Learning by Doing Pakistan's Experience with Counterinsurgency: Shuja Nawaz

[HRK]

My sincerest apologies.

for what .... ???

I download it from your post and reading ....

 

[Joe Shearer]

for what .... ???

I download it from your post and reading ....

Try reading his comments as relating to the post below the comment, rather than the usual practice of relating to the post above.

 

[doorstar]

for what .... ???

I download it from your post and reading ....

this is for you

Sir, your views would be awesome to read.

 

[fatman17]

The US imparted training in COIN to the FC, wing by wing. In the end 47 wings were trained by US advisors. This was a on the job training of sorts but the US advisors did not take part in the actual fighting (which they were keen to ). Gen Tariq was hands on, there are pics of him eating food with the soldiers, he was a hard task master and his command style was well liked by the FC as well as the US. He would've made a brilliant COAS, but unfortunately he also had a disdain for democracy, therefore overlooked.

Well it does state that the helicopters provided were insufficient and more were needed. It clearly does state that the funds provided were wholly insufficient for FC. But under the leadership of Gen Tariq they were used at their best .While PA got plenty of Equipment i guess the materials were insufficient to mount an offensive all over tribal areas and swat on the same time.

I would like to read up on what training the Americans and allies provided to FC . not much is out there regarding it.



Understandable


He was probably a Godsend for the war, I dont know who could've done a better job in countering the militancy. Which in the book is rightly used by Gen Tariq to describe the menece in the tribals.

 

[jaibi]

Sir that story is a whole nother chapter

The US imparted training in COIN to the FC, wing by wing. In the end 47 wings were trained by US advisors. This was a on the job training of sorts but the US advisors did not take part in the actual fighting (which they were keen to ). Gen Tariq was hands on, there are pics of him eating food with the soldiers, he was a hard task master and his command style was well liked by the FC as well as the US. He would've made a brilliant COAS, but unfortunately he also had a disdain for democracy, therefore overlooked.

Sir, like @doorstar and @Joe Shearer clarified; my text for you was that reading your views would be awesome.

for what .... ???

I download it from your post and reading ....

 

[Enigma SIG]

Quite an illuminating read. This is very old though. I'd love to read more about recent successes. Also i'd like to know how PA is keeping it's conventional edge given the amount of resources it had to divert for COIN in the past few years.

 

[HRK]

Sir, like @doorstar and @Joe Shearer clarified; my text for you was that reading your views would be awesome.

OK completed the reading of this paper and honestly I find myself incapable to comment on most of the things as there are many things I noted as new to me, but I do have one query about the change of Training regime of PA which as per this paper has shifted focus from traditional security threats to non-traditional and unconventional threats so it mean the training and experience our new recruits have gathered is related to nontraditional or unconventional war, so

Could this cause any negative impact on traditional warfighting capabilities of PA .... ??? If yes then what would be the extent .... ???

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

Gen Tariq was also considered too pro USA.

 

[jaibi]

Sir, firstly, you should notice that the paper was published a decade ago so at the time what S. Nawaz is referring to as a shift in training was more emphasis on fluid field level command of the junior officers and subsequent focus on section based actions instead of the traditional training of just platoon level action. That was supplemented over the traditional training rather than just being a substitute of it. I would say that the balance was well kept as far as operational capabilities are concerned.
Secondly, the army also geared up to have every fighting regiment (infantry, armour or arty) have field experience. I have talked to some other veterans from abroad and this seems to be a unique feature to us. It was always there to some degree but it's rock solid now.
Thirdly, the training at PMA was geared towards creating fighting fit men from the get go. The traditional sense of learning via regimental joining was negated. Courses reported straight to the battlefield.
Overall, I think that it has made us stronger in this regard rather than any compromise being done.

OK completed the reading of this paper and honestly I find myself incapable to comment on most of the things as there are many things I noted as new to me, but I do have one query about the change of Training regime of PA which as per this paper has shifted focus from traditional security threats to non-traditional and unconventional threats so it mean the training and experience our new recruits have gathered is related to nontraditional or unconventional war, so

Could this cause any negative impact on traditional warfighting capabilities of PA .... ??? If yes then what would be the extent .... ???

I would disagree with that opinion.

Gen Tariq was also considered too pro USA.

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

Sir, firstly, you should notice that the paper was published a decade ago so at the time what S. Nawaz is referring to as a shift in training was more emphasis on fluid field level command of the junior officers and subsequent focus on section based actions instead of the traditional training of just platoon level action. That was supplemented over the traditional training rather than just being a substitute of it. I would say that the balance was well kept as far as operational capabilities are concerned.
Secondly, the army also geared up to have every fighting regiment (infantry, armour or arty) have field experience. I have talked to some other veterans from abroad and this seems to be a unique feature to us. It was always there to some degree but it's rock solid now.
Thirdly, the training at PMA was geared towards creating fighting fit men from the get go. The traditional sense of learning via regimental joining was negated. Courses reported straight to the battlefield.
Overall, I think that it has made us stronger in this regard rather than any compromise being done.


I would disagree with that opinion.

Thats not really my opinion.

 

[jaibi]

I said I disagree with 'that' opinion.

