N-deal with Pak could hit ties, India cautions China

[karan.1970]

Yes agreed, but when a party (a) can bend the rules as an exception for party (b) it sets a precident that is not easily forgotten. Don't you think?

No disagreement there. And that precedent can and should be used to achieve future flexibilities as well..

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I though reports from Indian media are not considered credible on this forum. Or is it only when they dont back a particula POV

As they relate to Pakistan, Indian media reports are not credible - that has been shown time and again through the manner in which Western media reports are often distorted, and even original Indian media reports use denigrating and inflammatory language when referring to events involving Pakistan, and even concoct events out of thin air, such as the mythical 'Headley confession implicating the ISI'.

This particular report however had India and the potential repercussions for India as the subject matter, and therefore posting it was not really an issue.

 

[toxic_pus]

What the US stated is clear from the declassified documents I linked to earlier:

We believe the Government of Indian is aware of the American Interpretation of agreements under which the United States has assisted India's development in the field of atomic energy. However, we would like to reiterate the American view in the interest of clarity and to obviate any misunderstanding.

The American position, reflected in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is that the technology of nuclear explosives for peaceful uses is indistinguishable from that of nuclear weapons, and that any nuclear explosive device, though it be intended for benign economic purposes, could also be used for destructive purposes. The development of such explosives, therefore , is tantamount to the development of nuclear weapons. Any other position would be inconsistent with United States obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the United States Atomic Energy Act.

Consequently, the United States would consider it incompatible with existing United States-Indian agreements for American nuclear assistance to be employed in the development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices. Specifically, for example, the use, for the development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices of plutonium produced therefrom, would be considered by the United States a contravention of the terms under which the American materials were made available.

The United States interprets the safeguards and guarantees provisions of the Tarapur agreement as prohibiting the use of American materials and equipment, or materials produced from such materials and equipment, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive devices, regardless of stated applications.

-- The contract of March 16, 1960, under which the United States sold Heavy water to India for the CIRUS Reactor States: "The heavy Water sold hereunder shall be for use only in India by the Government in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes ..." The United States would not consider the use of Plutonium produced in CIRUS for peaceful nuclear explosives intended for any purpose to be 'research into and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes."

http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/19701116_US_Aide_Memoire_Indian_AEC.pdf

This position was conveyed clearly to India, and as a client of these foreign suppliers of equipment and technology, India should have abided by the agreement as interpreted by the suppliers, or sought to find an arbiter to clarify the conflict in interpretation. Instead, India chose to apply her own interpretation and ignore the suppliers, and conducted a nuclear explosion.

Hence, at the least, this was 'misuse and redirection' of materials meant for 'peaceful nuclear research' into India's nuclear weapons program.

Except for two things.

First, these 'interpretations' were not part of the original agreement of 1956, but were being pushed down when US got the wind that India was becoming capable of designing a nuclear devise. These 'interpretations' were ad-hoc and therefore, India was under no obligation to 'abide' by any such 'interpretations' that India hadn't agreed to when signing the dotted lines. Period.

Second, the heavy water was never really a major issue because there is no evidence that India had used US supplied heavy water.

'Question 5: How much plutonium has been produced by India utilizing this heavy water? What was the status of this plutonium at the time of India's nuclear explosion and what is the status subsequent to the explosion? Has the United States asked to see Indian records pertaining to this plutonium?

Answer: We have no knowledge of the status of the plutonium produced during any specific time period, either before or after the Indian explosion of 1974, and we have no basis on which to require the examination of Indian records. In any case, however, since India had available to it the quantity of heavy water necessary for operation of the CIRUS reactor without reliance on the initial US supply from about 1965 onward, only the quantity of plutonium produced prior to the mid-1960s was presumably dependent upon the US heavy water. Although plutonium production in CIRUS currently may be on the order of 10 kgs/yr under optimum operating conditions, operational problems prior to 1965 indicate that this cumulative amount probably was less than ten kilograms.

[Congressional Record; Vol. 122; 94th Congress, 2nd Session; August 30, 1976]

'This review establishes that in earlier efforts the previously indicated heavy water loss rate and certain related calculations were incorrect. Consequently, there is high probability - because of India's practice of co-mingling heavy water - that some US heavy water remained in the CIRUS reactor during the period in question. We nevertheless do not have enough information to conclusively establish that such heavy water was present at all times after 1965. A full statement of our current best understand of the situation is contained in the attached Staff Analysis. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been provide with this information.

