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Moderinization and increasing PN Fleet size ...

Is there a need for an aircraft carrier ? Or do we need to focus on countering adversary's Carrier ?

  • Yes , Aircraft carrier is needed

    Votes: 14 12.5%
  • No , we don't have the budget for that , we need to focus on countermeaures

    Votes: 98 87.5%

  • Total voters
    112
I would hope that PN doesnt get specialized ships or moves away from this concept in future acquisitions or upgrades. They should go for the smaller low cost multimission vessels. Even USN is doing this with the FFG(X). Every ship should be able to operate independently amd as a group. With respect to the air defense, i hope PN would consider approaching Russia about acquiring the Redut (with the 9m96e or e2 depending on the length of the vls tubes) and making it the standard for PN (Instead of Hq-16). It has more range and both missiles are quad-packed. If you you look at F-22p, a VLS (12-16 cell) can fit where the current HQ-7A sits. A Redut system would set you up with 48-64 missiles (60-120km in range). Change its radar to Smart S MK2 and you would make the F-22P a very versatile survivable ship. A 12-16 cell vls in MILGEM with the same Missile would be great. The Type 054A could also be fit with the 9M96E2 (120km range) and 16 cells could utilize these (64 missiles with the remainder loaded with Yu-8 ASROC and 8 LACM. The redut could be am answer to Barak-8 except with more missiles and possibly better range.
The major problem seems to be a large disparity in terms of funds available (due to huge difference in economic sizes of the two countries) and the fact that naval assets are generally among some of the most expensive assets armed forces can acquire. Therefore IN would always hold a quantitative and possibly qualitative advantage over PN.

So wouldn't it be better if PN changed up its approach? Instead of trying to match IN in the same manner...what if instead after building up a minimum deterrence capability(a sufficient number of surface warships...whatever that number maybe...I'm not an expert in this), PN invested more in A2/AD assets and approach. Meaning investing more in coastal defense batteries like Zarb...increasing it's range...and increasing the range of Babur and Harbah. Building more missile boats and use shoot and scoot tactics...more submarines(essential for A2/AD). The approach being just launching volley after volley of cruise missiles at any IN asset found to be operating within Pakistani territorial waters. This way Pak can make it extremely cost prohibitive for IN to take on PN. What are ur thoughts on this type of asymmetric and less cost prohibitive approach?
 
Yeh 9 trillion economy the concepts and standards being floated to a navy which is third world country where crooks and thieves are elected and millions of kids do not go to school today 2019 :D

Focus on educations, health and economy
 
The major problem seems to be a large disparity in terms of funds available (due to huge difference in economic sizes of the two countries) and the fact that naval assets are generally among some of the most expensive assets armed forces can acquire. Therefore IN would always hold a quantitative and possibly qualitative advantage over PN.

So wouldn't it be better if PN changed up its approach? Instead of trying to match IN in the same manner...what if instead after building up a minimum deterrence capability(a sufficient number of surface warships...whatever that number maybe...I'm not an expert in this), PN invested more in A2/AD assets and approach. Meaning investing more in coastal defense batteries like Zarb...increasing it's range...and increasing the range of Babur and Harbah. Building more missile boats and use shoot and scoot tactics...more submarines(essential for A2/AD). The approach being just launching volley after volley of cruise missiles at any IN asset found to be operating within Pakistani territorial waters. This way Pak can make it extremely cost prohibitive for IN to take on PN. What are ur thoughts on this type of asymmetric and less cost prohibitive approach?
Oh i agree, but the problem is without air cover, your missile boats, a2/ad strategies go up in smoke to CBGs. You need to have a competent mutlilayered air defense at sea to protect missile boats and submarines as well as to hunt subs. I am most in favor of the Israeli approach to ships (small, stealthy, fast and carry a big stick). The Sa'ar 5 is 1275 tons. It carries 8 harpoons and 16 Barak 8 (90km) SAMs. My ideal vessel for PN would be the Russian Steregushchiy class which has 8 Kalibr AShM/LACM and 12 cell vls for 48 redut missiles
 
Oh i agree, but the problem is without air cover, your missile boats, a2/ad strategies go up in smoke to CBGs. You need to have a competent mutlilayered air defense at sea to protect missile boats and submarines as well as to hunt subs. I am most in favor of the Israeli approach to ships (small, stealthy, fast and carry a big stick). The Sa'ar 5 is 1275 tons. It carries 8 harpoons and 16 Barak 8 (90km) SAMs. My ideal vessel for PN would be the Russian Steregushchiy class which has 8 Kalibr AShM/LACM and 12 cell vls for 48 redut missiles
Yeah I absolutely agree with the air cover...that's an integral part of any effective navy. Besides providing air cover to the assets operating out in the ocean, they can also fire at enemy ships from stand off ranges. My main argument however is that unlike what members here are saying things about having an aircraft carrier and what not...I think it's unwise to try an compete with IN on a one to one basis. Asymmetric approach would be the best IMO.
 
