LCA MK2 a disaster waiting to happen!

[Su-11]

A Better Alternative
Before Tejas Mk II is brought in, experts should weigh all the pros and cons

By Air Cmde. (retd.) Parvez Khokhar

Now that sounds coming from the ministry of defence (MoD) and Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) seem to be suggesting that the Tejas Mk I is just around the corner, the focus seems to be shifting to the Tejas Mk II. This variant appears to be gathering momentum in the eyes of clairvoyant chair-borne pundits, who profess that this will be the panacea for all the ills that beset the indigenous aircraft industry and will also address the desire of the Indian Air Force (IAF) to have a super-duper fighter.

ADA and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) have even widely publicised a time schedule for the induction of this aircraft (too fictional to be mentioned). The granting of permission by the MoD to commence this project and its acceptance by the IAF by placing some initial orders, is not in the public domain. In order to take an educated decision on what the Mk II aims to be and the challenges involved therein, it is imperative to comprehend the facts, as they exist today.

ADA and HAL have made public statements that work on the airframe will begin by end 2013. Whilst it is apparent that the qualities envisaged in the Mk II are all commendable, they require a closer examination to comprehend the challenges involved in reaching this target without unacceptable time and cost overruns. So what are the major changes envisaged in the Mk II in order to be a quantum leap over the Mk I?

These are: More powerful engine F-414-GE-INS6; New Flight Control Computer; Upgraded avionics; Retractable In Flight Refuelling probe; On Board Oxygen Generating system (OBOGS); AESA radar; Cockpit upgrade; New Electronic Warfare(EW) suite; and Ability to super cruise (fly supersonic in level flight in dry power).

These changes will lend value throughHigher thrust; More ordnance carrying capacity; Better avionics; Longer endurance with On Board Oxygen Generating System (OBOGS); State-of-the-art radar; Better man-machine interface and situational awareness through larger displays in the cockpit and easier management drills; and Better survivability through better EW suites. This factor will also enhance the operational performance.

ADA’s contention that all this can be done within two years is based on the example of the Swedish Gripen NG (called Gripen E for in-service usage). ADA has also sought guidance through consultancy from Saab for the Mk II. Before proceeding further, we need to factor in some extremely relevant points, otherwise this comparison becomes rather odious.

• The Gripen E is an off-shoot of the highly successful Gripen A/B/C/D. The Tejas Mk I is yet to enter service.

• Saab has over 75-year-old history of design and development of fighter aircraft vis-a-vis ADA/HAL’s nascent experience in producing fighter aircraft.

• ADA’s record of non-adherence to consultants’ recommendations, especially when it runs against their grain and involves redoing certain aspects of work, is well known.

• Then there are consultants who merely review your work and either tell you that it is okay or withhold comments that may rock the boat. It is to be seen how much Saab would be involved; ADA should be absolutely clear that Saab will neither build/design this aircraft for them nor give them a blueprint to follow.

Let us take a cursory glance at the summary of how Saab went about making the Gripen E, which has fairly similar improvements as envisaged for the Tejas MK II. The stated aims of the Gripen E were: Increased thrust; Decision support; Sensor fusion; Superior HMI; Improved communication; More weapon stations; Superior target acquisition; Airframe upgrades; External sensors; General systems upgrade; New avionics architecture; and Electronic Warfare

These changes led the demonstrator aircraft (the NGs) to achieve the following:Enhanced range; Morepayload; New sensor suite/weapons/electronic countermeasures; Engine with higher thrust; AESAradar; New avionics system; More internal fuel; and Super cruise ability. This also permitted reduced cost and lead time by 60 per cent, thanks to new processes and new supplier strategy (very significant in the Indian context).

The programme followed a time-bound schedule that went through the following steps:

• Early 2006: Demonstrator development started in Saab with the aim to fly in 2008

• 27 May 2008: Maiden flight of the Demonstrator(NG). This segment of the test programme was concluded in only 79 test flights with the new engine (414), larger internal fuel tank and more pylons (increased payload).

• 27 October 2009: Introduced AESA (limited version), MAW and SATCOM. Flown and tested in 73 flights including flights with a larger drop tank. Next step planned was to introduce new avionics.