The key factors in this matter, in our view, are that by 1965 India had produced unsafeguarded heavy water in its own Nangal heavy water plant in excess of that needed to replace the heavy water supplied by the US for the CIRUS reactor. Thereafter, Indian supplies of Nangal-produced heavy water continued to increase so that by 1974 it had produced several fold the CIRUS requirements. Thus, US heavy water was not essential to the production of plutonium to the Indian nuclear test, and our response to the Indian nuclear test took this important consideration into account.'

[Henry Kissinger's letter to Abraham Ribicroff, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, dated Aug 2, 1976]

Now what did this Staff Analysis say

'In 1962, the Nangal heavy water plant came into operation with a production capacity of some 12-15 tons of heavy water per year. [...] It is estimated that by 1965 the quantity of heavy water produced by Nangal had exceeded the 21 tons supplied by the US under our 1956 contract, and by 1966, when the CIRUS reactor achieved reliable operation cumulative production from Nangal had reached some 38 tons. The growth of the Indian inventory of heavy water is evidenced by the fact that in 1964 it returned 5 tons of the material supplied for Zerlina in the original drums and in apparently unused condition and, in 1965, loaned 12 tons of heavy water to Belgium. [...] For the reasons cited above it is technically impossible to determine the amount of heavy water initially supplied by the US in 1956 for use in CIRUS which physically remains in India today. Neither is there any conclusive basis for establishing the origin of the heavy water present in the CIRUS reactor at the indeterminate time that plutonium used in the 1974 nuclear explosive test was produced.' [Staff Analysis report]

Your first allegation that India 'stole material' was one big fat lie. Your current allegation of 'misuse and redirection' also remains unsubstantiated.

 

[karan.1970]

This particular report however had India and the potential repercussions for India as the subject matter, and therefore posting it was not really an issue.

Despite not a single named source about most of the claims in the report..

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

All decisions in this world can not be objective. If they were, Machines could run the world and books from Issac Asimov wouldnt be found under the science fiction section in Barne's and Nobel. As a matter of fact, most critical decisions are subjective in nature, however, if you can explain the reasoning behind them (irrespective of the fact whether everybody agrees to that reasoning or not), they are not arbitrary.. And that is the part of your statement I disagree with.

Whatever spin you want to put on it, when decisions are not objective, uniform or based on established criteria and metrics, especially when they are not taken in a bilateral context but an international context, they open themselves up to charges of double standards and discrimination. The whole point of setting up the NSG was to provide some sort of order to international nuclear trade, and the whole point of 'NSG rules', which the US, India, and various international experts keep stressing China might be in potential violation of, was to establish some sort of 'objective' metrics and conditions that would govern nuclear trade.

If subjectivity is to rule the roost, then the whole premise of the NSG is flawed, and there really is no issue with what China or any other NSG member nation does with respect to nuclear trade, since no longer are there any hard and fast 'objective rules of the NSG' to play by.

Wiki defines arbitrariness as:

Arbitrariness is a term given to choices and actions subject to individual will, judgment or preference, based solely upon an individual's opinion or discretion.

In this particular case, given the lack of established metrics that govern/would have governed exemptions, the decision by the NSG was exactly that - they might as well have argued that India deserved the NSG exemption because Yoga was invented there, even if as you claim, there was a clause in the NSG that allowed for 'exemptions for special cases based on consensus'. The lack of rules or 'objectivity' governing those exemptions makes them arbitrary.

NSG's mandate is to non proliferation. It has a set of rules that dis allow trading with non NPT Signatories. It also has a provision for exception based on consensus for any special case. And thats what they did. Hence not arbitrary.

With respect to this provision, this is something I asked for pages ago in this thread - can you provide a link to this provision in the NSG rules please.

Loosly speaking, you can say that they discriminated against Pakistan based on its proliferation history. However then every person with a bad credit history in the USA can claim a similar discrimination by the Banks based on their credit scores

The argument of proliferation against Pakistan, in terms of denying it equal treatment, is bunk given that several European nations (or entities within them) were involved in far greater proliferation that resulted in the establishment of the Israeli and Pakistani nuclear programs. The Chinese are credited with even more fantastic accomplishments in furthering the Pakistani nuclear program than possibly any other nation in history.

