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Mechanised Divisions Pakistan Army

Exactly my friend, Ist Corps south of Chenab, New Corps north of Chenab, all the Divisions are allready in place that way. Just need na extra IABG for Ist Corps etc.

North of Chenab, we have 4× Inf Bdes of 23 Div < 10 (holding) Corps < HQ Northern Command (under raising) deployed:
  • 3 AK Bde - Kotli
  • 4 AK Bde - Bhimber
  • 66 Inf Bde - Chamb
  • 333 Inf Bde - Jalalpur Jattan
And there is HQ Central Command at Kharian and its subordinate 1 (strike) Corps > 17, 19, 37 Inf Div's + 8 IABG. How do you carve out a new corps and what will be its AOR?
 
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In 1965, 1st Armored Div had minimal infantry support which is why tanks were shot up easily by Indian RRs. If Infantry had been deployed effectively, they would have flushed out the ambushing Indian forces. Tanks cannot advance without infantry, tanks cannot operate on their own.

ATGM is a defensive weapon. It can be used offensively, yes, but the main offensive weapon of an Army is Tank. There has to be sizeable offensive force in every region of operation. "Counter-attack" is a term used in military which is used to offset advantage gained by the enemy. Did you read about Rommel's campaign in Africa ? He never consolidated his position by building defenses, he kept advances with whatever force he had. It's a gamble as he retreated twice along the route that he won, but a middle approach can be sought. He kept pressurizing his enemy but neither he nor his enemy could get a foot hold of territory for long till Montgomery came along. Rommel's example is extreme, however counter attack is important. Infantry has to be supported with tanks against enemy infantry and if possible by strike aircrafts. So if Indian Army attacks and captures a Pakistani village or town, Pakistan should have sufficient armor along with majority infantry to counter-attack not just captured area, but also attack Indian reinforcements pouring in to consolidate that area, attack Indian supply lines to cut off enemy's link from its rear and also to defend against another attack when the reserve battalions are thrown in by Indian Commander which had been held back initially. For all this, Pakistan needs Tanks. Infantry cannot handle all these Military build ups by Indian Army. Most importantly, after Indian Army is dislodged from pakistani soil, then tanks are needed to attack Indian forces in Indian territory. All this cannot be done with ATGMs alone.

Pakistan uses its Brigade sized forces or Ad-hoc brigade sized forces effectively. This was seen in deployment of Changez Force in 1971. If you read 1971 war threads, you will see that atleast one brigade of every Division had performed much better than the whole division on its own. US Military has moved to Brigade Combat Teams (Stryker Bdes). India has moves to IBGs which are larger than Bde but smaller than Div. Pakistan itself is expected to use mixed Brigade sized forces comprising of armor, infantry, artillery, AD, Gunships to stop or delay a much larger Indian force.

Through Pakistan Military's deployment, now there are 4 armor/mechanized divisions capable of penetrating into India at four various places instead of a single area like you want. Concentrating all the armored force towards a single target will attract IAF, missiles, ATGMs and lots of Indian infantry in that area. Pakistan will lose initiative elsewhere. India will use minimal armor forces to counter this Pakistan Armored Corps size thrust and then India will create its own Corps sized Armored forces using that force to enter Pakistan hundreds of miles away. Pakistan won't have sufficient tanks to stop that Indian armored attack and then counter attack.


Plan-B is Second Div strength force of FC which is now operational.

And I believe ad-hocism might one of the reasons for such a foresight. You can not just jumble people together in a high pressure situation and expect them to work just fine. This may work at the lower level where there is less coordination required and the ground staff may be adept at pulling it off. But they won't give the same returns when practiced at a higher level.

The shortage of equipment of nearly all types is well known. We do not have long range air cover, we do not have IFVs, our tanks production rate is disastrously low and so on. We all would like to have more of it but I can't see that happening in the near future. Not till we pull off some impressive economic growth figures. In the end, it was more men and material that enabled the British to beat the Germans in Africa. Rommel may have been a brilliant tactician and field commander but he was not a very goof theatre commander. Increased effectiveness of ATGMs was probably one major reason, out of many, for buying the Cobras and then Zulus in the first place. Its an excellent platform for both offensive and defensive options and, as its airborne, it gives us much more flexibility. I hope we might look to replace the Zulus with Chinese or Russian options.

