Mechanised Divisions Pakistan Army

[CriticalThought]

This problem is very much there, and there is no solution for it as of now.... On one hand the dust does restricts your visibility, but on the other hand it provides a sudden camo for Own tanks against tanks against enemy direct firing weapons such as ATGMs etc.

You are right. Your post caused me to search for a solution, and it seems even the US has only recently acquired a solution that involves multi-sensor fusion:

Fog Of War: How Clever Technology Enables Military Pilots To See Through Smoke, Dust, Mist & Smog

Lack of visual cues caused by poor visibility can lead to loss of aircraft and lives.

www.forbes.com

I wish our top brass would pay attention to these matters and try to actively find avenues where we can gain a qualitative edge through indigenous research to surprise the enemy. This is essential for PA in the asymmetric Pak-India scenario.

 

[Signalian]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1367355694102511617

T-85UG ( Type 85-IIs ) , M113 , KRL-122 & HQ-16 battery in the end

Showcasing mostly MBTs in the video is a picture of strength but if they had the shown the full compliment of all arms in continuous form, treading along for an offensive, that would have portrayed a much more powerful view of armored column. HQ-16 showing presence with armored forces could mean it will provide air cover during armored offensives and could potentially go across the border inside enemy territory. At 0:12 they show a few 4x4 marching along between APCs, if I have observed correctly. No aviation support was seen. Couple of AH-1F or observation heli or surveillance drones should have taken part.

This area of Bahawalpur region is mostly desert or semi desert and it would have been interesting to see how would 2.5 T, 5 T and 10 T logistic support trucks would fare in this terrain to supply armored troops. If a 5 T truck can carry 4.5 T on road, then it would carry half of that or 2.2 T off road (or desert). More trucks would be required, more fuel, more drivers, more mechanical support workshops. This logistics part is most vulnerable domain of armored warfare. If such support lines are destroyed, it would leave enemy armored forces stranded and unable to carry on any offensives. If PA creates a dedicated light armored or motorized unit that is tasked to take out enemy logistics lines, the job of armored forces will become easier.

 

[CriticalThought]

This problem is very much there, and there is no solution for it as of now.... On one hand the dust does restricts your visibility, but on the other hand it provides a sudden camo for Own tanks against enemy direct firing weapons such as ATGMs etc.

Came across this video, that shows the superiority of thermal sights over plain sight under sand storm conditions:

 

[Raja Porus]

Cheetah Armoured Tractor:
These were modified tractors by HIT intended to serve as training vehicles to reduce wear on actual combat equipment saving operating costs.They were lightly armored (Against small arms) , had electrically discharged smoke launchers and radio attached in them. They didn't have NBC system or night-vision equipment as they weren't ever intended for actual combat use.
There were three main variants

*Anti-Tank with TOW carrier

*RBS 70/Anza SAM carrier

*14.5mm MG carrier

 

[SQ8]

Showcasing mostly MBTs in the video is a picture of strength but if they had the shown the full compliment of all arms in continuous form, treading along for an offensive, that would have portrayed a much more powerful view of armored column. HQ-16 showing presence with armored forces could mean it will provide air cover during armored offensives and could potentially go across the border inside enemy territory. At 0:12 they show a few 4x4 marching along between APCs, if I have observed correctly. No aviation support was seen. Couple of AH-1F or observation heli or surveillance drones should have taken part.

This area of Bahawalpur region is mostly desert or semi desert and it would have been interesting to see how would 2.5 T, 5 T and 10 T logistic support trucks would fare in this terrain to supply armored troops. If a 5 T truck can carry 4.5 T on road, then it would carry half of that or 2.2 T off road (or desert). More trucks would be required, more fuel, more drivers, more mechanical support workshops. This logistics part is most vulnerable domain of armored warfare. If such support lines are destroyed, it would leave enemy armored forces stranded and unable to carry on any offensives. If PA creates a dedicated light armored or motorized unit that is tasked to take out enemy logistics lines, the job of armored forces will become easier.

I wonder if the Indian goal is influenced by the above - essentially keep the shallow thrusts in range of infrastructure that can support this logistics train.
100km-200km may not mean much but many chunks of it across the border are a serious bargaining chip.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Cheetah Armoured Tractor:
These were modified tractors by HIT intended to serve as training vehicles to reduce wear on actual combat equipment saving operating costs.They were lightly armored (Against small arms) , had electrically discharged smoke launchers and radio attached in them. They didn't have NBC system or night-vision equipment as they weren't ever intended for actual combat use.
There were three main variants

*Anti-Tank with TOW carrier
View attachment 722632
*RBS 70/Anza SAM carrier
View attachment 722633
*14.5mm MG carrier
View attachment 722634

They made their debut in Ex Zarb E Momin....they were concieved in order to offset our lack of cross country mobility in the desert sector in the late 80s.

