads.

As they have already said that Pakistan have produced approximately 2,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) that will give Pakistan around 80 to 130 HEU based nuclear weapons as per their estimates of 15 to 25 kg per nuclear weapon and 90 kilograms of separated military plutonium will give 30 plutonium based nuclear weapons by early 2008.”.

It was stated that 40–50-megawatt heavy water Khushab plutonium production reactor can produce 10 to 15 kg of plutonium each year and by the end of 2000 Pakistan had Min of 10 kg and Max of 28 kg plutonium. By these statements we get Min of 90 kg and Max of148 kg plutonium by end of 2008. This putts the upper limit of 49 plutonium nuclear weapons by end of 2008.

So combined nuclear capability of Pakistani nuclear weapons is Minimum of 110 to maximum 179 (160 by the figures provided by this report) warheads. Now I don’t know why they say that “we estimate a current Pakistani nuclear stockpile of about 70–90 warheads

Aircraft
F-16a/b 1,600 1 bomb (4,500)
Mirage V 2,100 1 bomb (4,000)
Ballistic missiles
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) ~400 conventional or nuclear (500)
Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) 450+ conventional or nuclear (1,000)
Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6)* 2,000+ conventional or nuclear (1,000)
Ghauri (Hatf-5) 1,200+ conventional or nuclear (1,000)
Cruise missiles
Babur (Hatf-7)* 320+ conventional or nuclear (n/a)
Ra’ad (Hatf-8)* 320+ conventional or nuclear (n/a)

F-16s range and payload both are understated, My question is why?

The Pakistani Air Force deploys its F-16s with Squadrons 9 and 11at Sargodha Air Base, which is located 160 kilometers northwest of Lahore. The F-16 has a refueled range of more than 1,600 kilometers, and that range can be extended if the planes are equipped with drop tanks. The aircraft can carry up to 5,450 kilograms externally on one under-fuselage centerline pylon and six underwing stations.

Pakistani military with several options: fabricating weapons that use plutonium cores; mixing plutonium with HEU to make composite cores; and/or using tritium to “boost” warheads’ yield (loading the reactors’ targets with lithium 6 will produce tritium).

Pakistan has already announced that their nuclear weapons that were tested included boosted fission nuclear warheads. Though these were not two stage thermonuclear warheads but these claims were sufficiently supported by the evidence of the purchase of equipment from the western countries in late 1980s.

“Pakistani nuclear controls include some functional equivalent to the two-man rule and permissive action links”

If i am not wrong, Dr Samar have also mentioned that Pakistan uses three man control unlike US two man control that created several disasters like B-52 carrying missing nuclear weapons and sleeping two man intended to protect the nuclear weapons

The solid-fueled, single-stage Ghaznavi entered service in 2004 and can deliver a 500-kilogram payload approximately 400 kilometers. We don’t know how many Ghaznavis Pakistan deploys or keeps in storage. The missile is believed to be derived from the Chinese M-11 missile, of which approximately 30 were delivered to Pakistan in the early 1990s.

Pakistan has never stated that the range of Ghaznavi SRBM is more than 300km. Only the fools who have already assumed that Pakistani Ghaznavi missiles are copies of the M-11 missiles, will assume that Ghaznavi Hatf-III will have similar range which is not the case.

Hatf-III is not M-11 contrary to the internet myth; both missiles are having completely different dimensions weights, range and reentry vehicles. So far no one is able to produce a single picture of M-11 in Pakistani service on the other hand many pictures of Hatf-III are available on the internet and that is completely different missile then M-11

Specifications of M-11
Official name: DongFeng 11 (DF-11)
Export name: M-11
Length: 7.5m (DF-11); 8.5m (DF-11A)
Diameter: 0.8m
Launch weight: 4,200kg
Warhead: 500kg HE
Range: 280~350km (DF-11); >500km (DF-11A)
Accuracy: CEP 500~600m (DF-11); <200m (DF-11A)

Specifications of Ghaznavi Hatf-III
Official name: Ghaznavi Hatf-III
Length: 9.64m
Diameter: 0.88m
Launch weight: 5256kg
Range: 290
Accuracy: CEP less then 58m

Pakistan’s Shaheen-1 is a reverse engineered M-9 missile originally supplied by China. The solid-fueled, single-stage missile has been in service since 2003, can strike targets in excess of 450 kilometers—though some observers suggest the range is closer to 700 kilometers —and can deliver a payload of up to 1,000 kilograms.

