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Last month, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or Nato invited India to become a partner in its missile defence programme, identifying the technology of missile defence as an area for co-operation.
Both Nato and India face similar ballistic missile threats. There has been steady growth in the range and accuracy of ballistic missiles on the perimeter of Nato as well Indian borders. Measures such as export controls, devised under the Missile Technology Control Regime, have not prevented these programmes from maturing even as arms control efforts have failed. As a result, both Nato and India have resorted to missile defence to address the challenges posed by missile proliferation. In November 2010 at the Lisbon summit, Nato adopted its new strategic concept called "Active Engagement, Modern Defence". It outlined the Alliance's approach to emerging security challenges. The document underscores the commitment to defend Nato members' populations and territories against ballistic missile threats. Missile defence is critical to realising this commitment.
On a technical level, the "phased adapted approach" introduced by the Obama Administration in September 2009 appears to be central to Nato's missile defence architecture. This approach aims at protecting the US and its European allies in the short term while working on a comprehensive missile defence programme in the long run. This policy, in principle, provides a number of benefits: increased participation from member states, reduced costs, improved transatlantic ties and infrastructure sharing. However, it poses a number of questions including identifying external threat, encouraging active co-operation with Russia, debating how best the US missile defence plans can be integrated into Nato's own plans, and identifying a configuration that would contribute to the indivisible security of the alliance.
Though missile defence may be short of a technical reality, the political reality is certain and will prove decisive. For most European Nato members, this would be an interesting debate on two critical issues: how best to engage Russia and differing perceptions about the Iranian and Syrian missile threat and how best to counter them. Co-operation in the technical realms of missile defence could become a bone of contention. This is especially true for France; the debate there is about the impact on European co-operation in technology development and the defence industrial impact of adopting what is essentially a US system.
The latest Nato offer to India should be viewed in a broader light. For India, this is a very interesting proposition and worth serious consideration. India could leverage its position to bargain for more missile defence technologies to aid its nascent missile defence programme.
In one of its swiftest diplomatic moves ever, within hours of the US declaration in 2004 that it intends to pursue its plans to deploy the first phase of ballistic missile defence, India became one of the few nations in the world to extend support to the new security architecture being proposed by the US. India hailed the US proposals for deep cuts in nuclear arsenal and building missile defence as a significant and far-reaching effort to move away from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War. India went on to say that it believed "there is a strategic and technological inevitability in stepping away from a world that is held hostage by the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to a co-operative, defensive transition that is underpinned by further cuts and a de-alert of nuclear forces". But India's position drew much opposition from the left, right and centre of Indian politics and strategic circles. While India's engagement with the US on missile defence came to reflect, for some, both an example of, and a means towards, enhancing US-India rapprochement, that was precisely the problem for others. India decided to take a solitary route and announced its own missile defence test for the first time in November 2006. V K Saraswat, who is leading India's indigenous ballistic missile defence programme, has suggested that by late 2011, India would have the capability to intercept 2,000-km range ballistic missiles, a claim questioned by some.
Given that China continues to target its missiles against India as well as growing instability in Pakistan, the importance of missile defence will continue to grow for India. Indian security interests demand that India take missile defence seriously and for this it will have to collaborate with others on this high-technology front. It should give Nato's proposal serious thought. Russia has been one of the strongest opponents of Nato's missile defence programme for Europe, but now Nato is working with Russia to dispel its misgivings and has formed the Nato-Russia Council, which meets every month and briefs Russia about the missile defence project. If Russia can work with Nato on missile defence despite the Cold War baggage, there is no reason for India to ignore the offer.
To begin with, co-operation is likely to be merely symbolic. It is not clear what parameters are being envisaged by Nato for co-operation with India. It is also not readily evident what India brings to the table — technically, there is not much India can offer. Politically, it's merely symbolic, at least at this juncture. Symbolism, however, matters. Indian security demands that New Delhi examine this issue dispassionately rather than getting swayed by those fighting old-style ideological battles. As the major powers reduce their nuclear arsenal, missile defence will become increasingly rational. Ultimately, technology, rather than arms control considerations, will determine whether it will be fully deployed or not. India would not like to be left behind in this technological race and the politics of missile defence in India is bound to become more interesting in the future.