If India can counter our armoured thrust with minimal armour, why shouldn't we be able to do the same to theirs. Right now we have four armoured/mech div who will be used for counteracting the Indians and then take the fight to their land. Shouldn't we two of them together in a theatre to really hurt them where it counts. Provided, this formation has good air cover and auxiliary support. Whereas, we can utlize the other two for countering Indian armour threat and capturing any lost territory and even take the fight to their own land while the armoured corps wreaks havoc in our preferred choice of attack. Throw in the FC into the mix and we have reserves that are tough and seriously under appreciated. These guys might prove as the NLI did in kargil.

Another question though, what are our chances of withstanding an intitial IA fullscale attack? We have a riposte doctrine but are we big enough to absorb an initial full scale attack.
 
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I believe the current ORBAT gives us a hint on GHQ's planned use of the I Corps. 23 Div is under X Corps and since Central Command does not have nominal authority over it, coordinating an offensive with I Corps across Tawi from the west would be difficult. But an approach from the flanks of the Phuklian Salient would be easier, if initiative is taken, as a direct threat to the Marala Headworks is not affordable again.

ARN's most valuable use would definitely be by exploiting the Shakargarh-Narowal Bulge, but that would depend on who takes the initiative first, and it should be kept in mind that the Indians would surely be ready for a '71 style massed offensive to lure our ARN into a slugfest.

23 Div would be most balanced by holding it's ground in a defensive attritional battle and conduct only limited tactical assaults to disrupt enemy balance, a replay of the '71 Chamb feat would be too risky. Hence there is no need to raise a new Corps, IMO.
North of Chenab, we have 4× Inf Bdes of 23 Div < 10 (holding) Corps < HQ Northern Command (under raising) deployed:
  • 3 AK Bde - Kotli
  • 4 AK Bde - Bhimber
  • 66 Inf Bde - Chamb
  • 333 Inf Bde - Jalalpur Jattan
And there is HQ Central Command at Kharian and its subordinate 1 (strike) Corps > 17, 19, 37 Inf Div's + 8 IABG. How do you carve out a new corps and what will be its AOR?
 
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I believe the current ORBAT gives us a hint on GHQ's planned use of the I Corps. 23 Div is under X Corps and since Central Command does not have nominal authority over it, coordinating an offensive with I Corps across Tawi from the west would be difficult. But an approach from the flanks of the Phuklian Salient would be easier, if initiative is taken, as a direct threat to the Marala Headworks is not affordable again.

ARN's most valuable use would definitely be by exploiting the Shakargarh-Narowal Bulge, but that would depend on who takes the initiative first, and it should be kept in mind that the Indians would surely be ready for a '71 style massed offensive to lure our ARN into a slugfest.

23 Div would be most balanced by holding it's ground in a defensive attritional battle and conduct only limited tactical assaults to disrupt enemy balance, a replay of the '71 Chamb feat would be too risky. Hence there is no need to raise a new Corps, IMO.

If 19 Inf Div can be placed under HQ 1 Corps, who knows 23 Inf Div may turn subordinate HQ 30 Corps. :woot:
 
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Officially 62 Armoured Units in Indian Army. That is 62 x 59 1st line held. So, 3658 tanks in 1st line.
How 62?
2 armored div = 14 reg
1 mechanized div = 3 reg
5 RAPID = 10 reg
Independent reg under 16 inf div = 16 reg
5 Independent armored brigade = 10 reg
2 Independent mechanized brigade = 2 reg
total = 55 reg?
 
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And I believe ad-hocism might one of the reasons for such a foresight. You can not just jumble people together in a high pressure situation and expect them to work just fine. This may work at the lower level where there is less coordination required and the ground staff may be adept at pulling it off. But they won't give the same returns when practiced at a higher level.

The shortage of equipment of nearly all types is well known. We do not have long range air cover, we do not have IFVs, our tanks production rate is disastrously low and so on. We all would like to have more of it but I can't see that happening in the near future. Not till we pull off some impressive economic growth figures. In the end, it was more men and material that enabled the British to beat the Germans in Africa. Rommel may have been a brilliant tactician and field commander but he was not a very goof theatre commander. Increased effectiveness of ATGMs was probably one major reason, out of many, for buying the Cobras and then Zulus in the first place. Its an excellent platform for both offensive and defensive options and, as its airborne, it gives us much more flexibility. I hope we might look to replace the Zulus with Chinese or Russian options.