Same goes for the Shaheen-1missile which is much heavier, longer in length, has long range and is specifically designed to carry a larger re-entry vehicle ( when compared to the 500 kg M-9)with mass of 850kg (not 1000kgs as suggested in the article) and have a terminal guidance to achieve high accuracy. M-9 was shown with terminal guidance only in 2007-08

Specifications
Official name: DongFeng 15 (DF-15)
Export name: M-9
NATO reporting name: CSS-6
Configuration: Single-stage (DF-15)
Length: 9.1m (DF-15)
Diameter: 1.0m
Launch weight: 6,200kg
Warhead: 500kg HE
Range: 600km (DF-15)
Accuracy: CEP 150~500m; or 30~50m on the later variants

Specifications of Shaheen-I
Official name: Shaheen-I Hatf-IV
Length: 12m
Diameter: 1m
Launch weight: 9500kg
Range: 750
Re-entry vehicle mass of 850kg
Accuracy: CEP less than 20-30m

Authors of the article mentioned the range of 450km which is the range Indians claimed that shaheen-1 was able to achieve in its first test.

Islamabad claims that its two-stage Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile, unveiled seven years ago at the Pakistan Day parade but still under development, has a range of 2,050 kilometers and can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload. The missile is carried on a six-axle, road-mobile launcher, and satellite images of the National Defense Complex near Fatehjang appear to show 15 launchers at various stages of being equipped with their missile erector. The army conducted two operational readiness launches of the missile on April 19 and April 21, 2008, indicating that the Shaheen-2 is close to becoming operational.

Ohh, they can’t even copy past now, Shaheen-2 have a range of 2000 km that can be extended to 2500km not 2050km

In 2007 satellite imagery show that’s 11( yes 11 not 15 launchers for Shaheen-2 were spotted in the imagery out of which 2 were already fitted with shaheen-2 missiles with other 9 in various stages of being equipped. Another four launcher were for shaheen-1again two of them were already fitted with Shaheen-1 missiles) launchers at various stages of being equipped with their missile erector and in 2008 Pakistan’s Army Strategic Force Command tests Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile twice which can only be done once missile is deployed by the PA’s SFC. So what is left of being operationally deployed? What kind of more proof these fools wants?

The 1,200-kilometer medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) is Pakistan’s only liquid-fueled nuclear-capable ballistic missile. First deployed in 2003, the single-stage missile can deliver a payload of 700–1,000 kilograms. The Ghauri might be replaced by the Shaheen-2.

Completely missed the long range stretched Ghauri-2 Missile which was covered as part of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (Ghauri-2 (Hatf-6) 2,000–2,300 750–1,000 Tested April 14, 1999)

Cruise missiles. Pakistan also is developing two cruise missiles that U.S. Air Force intelligence estimates may be nuclear capable. The ground-launched Babur (Hatf-7) has been test-launched five times, most recently on December 11, 2007. U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that the missile has a range of about 320 kilometers, while media reports frequently suggest the range is from 500 to 700 kilometers. Pakistani officials describe the Babur as a “low-flying, terrain-hugging missile with high maneuverability, pinpoint accuracy,and radar-avoidance features.”14 The Babur appears to be similar to the new Chinese DH-10 air-launched cruise missile and the Russian AS-15. The Babur is significantly slimmer than Pakistan’s ballistic missiles, which suggests that Pakistani engineers have made progress in warhead miniaturization, perhaps based on a new and smaller plutonium warhead. A submarine-launched version of the Babur, which has been rumored to be in the work, has not yet materialized. The air-launched Ra’ad (Hatf-8), or “Thunder,” which has the same range as the Babur, was first test-launched on August 25, 2007 by a Mirage aircraft; a second test-launch occurred on May 8, 2008. A Pakistani military spokesman described the Ra’ad as a low-altitude, terrain-following missile with high maneuverability and as equipped with “special stealth capabilities” to provide “a great strategic standoff capability on land and at sea.”

