alok mishra
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No other country in the world debated going nuclear for a longer period than India and yet when the country finally took the plunge it produced more divisiveness than in any other seven declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states. After the tests the ruling party coalition has also not taken adequate steps to explain to the Indian population and the rest of the world the logic for its going nuclear. This lack of effort is all the more surprising because India has a very strong case for acquiring nuclear weapons in the present international security environment. It is therefore essential to have an objective analysis of the circumstances that made Indias acquisition of nuclear weapons inevitable.
Unfortunately, since the Indian political class and bureaucracy do not believe in getting history written up or putting out annual policy statements the continuous security concern vis-a-vis Chinas nuclear capability and nuclear proliferation activity were kept away from the attention of Parliament and the people. The country has no tradition of strategic thinking. Our foreign and security policies are mostly reactive and Micawberish with no thought for tomorrow. People have not been told that as far back as 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri sought security guarantee against the Chinese nuclear threat and he sanctioned the subterranean nuclear explosive project (SNEP) as early as 1965 in response to the Chinese threat. Indira Gandhi sent her envoys, L.K. Jha and Vikram Sarabhai, to Moscow, Paris, London and Washington to seek security guarantees from these four powers. Since India did not get that assurance it decided not to accede to the NPT.
In 1971 India faced a Pakistan-China-US line-up when General Yahya Khan cracked down on the Awami League and population of East Bengal. Nearly a million people were estimated to have been killed and ten million refugees were pushed on to Indian soil. Faced with this hostile combination of powers Mrs Gandhi was compelled to sign a Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union to generate adequate deterrence against Chinese adventurism. As it turned out, this was a prudent move and produced the desired results. President Nixon in his interview to Time magazine of 29 July 1985 said about the 1971 crisis:
The Chinese were climbing the walls. We were concerned that the Chinese might intervene to stop India. We didnt learn till later that they didnt have that kind of conventional capability. But if they did step in and the Soviets reacted what would we do? There was no question what we would have done.
Nixon lists this as one of the three instances when he considered using nuclear weapons. Even as he did so he despatched the nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal on an intimidatory mission. The Soviet navy sent its task force behind it and the Soviet naval headquarters generated a lot of signals to their submarine fleet at sea in a deterrent exercise. Obviously, this nuclear blackmail should have been one of the factors that persuaded Mrs Gandhi to order the scientists to go ahead with the Pokhran I test.
No doubt Mrs Gandhi got cold feet after the tests and suspended further testing. Meanwhile China and Pakistan concluded a technology cooperation agreement and Pakistan started receiving Chinese support for its nuclear weapon programme. Mrs Gandhi ordered pre*parations for a nuclear weapon test in 1983 and called them off under US pressure. By 1987 Pakistan achieved nuclear weaponization with Chinese help. The weapon was of Chinese design tested in 1967 as a missile warhead.
Faced with this challenge of China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ordered a programme of Indian nuclear weaponization in 1988. As Mr V.P. Singh disclosed in the BBC Hard Talk interview, India was ready for testing during his tenure of office and he did not do it because India was economically weak and would not have been able to withstand sanctions. Following the legitimization of the nuclear weapons by the international community through the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT Mr Narasimha Rao ordered testing of the weapons. Again they were called off because of US pressure. But the shafts made were available for fresh tests at short notice.
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Unfortunately, since the Indian political class and bureaucracy do not believe in getting history written up or putting out annual policy statements the continuous security concern vis-a-vis Chinas nuclear capability and nuclear proliferation activity were kept away from the attention of Parliament and the people. The country has no tradition of strategic thinking. Our foreign and security policies are mostly reactive and Micawberish with no thought for tomorrow. People have not been told that as far back as 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri sought security guarantee against the Chinese nuclear threat and he sanctioned the subterranean nuclear explosive project (SNEP) as early as 1965 in response to the Chinese threat. Indira Gandhi sent her envoys, L.K. Jha and Vikram Sarabhai, to Moscow, Paris, London and Washington to seek security guarantees from these four powers. Since India did not get that assurance it decided not to accede to the NPT.
In 1971 India faced a Pakistan-China-US line-up when General Yahya Khan cracked down on the Awami League and population of East Bengal. Nearly a million people were estimated to have been killed and ten million refugees were pushed on to Indian soil. Faced with this hostile combination of powers Mrs Gandhi was compelled to sign a Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union to generate adequate deterrence against Chinese adventurism. As it turned out, this was a prudent move and produced the desired results. President Nixon in his interview to Time magazine of 29 July 1985 said about the 1971 crisis:
The Chinese were climbing the walls. We were concerned that the Chinese might intervene to stop India. We didnt learn till later that they didnt have that kind of conventional capability. But if they did step in and the Soviets reacted what would we do? There was no question what we would have done.
Nixon lists this as one of the three instances when he considered using nuclear weapons. Even as he did so he despatched the nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal on an intimidatory mission. The Soviet navy sent its task force behind it and the Soviet naval headquarters generated a lot of signals to their submarine fleet at sea in a deterrent exercise. Obviously, this nuclear blackmail should have been one of the factors that persuaded Mrs Gandhi to order the scientists to go ahead with the Pokhran I test.
No doubt Mrs Gandhi got cold feet after the tests and suspended further testing. Meanwhile China and Pakistan concluded a technology cooperation agreement and Pakistan started receiving Chinese support for its nuclear weapon programme. Mrs Gandhi ordered pre*parations for a nuclear weapon test in 1983 and called them off under US pressure. By 1987 Pakistan achieved nuclear weaponization with Chinese help. The weapon was of Chinese design tested in 1967 as a missile warhead.
Faced with this challenge of China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ordered a programme of Indian nuclear weaponization in 1988. As Mr V.P. Singh disclosed in the BBC Hard Talk interview, India was ready for testing during his tenure of office and he did not do it because India was economically weak and would not have been able to withstand sanctions. Following the legitimization of the nuclear weapons by the international community through the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT Mr Narasimha Rao ordered testing of the weapons. Again they were called off because of US pressure. But the shafts made were available for fresh tests at short notice.
Read More