Yeah I absolutely agree with the air cover...that's an integral part of any effective navy. Besides providing air cover to the assets operating out in the ocean, they can also fire at enemy ships from stand off ranges. My main argument however is that unlike what members here are saying things about having an aircraft carrier and what not...I think it's unwise to try an compete with IN on a one to one basis. Asymmetric approach would be the best IMO.
100% agreed. Infact there was even a article in the National Interest which is an American International Affairs magazine (often has anti-Pakistani and heavily pro-indian tilt), which assessed the efficacy of IN carriers and concluded that they would likely be ineffective in any full scale conflict, with very low serviceability of the air wings and that half the available aircraft would be needed to just defend the ship itself leaving only a handful of aircraft to assault Pakistan (essential negating the efficacy of the carrier, making it a giant target). Im not sure how reliable their conclusions but they made a good point. The members here should read this article and understand the realities of operating an aircraft carrier. You have to have enough ships and aircraft to defend the carrier to make it worth it to have. Having a carrier that only has 20 or so aircraft and a few ships that have only point defense missiles or even 4 ships with 40km range SAMs is a recipe to lose your huge investment. The better solution as you said is invest in shoot and scoot capable vessels (the FAC-55 design looks ideal for such jobs) with some larger vessels capable of going toe to toe with an IN CBG in flotilla battles (say Type 054A with F-22P and MILGEM and 2 subs) if the F-22P and Milgem have better air defense capabilities. As i stated, they need something along the lines of the REDUT system. Of note, the 40km quad packed KS-SAM of south Korea was based on the 9M100 which is the shortest ranged missile in the redut system and jointly developed with Russia. I am sure PN could approach the Russians to either jointly develop a missile based on 9M96E or E2 or at lease acquire them as the standard missile of PN. I think the HQ-16 is going to be the wrong system for PN even if is cheaper. The 9M96E is a smaller missile and able to be quad packed and has same to longer range (40-60km depending on the source) compared to HQ-16A (40km) and favorably compares even to HQ-16B (70km).
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/indias-aircraft-carriers-giant-waste-time-39672
 
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The Pakistan Navy’s Future Plans in a Nutshell

It is unclear if that chain is still in place, but since 2015, the PN has slotted – and signed – a set of big-ticket contracts for naval assets from China, Turkey, and the Netherlands.

These include:

  • 8 new Hangor-class submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) (China);
  • 4 Type 054A/P multi-mission frigates (China);
  • 4 MILGEM corvettes or light frigates (Turkey);
  • 2 1,900-ton offshore patrol vessels (OPV) (Netherlands).
Collectively, these procurements will not only recapitalize the PN’s fleet, but expand it across both surface and sub-surface domains. According to the PN Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi, in a July/August 2018 interview, the PN intends to add new aviation assets.

These could include:

  • a new long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft to augment its existing P-3C LRMP;
  • an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) platform
  • and ‘modern multi-function helicopters.’
The list would indicate that the PN does not intend to rely on aging Alouette IIIs or refurbished Westland Sea King helicopters, nor is it undervaluing the need for a genuine successor to the P-3C.

https://quwa.org/2019/10/29/a-look-...wreDykZTx5oy9vxsPNp7d3clyIrsvm7-GNYotWBjpUJzE

LOADED PROCUREMENT PIPELINE IN TOW, THE PAKISTAN NAVY RISES (PART 1)

In 2015, we posed the question, “Is it Finally the Pakistan Navy’s Turn?”

The original article outlined the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) original procurement plans in the 2000s, which it had to shelve in the early 2010s, ostensibly due to Pakistan’s economic troubles at the time.

