Overview
Chinese nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan were a major proliferation concern for many years. Recently these concerns have been sidelined somewhat, in light of the new strategic importance of Pakistan to the U.S. and progress in Chinese export controls. In general, most of China's nuclear exports and cooperative projects have been for non-weapons purposes (though concerns still exist, given Chinese refusal to accept full-scope safeguards and the dual-use nature of much nuclear technology). China allegedly provided direct assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the past, including supplying Pakistan with warhead designs and enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) for at least two nuclear bombs. China also provided assistance and transferred dual-use materials that could be applied in the development of nuclear weapons. Beijing insisted that China's assistance involved the provisions of peaceful technical information rather than weapons-related technologies or materials. China publicly adopted responsible nuclear export policies after joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, and furthered its commitment by acceding to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. Beijing has formally enunciated three principles governing its nuclear exports: (1) acceptance of IAEA safeguards; (2) peaceful use only; and (3) no re-transfers to a third country without China's prior consent. In recent years, China has also promulgated domestic laws regulating nuclear and dual-use exports.
Sino-US controversy over Chinese nuclear trade and cooperation with Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from differences in Beijing and Washington's strategic, nonproliferation, and foreign policy considerations at the time. Prior to the test firing of a nuclear device in 1998, US policy was aimed at preventing Pakistan from achieving nuclear weapons capability. The US introduced specific legislation aimed at dissuading Pakistan from continuing its nuclear weapons programs by threatening to cut off economic and military aid and imposing sanctions. From China's perspective, Pakistan had long been a useful ally in its South Asia strategic calculations and Sino-Pak defense cooperation underlines this close relationship. The US had been concerned about the impact of South Asian nuclear weapons programs on the international nonproliferation regime; China, on the other hand, did not want to commit itself beyond its legal obligation to the NPT. At the same time, Beijing always insisted on the legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy and opposed restrictions on nuclear transfers and assistance under the name of nonproliferation. While China made a formal pledge in May 1996 not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, the fact that China has not adopted IAEA full-scope safeguards contributed to US concerns about the potential of indirect Chinese transfers and assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs. Recent revelations in Libya seem to support this concern.
As China's participation in nonproliferation regimes increased, Beijing assistance to Pakistan appeared to decrease-- at least with regards to direct transfers, although dual-use items continued to be transferred. China's commitment to backing away from assisting Pakistan's program appeared to increase after the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, and improved export controls were released which coincided with Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control lists and guidelines. In 2004 China reversed its position and applied to join the NSG, meaning that it would need to come in line with "full-scope safeguards," potentially barring Chinese companies from continuing to do business with Pakistan's civilian nuclear industry. However, Beijing may still insist that nuclear cooperation agreements, including those to build nuclear power plants in Pakistan, made prior to China's application to the NSG should continue to be honored.
I was like what the...? LOL