This part gets even worse as it compares the Babur GLCM with the Russian AS-15

Authors cannot see the difference between Babur and Kh-55

Babur GLCM
Length --
Body diameter --
Launch weight 1500kg
Payload 300kg (newer version has 450kg)
Range 750 km
Accuracy 3-5m CEP

AS-15A
Length: 6.04 m (7.1 m with boost motor)
Body diameter: 0.514 m
Launch weight: 1,210 kg
Payload: Single warhead 410 kg
Warhead: Nuclear 200 to 250 kT
Range: 2,500 km
Accuracy: 25 m CEP

1.Both Babur GLCM and Russian cruise missile are completely in different category as far as range is concerned Range is different

2. Weight is completely different AS-15/ Kh-55 with 1210kg and Babur with1500 kg

3. Payload capability is totally different Kh-55 with 500 kg and Babur with 300 kg

4. Air intake is of different design AS-15 / Kh-55 as engine is on a short pylon under the rear body after launch on the other hand in Babur’s case only air intake comes out after launch.

5. Different kind of launchers Kh-55 with air and submarines and Babur with ground launched with rectangular launchers for operational use and DH-10/C-602 is with round launchers

6. Babur has much more similarity with the TOMHAWAK cruise missile then this Russian. Babur appears to share several basic similarities with the US BGM-109 Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, with the two being roughly the same size and shape and having a similar wing and engine intake design.

Ukraine's Illicit Weapons Sales to Iran and China

On February 2, 2005, Hryhoriy Omelchenko, Deputy Chair of the Ukrainian parliament’s Committee on the Fight against Organized Crime and Corruption, made public information about ongoing investigations into the alleged illegal export of 12 Kh-55 (NATO designation AS-15A) and Kh-55SM (AS-15B) nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) from Ukraine to Iran and China. [1]The transfer of the missiles was in violation of Kiev’s START I Treaty obligations. Under the treaty, to which Ukraine became a party by signing the Lisbon Protocol in 1992, Ukraine committed to dismantling or returning to Russia the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers and accompanying Kh-55 ALCMs that remained in the country after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. [2] However, according to Omelchenko, the Progress trading firm (a subsidiary of the state arms trader Ukrspetseksport) illegally transferred missiles to China in April 2000 and to Iran in May 2001. In addition, Progress supplied Iran with an associated ground targeting system, referred to as the KNO-120. [1]Omelchenko’s letter began with a request to arrest Valeriy Shmarov, head of Ukraine’s arms export company Ukrspetseksport. According to the letter, a criminal case regarding the missile sale was opened in February 2004. Director of the air cargo company UkrAviaZakaz and former Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) staffer V.V. Yevdokymov, along with three Russian citizens (Oleg G. Orlov, Ye. V. Shilenko, and G.K. Shkinov) stand accused of collaborating with S.M. Samoylenko, then director of Progress, in the missile sale. [1] Orlov, a Russian arms trader accused by the U.N. Security Council in 2001 of selling illegal weapons to Angola, and Shilenko approached Ukrspetseksport in early 2000 regarding the sale. [1,3] The Russians had fictitious documents from the Russian Ministry of De fense and the state-owned Rosvooruzheniye arms trading company, as well as end-user certificates to support their request to purchase 20 Kh-55 missiles. These false documents were evidently accepted by Ukraine’s State Export Control Service, which allowed the sale to move forward. Yevdokymov arranged for the missiles to be transported by air from Ukraine to China in April 2000. [1] He provided customs with documents indicating that the flight was departing for an airport in Russia, but instead the six missiles were flown to China. [4] Former Ukrspetseksport head V.I. Malyev reportedly knew that the paperwork was fictitious and that the missiles were headed for China. Progress was paid US$600,000; the payment was made by two firms based in Cyprus via the U.S. firm Technocality Inc. through the Central European International Bank in Budapest. [1] Six missiles destined for Iran similarly were sold for US$600,000, and related ground targeting equipment for an additional US$200,000, also paid through Technocality Inc. This time, a fictitious contract between a Cypriot firm and Iranian firm for the provision of equipment to oil refineries was used as a cover for the money transfer. Further, the Iranian deal included servicing of the missiles; Ukrainian specialists visited Iran for this purpose several times in 2001-2003.In October 2004, the SBU opened a criminal case regarding the embezzlement of more than US$13 million by Ukrspetseksport staff, including Director Shmarov, through these and other illegal weapons sales. Omelchenko related that it was only in the fall of 2003, when SBU head Leonid Derkach was replaced by Ihor Smeshko, that the SBU began to investigate illegal exports, including the Kh-55 sales as well as other illegal arms sales to Sierre Leone and Eritrea. [1] The Kh-55 missile, also known in the West as a “Kent” missile, is a strategic ALCM (a missile with a range exceeding 600 km) under START I rules. The Kh-55SM is a long-range variant of the missile, with a maximum range of 3,000 km. The Kh-55 and Kh-55SM are designed to carry a 200-kt nuclear warhead; the conventional variant of the Kh -55 was never adopted into service; the conventional variant of the Kh-55SM missile is the Kh -555. [5] Several Kh-55—as well as short-range Kh-22—missiles remained in Ukraine after Russia purchased most heavy bombers and related weapons from Ukraine after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is likely that the missiles were purchased for parts and possibly also reverse engineering of the Kh-55’s highly efficient turbofan engine, the R95-300. Kh-55s were designed only for nuclear warheads and only for heavy bombers (Tu-95MS and Tu-160). Iran or China would have to modify their Kh-55s to make them capable of being launched from underneath the wing of an aircraft. Although such a conversion is conceivable, given the small number of missiles, it hardly seems worth the effort.

