New Threat to Pakistan with India,s New K4 SLBM test next month

[bloo]

This hasn't got anything to do with being a huge country and vastly varying trajectories here , North Korea isn't close - has a lower land area and very few launch positions known to the Yanks sitting next to Pyongyang in Seoul , even then the U.S. experts are warning about the threats originating from it and pointing out the vulnerabilities in their shields . I read what you posted without taking the limitations into account just fine , suffice to say that Indians are more confident and have some false sense of security in their yet-to-be-operational ABM than the other more advanced nations working on it for a long time and claiming to overcome problems which the analysts say - are yet to be conquered by the ballistic defense technology . If the longer distance and a relatively large time window compensates for the advanced missiles equipped with robust countermeasures then the shorter distances and the small time window in our case will compensate for the relatively modest missile technology with few countermeasures , fair to say that ? Apply the same logic here . I do not know what is hard to understand that simulated tests do not take into account , a lot many variables , which will not be predetermined/set by the Indian scientists in a war scenario , this has got more to do than just speed and size , what about the trajectory , launch time/place , its type , chaff's , decoys and the maneuverable vehicle etc ? There's a time constraint imposed by the shorter distances too then there's the cost of the interceptors and their effectiveness , you are claiming a very high value of successful intercept probability ( 99.8 % official Indian claim ) than what the world's best have managed (50 % - even that most of their own defense analysts call as exaggerated and being conducted under controlled conditions ) which makes one think that the tests are being conducted carefully with a lot of variables being controlled extensively .
I can understand the initial testing phase through which the BMD is going through now , but where was I wrong when I said that it would take still a decade or two to be deployed significantly ? If you aren't ready for counter measures , pray tell me what are you testing against ? By the time you get it operational , the adversary would have had it deployed . Here you are only talking about Pakistan which started work on MIRV in 2004 and keeps information under tight wraps , what about the other enemy which has it all deployed already ? How do you plan to counter that ? This stopping the missile before it reaches its highest point is well easier said than done , there's no practical example from what I am seeing here where a MIRVed missile is intercepted . I am not aware of India possessing any such infrared system in space , does it exist or that is a future plan which hasn't materialized until now ? Actually , he's not the only one claiming the fifty percent success rate , I have seen a couple of sources which all claim the same thing , maybe its after even the new " discriminating technology " since well the author clearly declares that no countermeasures were used by the offense .
Actually , that is a good example . I am not overestimating the capabilities on my side since North Korea doesn't have any counter measures properly deployed like Pakistan and not underestimating the enemy . Even then , the equation is not quite good . The costs are high for interceptors since I doubt that only a single one can be used and with MIRV in the mix , its going to be high than that of the defense . Well , every interceptor test sets variables , what do you mean by " you dont know that " ? The tests are always rigged since there are too many variables to consider and one can only anticipate so much @gambit if you will please explain the " setting the rules " for the test .
Conditions changed dramatically in 1970 with the introduction of Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. Suddenly each launcher was throwing not one warhead, but several. These would spread out in space, ensuring that a single interceptor would be needed for each warhead. This simply added to the need to have several interceptors for each warhead in order to provide geographical coverage. Now it was clear that an ABM system would always be many times more expensive than the ICBMs they defended against. In summary, the MIRV made ABM economically ineffective, and practically non-workable.
Anti-ballistic missile - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This has everything to do with being a not so huge a country and vastly varying trajectories.
And I was referring to Pakistan not NKorea.
The article you posted mentions the failure of ground based interceptors which means distance is the key factor unlike in India-Pakistan arena.
Detection over large distances may provide time for engagement but it also puts lot of strain in continuous detection, as per the link I provided, and space based IR satellite systems are one such counter to it.
Pakistan has no second strike capability which means any BM strike will be ground based, continuous vigilance by satellites are already in place and a multifaceted missile strike therefore is not possible thus too many varying trajectories won't be there either.

"will capture the signature of any missile launch activities happening in a radius of 6,000 kilometers. This signature will be transmitted to a central control unit which would initiate [the] necessary counter-mechanism."
"Given their strategic position, we can even have exclusive facility to monitor a country or a particular region," the insiders said. "Given the GSATs' capability to map anything to a resolution of one meter, we will be able to capture the slightest of movements or even heat signatures."
India to Tap Satellites as Missile Sensors | Global Security Newswire | NTI