However, the PN was also constrained by the reality that its budget was the thinnest of Pakistan’s service arms, i.e., behind the Pakistan Army (PA) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Thus, with any initiation of new procurement, the PN was expected to sit at the back of the priority chain.

The Pakistan Navy’s Future Plans in a Nutshell
It is unclear if that chain is still in place, but since 2015, the PN has slotted – and signed – a set of big-ticket contracts for naval assets from China, Turkey, and the Netherlands.

These include:

  • eight new Hangor-class submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) (China);
  • four Type 054A/P multi-mission frigates (China);
  • four MILGEM corvettes and frigates (Turkey);
  • and two 1,900-ton offshore patrol vessels (OPV) (Netherlands).
Collectively, these procurements will not only recapitalize the PN’s fleet, but expand it across both surface and sub-surface domains. According to the PN Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi, in a July/August 2018 interview, the PN intends to add new aviation assets.

These could include:

  • a new long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft to augment its existing P-3C LRMP;
  • an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) platform
  • and ‘modern multi-function helicopters.’
The list would indicate that the PN does not intend to rely on aging Alouette IIIs or refurbished Westland Sea King helicopters, nor is it undervaluing the need for a genuine successor to the P-3C.

In fact, the CNS clearly placed the P-3C – a LRMP – in a different category to the PN’s newly acquired ATR-72, which it classified as a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), i.e., differently.

However, besides high-profile procurements. The PN is also crafting a revamped auxiliary/support fleet, namely: a new 3,000-ton ocean survey vessel, a new submarine rescue-and-salvage vessel, and, possibly, an additional new tanker in the future to join the newly commissioned 17,000-ton PNS Moawin.

There is more at play than just accumulating assets. The PN has already built the foundation of a network-enabled warfare capability (developed with Turkey’s MilSOFT), but its far from reaching its potential. This will be realized in full as the PN inducts its new surface combatant and aviation assets.

In part-one, Quwa focuses on the PN’s forthcoming surface combatants. In part-two, we will discuss the PN’s aviation; in part-three, auxiliary/support, and network-enabled warfare efforts; and in part-four, submarines.

Surface Combatants

The make-up of Pakistan’s future surface fleet was covered in detail in previous Quwa Premium articles, but for this piece, the focus is on the potential arrangement.

The PN uses an internal nomenclature for its ships. Ships designated as ‘frigates’ in the UK – such as the Type 21 – are designated as ‘destroyers’ in the PN. However, when speaking externally, the PN could use the original nomenclature. Thus, the terminology of ‘frigate’ or ‘corvette’ may be inconsequential.

To simplify the issue, we will divide the make-up of the PN fleet into heavy, medium, light and shore. Our rationale is not whether the ship was originally classified as ‘frigate’ or ‘corvette’, but its displacement in tons. In turn, that classification could determine the intended role and capability of the ship.

Heavy (4,000+ tons)

With a full-load displacement of 4,000 tons, the Type 054A/P will be the largest surface warship in the PN and, in all likelihood, the nucleus of its future air defence and long-range attack capabilities.

This is true in terms of the relative improvement it will offer once inducted, i.e., an over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) that will enable both the Type 054A/P and other PN ships to utilize long-range ASCMs, or the LY-80N-based medium-range AAW, a capability that does not exist in the PN today.

However, the future is also important.

It is unlikely that the PN would not opt to upgrade its premier ship-class with long-range AAW and higher-output sensors when those subsystems are available. Granted, one could make a case for the PN to add destroyers from China that can already support those systems, but those ships are not available for export.

But seeing China’s drive to emulate current and emerging Western concepts, the idea of a SM-2-like long-range SAM is plausible. Turkey is also pursuing its own line of long-range SAMs (with support from France and Italy), and this could also be a potential option for the PN in the long-term for use on the Type 054A/P.

In any case, the Type 054A/P’s role will likely be to enable other platforms to maximize their ASCM usage (with long-range situational awareness and targeting) and to provide those platforms with AAW coverage.

Medium (2,000 to 3,900-tons)

In this tier the PN will operate its four Zulfiqar-class F-22P and four MILGEM warships, the latter expected to comprise of three Ada corvettes and one Jinnah-class frigate. These ships will augment the Type 054A/P in terms of AShW and ASW, but rely on the Type 054A/P’s AAW coverage and OTH targeting.

However, the MILGEM deal might also be a sign of the PN wanting to evolve its medium-class ships. The clearest indication of this is the inclusion of the Jinnah-class frigate.