Sources:
1. “Deputatskiy zapit” [Deputy’s Request], Sobor website, February 2, 2005, <http://www.sobor.org.ua/vr/dep020205_2.htm>.
2. “Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Arms,” in NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/fulltext/treaties/start1/s1lis.htm>.
3. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Great Weapons for Rogues,” Moscow Times, February 15, 2005, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com>.
4. “Utechka informatsii iz Apellyatsionnogo suda Kieva: rakety iz Ukrainy okazalis v Kitaye i Irane!” (Leaked information from Kiev’s Appellate Court: Missiles from Ukraine turn out to be in China and Iran!), Obozrevatel (Kiev),February 3, 2005, in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
5. “Russian Heavy-Bomber Delivered Missiles,” NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/bombers/bombers.htm>.

Now as you can see in the above news Pakistan’s name was never mentioned and this news was simply about the Ukraine smuggling of Kh-55SM/Korshun by Iran and china but then Pakistan tests the Babur cruise missile few years after the news appeared and Indians were surprised and then comes this Prasun K Sengupta with wildest of claims and started including Pakistan without any kind of proof. He gives the details of everything like he was there supervising the operations but won’t have anything to say once you ask him for proof. He is actually so bad at making the lies that he even don’t know the basic realities that existed in Pakistani nuclear establishment. He links the famous A.Q.Khan (because of his reputation of smuggling the Strategic weapons) with this news without any proof. Poor guy even don’t know that Dr A Q Khan was running the KRL not the NESCOM where Babur cruise missiles are designed and build and even when Dr A Q Khan was running the KRL, he had furious rivalry with NESCOM. Therefore complete theory of Wal-Mart goes to ground as only thing in this article that can be called a Wal-Mart is he i.e. Wal-Mart of baseless news

But irrespective of the fact that his allegations against Pakistan were baseless, few so- called experts started using his story as bases to link Pakistani Babur with AS-15, especially Americans, perhaps to reduce the shame of the fact that Pakistan was able to use their crashed BGM-109 Tomahawk.

JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - AUGUST 12, 2005
PAKISTAN TESTS CRUISE MISSILE
Robert Hewson, Editor, Jane's Air-Launched Weapons and
Andrew Koch JDW Bureau Chief

