Interesting article from India that reviews past actions and potential future options - in summary, no really good 'military retaliation options' that don't risk an escalation into a full fledged war.
Opinion | Pulwama: India’s response should be informed by history
It is increasingly becoming difficult for India to impose costs on Pakistan that will instil some level of deterrence while at the same time not breaching nuclear red line
The surgical strikes also carried an element of surprise. It wasn’t clear how India would respond to the Uri attack, or even whether India would respond at all. The inaction after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks was still fresh in the memory. Where India failed was to follow up these strikes with similar moves involving surprise and exhibit a willingness to escalate in responding to attacks that followed in Nagrota and elsewhere. A one-off surgical strike is too little to bring about a behaviour change in Pakistan’s generals.
Now, let us turn the gaze to those instances when India failed against Pakistan.
2001-02: The terrorist attack on the Parliament in New Delhi was followed by a massive mobilisation of Indian troops along the LoC and the international border. India also pressed Pakistan to surrender 20 terrorists to India. The coercive strategy failed. While the mobilisation was meant to signal escalation, it took so much time that the surprise element was entirely gone. India’s tardiness allowed Pakistan to counter-mobilise and provided the room for international mediators to weigh in.
2008: The 26/11 attacks in Mumbai were an opportunity to rectify the mistakes of 2001-02. However, India allowed itself to be deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear bombs. International support was with India and a limited conventional attack would have called out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. But India decided to not go down that route.
As the Modi government mulls its retaliatory options against the dastardly attack in Pulwama, it needs to look back in history and make a note of what works and what doesn’t. Whenever India has enjoyed a degree of military success against Pakistan, it has had to do with two common attributes: an element of surprise and a willingness to escalate. Unfortunately, surgical strikes no longer carry the surprise element. After 2016, the Pakistani army will be prepared for it. Also, unlike last time, there would most probably be no terrorist launch pads to be found in areas close to the LoC.
Since the Pulwama attack is bigger than Uri but much less ambitious than Kargil, one would expect an Indian military response, if any, to be between the two strata of surgical strikes and the use of air power. This is a narrow window, and then there are the low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons that Pakistan regularly flaunts. It is increasingly becoming difficult for India to impose costs on Pakistan that will instil some level of deterrence while, at the same time, not breaching any nuclear red lines. Any significant response will either breach those red lines or demolish the Pakistani nuclear bluster for good. Once the immediate needs have been taken care of, India should think of a long-term strategy. Everything from covert operations to counterforce strikes should be on the table.
kunal.singh@htlive.com
https://www.hindustantimes.com/anal...-by-history/story-UydJjuXelGWLlMAwggmo6K.html
