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March of the Taliban By Kamran Shafi

roadrunner, Swat and such areas are not exactly FATA.
We should never ever have lost control in Swat, it has given TTP a whole new dimension in the eyes of the people.

The cancer has spread even till DG Khan.
Had a friend in Taunsa who has moved on to Canada in view of what he had to tell me about the Taliban presence there.

My point is very simple, if you do not punish a hostile act you only encourage such acts...a very basic philosophy which is ringing true here.

Taliban will only expand and so far TTP is not called a terrorist organization by our clerics or what people call the original Taliban.
They are all different faces of the same movement and it is time we accept that bitter truth. To them the TTP struggle is just and the cost of lives is unfortunate but all in a just cause...

Our logic and reasoning will never halt their advance into Pakistan proper, only force will counter them and check their advance.

The war is not against the Tribals, it is against the TTP who have killed many tribal elders, maliks, jirgas and have as hostages many influential families and will systematically eliminate all their opponents.

Is it not time that we start thinking like a nation?


I agree, 100 percent with All-green. He has hit the target spot on! There is indeed, no use, appeasing, accommodating, arguing or making deals with them.

These talibaan are an existential threat to our country and our way of life! They will stop at nothing, from going for the jugular vein of our country and all of us! It is, as they say, the call of duty,now, for all Pakistanis to defend their motherland against these barbarian hordes.:sniper:

I again thank All-Green, as he has very forcefully and clearly laid out what needs to be done, and that, without further delay!
 
This isn't true. The people did not oppose the ideology of the TTP in Swat. They more so took it on board. These are Swat Pakistanis who have taken on the ideology of the TTP. The way forward is to first stem the flow, then invest in education and development. Violence against ones own countrymen will only escalate a situation. Diplomacy is the important word.

No way is that the accurate picture but even if the truth is somewhere in between, why did TTP resort to brutal and merciless tactics if their version of Islam is now the heartbeat of every Pakistani?...there is hell of a difference between Shariah and what TTP is trying to force...they only have cosmetic resemblance.

It's an ideology that is spreading.

With guns, suicide bombs and threats the ideology is spreading; but what to call such an ideology?

You encourage further growth if you punish people unfairly.

So punishing a murderer or terrorist shall be unfair?
Do we not know the many thousands who are holding control of many valleys, towns and villages and have owned up to all what we see as terrorism...


The TTP are a terrorist movement, but they are Pakistani, and their ideology is spreading. Violence solves very little. It's covert ops that is needed, surgical ops, occasionally, with a heavy dose of re-education and regional development.

RR, i have always emphasized on the covert aspect and the media war aspect more than many ...you can see where i am coming from by my various posts on this multidimensional counter terrorism concept....but i am sorry it is way past the level where we wait for re-education and regional development....with TTP present that is not possible anymore in such areas...and it is not like it can be done within 1 year or so...even if GOP is sincere in working its a** off!
Furthermore in coming to this point you have come to a very weak ground vis a vis SWAT...SWAT was not a very backward area nor lacking in education...its takeover is something that shall give TTP unprecedented confidence...

Also, a sealing or better monitoring of the Western border. Thise weapons the TTP and militants use are not ordinary weapons is my opinion. They're supported by foreign powers. It's a difficult situation for Pakistan, but I'm sure if the Pakistani government gave them their attention for education and development as much as they could, the folks in Swat or even the tribals would not be able to be bought of by any foreign powers.

Never do i rule out the possibility of external funding but thanks to the Jihad against soviet union this area is an arms cache and it is no trouble for TTP to get weapons from Afghanistan to Pakistan and vice versa, we need to deal with the problem at hand if we cannot stop the funding or prove its sources...
I hate it but that's how it is...
Once we trace the funding...smash those organizations and countries...wage utter war on them for perpetrating these atrocities.


It's an ideology that is spreading. The TTP are not reproducing like frogs spawn all of a sudden and marching. Don't cloud the issue.