The Pakistani Babur cruise missile seems to share several basic similarities with the US BGM-109 Tomahawk . Pakistan's ultimate aim may be to field this weapon on its Agosta-class submarines Pakistan has made public the first test launch of a new cruise missile system, the Babur (also known as the Hatf-VII), which was successfully flight-tested on 11 August. The launch is a significant step forward for its strategic arsenal. Major General Shaukat Sultan, the Pakistan Army's chief spokesman, said that the weapon has a 500 km range and can be fitted with either a conventional or nuclear warhead. The Babur is described as a high-speed, low-level terrain-following missile, but Shaukat declined to provide specifics on its guidance or propulsion system. Neither is its payload capability known. Film footage of the test launch shows the Babur being fired from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) by a solid rocket booster fitted to the missile's tail section. The booster drops away after a short initial phase and the missile transitions into forward flight with the deployment of pop-out wings and a ventral air intake for the main engine. It is unclear whether the engine is a turbofan or turbojet power plant. However, in 2002 Pakistan announced development of a turbojet-powered aerial target called the Nishan-Mk 2TJ that analysts viewed as a preliminary step to developing a cruise missile.
The Babur test firing occurred at a previously undisclosed test range, Maj Gen Shaukat confirmed to JDW. This is understood to be located along the Baluchistan coast. A US intelligence official noted that additional tests are expected to be conducted using that area. Pakistani scientist Samar Mubarak Mund, who heads the National Engineering and Scientific Commission that led the Babur programme, told the Pakistani newspaper The News that production of the missile would begin within a month. The Babur appears to share several basic similarities with the US BGM-109 Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, with the two being roughly the same size and shape and having a similar wing and engine intake design. A Pakistani source with knowledge of the programme said the project began around 1998 and was bolstered by lessons learned from Tomahawk missiles recovered in Pakistan. These US Tomahawks had failed to reach intended targets in an August 1998 strike against a terrorist camp in Afghanistan; Pakistani officials at the time acknowledged that they had recovered at least two missiles. "I'm sure they must have learned from that ... they are quite good in reverse engineering," the source noted. Ultimately, Pakistani officials said, the Babur is being developed for land- and submarine-launched applications, with a longer-term goal of making it suitable for airborne launch. The Pakistani source said that the intention is to have the Babur deployable on the country's French-designed Agosta 90-class attack submarines, although he noted it does not appear the missile is small enough to fit into 533 mm torpedo tubes in its current configuration. The Babur's vertical launch mode also points to a possible ship-board configuration, which would be an obvious first step for such a missile. The first reports of a possible Pakistan cruise missile emerged in mid-2004 when a test was predicted before the end of that year. None occurred, but just days before the 2005 launch Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf predicted that more missile tests would be undertaken soon. At the same time Pakistani officials were reported to be working on a new nuclear missile system that would be tested in the near future. General Musharraf said that the Babur test was a "major milestone" in Pakistan's nuclear programme. According to one high-ranking military source within Pakistan's Joint Staff HQ, the Babur "is an indigenous cruise missile that has been developed and produced in Pakistan", adding that the missile design "has no 'lineage' as such". In a related development, JDW has learned that Pakistan is actively negotiating with China and France for the purchase of two or three new submarines. These same sources say that Islamabad aims to develop its first submarine-launched ballistic missile by 2006.A senior Pakistani official told JDW that "expansion of our submarine fleet" represents the next stage in the development of Pakistan's strategic weapon capability. The navy will have nine submarines following the induction by next year of the last of three Agosta submarines acquired from France. Source: Janes Defence

Anyways Babur GLCM have a range of 700+ km (not the 320 km in fact this is the first time I have seen such a claim, even in their 2007 article they put the range at 500km.) Ra’ad ALCM have a range of 350 kmm not 320km.

 

[Screaming Skull]

As they have already said that Pakistan have produced approximately 2,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) that will give Pakistan around 80 to 130 HEU based nuclear weapons as per their estimates of 15 to 25 kg per nuclear weapon and 90 kilograms of separated military plutonium will give 30 plutonium based nuclear weapons by early 2008.&#8221;.

Forget about the amount of fuel to number of warheads analogy given here. There is no basis for it. Let us stick to the official IAEA definition of &#8216;Significant Quantity (SQ)&#8217; &#8211;

Significant quantity (SQ) &#8212; the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. Significant quantities take into account unavoidable losses due to conversion and manufacturing processes and should not be confused with critical masses. Significant quantities are used in establishing the quantity component of the IAEA inspection goal.

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf

From the same document the SQs for HEU and Pu are 25kg and 8kg respectively. Thus the total warhead number for Pakistan, comes up to approx. 91 (80HEU+11Pu). This figure will be correct if we assume that Pakistan used all the HEU & Pu it produced to make 10kt warheads (or in that range). This assumption needn&#8217;t necessarily be true. Pakistan could have gone for warheads with higher yields which would consume more fuel per sample. So, imo this figure of 70-90 warheads is fairly accurate (ie assuming that Pakistan produced no more than 2000kg HEU & 30 kg Pu).

It was stated that 40&#8211;50-megawatt heavy water Khushab plutonium production reactor can produce 10 to 15 kg of plutonium each year and by the end of 2000 Pakistan had Min of 10 kg and Max of 28 kg plutonium. By these statements we get Min of 90 kg and Max of148 kg plutonium by end of 2008. This putts the upper limit of 49 plutonium nuclear weapons by end of 2008.

