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Nothing less than the very best for PAF

Hi,

You should know that in making a deal---it is all about the timing---and what does it bring to the table---meaning what kind of power projection would it give the nation and the Paf---.

Money is secondary---.
Timing is important like you said, but it is like a double faced coin in some situations, there is the good timing that fits the seller's requirements and there is the other good timing that fits the buyer's ones, in case they are conflicting there will be no sale, but when harmonious, you get a sale.. as a salesman you know that you can't always be able to close a deal, since it depends on other variables among which the best timing that fits the buyer's pocket..
When it comes to power projection or the value plus the M2K-9 will bring to PAF and to the nation, one can see it as if PAF is getting 60 used in good condition F-16 Blk 52 minus the infra and compatibility but with the same performance and at a better price that compensates for the infra and compatibility part.. It is a very good deal if it does not financially interfere with the ongoing projects and 5th G procurements..
 
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This is an add on to my earlier post about DACT...

https://defence.pk/threads/nothing-less-than-the-very-best-for-paf.474121/page-6#post-9159421

Operation Bolo from the Vietnam War...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bolo

The North Vietnamese employment of the MIG-21 was of the 'tethered' fashion, meaning the pilot was essentially 'slaved' to the ground controlled intercept (GCI) officer. North Vietnam did not have the quantity of air combatants to face US air power head on. So North Vietnam conducted guerrilla air warfare.

The North Vietnamese ground controllers knew the air corridors that the US routinely uses, altitudes of different combat aircrafts, and even familiar call signs. From these bits of information, the North Vietnamese GCI officers would guide the MIG-21s towards what they believed to be heavily laden F-105 fighter-bombers, and usually they were correct.

The MIG-21s flew what was called 'slash and dash' attacks where a few F-105 victims would cause the entire flight to jettison their bomb loads. That was the intent. There were no dogfights.

In Operation Bolo, the American F-4s carried no bombs but only missiles. They flew at the same altitude and airspeed, and used the familiar call signs of the fighter-bombers, misleading the North Vietnamese GCI officers. When the MIG-21s arrived at the scene, they were met by F-4s who were already at tactically advantageous altitude and directions.

The lesson here is this...

When confronted with the F-4s, the MIG pilots became 'unslaved' from their GCI officers. It is not that the North Vietnamese MIG pilots did not know how to fly combat maneuvers. They simply did not know how to maximize the MIG's advantages over the F-4s. They were conditioned to fly a certain profile against relatively steady state targets.

It is not that the F-4 pilots were familiar with the MIG-21's performance. Certainly they knew better than to engage the smaller and more agile MIG under certain conditions. Rather, the real lesson is that the American pilots knew their F-4s better than the North Vietnamese pilots knew their MIG-21s.

In one day, North Vietnam lost half of its MIG-21 force and grounded the rest for months to reassess its air warfare doctrines and combat tactics.
 
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This is an add on to my earlier post about DACT...

https://defence.pk/threads/nothing-less-than-the-very-best-for-paf.474121/page-6#post-9159421

Operation Bolo from the Vietnam War...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bolo

The North Vietnamese employment of the MIG-21 was of the 'tethered' fashion, meaning the pilot was essentially 'slaved' to the ground controlled intercept (GCI) officer. North Vietnam did not have the quantity of air combatants to face US air power head on. So North Vietnam conducted guerrilla air warfare.

The North Vietnamese ground controllers knew the air corridors that the US routinely uses, altitudes of different combat aircrafts, and even familiar call signs. From these bits of information, the North Vietnamese GCI officers would guide the MIG-21s towards what they believed to be heavily laden F-105 fighter-bombers, and usually they were correct.

The MIG-21s flew what was called 'slash and dash' attacks where a few F-105 victims would cause the entire flight to jettison their bomb loads. That was the intent. There were no dogfights.

In Operation Bolo, the American F-4s carried no bombs but only missiles. They flew at the same altitude and airspeed, and used the familiar call signs of the fighter-bombers, misleading the North Vietnamese GCI officers. When the MIG-21s arrived at the scene, they were met by F-4s who were already at tactically advantageous altitude and directions.

The lesson here is this...

When confronted with the F-4s, the MIG pilots became 'unslaved' from their GCI officers. It is not that the North Vietnamese MIG pilots did not know how to fly combat maneuvers. They simply did not know how to maximize the MIG's advantages over the F-4s. They were conditioned to fly a certain profile against relatively steady state targets.

It is not that the F-4 pilots were familiar with the MIG-21's performance. Certainly they knew better than to engage the smaller and more agile MIG under certain conditions. Rather, the real lesson is that the American pilots knew their F-4s better than the North Vietnamese pilots knew their MIG-21s.

In one day, North Vietnam lost half of its MIG-21 force and grounded the rest for months to reassess its air warfare doctrines and combat tactics.
Thanks, May I know the translation of your signature? "Caveant Coelum Nostrum Aera Vincere In Terram Suam" google translate did not help me much.
 
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Caveant Coelum Nostrum Aera Vincere In Terram Suam
"They are to avoid being bound in heaven, his own country, in our." Courtesy google translator.
A
 
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It is interesting to note that the feature list of Mig-35 sounds like a copy of the purported features for JF-17 Block 3.

http://quwa.org/2017/01/31/discussion-look-russias-mig-35-pitch/
The centerpieces of the MiG-35 comprise of the Zhuk-AE active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar and RD-33MK smokeless turbofan engines with full-authority digital engine control (FADEC). When the MiG-35 was under development, Mikoyan had intended to configure it with the Thales TopOwl-F helmet-mounted display and sight (HMD/S) system and Elettronica ELT/568(v2) electronic warfare (EW) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) pod from France and Italy, respectively.
 
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