What about speed and size?
A moving object's speed can easily be detected and determined in a radar.
And if by speed you mean maneuverability then it has been noted that BMs can't swerve like HOBS missiles they run the risk of disintegrating in mid air because of the speed, thus MaRV can occur only to a certain point. And the interceptors are not on a tail chase that they need to worry about being outrun, its a head on collision and the Indian ABMs are not kinetic hit to kill, they use proximity charge warhead that can penetrate thick steel and cause damage with a high hit [repeat hit] density. The missile just needs to get close enough to the target.
And what about the trajectory, even a MaRV warhead won't do crazy maneuvers like you think it will do, and as I said before the 6th BMD test showed the ABM killing a maneuverable warhead.
False sense of security?
You are the one over estimating yourself, thinking MIRV as an easy fix when in fact you are taking for granted that it is already developed by Pakistan, when it is not, unless ofcourse you have a link that proves otherwise.
As of now, for Pakistan's projected capability our BMD seems sufficient.
I'm not saying that we have all the answers but we are getting there.
PDV when ready will be able to engage a target at over 150km that is before a BM can engage its counter measures.
As for the intercept probability, what's hard to believe? The eight tests have proven so.
Its so easy for you to believe the failure reports the DRDO makes public whereas the successes just goes over your head, we had a long discussion about this on the Babur thread too.
As for time constrain because of short distance, the prithvi target missile followed the trajectory of a 1500km with a high Mach speed and was struck by the AAD at the right time. If the radar detects and the program reconfigures the launcher, then time is of no issue.
When did I say you were wrong? It probably will take a decade or so for the complete protection that everyone is looking to achieve.
We are not ready for every countermeasure but we are getting there.
As for what have we already tested against:

• A MaRV warhead has been successfully destroyed.
• Multiple engagement scenario where two BMs were simultaneously tracked, engaged and were successfully destroyed, the numbers will eventually increase in the coming tests.
• And high altitude killer test will happen either this month or the next which will have a dual IR and active radar seeker so as to differentiate between chaffs and the real warhead.

As for being operational:
The phase-1 is complete and will be set in place around 2014-2015 it could have happened by now only the red-tapery needs to be dealt with.
The phase 2 may take some time.
Oh come on that's bull. If Pakistan had something so potent it would have been out there, its either in development or not there at all.
We'll see if striking BM's in its apogee is easy or no in a month or two.
No, India has no such system but there are plans in place.
If we only take the SBIRS result alongside the PAC-3 and THAAD, the tests have been more successful than the with ground based radars.
When did Pakistan openly deployed countermeasure?????
Yes please explain what those variables are?
The very purpose of these scientists is to take in those variables and you seem to know more than them, please enlighten me.
Things are never black and white as you probably think they are, there is always a shade of grey, nothing is absolute.
Today there's a counter to BM tomorrow there won't be and the day after it will again be in place and so on and so forth.

 

[HariPrasad]

@bloo
All of the “successful” missile defense tests to date have been under the most carefully controlled conditions imaginable. During a test, the interceptor operators know where the missile was being launched from and when it was being launched.The have all the idea about the dimensions of the missile Basically, having the information that will never be available in a real (full scale) nuclear exchange.
There would be dummy launches, fake warheads, decoys, MIRVs , MARVs everything you can imagine that would make it difficult if not impossible for any Indian missile defense system to determine precisely what is happening.
It is more difficult than hitting a bullet with another bullet,

False.

If you see the video PAD second test, It hits a maneuvering target. The system is designed to hit maneuvering target. V K Saraswat told that the system is designed to intercept the target like Topol M of Russia which is well known for changing the path to evade ABM interception.

In about seventeen tries since 1991, anti-ballistic missile interceptors (sometimes called ABMs) have successfully intercepted eight incoming missile warheads for a success rate of just under 50%. And this was under unrealistic conditions where the defenders knew everything there was to know about the "dummy" warhead's characteristics, trajectory, launch time, and no countermeasures were used by the offense!

In any such experiment recent test matters and not the average since 1991 as initial tests are bound to fail. As system matures, the success rate increases.

 

[acid rain]

50 % intercept capabilities in simulations add all the incertainities present in a real war with countermeasures like chaff , flares , decoys , MARVs and MIRVs and the fact that the BMD will be deployed only on certain areas and not in a large area I think our arsenals will be reduced much lower than 50%

That is open for interpretation as in, how much area the BMD's will eventually cover and what are the countermeasures it comes up against, there are plans for having naval versions of it as well. Once it matures we can line it up all along our border too.

@Alpha1, My point is a BMD has taken you into an area of uncertainty and makes you try and develop countermeasures and strategies to try and defeat it - that alone proves it credibility.

 

[Friei Indien]

We all know about Sagrika UNDER WATER ballistic missle which is currently going to equip the first Arihant nuclear sub.

But news is beaking that India Top Secret K4 & K5 SLBM are also ready soon with TESTS planned in weeks.

These SLBM have ranges of 3500KM & 5000KM respectively asnd wil equip Arihant 2 3 & 4 over the coming years as india expands its nuclear sub fleet

heres the article

Longest Range Ballistic Missile All Set for Undersea Launch -The New Indian Express

k4 wiil be too much for pakistan, its not meant for them

 

[gambit]

Well , every interceptor test sets variables , what do you mean by " you dont know that " ? The tests are always rigged since there are too many variables to consider and one can only anticipate so much @gambit if you will please explain the " setting the rules " for the test

The top rule for every weapons testing regime is containment of variables.

Variables are items that can and will affect the performance of the device, be it a car or a jet fighter or a ship, and those things are not part of the device. For example...Atmospheric conditions are not parts of the car but can affect how the car will perform in rain or snow. So containment of variables means you must initially isolate the car from environmental variables so you can collect baseline data on how the car perform without those variables.