Can produce doesn&#8217;t mean it produces that much Pu annually. There is something called plant capacity factor that limits the total output of most reactors to about 50-80&#37; of their full capacity. If I am not wrong, Khushab became operational in early 1998. But going by the figures at the end of 2000, it appears that the reactor could produce only 10-28kg of Pu. Now that tells us a lot about the capacity factor of the reactor. In ideal case scenario even if we assume that the higher figure of 28 is correct, it gives us a rate of about 10kg/yr. So from that logic 90kg Pu by early 2008 is also fairly accurate (you are assuming for end of 2008 while the doc clearly mentions early 2008).

 

[jawadqamar]

You assumption of forgetting the what these experts have said about the technical capability of Pakistan and using the general definition from official IAEA definition of &#8216;Significant Quantity (SQ) don&#8217;t stick in this issue for number of reason.

Authors presented estimates about both the technical capability and fissile material so you simply can&#8217;t wake up and start unlinking them and IAEA's definition of &#8216;Significant Quantity (SQ) don&#8217;t take into account the level of expertise of the particular country but it is intended to give the reader some general idea. So you cant just apply it on everybody you want.

Lastly if you start researching you will find that such capabilities are declared by the experts after taking into account all the factors you are mentioning here

It was stated that 40&#8211;50-megawatt heavy water Khushab plutonium production reactor can produce 10 to 15 kg of plutonium each year and by the end of 2000 Pakistan had Min of 10 kg and Max of 28 kg plutonium

Friend, max capability of Khushab is 10 to 15kg not 10 to 28kg

It was estimated that by the end of 2000 Pakistan already produced Min of 10 kg and Max of 28 kg plutonium i.e. 28 kg represents max plutonium Pakistan could have by end of 2000


To a question,Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (ex- Director-General, Nuclear Power, PAEC/ Project-Director Kahuta enrichment project and Khushab reactor project) said that after the successful commissioning and functioning of Khushab Nuclear Reactor Pakistan could develop any tactical nuclear weapons and conducting thermal nuclear blasts had become meaningless.

To another question he said that Khushab Nuclear Reactor was based on home-grown technology and 80 per cent of the reactor was built with the local expertise. This is a testimony that now Pakistan can build a nuclear reactor on its own, he further said. He said that Khushab Nuclear Reactor had been functioning trouble-free for over 12 years that was a great achievement.

This interview was conducted in 2009, in the words of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (ex- Director-General, Nuclear Power, PAEC/ Project-Director Kahuta enrichment project and Khushab reactor project) heavy water Khushab plutonium production reactor is operational for over 12 years and you can see the real date, when it was first operational rather than relaying on the estimates by the intelligence according to which Iraq had huge WMD

 

[jawadqamar]

(you are assuming for end of 2008 while the doc clearly mentions early 2008).

My mistake

But then these estimate by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists&#8217; in &#8220;Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani nuclear forces 2009&#8221; are good for 2008 not 2009

 

[Screaming Skull]

You assumption of forgetting the what these experts have said about the technical capability of Pakistan and using the general definition from official IAEA definition of &#8216;Significant Quantity (SQ) don&#8217;t stick in this issue for number of reason.

Authors presented estimates about both the technical capability and fissile material so you simply can&#8217;t wake up and start unlinking them and IAEA's definition of &#8216;Significant Quantity (SQ) don&#8217;t take into account the level of expertise of the particular country but it is intended to give the reader some general idea. So you cant just apply it on everybody you want.

Lastly if you start researching you will find that such capabilities are declared by the experts after taking into account all the factors you are mentioning here

I sincerely couldn&#8217;t understand your point here. Can you please elaborate? I never questioned the claims made in the report. In fact I said that their estimate of 70-90 warheads is fairly accurate. I merely wanted to point out that your logic to arrive at a figure of greater than 150 is convoluted and grossly inaccurate. For a nuclear warhead of 10 kt yield you need about 25 kg HEU even with present generation pure fission designs (The Hiroshima bomb &#8211; &#8216;Little Boy&#8217; having a yield of about 13 kt, used 64 kg of 80 &#37; enriched uranium).

Friend, max capability of Khushab is 10 to 15kg not 10 to 28kg

It was estimated that by the end of 2000 Pakistan already produced Min of 10 kg and Max of 28 kg plutonium i.e. 28 kg represents max plutonium Pakistan could have by end of 2000


To a question,Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (ex- Director-General, Nuclear Power, PAEC/ Project-Director Kahuta enrichment project and Khushab reactor project) said that after the successful commissioning and functioning of Khushab Nuclear Reactor Pakistan could develop any tactical nuclear weapons and conducting thermal nuclear blasts had become meaningless.

