Vergennes
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The idea has stirred the German political scene for several months now. In August 2018, believing that NATO was "weakened" by the attitude and the words of Donald Trump, the American president, Christian Hacke, a specialist in international relations having practiced at the University of the Bundeswehr, affirmed in a tribune, that "national defense on the basis of nuclear deterrence should be a priority given the new transatlantic uncertainties and potential confrontations. And said that Germany needed the nuclear bomb.
This prospect was brushed aside by Wolfgang Ischinger, a former diplomat and currently chairman of the Munich security conference. According to him, Germany should not give up its status as a non-nuclear power to become the "gravedigger of the international non-proliferation regime." On the other hand, he will later argue, a "Europeanisation of French nuclear potential would indeed be a very good idea in the medium term. "
Ischinger said the French nuclear deterrent should "benefit" the European Union in return for a financial contribution to its development and implementation from the member states.
"If the costly French nuclear potential were to be developed, we cannot expect France to pay this alone from its own budget. The other partners within the EU, who would benefit from this protection, should contribute accordingly, "said Ischinger in February 2019. He also took care to specify that control of this deterrent must remain in the hands of the French president and not be entrusted to an EU committee. "A condition that we must accept! ", He had emphasized.
But on February 3, a close to the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, went even further. Johann Wadephul, vice-chairman of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU], said that Germany should "consider cooperation with France with regard to nuclear weapons" and "be ready to participate in the force nuclear deterrent with its own capabilities and means. "
Only, in return, France would lose control of its strike force… because, continued Mr. Wadephul, the latter should "be placed under a joint command of the European Union or NATO".
Except that NATO already has its own nuclear plans. German plans, moreover, with Panavia Tornado fighter-bombers capable of carrying the American tactical nuclear bomb B-61. Note that the control of these weapons [and therefore of their weapon code] is the responsibility of the United States, according to the so-called double-key principle.
As for the idea of placing French deterrence under European command, it is simply utopian. Who would make the decision, if any, to press the "button"? Who would decide what about the patrol of the French Navy nuclear launchers [SNLE] or the missions of the Rafale B of the Strategic Air Force [FAS]? Who would work on the capacity needs implied by a strike force? And with what experience?
"President Emmanuel Macron has called on us to dare more for Europe more than once. He could now show that he too is ready for it. It will take time, but the debate has to start now, "said Wadephul in an interview with Tagesspiegel. "The reality is that we need nuclear deterrence. It is in the German interest to have an influence on the strategy that protects us. It would be wise to try the same with France, "he insisted.
As a reminder, French nuclear doctrine aims to make the national territory a "sanctuary" while emphasizing the need to defend the "vital interests of the Nation". And, on this point, the 2017 Strategic Review explains that "the definition of our vital interests cannot be limited to the national level alone, because France does not conceive its defense strategy in isolation, even in the nuclear field . "
http://www.opex360.com/2020/02/03/u...la-france-a-partager-sa-dissuasion-nucleaire/
This prospect was brushed aside by Wolfgang Ischinger, a former diplomat and currently chairman of the Munich security conference. According to him, Germany should not give up its status as a non-nuclear power to become the "gravedigger of the international non-proliferation regime." On the other hand, he will later argue, a "Europeanisation of French nuclear potential would indeed be a very good idea in the medium term. "
Ischinger said the French nuclear deterrent should "benefit" the European Union in return for a financial contribution to its development and implementation from the member states.
"If the costly French nuclear potential were to be developed, we cannot expect France to pay this alone from its own budget. The other partners within the EU, who would benefit from this protection, should contribute accordingly, "said Ischinger in February 2019. He also took care to specify that control of this deterrent must remain in the hands of the French president and not be entrusted to an EU committee. "A condition that we must accept! ", He had emphasized.
But on February 3, a close to the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, went even further. Johann Wadephul, vice-chairman of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU], said that Germany should "consider cooperation with France with regard to nuclear weapons" and "be ready to participate in the force nuclear deterrent with its own capabilities and means. "
Only, in return, France would lose control of its strike force… because, continued Mr. Wadephul, the latter should "be placed under a joint command of the European Union or NATO".
Except that NATO already has its own nuclear plans. German plans, moreover, with Panavia Tornado fighter-bombers capable of carrying the American tactical nuclear bomb B-61. Note that the control of these weapons [and therefore of their weapon code] is the responsibility of the United States, according to the so-called double-key principle.
As for the idea of placing French deterrence under European command, it is simply utopian. Who would make the decision, if any, to press the "button"? Who would decide what about the patrol of the French Navy nuclear launchers [SNLE] or the missions of the Rafale B of the Strategic Air Force [FAS]? Who would work on the capacity needs implied by a strike force? And with what experience?
"President Emmanuel Macron has called on us to dare more for Europe more than once. He could now show that he too is ready for it. It will take time, but the debate has to start now, "said Wadephul in an interview with Tagesspiegel. "The reality is that we need nuclear deterrence. It is in the German interest to have an influence on the strategy that protects us. It would be wise to try the same with France, "he insisted.
As a reminder, French nuclear doctrine aims to make the national territory a "sanctuary" while emphasizing the need to defend the "vital interests of the Nation". And, on this point, the 2017 Strategic Review explains that "the definition of our vital interests cannot be limited to the national level alone, because France does not conceive its defense strategy in isolation, even in the nuclear field . "
http://www.opex360.com/2020/02/03/u...la-france-a-partager-sa-dissuasion-nucleaire/
