Yes in respect of those 13 InfDivs at the East (8 deployed at IB + 2 deployed in LOC +3 with Strike Corps), waste of Money for those 4 deployed in the West and not necessary in 12th InfDiv.
There should allways be Corps reserve formations (IABGs and IIBGs) avaiable to the Corps Commander, making im possible influence on the developing battle situation.
This whould mean 13 extra ArmRegs (572 Tanks) with all its cost, Logistic support necessary and it could result in those extra Tanks being of a low grade type (knot first line).
We did sow this type of formations in Sadam Army in 1990, their combat performance was very bad, they had T55/T62/Type59/Type69.
They simply dont have fighting power to make the diffrence against a 1st line Armoured/Mechanised Division. They make numbers on paper during peace time, but the cost/logistic off that extra Armoured Regiment and Mechanised Battalion will not be proportionate to their fighting value.
It has much to do with the terrain were the InfDiv will deploy. Maybe 4 extra ArmRegs for those 4 InfDivs at the IB of those two Southern Corps.
Thanks
Since I was talking about Armd Bde so I obviously meant Inf Divs devoid of the ones deployed on Mountains.
The Infantry Divs own offensive power is 9 (infantry):1 (Armor) ratio. That is 12-15 tanks to support a Brigade or 4-5 tanks to support an infantry battalion, whether in offense or defense. AT units whether LAT or HAT are mainly defensive, again can be distributed and attached to Infantry battalions. Loss of tanks, loss of ATGM luanchers will affect performance of Infantry Div which is supposed to operate independently too since it has all the support units along with fighting units under its command. If an Inf Div has an Armored Bde with 2 Armor Regts, there will be 24-30 tanks supporting a Brigade or 8-10 tanks supporting an infantry Battalion. The chances of success of an Ops increase.
Inf Divs are supported by units from other formations to mount a successful Ops since Inf Divs in PA have just strength enough to stand own ground in case of an attack. Even in WOT, few Inf Divs were diluted to send units to western theater since full relocation of Inf Divs wasn't considered enough and viable in some cases.
Take 4 Corps HQ, Lahore as an example, which has:
10th Infantry Division
11th Infantry Division
212th Independent Infantry Brigade Group
4th AD Brigade
Corps Artillery Brigade
3rd IABG
and probably another Independent Infantry Brigade Group from 30 Corps (Sialkot) deployed under its AOR.
To mount an offensive, either one of the two Inf Divs (10th ID or 11th ID), lets say 10th ID with IABG or IIBG will be thrown in the mix. The only tanks left with the Corps after this will be Armor Regiment of 11th ID. Else than this Corps HQ will ask for GHQ Armor Reserves (GHQ will either send reserves or dilute an armor regiment from any other Inf Div/Mech Div/Armor Bde and send it) otherwise 11th ID will stay on defensive through out the war.
Almost same case with 30 Corps HQ Gujranwala/Sialkot.
31 Corps HQ (Bahwalpur) and 5 Corps HQ (Karachi) could have all their IABG and IMBG under Mech Div HQs. So there might not be any armor to be attached to their Infantry Divisions. 11 Corps HQ (Peshawar) and 12 Corps HQ (Quetta) will be sending at least one of their Infantry Divisions towards Eastern border (India) in case of war, which again have only 1 Armor Regiment each.
In 1971, 23rd Inf Div which made gains into IOK was bolstered with units from other formations so it could successfully conduct an Ops. With its own units, 23rd ID would never have gained ground into IOK.
IABG is a Corps Asset. The Corps HQ may or may not use IABG to support Inf Div Ops. The Corps HQ can use it in different other methods independently, even holding it as reserve.
Indian Army is an infantry dominated Field Army, however it has RAPIDs and then IBGs, which can be very effective in attack or defense. PA can successfully defend attacks from RAPID or IBG through an Infantry Division, but mounting an attack on RAPID or IBG will require more armor for PA's Infantry Division.