To another question he said that Khushab Nuclear Reactor was based on home-grown technology and 80 per cent of the reactor was built with the local expertise. This is a testimony that now Pakistan can build a nuclear reactor on its own, he further said. He said that Khushab Nuclear Reactor had been functioning trouble-free for over 12 years that was a great achievement.

This interview was conducted in 2009, in the words of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (ex- Director-General, Nuclear Power, PAEC/ Project-Director Kahuta enrichment project and Khushab reactor project) heavy water Khushab plutonium production reactor is operational for over 12 years and you can see the real date, when it was first operational rather than relaying on the estimates by the intelligence according to which Iraq had huge WMD

Again you do not understand my point. Agreed- Khushab became operational more than 12 yrs ago. So, in 4 yrs (1997-2000) it is assumed to have produced a max of just 28 kg Pu. The max annual rate of production then turns out to be 7kg/yr. Even if the capacity factor was scaled up by 50% in subsequent yrs, it couldn&#8217;t have produced more than 10 kg annually. That is why I am saying that it could not have produced more than 90 kg Pu by early 2008. Hence, the estimate made in the doc is again fairly accurate.

 

[jawadqamar]

I sincerely couldn&#8217;t understand your point here. Can you please elaborate? I never questioned the claims made in the report. In fact I said that their estimate of 70-90 warheads is fairly accurate. I merely wanted to point out that your logic to arrive at a figure of greater than 150 is convoluted and grossly inaccurate. For a nuclear warhead of 10 kt yield you need about 25 kg HEU even with present generation pure fission designs (The Hiroshima bomb &#8211; &#8216;Little Boy&#8217; having a yield of about 13 kt, used 64 kg of 80 &#37; enriched uranium).

My point is simple, by the facts given in the article Pakistan could have anywhere between 110 to 160 nuclear weapons not 70 to 90.I am not saying that is 160 or it is 110 what I am trying to say is truth lies somewhere in the middle. So even if we take you stance of 25kg per weapon, total is still 110 weapons. Again I would like to correct you that requirement of HEU depends upon the capability of designers and enrichment of the uranium.

ISIS has decided preliminarily that the test devices contained an average of 15 kg of WGU

So in my opinion what you are saying is good for general knowledge but is useless when you are talking about a particular country. Technical capability of designers varies in almost all the countries, USA will certainly be using much less HEU for a specific yield due to it high tech design on the other hand North Korea will need far more HEU to manufacture a similar yield weapon.

Lastly these figures of 15 kg or 25 kg won&#8217;t matter as Pakistan has announced that it has tested boosted nuclear weapon designs.

Again you do not understand my point. Agreed- Khushab became operational more than 12 yrs ago. So, in 4 yrs (1997-2000) it is assumed to have produced a max of just 28 kg Pu. The max annual rate of production then turns out to be 7kg/yr. Even if the capacity factor was scaled up by 50% in subsequent yrs, it couldn&#8217;t have produced more than 10 kg annually. That is why I am saying that it could not have produced more than 90 kg Pu by early 2008. Hence, the estimate made in the doc is again fairly accurate.

In the words of David Albright President and Founder of ISIS "assuming that the roughly 50 MW reactor operates at full power an average of 60 to 80 percent of the year, Pakistan would be able to produce 10 to 15 kg of weapon-grade plutonium per year."

Agreed- Khushab became operational more than 12 yrs ago. .

So from 1997 to 2007 Pakistan could have produced around 100 to 150 kg plutonium and by end of 2008 120 to 180 kg plutonium

Through the end of 2000 approximately 10-28 kg is estimated to have been separated from the fuel. So 28 kg by end of 2000 represented the plutonium separated from the fuel not the total plutonium produced.David Albright assumes that Kushab reactor began operating in April 1998 not in 1997 (fact on which you agreed) and by logic 28 kg could not include the production from 2000 as it would still need to be separated. So David Albright missed one year of operations of Kushab reactor when calculating the 28kg plutonium estimate should be higher



But for sake of argument let&#8217;s say that 90kg is correct figure even then it gives Pakistan 30 plutonium based weapons i.e. Min of 110 weapons (80 HEU weapons (25kg/weapon plus 30 plutonium weapons) by 2008

 

[Engr786]

Mr. Screaming Skull u & ur country are not eligible to dabate on nuclear issues.
If u thin i'm wrong then please read the news paper of 15 May 1998, u'll get the proof.
Even if u need more then read FAS document on indian nuclear program.