So if nations such as those can become NSG members, the argument of 'proliferation' in denying Pakistan an exemption is yet more discrimination and double standards.

To use your 'credit' analogy', its like a bank issuing loans to people with absolutely junk credit, merely because it feels like it and likes them, and then turning around and denying finances to people with slightly better credit.

Pakistan obviously finds this discriminatory since NSG will never make that exception for Pakistan. Ask a Pakistani and he will call it discriminatory. Ask NSG and they will say its a decision based on the facts of Pakistan's proliferation history.

Any decision based on 'proliferation history' by the NSG would be discrminatory given the presence of nations, with vastly greater proliferation records than Pakistan's, on the NSG.

So as far as NSG is concerned, its exemption for india is niether discriminatory nor in violation of its charter. Pakistan obviously doesnt believe that, but it really has no say here since its niether a member of NSG nor is in a situation where a waiver has been asked for and rejected by NSG...
At the end of it, this comes back to the same arguement of One man's terrorist is other man's freedom fighter. Substitute Terrorist and FF with discretion and discrimiation and we have a new one.

Again, whether Pakistan has a direct say or not has little to do with the issue - Pakistan can make its protests and views known through other means, such as pursuing nuclear cooperation with NSG member States that agree with the Pakistani position, which is precisely what is happening with the proposed Sino-Pak nuclear deal.

And objectively there really is no question about the fact that the Indian exemption was discriminatory and an example of double standards, unlike the 'freedom fighter vs terrorist' argument.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Despite not a single named source about most of the claims in the report..

You are free to point that out and further establish how untrustworthy the Indian media is and that nothing out of it should be considered credible.

In the meantime, whether the sources are credible or not, I thought it raised an interesting possibility, on how the opposition to the Sino-Pak nuclear deal and the international opposition to it might impact potential Indian membership at the NSG.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Absolutely does not mean that..

- Means to bypass.. Yes sure..
- Rights to bypass... not as long as they accept those rules in public. -- Raise the issue.. by all means..

In my opinion, either reject the rules and make your own like India and Pakistan did in 1990's. Or stick by them till the time you can get them changed..

Since you argue 'subjectivity', rights to bypass, whether directly or through obfuscation given the need to keep everyone 'happy', exist, based on the 'subjective interpretation' of the NSG rules and the impact of the Indian exemption upon them.

 

[schneider]

How, when they are light water NPP's and therefore do not produce Plutonium as a byproduct, nor are they breeder reactors (such as the ones India is researching) that would produce U-233?

In fact, Pakistan has to enrich the Uranium it uses to fuel those reactors, and the same enrichment process (which has nothing to do with the reactors) is used to produce Highly Enriched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons.

So again, how will these Light Water NPP's produce fuel for Nuclear Weapons?

what I am saying from the begning is, Pakistan has made Nuclear Tipped Cruise Missiles and SRBM. A very compact warhead is used in these weapons, so it has nothing to do with HIGHLY enriched U-238 and U-235. because its Critical mass is 40-55kgs.

You are left with only two Options that is to produce U-233 in your Research reacter or produce Plutonium in Khushab.

You will not produce much mass U-233, because you need though small and powerful bombs. Which is only possible by Adding small gram of LI6 in Plutonium. Which increases the yield by 300% as Pakistan does not posses a Thermonuclear Warhead. Plus you are increasing your arsenal using , alone U233 producing reactor cannot do that.

So your policy is shifting from Uranium warheads to Plutonium warheads. And the reactors which are being build by China are all Plutonium based reactors. This gives us suspecion that you will use the material to build weapons.

 

[karan.1970]

You are free to point that out and further establish how untrustworthy the Indian media is and that nothing out of it should be considered credible.

In the meantime, whether the sources are credible or not, I thought it raised an interesting possibility, on how the opposition to the Sino-Pak nuclear deal and the international opposition to it might impact potential Indian membership at the NSG.

Really the point here, which I think you are aware, is that how in a discussion around double standards and arbitrary decisions, you yourself are using snippets from the same Indian media that you normally rubbish as unreliable and untrustworthy when it does not suit your line of arguement. Ironic?

 

[karan.1970]

Since you argue 'subjectivity', rights to bypass, whether directly or through obfuscation given the need to keep everyone 'happy', exist, based on the 'subjective interpretation' of the NSG rules and the impact of the Indian exemption upon them.