If India can counter our armoured thrust with minimal armour, why shouldn't we be able to do the same to theirs. Right now we have four armoured/mech div who will be used for counteracting the Indians and then take the fight to their land. Shouldn't we two of them together in a theatre to really hurt them where it counts. Provided, this formation has good air cover and auxiliary support. Whereas, we can utlize the other two for countering Indian armour threat and capturing any lost territory and even take the fight to their own land while the armoured corps wreaks havoc in our preferred choice of attack. Throw in the FC into the mix and we have reserves that are tough and seriously under appreciated. These guys might prove as the NLI did in kargil.

Another question though, what are our chances of withstanding an intitial IA fullscale attack? We have a riposte doctrine but are we big enough to absorb an initial full scale attack.

The training doctrine allows formations of any level (platoons up to Divs) to work together. Ad Hoc forces is not the issue, Zulfiqar force in 1965 Chawinda and Changez force in 1971, held back attacks of much superior forces. The issue you would want to address is "Change of Command" in midst of war. Second issue, which now seems much addressed is, training of General staff in command position. I say its now addressed due to recent Ops seen in WOT, results of Divisional command are much better.

Rommel had the drive which made British insane. Pakistani and Indian military commanders are mainly trained on British traditions. So who can put a crack into that ? Someone like Rommel. Yes I know that Rommel eventually got defeated by British General Montgomery, but what was Montgomery's style? gather forces, put them in defense, be very cautious in movement. So in 1971, both armies did that. Where were armored divisions of PA and IA in 1971? Waiting for the other to attack, just like Montgomery, who let Rommel attack.

ATGM can be countered easily in subcontinent since both armies (PA and IA) are infantry dominant and it wull be expected from infantry to finish off ATGM teams as Armor advances. Syria war showed it too. MBT's own APS is an additional advantage but subject to technology, accessibility and if it performs in the war, most importantly, after a couple of days of war, both sides will know how to effectively destroy MBTs protected by APS. No weapon is invincible in a conventional war. It will always be a combo of Infantry-Armor-Artillery-SAM-Aviation that will help win a skirmish or war, not one weapon alone - Combined Arms. Gunships for PA are constantly required in COIN war on west, not just against Indian armor.
 
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The training doctrine allows formations of any level (platoons up to Divs) to work together. Ad Hoc forces is not the issue, Zulfiqar force in 1965 Chawinda and Changez force in 1971, held back attacks of much superior forces. The issue you would want to address is "Change of Command" in midst of war. Second issue, which now seems much addressed is, training of General staff in command position. I say its now addressed due to recent Ops seen in WOT, results of Divisional command are much better.

Rommel had the drive which made British insane. Pakistani and Indian military commanders are mainly trained on British traditions. So who can put a crack into that ? Someone like Rommel. Yes I know that Rommel eventually got defeated by British General Montgomery, but what was Montgomery's style? gather forces, put them in defense, be very cautious in movement. So in 1971, both armies did that. Where were armored divisions of PA and IA in 1971? Waiting for the other to attack, just like Montgomery, who let Rommel attack.

ATGM can be countered easily in subcontinent since both armies (PA and IA) are infantry dominant and it wull be expected from infantry to finish off ATGM teams as Armor advances. Syria war showed it too. MBT's own APS is an additional advantage but subject to technology, accessibility and if it performs in the war, most importantly, after a couple of days of war, both sides will know how to effectively destroy MBTs protected by APS. No weapon is invincible in a conventional war. It will always be a combo of Infantry-Armor-Artillery-SAM-Aviation that will help win a skirmish or war, not one weapon alone - Combined Arms. Gunships for PA are constantly required in COIN war on west, not just against Indian armor.

Got your point. Though I think it will create one hell of a nightmare for logistics. Not sure they would like it

So they need a Rommel to kick them around a bit before they learn something. As you mentioned, the recent WOT might actually be that kick. However, they were fighting a relatively lightly armed adversary without the tools for a full fledged war. And it took us more than a decade to get rid them. It is too early to say how our current crop of commanders will fare against a fully armed army.

