Decline of the insurrection
In September 1948, the Dominion of India launched a military intervention for the
annexation of Hyderabad.
[50][51] The intervention officially described as a "police action" was justified on the grounds of ending the undemocratic feudal regime of the Nizam and the
razakar repression enabled by him.
[52] Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru had stated in a press conference the government's policy towards the communists would depend on how they respond during and after the intervention.
[53] The comment was misleading as the government was making preparations to liquidate the peasant communes and restore the
durra aristocrats regardless of their response. Internally, the communists were described as the primary target rather than the Nizam and the
razakars.
[53][54][55][51] V. P. Menon had briefed the American embassy about the intervention and promised them that the communists would be eradicated in return for their support in justifying the military action to the
international community. The Home Ministry under Vallabhbhai Patel favoured military intervention as it would enable them to deploy military personnel in Telangana. They had initially stalled the intervention for over a year, despite ongoing
razakar atrocities because it was feared that an invasion would allow the communists to strengthen their position. Menon wanted the rebel administration to be dealt with through
military courts rather than by civil authorities.
[50]
The Indian Army marched into Hyderabad State on 13 September and the already demoralised Hyderabad State Force, the police and the
razakars surrendered within a week after minimal resistance.
[56] This military intervention was perceived by the peasant communes as a positive development and not as an attack on them. The villagers believed the army was helping them defeat the Nizam's government. They launched a final parallel assault against the remaining military camps of the state forces, outposts of state agents and garrisons in
durra estates, accompanied by victory celebrations.
[53] The rebels came across large stores of arms and ammunition during the assault. Many of them were handed over to the army after their objectives were accomplished, as the peasants returned to their villages with the belief that the armed conflict was over.
[57] The commanding officer selected for the invasion was Major General
Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri, who was also a
zamindar aristocrat from West Bengal.
[58] He set up a military administration after the Nizam's capitulation, banned the Communist Party, and immediately launched a military offensive against the peasant communes.
[54][59] The
deshmukhs and officials returned as the redistributed lands were to be confiscated and granted back to their original owners.
[57]
The military administration did not induct any local police personnel or civil servants, including those affiliated with the Hyderabad State Congress, who were sidelined. Vallabhbhai Patel distrusted them and justified it with the claim that they had a partisan character.
[60] They deployed officials and personnel from outside the state, as it was feared that locals might be apprehensive of conducting violence against their own and might even be covert communist sympathisers. Chaudhuri also issued a warning to the police personnel from outside the state about falling under communist influence.
[57] The administration orchestrated an anti–communist
witch hunt in the state, attempting to arrest any and all communists. There was widespread use of torture against those suspected of harbouring information and the military personnel occasionally conducted indiscriminate arrests and mass shootings against villagers in Telangana.
[61][62] Meanwhile, the Nizam was not prosecuted and instead was made the
Rajpramukh of Hyderabad State for a period of time.
[63] Kasim Razvi was arrested, tried and jailed but soon released and forced to migrate to Pakistan.
[64] The military administration actively promoted feudal restoration in Telangana.
[65]
Puran Chand Joshi, the
general secretary of the Communist Party from 1935 to 1948
The offensive sent the peasant communes and the Communist Party into disarray, causing divisions within them.
[66][67] Some of them, including Ravi Narayan Reddy and the former general secretary
Puran Chand Joshi, among other veteran party leaders wanted to abandon the armed rebellion and attempt to employ legal pathways to stop the repression to continue their movement, while others antagonised by the actions of the administration wanted to continue an armed guerrilla struggle against the military. Some, including the new general secretary
Bhalchandra Trimbak Ranadive, even advocated for escalating the rebellion into a national revolution. Both sides exchanged accusations, denouncing each other as "right wing reformists" and "left wing adventurists".
[68][69] The government used this to its advantage, as they were occasionally able to coerce former participants into becoming informants.
[62][70] The urban population, unaware of the events in the countryside, had supported the intervention and were convinced by the government and with the help of various statements made by revolutionaries against the Congress, that they were indulging in an unnecessary peasants' partisan warfare after the annexation.
[52] On the other hand, the division weakened the communists. Many of the peasants had abandoned the rebellion, especially those from the middle and richer peasantry, some of whom were dissatisfied with the latest land ceiling and who used to provide important contacts and financial support.
[67] Despite the desertions, most of the peasants remained sympathetic towards the guerrillas who had decided to keep fighting, and refused to cooperate with the police.
[57]
In December 1948, the administration began a large-scale
counterinsurgency campaign designed to frighten villagers into not assisting the guerrillas. The
States Department sent Captain Nanjappa to act as the Special Commissioner of Police for the operation. Nanjappa ordered indiscriminate arrests, burning down of entire villages where land redistribution had occurred and
extrajudicial killings of suspects after capture.
[71] Around 2,000 peasants, armed and unarmed, were killed and 25,000 arrested by the end of August 1949.
[54] The communes were dis-established and the former
durra estates restored in their respective areas. The guerrillas had to retreat into the dense forests of the
Godavari Basin and to the forests across the
Krishna River in the
Nallamala Range, with the support of the
Koya and
Lambadi tribals respectively.
[63][72] The landless and impoverished peasants, which included most of the tribals and untouchables, formed the backbone of the rebellion.
[73] The guerrillas adopted even more clandestine tactics; the size of individual squads was reduced to five from ten. They started leading civilian lives among the rural population without readily available arms, depended on intermediaries for communication and occasionally organised to conduct operations. The government adopted the strategy of the
Briggs Plan in response; tribal communities were evacuated en masse and placed in large detention camps but guerrillas with widespread support from the locals continued to be able to operate and remain supplied.