I agree with your assessment of the worth of the territory, but could we have realistically retained those territories at all I wonder? Escalation ladder was in Indian control, and they seemed to dictate how far they’d be willing to go to dislodge us.
I’ve said in the past that I think Kargil planning and timing were both off. We had a few months of reserves in Q1-2 1998, our Air Force by their own estimation was at a disadvantage against the Indians, and initially denying that these were our troops could only work as a strategy up to a point. Beyond which circumstances would force us to own the conflict openly, or leave us unable to respond to escalation. At which point the former would force the brunt of the blame and diplomatic pressure directly on our shoulders for starting a conflict. We were snubbed by everyone during Kargil, even our allies in China refused to back us, the US was not interested in walking the Indians back from anything better than unconditional withdrawal.
I think the biggest issue with the Kargil plan was that it failed to account for broader consequences of starting even a limited conflict. The recent aerial spat showed us the importance of international and internal credibility when engaging in a conflict. And also, Musharraf and his close aides chose not to consult other arms of the military and the civilian government, the trade off for secrecy might have been that scenarios that involved significant escalation and diplomatic pressure mixed in were not wargamed.
I think that in the right conditions, with the necessary credibility, or at least a well thought out plan for managing escalation, another kind of Kargil conflict could have been a major success.
A basic problem with Kargil conflict is that most of us are unaware of the military and political objectives which were set as parameters to declare it successful. Unless those are known, our analysis of the tactical level performance or higher level leadership will be in vain.
We all enjoy the benefit of hindsight while discussing past operations, that may be kept in mind. This makes our task much easier while discussing anything. Its always easier to pass a judgement this way.
not only tangdhar but keran too is like a chicken neck in enemy hands.
when we had the chance.we were going in kargil we should have taken zojila pass.
that would’ve have checkmated indians
they were given free hand to bring in boffors.
if u were in that time wht moves u would take
I, based on my limited experience, always fail to understand the importance of FH-77 Bofors once Kargil is being discussed. It is nothing special, a normal artillery piece. Its extended range was of no use since the conflict dictated that artillery was already being fired over open sights, or direct fire. Rest it fired normal artillery shells which had the same effect as that of a normal artillery gun of its calibre. For Tiger Hill, Indians conducted a 200-gun pre-attack bombardment, followed by a Brigade level attack....even then what odds 8 Sikh, 18 Grenadiers and 2 Naga faced against a small body of NLI troops is pretty evident.
Do please keep in view the exact location of Zoji La pass vis a vis LOC, along with the indian deployments in the area. Its not that easy to reach Zoji La undetected.
A basic problem with Kargil conflict is that most of us are unaware of the military and political objectives which were set as parameters to declare it successful. Unless those are known, our analysis of the tactical level performance or higher level leadership will be in vain.
We all enjoy the benefit of hindsight while discussing past operations, that may be kept in mind. This makes our task much easier while discussing anything. Its always easier to pass a judgement this way.
I, based on my limited experience, always fail to understand the importance of FH-77 Bofors once Kargil is being discussed. It is nothing special, a normal artillery piece. Its extended range was of no use since the conflict dictated that artillery was already being fired over open sights, or direct fire. Rest it fired normal artillery shells which had the same effect as that of a 130 mm gun or IFG.
Do please keep in view the exact location of Zoji La pass vis a vis LOC, along with the indian deployments in the area. Its not that easy to reach Zoji La undetected.
@diligence
With all due respect, I think Kargil operation - starting right from its planning and then execution - was a flawed one. However, looking at it purely from a commander's point of view, it was an excellent plan – over-scoped though to suitably fit at a tactical level. It was a strategic move in all its nature, scope, and consequences. Musharraf failed in realizing that. The capturing of vital peaks and surrounding areas was executed perfectly. But the planning for a sustained hold on those peaks was either non-existing or insufficient. Such a devastating blow to the enemy, it must have been taken into account at the planning level, would certainly invite trouble because the shocked and helpless enemy would certainly expand the scope of operation both at military and diplomatic levels. But we Pakistanis failed to foresee that and hence you see neither all armed services nor the civilian government was onboard before or during the execution of that operation. Nations are required to define and follow a cohesive strategy to push such an operation to the success. But in this case, the civilian leadership was found unaware, least of all being prepared and willing, to effectively provide necessary diplomatic cover and required operational synergy to the operation. On top of that, the erroneous strategy of disowning the occupants on those peaks (calling them merely freedom fighters) badly tied the hands of state of Pakistan. As a result, how then you could deploy, for example, the PAF in support of the occupants to counter IOF sorties? How you could deploy regular army troops to secure the bases/foothills of those peaks to ensure a continued supply of men and material to the force stationed on the peaks? How could the civilian government could openly support the operation when it was launched by freedom fighters (that can easily be portrayed by the enemy as terrorists)? More than that, how the civilian government could resist international blackmailing and pressure launched by world powers (because Pakistan was perceived as an aggressor party - qualon key dallali main moonh kala - our men were being killed by enemy precision bombing on the peaks and we were being labeled as aggressors and could only see that helplessly). For the first time in my life, I heard this silly term of ‘sanctity of LoC’, the same LoC that has been consistently breached by Indians over not years but rather for decades. Yes, we still have a handful of peaks in our control but the operation caused more overall damage and incurred more cost to us than any benefits we reaped. In my opinion, it's not the case that we were not capable of retaining those peaks. Far from that, we had the military capability to achieve that. The prime reason for our failure to achieve that was a flawed planning. It was a failure of the planners to realistically analyze the enemy response and get fully prepared for effectively dealing and defeating the enemy response. The bottom line is that both the civilian government and military (including all three services) must be on the same page before such an operation is launched. You need months of prior diplomatic work to prepare a suitable environment for the time that is in sync with the actual launching of the military operation. We were sadly missing that part. False and self-deceptive narratives of putting all blame on the then civilian government is going to serve no national interest of ours. I believe it's rather harmful.
As far as planning is concerned, the objectives, their retainability and sustainability were all within limits if we had gone as per the ORIGINAL plan. If we would have stuck to the original plan, Indian response would not have been that big, and the scope of operation from both sides would have been within our acceptable limits.
You are right, disowning own troops is always detrimental to morale.
PAF support was originally not required as per the original plan.
Again, supply should not have been a problem if we would have followed the original plan.
You are also right that in the end, this operation did more damage to us than of any use.
You are also right that pre-hostilities diplomatic moves were missing which could have complemented our efforts.
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Cmon gentlemen, instead of discussing Kargil War in this thread (we can do it in its own thread) lets discuss our leaders, for this is what this thread is all about.
Leaders are not found in higher echelons, Pakistan Army has exemplary examples of leaders at all levels till General Officers. Just some examples (some, not all)
Gen Iftikhar
Gen Tajammal
Gen Bokhari (as Brigadier in FCNA)
Brigadier Ameer Hamza (105 Brigade)
Lt Col Raja Akram, FF
Lt Col Sultan, 31 Baluch
Brigadier Hayat, 107 Brigade, 1971
Gen A O Mitha
Gen Abrar, GOC 6 Armored Division
Gen Akhtar Malik
Brig Nisar, 25 Cavalry, Chengez Force
Brig Amjad Chaudhary
Brif A R Shami
our NH recipients
Capt Iqbal, SSG
Maj, later Brigadier Abdul Rehman, SSG
Brig T M
Above names may not be even 1% of our heroes, and then these are only from Army, we have many heroes from PAF and PN as well.....
Then, again, thousands of examples from the last two decades in our fight against terrorists.