Agreed again with your second point.

 
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PA's Mechanised Division:

A Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

B Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

C Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.
Pakistan Army Armored Brigades have total Two Armored Brigades (total four armored regiments).
Your configuration suggests that Pakistan Army Mechanized Divisions have more Armored Regiments (5) than that of Armored Division (4).

If question is to be asked then,
What is the configuration difference between Armored Division and Mechanized Division?
@Gryphon @Signalian
 
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Pakistan Army Armored Brigades have total Two Armored Brigades (total four armored regiments).
Your configuration suggests that Pakistan Army Mechanized Divisions have more Armored Regiments (5) than that of Armored Division (4).

If question is to be asked then,
What is the configuration difference between Armored Division and Mechanized Division?
@Gryphon @Signalian

I mixed up information as i try to give info close to reality but not 100% as PDF is an online forum and i have consistently noticed a surge of Guest numbers rising when i post in some Army/AF threads (like 2 members and suddenly 15-25 guests viewing post), who are these 15-25 guests viewing my post ? i dont know, so i have become cautious.

Formation structure at Div and Bde keeps changing too.
 
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Got your point. Though I think it will create one hell of a nightmare for logistics. Not sure they would like it

So they need a Rommel to kick them around a bit before they learn something. As you mentioned, the recent WOT might actually be that kick. However, they were fighting a relatively lightly armed adversary without the tools for a full fledged war. And it took us more than a decade to get rid them. It is too early to say how our current crop of commanders will fare against a fully armed army.

Agreed again with your second point.


Hi,

An armored division was sitting in the jungle near Khanewal @ Pirowal---.

Tanks were visible to those who drove by as did my older cousins---.

Change of command may be inevitable---not for waiting for two days during a whiskey drinking binge and sexual orgies---.
 
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Pakistan Army Armored Brigades have total Two Armored Brigades (total four armored regiments).
Your configuration suggests that Pakistan Army Mechanized Divisions have more Armored Regiments (5) than that of Armored Division (4).

If question is to be asked then,
What is the configuration difference between Armored Division and Mechanized Division?
@Gryphon @Signalian
Don't forget the Armoured Div Recce Regiment, makes it 5. I reckon there is another brigade but usually independent in peacetime, has 1 armoured regiment.
 
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Don't forget the Armoured Div Recce Regiment, makes it 5. I reckon there is another brigade but usually independent in peacetime, has 1 armoured regiment.
Yeah that's make it 5 regiments. But again, 5 regiments each for armored division and mechanized division then what's the difference?
 
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Yeah that's make it 5 regiments. But again, 5 regiments each for armored division and mechanized division then what's
Keep it ad hoc :police:

I believe the current ORBAT gives us a hint on GHQ's planned use of the I Corps. 23 Div is under X Corps and since Central Command does not have nominal authority over it, coordinating an offensive with I Corps across Tawi from the west would be difficult. But an approach from the flanks of the Phuklian Salient would be easier, if initiative is taken, as a direct threat to the Marala Headworks is not affordable again.

ARN's most valuable use would definitely be by exploiting the Shakargarh-Narowal Bulge, but that would depend on who takes the initiative first, and it should be kept in mind that the Indians would surely be ready for a '71 style massed offensive to lure our ARN into a slugfest.

23 Div would be most balanced by holding it's ground in a defensive attritional battle and conduct only limited tactical assaults to disrupt enemy balance, a replay of the '71 Chamb feat would be too risky. Hence there is no need to raise a new Corps, IMO.

A new division to should be added to either XXX Corps or IV Corps to look after Narowal area (North of Lahore). One of the two: 8th or 15th Infantry Division should be upgraded to mechanized.

This will free 1st Corps for a major offensive from Jammu till Amritsar.
 
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Yeah that's make it 5 regiments. But again, 5 regiments each for armored division and mechanized division then what's the difference?

26 Mech Div = 3× Armd/Mech Bdes. GOC from Armd Corps.
25 Mech Div = 2× Armd/Mech Bdes + 1× Inf Bde. GOC from Infantry.
 
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