Well, its not for Pakistan to do a subjective interpertation of NSG rules since it is not a member of NSG. And again, NSG is a group of nations just like G 20 or G 8. Pakistan actually is not even directly required to follow any mandate of NSG since its not a member. Its upto China (which is a member) to decide whether it wants to or not bypass the rules (that is if NSG objects to the deal). No once can or will give any country any rights to bypass these rules. Its at the end of the day, just trade (though of a more deadly nature) and the rules/directions are on the same line as that of WTO.

 

[sivadreams]

Source: Times of India
India to turn heat on China-Pakistan nuclear deal

NEW DELHI: With US and other members of the Nuclear Supplies Group appearing unlikely to block China's attempt to reward Pakistan with nuclear reactors, India has decided to work on its own to organize resistance to the Beijing-Islamabad deal.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will use a bilateral meeting with Canadian PM Stephen Harper this weekend to convey "concerns" about China's proposal to build new nuclear reactors for its "all-weather friend".

Singh will be in Toronto for the G-20 summit, as well as to sign a civil nuclear agreement with Canada. Canada is the world's largest supplier of uranium, which India is in dire need of.

While the reactor deal was done a couple of months ago, it's only now, with signs that NSG does not have the appetite for a feud with China on the issue, that India is slowly building up a diplomatic move on the issue. However, there will be no public lobbying against the Pakistan deal. India is expected to make quiet representations with "friends". "We will air concerns," said sources.

When asked, foreign secretary Nirupama Rao told journalists on Tuesday that India was not a member of the NSG, but was "closely monitoring" the debate.

Interestingly, Harper will be meeting Chinese president Hu Jintao in a bilateral meeting before the summit, while the India meeting is scheduled for after. Hu will expect to be complimented for allowing the Chinese currency yuan to be more flexible. This has been a major concern among the world's big economies, including India.

Singh is also expected to have a bilateral meeting with Hu on the margins of the summit, his first after China announced its nuclear deal with Pakistan. His last meeting with the Chinese president was in April on the sidelines of the BRIC summit in Brasilia. It's not yet known whether India will take up this issue.

The India-Canada nuclear deal will be the latest in a series of civil nuclear agreements that India has been signing with key countries in the wake of the India-US nuclear deal. It will allow Canadian companies to export and import "controlled" nuclear materials, equipment and technology to and from India. In effect, this brings India's nuclear history full circle. In 1974, Canada accused India of conducting its first nuclear test with Canadian nuclear materials that were supposed to be for peaceful uses.

Sources said the China-Pakistan nuclear lovefest has been on a high over the past few years. Conscious that frequent interactions between Pakistanis and Chinese in the nuclear field might raise eyebrows, the two countries who have a long-shared nuclear history, even kept part of their collaborations under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

By engaging in IAEA-blessed activities related to safety, extraction, etc, the two countries have been able to get their scientists together for intensive engagement, with little oversight on what knowhow was actually being passed on to Pakistan. Diplomats monitoring such activity between China and Pakistan say this cooperation has ramped up significantly in the past couple of years.

Briefing journalists, Vivek Katju, secretary (west) in MEA, said India and Canada were working on a slew of other agreements on science and technology, health, agriculture and culture. He said a number of agreements and MoUs were under active negotiation and likely to be concluded and signed during the PM's visit. These included civil nuclear energy cooperation, social security, mining, higher education and culture, he said.

Last week, the Canadian government issued a report on the Kanishka disaster which indicted the Canadian system for numerous lapses. Asked about the report, Katju said pointedly that India had determined that "the extremism which led to the tragedy was not given 'sufficient' attention before or after the disaster".

 

[karan.1970]

Whatever spin you want to put on it, when decisions are not objective, uniform or based on established criteria and metrics, especially when they are not taken in a bilateral context but an international context, they open themselves up to charges of double standards and discrimination. The whole point of setting up the NSG was to provide some sort of order to international nuclear trade, and the whole point of 'NSG rules', which the US, India, and various international experts keep stressing China might be in potential violation of, was to establish some sort of 'objective' metrics and conditions that would govern nuclear trade.

Some times, things are really as simple as the seem and everything that doesnt agree with one's point of view is not a spin.