The implication is that the Jinnah will spur a new family of ships and, seeing the proposed variants of the Ada, vertical launch systems (VLS) cells are a plausibility. However, VLS at this level would provide the PN’s future medium ships with medium-range AAW, a progressive step forward from current ships.

Moreover, a new family of ships would indicate that the PN intends to enlarge the size of its medium-class ships – and overall fleet – through the late 2020s and 2030s. The decision to buy the design and intellectual property rights is also an indicator of localizing ship design and manufacturing (similar to Project Azm).

Light (1,000 to 1,900-tons)

The Damen OPV 1900 would occupy this tier. Interestingly, the PN is not restricting the OPV 1900 to purely policing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or asymmetrical operations.

Rather, the PN will configure its OPVs with “indigenously developed SSMs (surface-to-surface missiles) besides close-in-weapon system, anti-aircraft guns and a modern EW (electronic warfare) suite.”

In effect, the OPV 1900 could emerge as a basic corvette capable of drawing into the Type 054A/P’s long-range targeting for long-range ASCM deployment (i.e., Harba). It should be noted that the baseline patrol variant of the OPV 1900 costs in the area of $50-60 m per ship.

The inclusion of electronic support measures (ESM) and guided munitions will raise the cost, but it if kept at less than $100 m per ship, it would offer the PN an additional and cost-effective fleet-building asset.

It can, in theory, also configure the OPVs for ASW, thus adding to its peacetime patrol and wartime littoral defence, thus freeing the medium and heavy-class ships to operate further offshore.

Fast Attack (250 to 900-tons)

The 560-ton Azmat Fast Attack Craft-Missile (FAC-M) is in this class. With two quad-cell or two triple-cell ASCM launchers, the FAC-Ms have a specific purpose: to deny access to enemy surface ships.

In 2016, the PN had outlined the need for four to six additional such ships, though it reportedly said it will look at Turkish options as well (i.e., not necessarily procure additional Azmat FAC-M).

Besides additional ships, one potential area of opportunity for the PN could be to match speed and low-observability with a supersonic-cruising ASCM, such as the CM-302 or HD-1A. In fact, from an anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) standpoint, this would make more sense than the Harba.

In today’s AAW environment, the Harba ASCM may be more suited for long-range, land-attack missions (which would make the low-cost FAC-Ms an offensive threat). However, the adoption of PDMS and quick-reaction surface-to-air missiles (SAM) may deprecate the Harba’s value against ships.

With the PAF lacking an asset with sufficient payload capacity to carry current supersonic ASCM, it is up to the PN and its surface ships to acquire analogous capability. The FAC-Ms offer an opportunity to access that capability at a lower-cost and, assuming if additional heavy and/or medium ships are sought, sooner.

Littoral (<249 tons)

The final tier is of littoral warfare assets. These include the Jalalat-II, Jurrat, and MRTP-33 FACs. These will continue operating in Pakistan’s littoral environment to support the PN’s A2/AD needs.

It is not known if the PN will opt to expand this tier, though it would be the lowest-cost option available.

However, with a growing number of AShW capable assets in the larger ship classes, coastal/land-based ASCM batteries, and the PAF’s burgeoning JF-17 fleet, it may not be necessary.

Rather, the emphasis may move to boats to move special operations forces (SOF) around the mangroves, unmanned surface vehicle (USV), and other measures to prevent asymmetrical threats (such as opposing SOF) from penetrating gaps along Pakistan’s shared coastal stretches.

In this respect, it would be worth observing Pakistan’s engagement with US-based Swiftships as well as its known suppliers in Turkey and Poland.

https://quwa.org/2019/10/29/loaded-procurement-pipeline-in-tow-the-pakistan-navy-rises-part-1-2/

THE PAKISTAN NAVY RISES (PART 2): NAVAL AVIATION

This is a continuation of Quwa’s series, the Pakistan Navy Rises.

In part-two, we highlight the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) plans to procure new aviation assets.

In an interview, the Navy’s Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi outlined that the PN intends to modernize across the board. New surface combatants and submarines are in the procurement pipeline, but details are beginning to emerge about aviation and support.

Aviation
Confirming earlier reports, the CNS had stated that the PN wishes to procure a new long-range maritime patrol aircraft (LRMP). The CNS termed the P-3C as a LRMP, but the newly inducted ATR-72 as a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) – i.e. two different categories of aircraft.