http://www.business-standard.com/in...efence-offer-to-india-nothing-to-lose/451882/
Both Nato and India face similar ballistic missile threats. There has been steady growth in the range and accuracy of ballistic missiles on the perimeter of Nato as well Indian borders. Measures such as export controls, devised under the Missile Technology Control Regime, have not prevented these programmes from maturing even as arms control efforts have failed. As a result, both Nato and India have resorted to missile defence to address the challenges posed by missile proliferation. In November 2010 at the Lisbon summit, Nato adopted its new strategic concept called "Active Engagement, Modern Defence". It outlined the Alliance's approach to emerging security challenges. The document underscores the commitment to defend Nato members' populations and territories against ballistic missile threats. Missile defence is critical to realising this commitment.
On a technical level, the "phased adapted approach" introduced by the Obama Administration in September 2009 appears to be central to Nato's missile defence architecture. This approach aims at protecting the US and its European allies in the short term while working on a comprehensive missile defence programme in the long run. This policy, in principle, provides a number of benefits: increased participation from member states, reduced costs, improved transatlantic ties and infrastructure sharing. However, it poses a number of questions including identifying external threat, encouraging active co-operation with Russia, debating how best the US missile defence plans can be integrated into Nato's own plans, and identifying a configuration that would contribute to the indivisible security of the alliance.
Though missile defence may be short of a technical reality, the political reality is certain and will prove decisive. For most European Nato members, this would be an interesting debate on two critical issues: how best to engage Russia and differing perceptions about the Iranian and Syrian missile threat and how best to counter them. Co-operation in the technical realms of missile defence could become a bone of contention. This is especially true for France; the debate there is about the impact on European co-operation in technology development and the defence industrial impact of adopting what is essentially a US system.
The latest Nato offer to India should be viewed in a broader light. For India, this is a very interesting proposition and worth serious consideration. India could leverage its position to bargain for more missile defence technologies to aid its nascent missile defence programme.
In one of its swiftest diplomatic moves ever, within hours of the US declaration in 2004 that it intends to pursue its plans to deploy the first phase of ballistic missile defence, India became one of the few nations in the world to extend support to the new security architecture being proposed by the US. India hailed the US proposals for deep cuts in nuclear arsenal and building missile defence as a significant and far-reaching effort to move away from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War. India went on to say that it believed "there is a strategic and technological inevitability in stepping away from a world that is held hostage by the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to a co-operative, defensive transition that is underpinned by further cuts and a de-alert of nuclear forces". But India's position drew much opposition from the left, right and centre of Indian politics and strategic circles. While India's engagement with the US on missile defence came to reflect, for some, both an example of, and a means towards, enhancing US-India rapprochement, that was precisely the problem for others. India decided to take a solitary route and announced its own missile defence test for the first time in November 2006. V K Saraswat, who is leading India's indigenous ballistic missile defence programme, has suggested that by late 2011, India would have the capability to intercept 2,000-km range ballistic missiles, a claim questioned by some.
Given that China continues to target its missiles against India as well as growing instability in Pakistan, the importance of missile defence will continue to grow for India. Indian security interests demand that India take missile defence seriously and for this it will have to collaborate with others on this high-technology front. It should give Nato's proposal serious thought. Russia has been one of the strongest opponents of Nato's missile defence programme for Europe, but now Nato is working with Russia to dispel its misgivings and has formed the Nato-Russia Council, which meets every month and briefs Russia about the missile defence project. If Russia can work with Nato on missile defence despite the Cold War baggage, there is no reason for India to ignore the offer.
To begin with, co-operation is likely to be merely symbolic. It is not clear what parameters are being envisaged by Nato for co-operation with India. It is also not readily evident what India brings to the table — technically, there is not much India can offer. Politically, it's merely symbolic, at least at this juncture. Symbolism, however, matters. Indian security demands that New Delhi examine this issue dispassionately rather than getting swayed by those fighting old-style ideological battles. As the major powers reduce their nuclear arsenal, missile defence will become increasingly rational. Ultimately, technology, rather than arms control considerations, will determine whether it will be fully deployed or not. India would not like to be left behind in this technological race and the politics of missile defence in India is bound to become more interesting in the future.
http://www.business-standard.com/in...efence-offer-to-india-nothing-to-lose/451882/