Anything, specially in international polictics, can open itself to charges of discrimination. And really, that possibility of being attacked as discrininatory (mostly by the nation thats losing out) is not what drives international diplomacy.

No standard operating procedure covers all unforseeable future possibilities. They are called unforseeable for a reason, you know. So to expect an objective criteria for every decision is naive at best. As I said, if that was possible, you wouldnt need people to run the govt.s and world bodies.

If subjectivity is to rule the roost, then the whole premise of the NSG is flawed, and there really is no issue with what China or any other NSG member nation does with respect to nuclear trade, since no longer are there any hard and fast 'objective rules of the NSG' to play by.

That's your own opinion really. The rules are very simple.. Just like the Bank example I took earlier. The rules decide who gets the loan or not (or who gets to do nuclear trade). In case there is an exception that needs to be made, the Bank Management takes a judgement call based on a combination of subjective and objective parameters. It cant be just objective parameters because based on those, the loan wasnt possible anyway.

Wiki defines arbitrariness as:

Arbitrariness is a term given to choices and actions subject to individual will, judgment or preference, based solely upon an individual's opinion or discretion.

In this particular case, given the lack of established metrics that govern/would have governed exemptions, the decision by the NSG was exactly that - they might as well have argued that India deserved the NSG exemption because Yoga was invented there, even if as you claim, there was a clause in the NSG that allowed for 'exemptions for special cases based on consensus'. The lack of rules or 'objectivity' governing those exemptions makes them arbitrary. With respect to this provision, this is something I asked for pages ago in this thread - can you provide a link to this provision in the NSG rules please.

You are bang on. The key phrase in your definition is individual's opinion or discretion. In the case of India's waiver, there were the converging opininions and discretions of 45 countries. Arbitrary Convergence is an Oxymoron if there ever was one.. Its as far fetched as the term Good Taliban

The argument of proliferation against Pakistan, in terms of denying it equal treatment, is bunk given that several European nations (or entities within them) were involved in far greater proliferation that resulted in the establishment of the Israeli and Pakistani nuclear programs. The Chinese are credited with even more fantastic accomplishments in furthering the Pakistani nuclear program than possibly any other nation in history.

So if nations such as those can become NSG members, the argument of 'proliferation' in denying Pakistan an exemption is yet more discrimination and double standards.

Who has denied Pakistan equal treatment? Has NSG rejected any waiver that anyone has approached it with regarding Pakistan? Arent you getting a little ahead of yourself here?

To use your 'credit' analogy', its like a bank issuing loans to people with absolutely junk credit, merely because it feels like it and likes them, and then turning around and denying finances to people with slightly better credit.

Any decision based on 'proliferation history' by the NSG would be discrminatory given the presence of nations, with vastly greater proliferation records than Pakistan's, on the NSG.

And that happens all the time. In a case which is not a straight pass thru decision, and is decided by an underwriter's discretion, folks with lower credit score may get a loan which a person with slightly higher score may not. Because, once the deal comes into a discretionary process, the objective parameter of credit score ceases to be the only criteria based on which the decision is taken. Thats why you have highly paid and experienced underwriters who bound by a loose set of decision guidelines take a judgement call on a case to case basis.

Again, whether Pakistan has a direct say or not has little to do with the issue - Pakistan can make its protests and views known through other means, such as pursuing nuclear cooperation with NSG member States that agree with the Pakistani position, which is precisely what is happening with the proposed Sino-Pak nuclear deal.

And objectively there really is no question about the fact that the Indian exemption was discriminatory and an example of double standards, unlike the 'freedom fighter vs terrorist' argument.

As I said, Pakistan has not even approached the NSG with a waiver request before crying wolf (or discrimination in this case). How was Indian exemption discriminatory? Just because Pakistan did not like it? What will be next. Pakistan crying discrimination when a large corporation decides to open its India operations while deciding to not go into Pakistan? The interesting thing here is that Pakistan is crying discrimination without even attempting a waiver on the same lines as India.

Wiki defines Discrimination as "A sociological term referring to the treatment taken toward or against a person of a certain group in consideration based solely on class or category. It involves excluding or restricting members of one group from opportunities that are available to other groups . The United Nations explains : "Discriminatory behaviors take many forms, but they all involve some form of exclusion or rejection"

Which rejection are we talking of? NSG just gave a waiver to India. It hasnt denied it to Pakistan yet. As a matter of fact no one has even approached NSG with a waiver request for Pakistan. Talk about discrimination when Pakistan asks for a waiver and is rejected based on arbitrary criteria. Right now in my opinion, Pakistan is just flustered that India got offered a deal which Pakistan did not.