In other words, additional ATR-72 MPAs are unlikely to be on the roadmap to supplant the P-3C, a new or different aircraft platform will be sought. However, few specifics are available about the intended type or configuration of the new LRMP, though one can imagine that Pakistan will value relative affordability.

The Saab Swordfish cannot be a factor as Saab has opted to stop marketing the platform. However, many of the Swordfish’s subsystems, including its main radar, electronic support measures (ESM), electro-optic and infrared (EO/IR) turret, are commercially-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions.

In theory, Pakistan can look into a bespoke solution using a platform of its choice with those COTS systems. In fact, the PN’s ATR-72 MPA already uses the same radar, ESM, and EO/IR as the Swordfish; the challenge would be finding a larger and longer-ranged platform as well as compatible munitions…

https://quwa.org/2019/01/11/the-pakistan-navy-rises-part-2-naval-aviation-2/

THE PAKISTAN NAVY RISES (PART 3): THE SUPPORT FLEET

With a growing surface fleet and sub-surface fleet, the Pakistan Navy (PN) is poised to not only modernize its support or auxiliary fleet, but qualitatively improve it with new capabilities.

Surface Fleet Support
At present, the PN’s support fleet comprises of two 15,000+ ton tankers – i.e. the 17,000-ton PNS Moawin, a new platform procured from Turkey and the Chinese Type 905 PNS Nasr – alongside two coastal tankers and two 1,600-ton small tankers and logistics ships.

Of these, the PNS Moawin and the 1,600-ton small tankers – i.e., PNS Rasadgar and PNS Madadgar – are the PN’s newer support ships, inducted in 2018 and 2011, respectively. The PNS Nasr and the two coastal tankers – i.e., PNS Gwadar and PNS Kalmat – were inducted in 1987, 1984 and 1992, respectively.

In terms of fleet tankers and auxiliary support ships, replacement ships would be sought to supplant the PN’s older fleet. However, this is unlikely to be a factor in the 2020s. Not only are these ships still newer than the steam-powered, 1960s-era Poolster-class tanker the new PNS Moawin replaced, but the PN may need those ships to sustain its expanding fleet through the 2020s.

In other words, the goal would be supplementing, not replacing the legacy fleet.

The existing support fleet is geared towards supporting the PN’s current-sized 2,000+ ton fleet, i.e., four F-22Ps, five Type 21s, and one FFG-7. With the Type 054A and MILGEM arriving – and Type 21s retiring – the PN’s 2,000+ ton fleet will have 13 such ships to its existing 10. That’s an additional squadron.

In addition, the PN will also have two 1,900-ton offshore patrol vessels (OPV) – with a potential scope for an additional two, if not more – that, while not as heavily armed as the frigates, will still be used for long-range and long-endurance missions. In other words, these ships will also need logistics support at-sea…

https://quwa.org/2019/01/15/the-pakistan-navy-rises-part-3-the-support-fleet-2/

THE PAKISTAN NAVY RISES (PART 4): THE SILENT SERVICE GROWS

In 2015, Pakistan’s announcement about procuring eight new air-independent propulsion (AIP)-powered submarines from China kicked-off the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) modernization efforts.

Initially, it had appeared that the new submarines – designated the Hangor-class – would form the entirety of the PN’s big-ticket procurement, largely due to the fact that Pakistan is fiscally constrained and that the PN typically does not receive as much in procurement funding compared to the Army or Air Force.

However, while the PN added large surface ships to its procurement pipeline, there is little doubt that its new Hangor-class submarines will, ultimately, have the greatest impact in South Asia’s maritime domain.

As discussed in previous Quwa articles, this is due to the fact that the Hangor-class will likely (1) carry the PN’s strategic deterrence element through submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), (2) offer credible anti-ship warfare (AShW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, and (3) leverage both numbers and low detectability to serve as a threatening anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) asset.

Supporting the Hangor-class submarines, the PN’s existing three Khalid-class (Agosta 90B) AIP submarines will have undergone major upgrades by 2028. In sum, the PN would have 11 AIP-powered submarines as well as, potentially, a submarine rescue and salvaging vessel by 2028…

https://quwa.org/2019/01/18/the-pakistan-navy-rises-part-4-the-silent-service-grows/
 
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