• By 19 December 2012 the demo aircraft had accumulated over 250 hours.

• 15 July 2013: Saab started the assembly of the Next Generation Gripen, the Gripen E. First to be constructed is the front fuselage of the first pre-production test aircraft 39-8.

• 15 August 2013: Saab claimed they reduced cost and lead time by 60 per cent, thanks to new processes and new supplier strategy

• 2018: Delivery of first Gripen E planned for the Swedish Air Force. Saab managed the weight issue rather cleverly through extensive use of aluminium alloys and composites for the airframe. The major lesson that this remarkable programme brought was that it is extremely important to work with the customer to achieve success in record time.

Challenges for the Tejas Mk II

ADA has certainly conducted some studies on this subject, but the extent to which they have proceeded and the results achieved are shrouded in secrecy. Educated guesses from within ADA vary from the ‘let’s see how it goes’ to the more horrifying prospect that it may do ‘less than the MK I’. The latter view seems to justify ADA’s reluctance to even part with the projected improved performance figures. Remember, unlike the Gripen E, the Tejas Mk II will first have to contend with the shortcomings and flaws that it will inherit from the Mk I. These include:

• Weight reduction;

• New engine F414 fitment requirements;

• Re-design of air intakes;

• Better cooling of the avionics bay;

• Estate management of ancillaries fitted around the engine to facilitate a swift engine change (Gripen engine change takes 33 minutes); and

• Brakes

These are only representative and by no means, exhaustive. Corrective measures for all shortfalls will have to be addressed along with the challenges that the new design will throw up.

The new design features would include modification of the fuselage to accommodate the larger and heavier F414 engine. This would entail lengthening the fuselage, strengthening the fuselage and redesigning the contours. More thrust being produced by this engine (35 per cent more than the F404) means more fuel consumed and hence, the necessity for larger capacity fuel tanks. The obvious penalty would be in adding more weight, changing the area ruling (contours of the fuselage) which would increase the drag index, thereby negating some of the advantages of having a more powerful engine. The addition of more weight would be counter-productive. However, some saving grace could be sought from redistribution of segments of the avionics components/LRUs and those of the new radar to get rid of the 200kg ballast that is carried in the nose bay to keep the centre of gravity within limits, an unheard of solution in good modern day fighters, only exception being Chinese fighters.

The air intakes would have to be redesigned to ensure full benefit is derived from the new engine. This is one area that ADA has shied away from doing for decades. It is both understandable and acceptable that they lack expertise in this area, but it has to be addressed, so why not get specialist help for this.

Fool-proof cooling of the avionics bay is a safety requirement, since this area houses much sensitive equipment, including the four channel cards for the quadruple fly-by-wire system of the Digital Flight Control Computer, which, if affected by thermal transfer due to inadequate cooling, can have disastrous consequences. The quadruple control system will come to naught if all four systems fail in quick succession. Other sensitive equipment can also get degraded and thereby, jeopardise mission accomplishment.

Maintenance practices in the Tejas are probably among the most primitive in this class of aircraft and certainly not conducive to operational efficiency. The Gripen requires all of 33 minutes to replace the engine. The Tejas takes a couple of days because of poor estate management of ancillary connections on the engine. With a Hot Refuelling (engine running after landing) and rearming with air-to-air missiles, the Gripen is back in the air in 22 minutes. Hot refueling is not permitted by Indian Oil, who seems to dictate the Tejas operational efficiency. The IAF could circumvent this issue by getting their own refuellers that are manned by IAF personnel. (I wonder whether Indian Oil is aware that air to air refueling does not require the engines to be shut down in the air! So much for their safety practices).

There are a host of other issues that have been swept under the table ever since the first aircraft was designed and manufactured. Unless each one of them is addressed, their ghost will always return to haunt this programme.

