A two-pronged offensive of brigade-strength each was hastily put together for the capture of Ramgarh and, for neutralising Jaisalmer Airfield – the latter, a rather quixotic task dictated by the absence of PAF in the area. It is also open to conjecture if the Pakistani GHQ had wishfully imagined the dislocation of Indian strategic reserves as a consequence of the daring 18 Division sortie. In the event, the offensive bogged down at Longewala soon after initiation on the midnight of 4 December. However, due to the boldness and surprise of the move, Indian 12 Division was knocked off-balance and remained mired in efforts to counter the Pakistani offensive, as well as screening the area for any more surprises. It could not progress beyond the initial capture of a desert outpost of Islamgarh and, failed to develop operations towards Rahim Yar Khan, which were charged with the ambitious objective of severing the rail-road link to northern Pakistan. There is also evidence of panic entraining of some elements of the crack Indian 1 Armoured Division for providing relief, a task that was quickly taken over by a detachment of six IAF Hunters belonging to No 122 Squadron stationed at Jaisalmer.
With no air opposition to menace them, the Hunters carried out text book strafing and rocketing attacks during the 38 sorties [1] flown over two days, in which they wreaked havoc on Pakistani tank columns caught in the open desert. By 7 December, Pakistani brigades were in full retreat, having suffered heavy losses, including at least 20 tanks [2] and scores of other vehicles destroyed or abandoned. At the end of the venture, Major General B M Mustafa, the ill-starred Commander of 18 Division, stood relieved of his command for an undertaking that went awry under his watch.
It is another matter that 18 Division offensive had been planned hastily, had not been war-gamed and, the logistics requirements had been treated most superficially. It was easy to see why it floundered as it did. Even though some diehard strategists make much of the initial advantage of surprise, it must be realised that, had the overstretched Pakistani force somehow reached its objective at Ramgarh, it would have been eventually destroyed by a realigned 12 Division charging in from the left flank.
Despite the battering that it took at Longewala, it can be said that 18 Division’s venture, foolhardy though it was, did not go in vain and, it was somehow able to prevent a befuddled 12 Division Commander, Major General R K Khambata, from achieving his main task of truncating West Pakistan. The Indian Official History of 1971 Indo-Pak War succinctly sums up 12 Division’s disappointment thus: “Had it detected the Pak thrust on 4 December, the Division could have met and dissipated it, and gone ahead with its offensive as originally planned
...and I lol'ed you LCH...even an undergraduates chinese studients can design this kind of toy as hobby. 
..LOL
.If your chinese have this such capability ,then what is the need of your top class scientists to copy Black hawk(you already conceded that).
..give me a good reason
