Your opinion is that the Sunnis suddenly woke up after a 5 year slumber and realized that Al Qaeda are very very bad people, through some sort of delayed "Awakening".
Your rewording of my exposition in an intentionally clumsy and inaccurate way does not negate the validity of what Ive explained, or the fact that my clarification is the prevalent view held by expert opinion-holders. Ive never said that the Sunni Awakening was a sudden phenomenon, in reality the US had been approaching the nationalist and tribal strands of the insurgency through back-channels long before General Petraeuss plans were announced. Cracks and divisions within the Sunni insurgency were always present, particularly due to their differing long term aspirations in regards to Iraqs future. The secularly inclined nationalists were opposed to Al-Qaedas plans for an extreme Islamist dispensation, something Al-Qaeda did proceed with in areas they have developed significant clout. Al-Qaedas brutal campaign of beheading and suicide bombings was also a factor behind local resentment; as was the fact that theyd increasingly been acquiring a social, economical, religious monopoly, often at the cost of traditional influentials such as smugglers, tribal chieftains, Baathist gangs, clerics, extortionists, etc. However, initially faced with an immediate and real American threat, these groups had been able to project a more or less unified front, for the time being.
Saddams former soldiers and militiamen obviously had access to regiments worth of weapons, ammunition and high explosives. The most effective weapon in the arsenal of the Sunni insurgents was the IED, hooked-up artillery shells wired to a dissembled mobiles electronic system. Iraq, particularly the Sunni areas, was (and is) awash with weapons: PKMs, SVDs, RPG-7s, and an assortment of mortars
you name it. Iraqs army sure knew how to maintain and use them; they were bitter, resentful and jobless. Al-Qaeda fighters, always experienced and brutal, came in to join up with these guys (obviously not with the heretic Shias who were seen as having supported the invasion). Al-Qaeda certainly had a lot of cash (Arab sources I would presume) to buy weapons, safe houses and recruits and smarting as they were over their defeat in Afghanistan, put their heads in the game. Thus this became the Sunni insurgency.
The Shia gangs under Sadr had long been suppressed by Saddams regime, while increasing confident and enthusiastic, were not particularly well armed or trained or experienced. Their primary source of weapons and equipment were deserted weapon depots the coalition had failed to secure immediately post-invasion. Secondly, like I said before, Sadr was (and is) not widely respected in the Shia clergy and drew his support from poor, resentful, slum-ish areas of Sadr City (named so after Saddams fall) and southern Iraq. Iraqi clerical heavyweights like Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani had distanced themselves from Sadr from the start, and have even gone as far as to question his legitimacy as a cleric. Sistani in particular, while not overly welcoming to Americans, is widely credited with averting the Shia-Sunni civil war that many of Sadrs undisciplined and fanatical supporters (helped by their Al-Qaeda counterparts) almost instigated. Thus the Shia community was not nearly as responsive to Sadrs ambitious and morally-dubious plans for Iraq as he wouldve liked. The alleged IRCG support to offshoots of Sadrs army (if not entirely an exaggeration) can be, again, attributed to deep rooted but complex clerical and doctrinal differences between the Iraqs Shia clergy (and thus vast majority of the Shia community) and the mullah regime running Iran presently. Indeed, Sistani despite his links to Iranian soil, is considered far from an instrument of Iranian agenda.
It is true that many Sadr loyalists are reported to have infiltrated new Iraqi institutions, particularly the police and the Interior Ministry. However your contention that Sadr having achieved all or most political objectives envisioned at the outset of this violent campaign is dubious at best. The fact that Sadr had lost much control over his militia, the fact that he was seen as having been greatly weakened by recently US military operations in and around his areas, the new Surge tactic of stationing small numbers of US troops at forward positions in dangerous neighborhoods such as Sadrs implemented after the ceasefire having weakened him further, and that Sadr was far from content with the amount of political influence he had gained as can be seen by repeated threats, resignations, long marches and attempts to restart the insurrection... would all suggest otherwise. Certainly the recent heavy and bitter crackdown by Iraqi Armed Forces against the Sadr militias, while not entirely conclusive, do prove that the level of political power gained or retained in the new democratic dispensation is far from what Sadr wouldve liked or expected at the inception of his campaign against the Americans and the British. I would go as far as to say that Sadr had a large appetite but small teeth.
The US opinion is that they surged their troops to capitulate the Iraqi insurgent groups, not that there was any "Awakening" or whatever it is (I wouldn't pay much attention to S-2 he tends to switch sides quicker than Dostum to settle his scores).
That is a primitive and largely inaccurate appraisal of the situation. The surge of the numbers in itself was not intended to intimidate or push the insurgent groups into capitulation. The surge of troops was a facilitation of a larger strategic and tactical plan, obviously envisioned by Petraeus before the surge (which was actually not all that large anyway), to push-forward and deploy small and spread out detachments of US troops (sometimes as much as 10) in disruptive districts for effective neighborhood policing. This checked lawlessness and violence, both sectarian and insurgent, through cooperation with the locals who felt protected and confident enough to collaborate. This encouraged and facilitated the Awakenings. The sealing off of entire volatile neighborhoods also helped in bringing much needed security to people.
Now, the way the Surge played into the defeat of Al-Qaeda was in complimenting the outcome of the Awakening, which was the unseating and expulsion of Al-Qaeda fighters from their traditional strongholds in the Sunni Triangle. This can also be credited to US forces scoring a tactical victory in and around the outskirts of Bagdad; with a strategic consequence that it further unseated Al-Qaeda (other than securing the capital ofcourse). Now Al-Qaeda, without its established hideouts and safe houses amongst the civilian populous was easy meat for US special forces and airstrikes while on the move. The surge and new neighborhood tactics meant that Al-Qaeda could not infiltrate new districts like they had so often done in the past (the aftermath of Faluja comes to mind) or retreat to old ones hosting the Awakening in order to recuperate and recruit. The whole thing was also helped by intelligence successes that lead to the elimination of most of Al-Qaedas leadership piecemeal. Note here that Al-Sadrs army had been greatly subdued through military operations before the ceasefire, before the elements of the surge came into play.
Also our fellow American member did not address you, nor did he participate in our debate himself. He merely referred to accounts of relevant officials that probably support my assessment over yours. So that is not his opinion which you say is subject to bias. But since you tried to deny the existence of any Awakening, that means your credibility is in question now sir.
In conclusion, yes Al-Qaeda was subdued in Iraq primarily because of a change in attitude of the Iraqis themselves, new American tactics were a secondary cause and Sadrs ceasefire none at all. The overall change of the security situation in Iraq can also be attributed to these events plus Sadrs capitulation, in the same order. In Afghanistan too, I believe extremist Taliban/Al-Qaeda rule dissuaded the majority from supporting their government through the pressures of a war, even a half hearted one and the quick over-throwing of the Taliban was the result. The whole system of rule and government was fragile and precarious, thus my conclusion that these elements of perverted extremist Sunni Islam are not adept at genuine ruling or control, and as terrorists organizations, their presence is anathema to human society (even Muslim society, contrary to some western beliefs). Their capitulation is inevitable, partly due to their own methods.