At best yoiu can accuse NSG of favoritism towards India, but discrimination implies denying an opportunity based on bias. Which is not true in this case so far..

 

[toxic_pus]

And that happens all the time. In a case which is not a straight pass thru decision, and is decided by an underwriter's discretion, folks with lower credit score may get a loan which a person with slightly higher score may not. Because, once the deal comes into a discretionary process, the objective parameter of credit score ceases to be the only criteria based on which the decision is taken. Thats why you have highly paid and experienced underwriters who bound by a loose set of decision guidelines take a judgement call on a case to case basis.

Venture Capital comes to mind, where the so called credit rating is the last thing on the investor's mind.

Besides, I was under the impression that India had a better nuclear 'credit rating' than Pakistan and it is this positive perception about India's past record that helped India to secure a waiver, in spite of the high decibel protests from the non-proliferation ayotollahs.

 

[PakSher]

NEW DELHI: With US and other members of the Nuclear Supplies Group appearing unlikely to block China's attempt to reward Pakistan with nuclear reactors, India has decided to work on its own to organize resistance to the Beijing-Islamabad deal.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will use a bilateral meeting with Canadian PM Stephen Harper this weekend to convey "concerns" about China's proposal to build new nuclear reactors for its "all-weather friend".

Singh will be in Toronto for the G-20 summit, as well as to sign a civil nuclear agreement with Canada. Canada is the world's largest supplier of uranium, which India is in dire need of.

While the reactor deal was done a couple of months ago, it's only now, with signs that NSG does not have the appetite for a feud with China on the issue, that India is slowly building up a diplomatic move on the issue. However, there will be no public lobbying against the Pakistan deal. India is expected to make quiet representations with "friends". "We will air concerns," said sources.

When asked, foreign secretary Nirupama Rao told journalists on Tuesday that India was not a member of the NSG, but was "closely monitoring" the debate.

Interestingly, Harper will be meeting Chinese president Hu Jintao in a bilateral meeting before the summit, while the India meeting is scheduled for after. Hu will expect to be complimented for allowing the Chinese currency yuan to be more flexible. This has been a major concern among the world's big economies, including India.

Singh is also expected to have a bilateral meeting with Hu on the margins of the summit, his first after China announced its nuclear deal with Pakistan. His last meeting with the Chinese president was in April on the sidelines of the BRIC summit in Brasilia. It's not yet known whether India will take up this issue.

The India-Canada nuclear deal will be the latest in a series of civil nuclear agreements that India has been signing with key countries in the wake of the India-US nuclear deal. It will allow Canadian companies to export and import "controlled" nuclear materials, equipment and technology to and from India. In effect, this brings India's nuclear history full circle. In 1974, Canada accused India of conducting its first nuclear test with Canadian nuclear materials that were supposed to be for peaceful uses.

Sources said the China-Pakistan nuclear lovefest has been on a high over the past few years. Conscious that frequent interactions between Pakistanis and Chinese in the nuclear field might raise eyebrows, the two countries who have a long-shared nuclear history, even kept part of their collaborations under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

By engaging in IAEA-blessed activities related to safety, extraction, etc, the two countries have been able to get their scientists together for intensive engagement, with little oversight on what knowhow was actually being passed on to Pakistan. Diplomats monitoring such activity between China and Pakistan say this cooperation has ramped up significantly in the past couple of years.

Briefing journalists, Vivek Katju, secretary (west) in MEA, said India and Canada were working on a slew of other agreements on science and technology, health, agriculture and culture. He said a number of agreements and MoUs were under active negotiation and likely to be concluded and signed during the PM's visit. These included civil nuclear energy cooperation, social security, mining, higher education and culture, he said.

Last week, the Canadian government issued a report on the Kanishka disaster which indicted the Canadian system for numerous lapses. Asked about the report, Katju said pointedly that India had determined that "the extremism which led to the tragedy was not given 'sufficient' attention before or after the disaster".

India to turn heat on China-Pakistan nuclear deal - India - The Times of India

 

[indushek]

I think though its a try not much can be achieved, if the US itself is not forthcoming not much can be done. Its the reality.