Where am i clouding the issue?
An ideology being spread by intimidation,force, bribes and a mass orchestrated disinformation campaign against Pakistan and its ideology...using the perverted concepts which have been propagated by many clerics, Mullahs and madrassas (who sadly outnumber the logical ones by far) to cloud the minds of the common man who thinks Islam is in danger but does not see that it is the TTP itself which is the biggest threat.
I am privy to some details regarding how they hire suicide bombers, pay their families, give them last meals, promise them heaven and their families support.
In addition to spending money on the cannon fodder in the form of poor brainwashed youth, TTP is basically hiring mercenaries everywhere to bolster their offensive capabilities....it is not only faith which is keeping them together...it is money and the promise of power and plunder... whereas i do want Pakistan to track the funding and take on the funding parties...i think that leaving TTP free to roam Pakistan would amount to surrendering all that we hold dear

The war is against an ideology. These are Pakistanis who have this ideology. To defeat an ideology you have to change people's minds. Violence only works if you can genocide an ideology. That is not a good idea in this case.

But many many people are scared into accepting this ideology...how would you change a persons mind who has been bullied into submission?
Take on the bully and free the bullied...
I agree that there are many who are for Shariah but why are we so helpless to separate Shariah from TTP?
Because we have never ever emphatically called them terrorists in the media or as part of government campaign to take on TTP....we surrender SWAT to them...we allow them on air time where their spokesmen make boasts at the cost of Pakistani blood, lives and property .....and this goes on...such acts only confuse the already confused and give TTP some legitimacy as a struggle and do not reinforce the opinion that it is a terrorist organization which is in no way to be interacted with but blocked and fought with all the might and wrath at our disposal
 
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I followed Iraq reasonably closely. The Sunnis had a consistent resistance inside the "sunni triangle" that caused a basic level of damage to coalition forces. But it was when Al-Sadr got a tummy rumble that the biggest damages were inflicted.

We were talking of Al-Qaeda’s downfall in Iraq which happened due to Sunni insurgent groups eventually rejecting them. You seem to have for some reason started arguing about whose contribution was more important in bringing stability in Iraq. While perhaps forgetting that Al-Sadr was never allied with Al-Qaeda in the first place and the implications of his decisions did not have much effect on Al-Qaeda compared to decisions made by Sunni nationalist and tribal groups (again I have to state the obvious for you). I am surprised to see anyone for that matter arguing that the Awakening was less responsible for Al-Qaeda’s demise than the decision of a Shia cleric to make peace with the Americans. Perhaps you should read up a little on the Anbar Awakening Council too.

However it would seem you did not follow the conflict in Iraq as closely as you pretend. The Sunnis constituted the most consistent, fierce and brutal parts of the Iraqi insurgency. The US military suffered the vast majority of their casualties from Sunni attacks in and around the Triangle of Death. The Al-Sadr militia, despite their numbers, provided spasms of ill-trained and relatively ill-equipped revolts that took heavily amounts of casualties during coalition counter-sweeps. When compared to the Sunni ex-soldiers and Baath Party militiamen, who according to reports had been training for resistance warfare before the Americans arrived, and who went on to ally with Al-Qaeda…Sadr’s men were definitely the secondary obstacle to coalition control. Sadr was also not widely supported by the Shia clergy and his men were accused more of sectarian violence and organizing death squads as opposed to conducting a consistent insurgency. The British forces in Basra took the brunt of the Shia militias and their casualties numbered in the hundreds as opposed to thousands of the US fatalities further up north. The pacification of the Sunni insurgency through the Awakening and creation of groups like the Sons of Iraq is widely regarded the primarily aspect of the turning of the war. Perhaps some Americans familiar here with the affair might attest to the fact that Al-Sadr accepting a ceasefire was far from the only factor behind the improvement. No doubt one of the reasons Al-Sadr relented was that he had been pretty thrashed up both militarily and in the eyes of the Shia community.

You underestimate the intelligence of the average Iraqi. They are not stupid people (neither are the FATA tribals, in fact). Many of them were quite well educated from the 1980s when Iraq was a country to rival some European ones in terms of technology.

What is this about, I don’t remember implying Iraqis were stupid. Though you have proved my point that the people in the tribal areas not stupid, you seemed to be implying they were when you said their opinions are unlike to change because they do not possess TV sets.

You're saying that when the Taliban were driven out of power in Afghanistan, it was because their ideology was rejected? In that case, the answer is no. The Taliban simply melted away. In this case it does not support what you're saying. If the Taliban ideology was rejected, they should not have been allowed to simply melt away into the population. They should have been handed over.

You’re saying that when the Taliban were ‘overthrown’ by the North Alliance and American bombing, they were not actually driven out and in fact melted away of their own accord? In that case, the answer is certainly no. The collapse of the Taliban and the ‘liberation’ of places like Kabul and Kandahar came much earlier, and easier, than anyone including the Americans, who were expecting the war to last for months, had predicted. Scholars conclude that the base of Taliban support was precariously weaker than estimated, primarily due to the conditions in Afghanistan under Taliban rule such as the extreme social-rules but including the unpopular Taliban campaign to crackdown on poppy cultivation. Defections in the Taliban Army and instances of Taliban fighters and Al-Qaeda ‘guests’ being handed over by the locals were all pleasant surprises that contributed to this viewpoint. The Taliban were broken, unseated and crippled. Conditions for the resurgence have more to do with the failures of the new regime such as endemic corruption and lawlessness, in cases mis-governance comparable or even worse than Taliban rule under the re-empowered war lords. Countless commentators have said it, Afghanistan is not a case where the insurgency is particularly strong, well-lead or popular but that a weaker central government makes the insurgents seem stronger in contrast, stronger than they actually are. The Taliban were not able to restart their campaign from year one after all, it took time for the people to become disillusioned with the new regime. Powerful people including the NATO Secretary General have expressed this view. Muse’s article is also a good pointer to the fact that the people, including the Pashtuns, don’t countenance the Taliban because of their ideology or fond memories of past rule; but because they just doubt the government’s or America’s ability to protect them when the Taliban do try something big. Bet on the strongest horse sort of thing, but this in the long term it won’t last, it can’t especially if the leaders get their house in order. So yes a lot of the Taliban were handed over, killed or imprisoned (those who were imprisoned would wish they were killed after the NA got hold of them). But obviously, not all of them. It would be lame to expect that all of the Taliban be captured and handed-over, that did not happen with Saddam and his generals despite how much Iraqis hated them, why should it happen in Afghanistan? It takes time and long term support to track these well connected leaders down. Those Taliban who escaped (or survived captivity) were able to recruit, reorganize and fight again due to the exploitable situation and not because of an ingenious and malevolent plan to melt away willingly only to comeback ‘when no one was expecting’. That would be childish.
 
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Blagh, Blagh... The Taliban are going to take over Punjab, we are all going to become slaves under Sharia Enforcing, AK toting, Turban wearing bigots. They will secure our military facilities and seats of power, rename Pakistan the Enclave and plot to take over the world...

Seriously, i have one thing to say to the press... Spare Me! & everyone else, today i had the best evening for months with my little boy, because when i came home i refused to put on the news and instead decided to watch some show on Cartoon Network.

These idiots are hype creating bastards who feed of the fear and anguish of the public, they should be put up against a wall and shot with SH*T balls for their continuing decision to give these turbanators airtime and valuable column space in the daily news.

Idiots!
 
fatman17 Sir,

Please do a sweep of your current location, maybe 2-3 TTP insurgents are hiding behind the Harvest.:enjoy:

I sincerely hope we rally as a nation and people like you are in every family...
:pakistan:

on the contrary!

well folks! i have just spent 3 wonderful days in the rural areas - the people are busy harvesting their wheat and sunflower - the days were bright, clear and warm - no bloody media types for miles - men driving their tractors, thrashers and harvest combines with music blaring from their radios, happy as hell that their harvest is going to be a good one - kids playing cricket in their village courtyards - it was so peaceful and i realised how far, far away this way of life is from the stressful life in the cities which is now completely controlled by our media because all day the boob-tube is on in our houses and we are listening to these sayers of doom and gloom!

spend a few days in the rural areas to detox - really!:enjoy:
 
An absolutely fine assessment of matters.

Your exposition WRT Iraq was as accurate an analysis of the true elements of the "surge" as any non-American military officer has provided that I've read besides Kilcullen himself. You are indeed correct that our primary threat was AQI and the baath-fascist minions embedded within the sunni "ratzline" running from Ramadi-Fallujah northwest through Haditha and eventually Tal Afar. It was (and remains, particularly around Tal Afar) a primary focus of our continuing stabilization efforts...

...and faces new challenges even as old ones depart. The shia insurgency, even with the able assistance of al Quds, has never matched the virulence nor professionalism displayed by our sunni opponents. From open urban combat in Fallujah to the most insidious terror network we've yet faced in either Iraq or Afghanistan, we were on our knees by early 2005.

Brig. Gen. McMaster's 3rd ACR moving into Tal Afar pointed the way. Petraeus and Kilcullen took it from there along with a number of other elements of strategy converging at a fortuitous time but it was (and remains) a precarious and near-run affair.

Superb post.
 
on the contrary!

well folks! i have just spent 3 wonderful days in the rural areas - the people are busy harvesting their wheat and sunflower - the days were bright, clear and warm - no bloody media types for miles - men driving their tractors, thrashers and harvest combines with music blaring from their radios, happy as hell that their harvest is going to be a good one - kids playing cricket in their village courtyards - it was so peaceful and i realised how far, far away this way of life is from the stressful life in the cities which is now completely controlled by our media because all day the boob-tube is on in our houses and we are listening to these sayers of doom and gloom!

spend a few days in the rural areas to detox - really!
:enjoy:

I do maintain that our media is a very big culprit in helping the terrorists gain their objectives, Lal Masjid affair was fanned by the media as a burning example of Missing Writ of the State and when the action was taken under immense pressure the same media started bombarding the state for brutality...
Hamid Mir was particularly two faced in this regards, his comments before and after the operation show a phenomenal hypocrisy
GOP should strictly control the media, no doubt about it.

So invite us man...we all need to relieve some stress...honestly our stress is even evident on on this forum where we are becoming more and more abrasive...too much knowledge is a double edged weapon...:)

Let us go on a rural adventure with fatman17 and detox!!!
:enjoy:
 
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Let us go on a rural adventure with fatman17 and detox!!!

any time and you know what - the rurals dont talk about AQ and taliban - they just dont support an iota of their ideology - the rurals are just good muslims, conservative, God fearing who are more worried about their crops then anything else!
 
Let us go on a rural adventure with fatman17 and detox!!!

any time and you know what - the rurals dont talk about AQ and taliban - they just dont support an iota of their ideology - the rurals are just good muslims, conservative, God fearing who are more worried about their crops then anything else!

May Allah keep them content and peaceful, Amen.
:pakistan:
 
Storm Lord, great post, really. It was a pleasure to read, and that's a rare thing to find among pages of half-baked opinions.

All-Green, I don't think the answer is to control the media. It seems to me that there is a lot of hostility between the government and the media in Pakistan.
Of course, things are quite bad on the ground so you'd expect the media to reflect that rather than tell fairy stories, but still somewhere the underlying message of unity and solidarity is missing.
If this were an Indo-Pak war, the media on both sides would go into patriotic mode and work with the government to rally the people, but this does not seem to be happening in the current scenario. Most top media agencies are either sympathetic towards the Islamists or extremely hostile towards the government, sometimes both together.
Of course, this highlights the underlying failure of the government to communicate with the heads of the major press/television outlets to bring out a message that would help the people of Pakistan to understand and face the current crises, but then the government itself is confused about how to tackle its problems so it would be far-fetched to expect a coherent media strategy.

I'm afraid that banning the media will never work out. For starters, it would prompt the media channels to launch popular campaigns against this (as seen under Mushy), which would lead to mass protests, international pressure and finally capitulation by the government.
Even if they do manage to implement a ban in theory, such a weak government would be unable to implement it effectively, leading to a proliferation of underground media outlets or overseas media outlets that would be even more hostile towards the current regime. After all, we've seen how helpless the GOP was to stop a popular illegal FM channel.
 
Way too to read in 5 minutes, but i got round to it.

We were talking of Al-Qaeda’s downfall in Iraq which happened due to Sunni insurgent groups eventually rejecting them.

That is your opinion.

The US opinion is that they surged their troops to capitulate the Iraqi insurgent groups, not that there was any "Awakening" or whatever it is (I wouldn't pay much attention to S-2 he tends to switch sides quicker than Dostum to settle his scores).

Your opinion is that the Sunnis suddenly woke up after a 5 year slumber and realized that Al Qaeda are very very bad people, through some sort of delayed "Awakening".

My opinion is that there were sticking points, Al Sadr wanted more power in the Iraqi government along with other Shiite clerics and when they were granted this power, much of the ferocity within Iraq went. It is true that Al Anbar was a Sunni stronghold of resistance, but generally it was Al Sadr who seemed to be able to cause a lot more violence and mayhem in Iraq.

You seem to have for some reason started arguing about whose contribution was more important in bringing stability in Iraq.

No.

While perhaps forgetting that Al-Sadr was never allied with Al-Qaeda in the first place and the implications of his decisions did not have much effect on Al-Qaeda compared to decisions made by Sunni nationalist and tribal groups (again I have to state the obvious for you). I am surprised to see anyone for that matter arguing that the Awakening was less responsible for Al-Qaeda’s demise than the decision of a Shia cleric to make peace with the Americans. Perhaps you should read up a little on the Anbar Awakening Council too.

You seem to think this silly idea of "Awakening" is the ultimate answer.

There were many things at play in Iraq.

This Awakening may have played a small part, but it was by no means the main part. Al Qaeda was settled in the Sunni areas of Iraq, Al Anbar I suspect one of them, not the Shias. But they were not able to inflict much damage on the US. The statistics show this clearly. There was a trickle of 1 fatality a day for years, until specific months when Al Sadr launched campaigns and violence spiralled in 2004/2005. It was around the areas of Najaf, Nasariyah and so on that Al Sadr had the most influence with his "Mahdi" Army.

However it would seem you did not follow the conflict in Iraq as closely as you pretend. The Sunnis constituted the most consistent, fierce and brutal parts of the Iraqi insurgency. The US military suffered the vast majority of their casualties from Sunni attacks in and around the Triangle of Death. The Al-Sadr militia, despite their numbers, provided spasms of ill-trained and relatively ill-equipped revolts that took heavily amounts of casualties during coalition counter-sweeps.

I'll probably be accused of being a Shia now, but I think the deaths caused by the militants were half and half. The Sunnis were more consistent, but the Shias were able to turn it on when they felt they were being sidelined in the government.

What is this about, I don’t remember implying Iraqis were stupid. Though you have proved my point that the people in the tribal areas not stupid, you seemed to be implying they were when you said their opinions are unlike to change because they do not possess TV sets.

I don't get what you're saying here.

I think I suggested your suggestion of an "Awakening" where it took those Iraqis 7 years to realize Al Qaeda is bad, implied that they were stupid.

They're not stupid, and they realized what Al Qaeda was like fairly early on, I would say within the first year of fighting. That year was inconsequential. It wasn't until 2004 and 2005 that fighting spiralled.

Your contention is that in 2008 the fighting reduced in Iraq due to Al Qaeda being thrown out and rejected. My contention is that the main cause of reduction was deals done that allowed more power to the Shia leaders within the Iraqi government. In other words Al Q did contribute to some fighting in Iraq, but when the Shia resistance had been pacified through deals, there was a change in the overall mindset within Iraq. That pacification through dealership was the important factor.

I'll read the rest if I have time.
 
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Your opinion is that the Sunnis suddenly woke up after a 5 year slumber and realized that Al Qaeda are very very bad people, through some sort of delayed "Awakening".

Your rewording of my exposition in an intentionally clumsy and inaccurate way does not negate the validity of what I’ve explained, or the fact that my clarification is the prevalent view held by expert opinion-holders. I’ve never said that the Sunni Awakening was a ‘sudden’ phenomenon, in reality the US had been approaching the nationalist and tribal strands of the insurgency through back-channels long before General Petraeus’s plans were announced. Cracks and divisions within the Sunni insurgency were always present, particularly due to their differing long term aspirations in regards to Iraq’s future. The secularly inclined nationalists were opposed to Al-Qaeda’s plans for an extreme Islamist dispensation, something Al-Qaeda did proceed with in areas they have developed significant clout. Al-Qaeda’s brutal campaign of beheading and suicide bombings was also a factor behind local resentment; as was the fact that they’d increasingly been acquiring a social, economical, religious monopoly, often at the cost of traditional influentials such as smugglers, tribal chieftains, Baathist gangs, clerics, extortionists, etc. However, initially faced with an immediate and real American threat, these groups had been able to project a more or less unified front, for the time being.

Saddam’s former soldiers and militiamen obviously had access to regiments worth of weapons, ammunition and high explosives. The most effective weapon in the arsenal of the Sunni insurgents was the IED, hooked-up artillery shells wired to a dissembled mobile’s electronic system. Iraq, particularly the Sunni areas, was (and is) awash with weapons: PKMs, SVDs, RPG-7s, and an assortment of mortars…you name it. Iraq’s army sure knew how to maintain and use them; they were bitter, resentful and jobless. Al-Qaeda fighters, always experienced and brutal, came in to join up with these guys (obviously not with the ‘heretic’ Shias who were seen as having supported the invasion). Al-Qaeda certainly had a lot of cash (Arab sources I would presume) to buy weapons, safe houses and recruits and smarting as they were over their defeat in Afghanistan, put their heads in the game. Thus this became the Sunni insurgency.

The Shia gangs under Sadr had long been suppressed by Saddam’s regime, while increasing confident and enthusiastic, were not particularly well armed or trained or experienced. Their primary source of weapons and equipment were deserted weapon depots the coalition had failed to secure immediately post-invasion. Secondly, like I said before, Sadr was (and is) not widely respected in the Shia clergy and drew his support from poor, resentful, slum-ish areas of Sadr City (named so after Saddam’s fall) and southern Iraq. Iraqi clerical heavyweights like Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani had distanced themselves from Sadr from the start, and have even gone as far as to question his legitimacy as a cleric. Sistani in particular, while not overly welcoming to Americans, is widely credited with averting the Shia-Sunni civil war that many of Sadr’s undisciplined and fanatical supporters (helped by their Al-Qaeda counterparts) almost instigated. Thus the Shia community was not nearly as responsive to Sadr’s ambitious and morally-dubious plans for Iraq as he would’ve liked. The alleged IRCG support to offshoots of Sadr’s army (if not entirely an exaggeration) can be, again, attributed to deep rooted but complex clerical and doctrinal differences between the Iraq’s Shia clergy (and thus vast majority of the Shia community) and the mullah regime running Iran presently. Indeed, Sistani despite his links to Iranian soil, is considered far from an instrument of Iranian agenda.

It is true that many Sadr loyalists are reported to have infiltrated new Iraqi institutions, particularly the police and the Interior Ministry. However your contention that Sadr having achieved all or most political objectives envisioned at the outset of this violent campaign is dubious at best. The fact that Sadr had lost much control over his militia, the fact that he was seen as having been greatly weakened by recently US military operations in and around his areas, the new ‘Surge’ tactic of stationing small numbers of US troops at forward positions in dangerous neighborhoods such as Sadr’s implemented after the ceasefire having weakened him further, and that Sadr was far from content with the amount of political influence he had gained as can be seen by repeated threats, resignations, long marches and attempts to restart the insurrection... would all suggest otherwise. Certainly the recent heavy and bitter crackdown by Iraqi Armed Forces against the Sadr militias, while not entirely conclusive, do prove that the level of political power gained or retained in the new ‘democratic’ dispensation is far from what Sadr would’ve liked or expected at the inception of his campaign against the Americans and the British. I would go as far as to say that Sadr had a large appetite but small teeth.

The US opinion is that they surged their troops to capitulate the Iraqi insurgent groups, not that there was any "Awakening" or whatever it is (I wouldn't pay much attention to S-2 he tends to switch sides quicker than Dostum to settle his scores).

That is a primitive and largely inaccurate appraisal of the situation. The ‘surge’ of the numbers in itself was not intended to intimidate or push the insurgent groups into capitulation. The surge of troops was a facilitation of a larger strategic and tactical plan, obviously envisioned by Petraeus before the surge (which was actually not all that large anyway), to push-forward and deploy small and spread out detachments of US troops (sometimes as much as 10) in disruptive districts for effective neighborhood policing. This checked lawlessness and violence, both sectarian and insurgent, through cooperation with the locals who felt protected and confident enough to collaborate. This encouraged and facilitated the Awakenings. The sealing off of entire volatile neighborhoods also helped in bringing much needed security to people.

Now, the way the Surge played into the defeat of Al-Qaeda was in complimenting the outcome of the Awakening, which was the unseating and expulsion of Al-Qaeda fighters from their traditional strongholds in the Sunni Triangle. This can also be credited to US forces scoring a tactical victory in and around the outskirts of Bagdad; with a strategic consequence that it further unseated Al-Qaeda (other than securing the capital ofcourse). Now Al-Qaeda, without its established hideouts and safe houses amongst the civilian populous was easy meat for US special forces and airstrikes while on the move. The ‘surge’ and new neighborhood tactics meant that Al-Qaeda could not infiltrate new districts like they had so often done in the past (the aftermath of Faluja comes to mind) or retreat to old ones hosting the Awakening in order to recuperate and recruit. The whole thing was also helped by intelligence successes that lead to the elimination of most of Al-Qaeda’s leadership piecemeal. Note here that Al-Sadr’s army had been greatly subdued through military operations before the ceasefire, before the elements of the surge came into play.

Also our fellow American member did not address you, nor did he participate in our debate himself. He merely referred to accounts of relevant officials that probably support my assessment over yours. So that is not his opinion which you say is subject to bias. But since you tried to deny the existence of ‘any Awakening’, that means your credibility is in question now sir.

In conclusion, yes Al-Qaeda was subdued in Iraq primarily because of a change in attitude of the Iraqis themselves, new American tactics were a secondary cause and Sadr’s ceasefire none at all. The overall change of the security situation in Iraq can also be attributed to these events plus Sadr’s capitulation, in the same order. In Afghanistan too, I believe extremist Taliban/Al-Qaeda rule dissuaded the majority from supporting ‘their government’ through the pressures of a war, even a half hearted one and the quick over-throwing of the Taliban was the result. The whole system of rule and government was fragile and precarious, thus my conclusion that these elements of perverted extremist Sunni Islam are not adept at genuine ruling or control, and as terrorists organizations, their presence is anathema to human society (even Muslim society, contrary to some western beliefs). Their capitulation is inevitable, partly due to their own methods.
 
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