I remain befuddled by those who can contend that taking no action in one area is analogous to somebody else that has for years been engaged in another.
I said analogous rather than identical for a reason.
Pakistan has a division worth of troops deployed in South Waziristan. The Pakistan Army, FC and local security forces man hundreds of check-posts along the Pak-Afghan border (over 800 posts according to the last information released) and conduct patrols along that border to prevent cross-border movement by insurgents.
We also have, in theory, an accord with the Tribes in NW under which they are to not allow foreign militants, nor are the Taliban to conduct cross-border operations.
It is a flawed agreement, and likely violated, but at the moment, given the paucity of resources and military deployments elsewhere, that agreement combined with the check-posts and patrols is what Pakistan can do - we apply a flawed strategy in NW because of the constraints we face.
In the North Eastern Afghan provinces, while ISAF may have deployments and may wage pitched battles here or there, it is obvious (till now atleast, it may change if Patterson's comments imply a tangible shift in that direction) that ISAF does not have the required resources deployed to defeat the Taliban or impact their 'sanctuary', from which they wage war on Pakistan, in any significant way.
This no doubt is due to resource constraints that ISAF faces.
The point is that while the two sides have different strategies with dealing with the Taliban threat, they are both doing 'a little' in their areas mentioned, and that little is not enough.
I fail to see why the 'too little' done by Pakistan should be characterized as 'deceit and duplicity', while the 'too little' done by ISAF gets a free pass in terms of 'resource constraints' and fawning over McChrystal's 'new COIN strategy' of focusing on the populated areas vs remote regions.