The next rule later in the testing regime is to release those variables incrementally. To continue with the car example. It does not have to rain in order for the road to somehow get wet. A water main rupture will produce wet roads. So you test your car and tires with wet roads. No need to wait for a rainy day.

MERCEDES-BENZ G63 AMG speeding on wet road - Test Drive Photo #80/102

Next comes snow, sand, gravel, high winds, and so on. Does not have to be in that order but the ideal testing regime would be to test each environmental factor individually. Your test vehicle must be of the same model, if not the exact vehicle ID and most likely will not be the exact vehicle anyway. The time to test for actual rain or snow is when driver related issues are on the schedule. Rain and snow affects vision. So just because your vehicle can handle rain and snow with aplomb it does not mean your driver can and there are great variations in drivers in the world. Driver related issues warrant their own testing regime.

The difference between car and missile is that the missile testing regime is always a destructive testing regime. A missile is a throwaway weapon whilst no one, other than spoil brat Saudi princes, throws away a Merc. It does not matter what kind of missile is it: an ICBM, an air-air, or an anti-whatever missile. Even a test like over-the-horizon (OTH) and/or satellite data linking capability, if the missile's design have it, involves the destruction of the test vehicle.

Precisely because your test vehicle dies at the end regardless of whether it complete its mission or not, destructive tests require the highest level of data collection technical capability -- in real time. If the missile successfully detonate near the test target, or hit the target, data and forensic analyses of the test vehicle, if its remnants are retrievable, are still important because the data an tell us a great deal about our design.

For example...If we intend the missile to detonate near the target, as how most air-air missiles are designed to do, then did the missile detonate at that exact distance we designed, or did it detonated closer? Closer does not mean a good thing. It means there might be a delay in communication between the command to detonate and the execution of igniting the explosive. That is NEVER a good thing. If we designed this air-air missile to detonate at one meter from target based upon the missile's own radar data, at one meter the missile should detonate. The reason is this: What if the missile is in a high speed/maneuver engagement and the angle of approach is not optimal for a physical collision, which is the most desirable outcome? One meter proximity detonation would at least cripple the enemy and increase our chance of winning this battle, which could increase our chance of winning the war. So why did the test missile detonated detonated at .8 meter? If there is an avionics related issue, what if we ignore it and in a real war, our production missiles detonated anywhere from one meter of target to missing the target completely and then it detonate? Our pilots would now be going into combat with a high degree of unease, knowing that their lives are even at greater risk because there is a higher chance of not killing the enemy pilots. If I designed the missile to detonate at one-meter proximity, I expect the missile to detonate at one-meter radar proximity against a STATIONARY test target, then a one-meter proximity detonation against a maneuvering one. Two destructive tests and I expect two one-meter detonations. Not one one-meter detonation against the stationary target, then a .8-meter detonation against the maneuvering target.

There is always the desire and even need to inject as many variables as possible into one test and that always increase the odds of failure. The pressure often comes from -- money. A destructive testing regime is always %99 of the time a costly regime in terms of finance and time. For a technologically sophisticated country like the US, simulations can reduce the need for physical testings. In simulations, we can inject/remove variables as needed. But even for US...

Anti-Ship Missile Prototype Conducts First Solo Test Flight

DARPA designed the free-flight transition test (FFTT) demonstration to verify the missile's flight characteristics and assess subsystem and sensor performance. Beyond the primary objectives of the free-flight transition, the test vehicle also detected, engaged and hit an unmanned 260-foot Mobile Ship Target (MST) with an inert warhead.

...We still perform live tests and for our own anti-ship missiles, we do not simulate ships but uses actual ships, albeit not active duty warships. We used old shipping containers and arrayed the boxes to produce radar reflections typical of a real warship. Those radar reflections constitute one variable by themselves and we must know if the missile's radar is capable of dealing with that variable. Note that the article said that it is the design's first solo test flight. Design, not a particular test missile ID. The testing day seemed to be a clear day. The surface of the water is calm, hinting that heavy clutter produced by storm surface water are not yet injected as a variable.

Douglas Sea Scale - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Douglas Sea Scale is a scale which measures the height of the waves and also measures the swell of the sea. The scale is very simple to follow and is expressed in one of 10 degrees.

Based on my own personal experience, I can and have deduced much about this missile from reading public information about its testing regime.

Given today's computer assisted simulation technology, it is very difficult to use the published number of physical tests as a clue to the severity of the testing regime. Radar clutter can be virtually introduced to see how the virtual radar responded -- mathematically. That is why if you are talented with numbers and have good programming education/skills to go with that talent, you will be highly desirable with defense related companies. Just understand that the vast majority of what you know are felonious information, meaning serious prison time if divulged.

 

[HariPrasad]

As per Wiki Following is the K family.

So currnt test may be of K4 Mark I with 20 Ton weight and 2.5 ton pay load 3500 KM range.

K4 Mark II has 17 ton weight with 1 Ton Warhead 5000 KM range

K5 has 1 Ton Warhead with 6000 KM range.

1 more Air launch K missile is under development having 2.0 ton weight with 200 KM range and 500 KG warhead.


K Missile family - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia