Lt-General Thorat's 1962 China warning fell on deaf ears.

[dray]

Lt-General Thorat's 1962 China warning fell on deaf ears | Mail Online

'Previously, the only real threat against India which merited consideration was from Pakistan. To this now has been added the threat from China,' begins the 1960 assessment of Lt-Gen SPP Thorat, then army commander, Eastern Command, on the looming threat of China.

The assessment was written after a yearlong study of the Chinese build-up across the McMahon Line.

The army even war gamed Chinese incursions and India's response in the form of Exercise Lal Qila.

The 1960 secret report of then army commander, Eastern command, Lt-gen SPP Thorat which forecasts the events

The report forecasts events that take place in the coming years

What emerges from the top secret papers is that the use of the Indian Air Force in an offensive role was integral to the army's war plans. In 1960, Lt-Gen Thorat felt that the Sino- Indian ties that had remained friendly in the past had undergone a considerable change.

'This is primarily due to the claim made by China upon large territories which are clearly ours.

She (China) has also refused to recognise the McMahon Line as the international boundary and has made deliberate incursions into our territory in Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh and NEFA (North- East Frontier Agency, now Arunachal Pradesh)...


We are required to resist to the full and evict any further incursions by China.

This requires us to be fully prepared to undertake immediate military action...' his assessment said.

More than two years before the first wave of Chinese troops overran the border on October 20, 1962, Lt-Gen Thorat had warned of the impending crisis.

Exercise Lal Qila was held on March 17, 1960. Lt-Gen Thorat, it appears, knew the Chinese would attack. He had assessed military and infrastructure build-up across the McMahon line.

Lt-Gen Guru Bakshi, former director general, infantry, then a young captain, said: 'In 1959, we as young officers were addressed by Gen. Thimayya. The impression we got was that the government, especially then defence minister V.K. Krishna Menon, was not interested in professional military advice. Gen. Thimayya had red flagged the Chinese build-up. The civilian leadership was not listening.'

The roughly 100-page top secret report accessed by Headlines Today/Mail Today records the situation in 1960 and also forecasts events that could take place in the coming years.

Lt Gen Thorat wrote that the task was to 'defend our territory and that of Sikkim against aggression from Pakistan and China and be prepared to give military assistance to Nepal and maintain law and order in the Naga Hills and Tuensang Agency (NHTA)'.

With the help of detailed intelligence inputs, Lt-Gen Thorat assessed China's military build-up, and road and airfield construction plans.

Lt-Gen Shantanu Chowdhary, former vice-chief of army staff, said: 'Sadly, there was lack of coordination between the top military and political leadership.

Had effective preparations been done, when Lt-Gen Thorat warned, the situation would have been very different.'

Lt Gen Thorat was also in favour of using the air force in an offensive role. Recently, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne also said that had air power been used then, the results of the war would have been different.

Author and military historian Kunal Varma said:'Then defence minister was not convinced that China would attack India. (Then PM) Nehru went with his view and the rest is history. Had Lt-Gen Thorat's report been taken in the right spirit, India would have been better prepared.'

 

[dray]

The Two Myths of 1962 | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

The Two Myths of 1962

In the 50-odd articles that have appeared in the media on the 50th anniversary of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, two issues have not been adequately addressed. First: the myth that the Indian Army had not provided viable military options to the then Government of India. Second: The reasons for the non-use of the combat potential of the Indian Air Force.

***
Until 1959, the defence of NEFA, now called Arunachal Pradesh, was the responsibility of the Ministry of External Affairs and not the Ministry of Defence and its borders were manned by personnel of the Assam Rifles. Most Indian readers are not aware of this. This was done to avoid annoying the Chinese.

In 1957 when Lt. Gen. SPP Thorat took over command of the Eastern Army then based at Lucknow, his area of responsibility stretched all the way to the eastern end of India’s borders, but NEFA was not included until 1959 when border clashes began increasing in frequency and intensity.

After he had visited many places in his command, Thorat called for the maps of the area and made a thorough and detailed appreciation. He assessed that there were at least six major ingress points or passes in NEFA through which large and organised bodies of enemy forces with heavy equipment and transport could enter India. The terrain favoured the Chinese because the landscape across the border does not have steep hills and mountains but in fact a few kilometres down merges into the vast Tibetan Plateau. There would only be a limited advance due to the difficulties of terrain and the Chinese would have to go back before the passes became snowbound in winter. The use of motor transport and very large bodies of troops could not therefore be sustained along these routes for long periods of time.

In Thorat’s assessment, a minimum of 70 platoons, with 20 in reserve, were needed for the defence of the Northern Sector of NEFA. The Assam Rifles then had only 36 platoons. (Three platoons per company would mean some 30 plus companies or 10 battalions were needed to man what he called ‘screens’ or small bodies of troops to provide advance warning of a Chinese attack. The need for additional support troops, equipment, signals communication, mortars, artillery and the like was also listed. Additional troops were obviously needed for the main defences.1

After studying the topography of the terrain, Thorat then forecasted the need for setting up in-depth positions which could be properly defended because the terrain and access to roads would favour the defender. These positions were roughly half way between the McMahon Line and the foothills. Thorat also underscored the urgent need to develop roads and other surface infrastructure in the area to support the movement of such large bodies of our own troops. Earlier, in 1950-51, a committee led by Deputy Defence Minister Maj. Gen. Himmatsinghji2 had already toured the area very extensively and submitted a similar requirement for the development of the surface infrastructure. The tardy progress of this initiative was known. Both GB Pant, the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and later Union Home Minister, and Dr. Sampurnanand, another Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, had directly complained to Nehru about this and yet little progress was achieved.

In 1959, the Indian Army’s 4th Division was ordered to move to the East after it had completed the now ‘famous’ Op. Amar Housing Project at Ambala for the Jawans under the ‘dynamic’ leadership of Lt. Gen. BM Kaul who was awarded the PVSM for it. On reaching the foothills, 7 Brigade, then under Brig. DK (Monty) Palit (a VrC of the 1947-48 Kashmir War and a horseman, Shikari and mountain trekking expert) walked all the way to Tawang and beyond as there was not even a jeep-able road in the West Kameng Division of NEFA and wrote an appreciation in which he chose Se La as the area where he would site his main brigade defences. By the time the war started, a jeep-able road linking Tezpur to Tawang had come up but beyond that the 30 odd kilometres to the border was still a hard slogging march. A helipad and some logistics areas were also established in the Tawang area. 3

On 8 October 1959, the Thorat plan was sent to Army Headquarters where General Thimayya approved it and personally showed the requirements to Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon. But Menon dismissed them as alarmist and unnecessary and boasted that he was confident of stopping the Chinese on his own with diplomacy and, therefore, the plans were not shown to Nehru. Another major reason for the rejection of the army’s plans arose from the inability of the civilian leadership to understand simple army tactics. Nehru had promised Parliament that he would defend every inch of Indian Territory. How could India defend every inch of her sacred land against the enemy if the army envisaged siting its main defences half way down in the foothills? The civilian leadership failed to realise that defending every inch of territory does not mean posting small groups of Jawans all along the border without mutual fire support and logistics back up. They also missed the role of the screens posted at points of likely ingress along the border. What if the Chinese came in and just stayed put? The army would then have to launch a counter attack to evict them. Thorat retired in May 1961 but was called to Delhi by Nehru after the battle in NEFA in October 1962. When Thorat personally showed him the plans, Nehru asked as to why he was not shown these earlier to which Thorat said Menon might provide the right answer.

***
In 1962, the Indian Air Force (IAF) then had some 25 Squadrons consisting of 100 each of Hunter, Mystere fighters and Canberra medium bombers, a squadron of photo-reconnaissance Canberra, some 75 each of relatively old slow speed and less capable Toofani and Vampire fighters and about 30 Gnat Mk.1 fighters in its inventory. The photo- reconnaissance Canberra had mapped the Chinese Road in Aksai Chin and provided a mosaic to Menon before Nehru made his statement on the issue in Parliament. A Canberra had also flown over NEFA but could not photograph the borders due to clouding. The pilot then flew below the clouds and visually confirmed the well-entrenched positions, Nissan Huts, artillery and transport of the Chinese PLA and reported this to the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal AM Engineer, who was personally present at Jorhat airfield to brief and debrief the pilot on landing. 4 Before the war, a Hunter had been asked to fly over Ladakh but was not allowed to come down below 15,000 feet. This pilot later rose to be the Chief of Air Staff. The Hunters based at Ambala were more than capable of engaging the Chinese in Ladakh especially when Chushul was threatened. Rezangla would then have seen a very different outcome. According to my information, some experienced fighter pilots were already deployed at forward bases such as DBO and Chushul for Forward Air Controller (FAC) duties to direct the IAF fighters. Although JK Galbraith was correct in assuming that the Chinese invariably marched by night and across country, he based this on the experience of the Korean War. His belief that for this reason alone the IAF would have been ineffective is not quite correct since the entire Aksai Chin region is without even a ‘blade of grass’ and the road/paths followed by the PLA in Kameng and Lohit Divisions of NEFA could have been effectively attacked, interdicted or, better, Chinese logistics and heavy artillery across the border could also have been targeted. All of the fighting did not only occur under the cover of darkness. The IAF was already familiar with Machuka, Tezu, Heleluyang, Tri-Junction, Walong, Tawang, Sela and Bomdila in the East and DBO, Chushul, Rezangla, Chip Chap Valley in the West, since all of these areas were after all being air supplied for many years prior to the conflict. Finally, the use of IAF combat power would have in all probability prevented the second wave of Chinese attacks that came on 18 November. The Indian political leadership was apparently fearful of escalation into an all-out war!

The Army suffered reverses not for want of valour but due mainly to the inability of a few generals to see the situation in the right perspective, a total disconnect between the military and civilian political leadership, a false sense of bravado (‘Throw the Chinese Out’), the inexplicable reluctance to talk to the military leadership, Nehru’s fondness of relying upon foreign advice (Mountbatten in 1947 and Galbraith in 1962), and above all a major misreading of the prevailing geopolitical climate which caused Nehru to think that the Chinese would not attack India since that would invite the direct intervention of the super powers – a clear over estimation of India’s importance. Finally, neither the Army nor the political establishment saw it necessary to speak directly to the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal AM Engineer, and take his views on the actual capabilities and effectiveness of the IAF. We must therefore not learn the wrong lessons from this 50 year old border conflict. India does not want war but what if it comes anyway.

 

[ptltejas]

The blunders of 1962

(1) Sardar Patel in yr. 1950 near sent a letter to the Nehru and stated that, the Political party of china had told to make the new border as it had in past (when one mongolian rules on china). also sent a map to the Nehru, but the Ego of Nehru does not permit him to accept this

(2) The chinese side many time breach the border after the slogan "Hindi Chini Bhai-Bhai), They sent letters to the Defence Ministry who return the same, and did not accept, which paper were put into the "Border File", one Journalist asked them about the same and they explained the same.

(3) The militery General had given the Information to the Nehru one time (Not thimaiya some one else) and informed Nehru that China may attack on India, on which Nehru had replied that, "Its not your work to give advise me, If some one attack at East India China will protect us".

(4) Nehru was more interested in his public International Image rather to protect the country, The News of the War starting , and End both come from other source and not militery or government.

(5) When Tibet was independent, Nehru had denied to help Tibet and said that they dont want to enter in other dispute, and irrespective of his statement, he had helped China by providing Medical and Food facilities.

(6) Krishnan Menon was also the acted like villan who was known as snake charmer in west, who always gave the advise to the Russia and US, and Never be serious about Country own, Even after failure the resignation was not taken, and later when there is hue and cry on him, he was transfered to Defence production, and he said that, There is nothing change in his power. The shameless person.

(7) After the loss of war, Nehru said in the Parliament that, there would be good lesson. (Is it necessary to learn lessons and then to understand the things).

(8) The Eastern Command was under the Nehru's relative, Mr. Kaul, who was on leave when war started and he was on leave and tour at Kasmir, when he informed about the war he did not return and said not to disturb him, his resignation was never taken, moreover Defence Ministry had not reject the Leave, which is done in the general cases.

We had Great Blunder as PM namely Nehru.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

According to India's own internal army report, and according to pretty much every international source, it was Nehru's Forward policy that started the 1962 War. The Forward policy in which he set up military outposts far beyond the MacMahon Line, where India did not even claim any land!

Yes, India did not prepare well enough. Who would have thought that China, in the middle of our worst famine in history (the Great leap forward) would be able to resist Nehru's Forward policy?

What better time to conduct the Forward policy, when China was collapsing from starvation?

This was a war that did not need to happen, if not for Nehru's foolishness. Even hosting the Tibetan government in exile in 1959 could have blown over in the long term, but the Forward policy was just too much. While we were starving no less.

 

[dray]

Thorat's Defence Plan:

Unsung Battles of 1962 - Gurdip Singh Kler - Google Books

 

[saikumar]

NOT POSSIBLE IN PRESENT SCENARIO

 

[Omega007]

According to India's own internal army report, and according to pretty much every international source, it was Nehru's Forward policy that started the 1962 War. The Forward policy in which he set up military outposts far beyond the MacMahon Line, where India did not even claim any land!

Yes, India did not prepare well enough. Who would have thought that China, in the middle of our worst famine in history (the Great leap forward) would be able to resist Nehru's Forward policy?

What better time to conduct the Forward policy, when China was collapsing from starvation?

This was a war that did not need to happen, if not for Nehru's foolishness. Even hosting the Tibetan government in exile in 1959 could have blown over in the long term, but the Forward policy was just too much. While we were starving no less.

Yeah,yeah you've made your point like you've a thousand times before.Now stop spreading your propaganda and get your nose out of here.

Your propaganda would work for those few apologists,we don't give a flying **** about what you've to say.

Now give me my negative rating that I earned or I'm gonna have your arse.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

Yeah,yeah you've made your point like you've a thousand times before.Now stop spreading your propaganda and get your blunt nose out of here you Han.
Your propaganda would work for those few apologists,we don't give a flying **** about what you've to say.

Now give me my negative rating that I earned or I'm gonna have your arse.

I would have preferred a logical reply, but I guess you calling me a "blunt nosed Han" will have to do. For future reference, it is rude to call someone by their ethnicity, followed by a racial stereotype no less.

As for the topic, why would India's own internal army report from 1962 be "Chinese propaganda"?

 

[Omega007]

I would have preferred a logical reply, but I guess you calling me a "blunt nosed Han" will have to do. For future reference, it is rude to call someone by their ethnicity, followed by a racial stereotype no less.

As for the topic, why would India's own internal army report from 1962 be "Chinese propaganda"?

The Indian Army's internal report which you like to bring in every other thread,accuses Nehru for not preparing the Army for the war and ignoring their professional advices that cost them so many good men and the war itself.They never accuse Nehru of actually starting the war.

You make it like it was only Nehru and his FP that started the war and the Indians were the aggressor.Yet in reality it was you guys who started to claim large tracts of Indian territory after illegally grabbing the Tibetan pleatu.

It was your government who had constructed the permanent highways through the disputed territory of Aksai Chin,without even feeling the need to notify the Indian authorities.It was you guys who had started to encroach Indian land.And farther more,it was your PLA who had fired upon and killed Indian border police patrols without any provocations or even warning them on multiple occasions,and that too when they were south of the McMahon line!!And guess what,all these incidents took place even before the commencement of Forward Policy.Actually Forward Policy was taken in response to these earlier provocations by your government.

And call us the attackers and play victim!!Great,just great!!In reality you people did everything to make that war happen because you knew Indian Government and Army both were being run by weak, inept and idiot people ;Indian Army was totally unprepared and outnumbered and you wouldn't get a better chance to punish the Indians for giving asylum to Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in Exile.What's done is done,just accept that and move on.It's really disgusting and shameful to see how you guys play the victim card to justify your actions.

And about the racist crap you gave,I've seen you commenting far worse about us Indians and thaking others for doing the same.And I just stated a fact about how you guys look,it was not racist.Now if someone calls a Bengali and brown Bengali,he will never take it as an offence because that's how you look.But you feel offended,does that mean you are not happy for what you are??

 

[janon]

Yeah,yeah you've made your point like you've a thousand times before.Now stop spreading your propaganda and get your blunt nose out of here you Han.
Your propaganda would work for those few apologists,we don't give a flying **** about what you've to say.

Now give me my negative rating that I earned or I'm gonna have your arse.

Can't you make your point without these racist remarks?

@Chinese-Dragon : It is my opinion that you shouldn't give negative ratings to somebody who abused you - you should simply report it to the mods, and let them or another think tank deal with it. I say this because now it seems that you gave him a -ve rating for going against you. (I agree that he deserved a negative for racial abuse, but I'm making a larger point about the whole rating system.)

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

And call us the attackers and play victim!!Great,just great!!In reality you people did everything to make that war happen because you knew Indian Government and Army both were being run by weak, inept and idiot people ;Indian Army was totally unprepared and outnumbered and you wouldn't get a better chance to punish the Indians for giving asylum to Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in Exile.What's done is done,just accept that and move on.It's really disgusting and shameful to see how you guys play the victim card to justify your actions.

So basically you are saying that China "tricked" India into starting the war with the Forward Policy?

Does any historian in the world support that theory with any kind of evidence?

It wasn't China, but Nehru who declared 1962 war - The Times of India

This is from India's own internal army report, which Neville Maxwell released.

The Indian government knows this, that's why they have tried to keep the report classified.

 

[janon]

...

Yes, India did not prepare well enough. Who would have thought that China, in the middle of our worst famine in history (the Great leap forward) would be able to resist Nehru's Forward policy?

What better time to conduct the Forward policy, when China was collapsing from starvation?
...

It's not like India was a prosperous, self sufficient country either, at that time. China was slightly poorer than us, but only slightly. Our green revolution had not happened yet, and India was one of the biggest importers of food products. Militarily, China was a lot more advanced compared to India - equipment or doctrines or strategy wise. India had not even developed a strategic culture or thought after independence; on the other hand, China's leaders were all baptised by fire in war. (I don't admire China's leaders of that time, I'm just saying that they knew more about warfare than Indian leaders did.) Mao was a veteran of the long march.

Yes it is Nehru's stupidity to have gone to war against China when the Indian army was horribly outclassed. But the bigger mistake was internal - political interference in military affairs, by politicians who did not know a whit about military affairs.

 

[dray]

According to India's own internal army report, and according to pretty much every international source, it was Nehru's Forward policy that started the 1962 War. The Forward policy in which he set up military outposts far beyond the MacMahon Line, where India did not even claim any land!

Yes, India did not prepare well enough. Who would have thought that China, in the middle of our worst famine in history (the Great leap forward) would be able to resist Nehru's Forward policy?

What better time to conduct the Forward policy, when China was collapsing from starvation?

This was a war that did not need to happen, if not for Nehru's foolishness. Even hosting the Tibetan government in exile in 1959 could have blown over in the long term, but the Forward policy was just too much. While we were starving no less.

Forward Policy was just setting up some posts in response to Chinese posts in that disputed land, and for that China started a war even after repeated assurances by their leaders to resolve the dispute through peaceful means. What you are trying to prove in every thread whenever this issue comes up, is like you had an argument with someone over a table in a restaurant, and you suddenly shoot the guy for arguing with you over the table, hence the fault is his. The war was declared over a small issue and in a haste without giving enough time to a peaceful resolution.

Nehru was not military minded, he was not looking for, neither expecting a military solution to that problem, and he totally misjudged the Chinese intention believing in their false assurances, he has his share of unforgivable blunders, but that doesn't take away the blame from China for unilaterally attacking a 'friendly' country who stood by them in their trying times, and souring the relationship between the two countries which was otherwise good for thousands of years.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

Can't you make your point without these racist remarks?

@Chinese-Dragon : It is my opinion that you shouldn't give negative ratings to somebody who abused you - you should simply report it to the mods, and let them or another think tank deal with it. I say this because now it seems that you gave him a -ve rating for going against you. (I agree that he deserved a negative for racial abuse, but I'm making a larger point about the whole rating system.)

Fair point, though now that I've made it, I'll let it stand.

I mean apart from the racism and swearing, he said "Give me a negative rating or I'm gonna have your arse!"

I mean, what? Firstly I am straight, secondly that's not the kind of thing you say on a forum. And I am very sure Webmaster will agree with me here.

 

[janon]

Fair point, though now that I've made it, I'll let it stand.

I mean apart from the racism and swearing, he said "Give me a negative rating or I'm gonna have your arse".

I mean, what? Firstly I am straight, secondly that's not the kind of thing you say on a forum.

IMO, this rating system is flawed and superfluous. If somebody violates forum rules, s/he should be given an infraction and the post deleted, which used to be the earlier practice. Racial abuse is quite clearly against forum rules.

Personally I don't mind swearing, since I am not a prude. But racial abuse in trying to make a point is pathetic.