 

[CriticalThought]

They made their debut in Ex Zarb E Momin.

They are very much relevant today for a light mechanized battalion. Note the absence of armor or infantry in the name. It should combine, MGs, AAGs, ATGMs/TOWs, VSHORAD SAMs, and even energy weapons such as sonic/laser/microwaves.

 

[Inception-06]

They made their debut in Ex Zarb E Momin....they were concieved in order to offset our lack of cross country mobility in the desert sector in the late 80s.

And how they performed ?

 

[PanzerKiel]

And how they performed ?

.... Sank axle deep....

 

[CriticalThought]

.... Sank axle deep....

No attempt was made to find the right platform? I think today's 6x6 wouldn't suffer the same fate.

 

[Inception-06]

Cheetah Armoured Tractor:
These were modified tractors by HIT intended to serve as training vehicles to reduce wear on actual combat equipment saving operating costs.They were lightly armored (Against small arms) , had electrically discharged smoke launchers and radio attached in them. They didn't have NBC system or night-vision equipment as they weren't ever intended for actual combat use.
There were three main variants

*Anti-Tank with TOW carrier
View attachment 722632
*RBS 70/Anza SAM carrier
View attachment 722633
*14.5mm MG carrier
View attachment 722634

You have more pictures ? Is this from book ?

 

[CriticalThought]

@PanzerKiel, as an example, this could be the underlying platform:

 

[Raja Porus]

.... Sank axle deep....

Of course

I wonder if the Indian goal is influenced by the above - essentially keep the shallow thrusts in range of infrastructure that can support this logistics train.
100km-200km may not mean much but many chunks of it across the border are a serious bargaining chip.