Thats not really my opinion.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sir, firstly, you should notice that the paper was published a decade ago so at the time what S. Nawaz is referring to as a shift in training was more emphasis on fluid field level command of the junior officers and subsequent focus on section based actions instead of the traditional training of just platoon level action. That was supplemented over the traditional training rather than just being a substitute of it. I would say that the balance was well kept as far as operational capabilities are concerned.
Secondly, the army also geared up to have every fighting regiment (infantry, armour or arty) have field experience. I have talked to some other veterans from abroad and this seems to be a unique feature to us. It was always there to some degree but it's rock solid now.

Dear Sir,

I write from a position of personal disadvantage, and am forced to keep my comments brief; that may be welcome to most who suffer them in their more florid versions!

You might like to take a look at the RR - Rashtriya Rifles - formations in the Indian Army. In my view, these are double-edged swords. On the one hand, they encapsulate what you have summarised in your remarks above, but to a very well-developed form. It is of course not comparable; the prey of the RR is typically a handful - five or six, at the most - of militants who slip over, commit an event or two, and are then cornered, and take refuge in civilian buildings. Quite different from the formidable adversaries that your FC faces. However, in essence, it is the same, sans the helicopters and the armaments beyond the scope of an infantry section.

The ill effects are also obvious. Our own version of General Tariq, with his disdain for democracy, but, in addition, a penchant for making totally unwanted remarks that exasperated everybody, including his own sometime seniors, rose to the top, superseding two very deserving candidates - the third such supersession in Indian military affairs - solely on the basis of his counter-insurgency experience. His civilian masters valued such experience very much more greatly than it deserved, given their own penchant for the use of unnecessary force; they obviously hoped, contrary to what ensued, for a wave of harsh and repressive military actions. He himself thereafter, as is only natural, favoured subordinates with this highly questionable counter-insurgency background, and that pushed down the combat experience or the combat orientation of other officers. We will now pay the price.

You are already aware of the deep resistance within Indian circles to the AFSPA, that permits the supersession of the provisions of the Army Act, preventing the use of the Army against citizens of India, and frees the Army and the Central Armed Police (CAPF) from judicial liability for deaths of civilians that occur during counter-insurgency actions. I do not know the situation in Pakistan or the laws that apply, but without this provision, there was absolutely no way for the military to act in support of the civil administration without violating judicial and legal boundaries, or without applying Martial Law, that in India is unthinkable. These provisions, first applied in the north-east, are being lifted one area at a time.

Please consider the RR experiment in your reviews.

 

[jaibi]

Sir, that's a very important point that you've raised if we are to analyse the COIN spirit de corps in a more generalized manner. I would love to work on this if you would be so kind as to help me with the reading materials and research?

Dear Sir,

I write from a position of personal disadvantage, and am forced to keep my comments brief; that may be welcome to most who suffer them in their more florid versions!

You might like to take a look at the RR - Rashtriya Rifles - formations in the Indian Army. In my view, these are double-edged swords. On the one hand, they encapsulate what you have summarised in your remarks above, but to a very well-developed form. It is of course not comparable; the prey of the RR is typically a handful - five or six, at the most - of militants who slip over, commit an event or two, and are then cornered, and take refuge in civilian buildings. Quite different from the formidable adversaries that your FC faces. However, in essence, it is the same, sans the helicopters and the armaments beyond the scope of an infantry section.

The ill effects are also obvious. Our own version of General Tariq, with his disdain for democracy, but, in addition, a penchant for making totally unwanted remarks that exasperated everybody, including his own sometime seniors, rose to the top, superseding two very deserving candidates - the third such supersession in Indian military affairs - solely on the basis of his counter-insurgency experience. His civilian masters valued such experience very much more greatly than it deserved, given their own penchant for the use of unnecessary force; they obviously hoped, contrary to what ensued, for a wave of harsh and repressive military actions. He himself thereafter, as is only natural, favoured subordinates with this highly questionable counter-insurgency background, and that pushed down the combat experience or the combat orientation of other officers. We will now pay the price.

You are already aware of the deep resistance within Indian circles to the AFSPA, that permits the supersession of the provisions of the Army Act, preventing the use of the Army against citizens of India, and frees the Army and the Central Armed Police (CAPF) from judicial liability for deaths of civilians that occur during counter-insurgency actions. I do not know the situation in Pakistan or the laws that apply, but without this provision, there was absolutely no way for the military to act in support of the civil administration without violating judicial and legal boundaries, or without applying Martial Law, that in India is unthinkable. These provisions, first applied in the north-east, are being lifted one area at a time.

Please consider the RR experiment in your reviews.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sir, that's a very important point that you've raised if we are to analyse the COIN spirit de corps in a more generalized manner. I would love to work on this if you would be so kind as to help me with the reading materials and research?

Two things: before I lose face with PanzerKiel, I have to finish the 65 narrative. Second, I would like to rope in jbgt90. Can we return to this in, say, three or four days, say, Sunday next, July the 5th?

You are right, we should take this very seriously, and it is an important subject. Robert Thompson is an obvious starting point; my father followed him almost like a text.

 

[jaibi]

Let's please keep this thread for the subject at hand, please.