Indian CSD is completely flawed and is more of a fantasy than reality. India plans to form 10-13 IBGs with about 5-6 inf/armd regts and 3 artillery regts plus supporting arms. That would mean about 7-8 thousand men per IBG. The drawbacks of CSD as conceived by me are :
1)Attainibilty of Objectives:
THe objectiv of CSD is to make shallow incursions of about 70-80 km deep but recent exercises have shown that the IA advanced at a rste of 10km per day. Now if we put them against a real enemy the rate would further decrease to atleast 5km. So 70-80km would require 2 weeks if everything went smoothly and they manage to catch us sleeping
2) Sustenance of objectives:
Even if we consider that IA was successful in making a 70-80km deep penetration even then it would be difficult to to sustain such a force of 13 IBGs not only logistically but those brigade groups would have to fight against the whole of PA before there main strike elements are mobilised.
3)Mindset of field Commanders:
The breed of IA officers that have been groomed according to CSD doctrine will have their aims limited only to the shallow penetrations and if a general war, which would surely, breaks out then they would find themselves in further exploiting their gains and drawing new plans to capture the New objectives that their seniors may assign them.
4) Limited number of IBGs:
only ten to 13 IBGs are being raised and some of them will be against china as well so if we take the amount of IBGs specially against PA to be 10 even then they might not be that much of trouble. They will just oversized brigades and until reinforced by their strike corps(which will tkae atleast 3 weeks) they would have to face the whole of PA.
5) Retreating:
GIven the fact that the initial objective of IBGS would be only 70-80km their commanders would not have that much flexibility especially at tactical level. They would not be able to make tactical retreats as their depth will be to shallow and if they start retreating then the whole op would be a failure.
6) Concentration of PA:
Again related to sustenance of Objective.Historically IA has tried to utilize its numbers by opening new fronts and sectors but in this case their brigade sized forces would be operating in a very limited area. On the other hand PA would be able to concentrate its forces against IBGs and obliterate them.
7)PAF:
Similarly, PAF would be able to concentrate its efforts especially related to CAS in few sectors and will be relieved of providing support to the whole of PA throughout Pakistan. Same goes for army AD and aviation.
8) Conservation of Strike elements of PA:
Recently many indp armd/mech bdes have sprung up in PA which can be used to tie down the IBGs in addition to holding corps while the strike corps can be preserved purely of offensive ops. And if the strike elements of PA are able to make successful attacks on India,IA would have to commit its strike elements against them and wouldn't be able to reinforce the IBGs.
9) Predictable avenues of Approach:
The areas and sectors going to be attacked by the IA can be predicted. The intelligence will also play an important role in this regard. Then, different obstacles/mines can be placed apart from the mobilisation of PA.
10)Last Nail in the Coffin of CSD:
Though I agree that CSD might have been useful between the period 2004-2017 while about 1/3 of our army was deployed in FATA in COIN ops but now we having been successfull in those ops have fully concentrated our efforts against IA. With the restructuring of FC the 11/12 corps are now available as reserves.
11)Condition of IA:
The lack of synergy between the Army and the IAF is one of the foremost concerns among the Indian planners. They are also lacking in spare parts and ammo. As of 2018 IA is also short of about 7000 officers. The lack of SP artillery and AD is also a concern. Induction of 100 k9s hasn't changed much, same goes for apaches as the PA will be able to concentrate its AD as explained above.
Also I don't understand why why the Indians compare CSD with blitzkrieg. They are two totally different concepts. I think that they consider anything involving amrour and inf in coordination with airforce as blitzkrieg.
@PanzerKiel @Signalian @Inception-06 and everyone else, feel free to criticize.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Of course
Indian CSD is completely flawed and is more of a fantasy than reality. India plans to form 10-13 IBGs with about 5-6 inf/armd regts and 3 artillery regts plus supporting arms. That would mean about 7-8 thousand men per IBG. The drawbacks of CSD as conceived by me are :
1)Attainibilty of Objectives:
THe objectiv of CSD is to make shallow incursions of about 70-80 km deep but recent exercises have shown that the IA advanced at a rste of 10km per day. Now if we put them against a real enemy the rate would further decrease to atleast 5km. So 70-80km would require 2 weeks if everything went smoothly and they manage to catch us sleeping
2) Sustenance of objectives:
Even if we consider that IA was successful in making a 70-80km deep penetration even then it would be difficult to to sustain such a force of 13 IBGs not only logistically but those brigade groups would have to fight against the whole of PA before there main strike elements are mobilised.
3)Mindset of field Commanders:
The breed of IA officers that have been groomed according to CSD doctrine will have their aims limited only to the shallow penetrations and if a general war, which would surely, breaks out then they would find themselves in further exploiting their gains and drawing new plans to capture the New objectives that their seniors may assign them.
4) Limited number of IBGs:
only ten to 13 IBGs are being raised and some of them will be against china as well so if we take the amount of IBGs specially against PA to be 10 even then they might not be that much of trouble. They will just oversized brigades and until reinforced by their strike corps(which will tkae atleast 3 weeks) they would have to face the whole of PA.
5) Retreating:
GIven the fact that the initial objective of IBGS would be only 70-80km their commanders would not have that much flexibility especially at tactical level. They would not be able to make tactical retreats as their depth will be to shallow and if they start retreating then the whole op would be a failure.
6) Concentration of PA:
Again related to sustenance of Objective.Historically IA has tried to utilize its numbers by opening new fronts and sectors but in this case their brigade sized forces would be operating in a very limited area. On the other hand PA would be able to concentrate its forces against IBGs and obliterate them.
7)PAF:
Similarly, PAF would be able to concentrate its efforts especially related to CAS in few sectors and will be relieved of providing support to the whole of PA throughout Pakistan. Same goes for army AD and aviation.
8) Conservation of Strike elements of PA:
Recently many indp armd/mech bdes have sprung up in PA which can be used to tie down the IBGs in addition to holding corps while the strike corps can be preserved purely of offensive ops. And if the strike elements of PA are able to make successful attacks on India,IA would have to commit its strike elements against them and wouldn't be able to reinforce the IBGs.
9) Predictable avenues of Approach:
The areas and sectors going to be attacked by the IA can be predicted. The intelligence will also play an important role in this regard. Then, different obstacles/mines can be placed apart from the mobilisation of PA.
10)Last Nail in the Coffin of CSD:
Though I agree that CSD might have been useful between the period 2004-2017 while about 1/3 of our army was deployed in FATA in COIN ops but now we having been successfull in those ops have fully concentrated our efforts against IA. With the restructuring of FC the 11/12 corps are now available as reserves.
11)Condition of IA:
The lack of synergy between the Army and the IAF is one of the foremost concerns among the Indian planners. They are also lacking in spare parts and ammo. As of 2018 IA is also short of about 7000 officers. The lack of SP artillery and AD is also a concern. Induction of 100 k9s hasn't changed much, same goes for apaches as the PA will be able to concentrate its AD as explained above.
Also I don't understand why why the Indians compare CSD with blitzkrieg. They are two totally different concepts. I think that they consider anything involving amrour and inf in coordination with airforce as blitzkrieg.
@PanzerKiel @Signalian @Inception-06 and everyone else, feel free to criticize.

Main criticism for you is that CSD is no more there, there's a new doctrine, new set of objectives with new groupings, everything new...

 

[Raja Porus]

You have more pictures ? Is this from book ?

No these were the only ones I could get