So, how does this translate into time required and cost involved?ADA has no clue and that is a charitable observation. Having been brought up for decades on self-delusion, delays and cost overruns, that have always been condoned, they no longer acknowledge the word ‘accountability’. HAL keenly aids and abets this philosophy. Before the ‘go-ahead’ is given to this project, a complete feasibility report must be produced by the two Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), clearly stating the aim of this exercise, with details of changes planned, the improved performance that would accrue and realistic timelines, plus costs.

It would not be out of place, based on past performance, to state that performance, costs and timelines will have to be critically examined and the casual figures bandied about by non-involved individuals/bodies must be totally ignored. If the Gripen E, with Saab’s extensive experience, is realistically pitched at 12 years from conception to manufacture to delivery of first aircraft to the Swedish Air Force, it would behove ADA/HAL to add on a few more years to the Tejas Mk II. At a conservative estimate of 16 years (your guess is as good as mine), does this version of the aircraft really add value to the IAF, when it would have already inducted the fifth generation aircraft?

A Viable Alternative

The rationale of making the Tejas MK II is centred around the Indian Navy’s requirement of having a greater initial acceleration for deck operations. Hence, the choice of a more powerful and bigger engine, the F414. The IAF has piggybacked on this solution since it promises a greater all round performance.

The navy’s requirement is well focused on the engine, though they would not be reluctant to avail of any other benefit that this aircraft would bring as a bonus. The IAF’s configuration for the MK II, though discussed internally, is still not frozen. Therefore, to consider a viable alternative is not too late.Give a serious thought to modifying the Mk I with all the changes envisaged for the Mk II, other than the engine change. The only major challenge is to redesign the air intakes to ensure optimum pressure recovery. The rest would entail only modifications and improvements.

The question that comes up is whether a serious study has been done to explore this alternative. It would not need rocket science to presume that the time, effort and money required to do this would be far less than design and development of a ‘new’ aircraft. Whether this version is called theMK IAor Mk II is of no consequence, since such nomenclature is pure semantics.

The prime focus will have to be on ensuring that the rated thrust is allowed to be produced by the engine. The Swedish version of the F404 is the RM 12, made by Volvo. Some tweaking by Volvo has enhanced the dry thrust from 49.9 kN to 54kN and in the after burner regime, from 78.7kN to 80.5kN. It has also strengthened fan modules to withstand bird strikes. The F404-IN-20 also incorporates these modifications, but the Tejas Mk I intake design does not allow this full thrust to be built up. Hence, it is mandatory to redesign the intakes. Both the Gripen and the older version of the F-18 have air intakes that permit optimum pressure recovery. Can ADA not consult both Saab and Boeing to overcome this problem?

The other unresolved issues that have defied a solution are not because of ADA’s capability, but their reluctance to address them, since it is far easier to sweep them under the carpet, to be looked at later. ‘Later’ has arrived now and procrastination cannot be condoned any further. The work force, which is familiar with the MK I and is relatively unoccupied, can now be gainfully diverted to carrying out structural and other reviews to resolve pending issues, instead of waiting to tackle the MK II, as and when it emerges.

Will this avatar of the Tejas meet the requirements of the Indian Navy? Has ADA measured what the static thrust of the engine is in the MK I as of now and determined how short it falls of the manufacturer’s figure? Unless that is known, how can we aim to achieve the latter? A comprehensive study would provide the answer. In the event that the enhanced initial thrust still falls short of the navy’s requirement, the F 414 may be the only answer, but not in the form that ADA envisages the Tejas Mk II. Before giving a ‘green light’ to the Tejas Mk II, a transparent study of the enhanced performance, with specific facts and figures, along with a realistic timeframe and cost, must be scrutinised by a competent body of the users (IAF and IN) and financial wizards, lest the taxpayers money is again squandered away. Is anyone listening?


Subscribers only - From Force Magazine

 

[Shankranthi]

Typical IAF ex-Chief Bull$hit.

Instead of focusing on his area of expertise and telling us how IAF can help in the development of Mk-II, he is offering condescending advice to ADA how to build an aircraft.

Everybody wants to offer 'expert opinions' and pretend to be experts. The only people who are not considered experts are people who are actually designing and building the aircraft.

He would have had a lot more credibility if he had applied his mind and had informed us what role IAF can play in the program. Instead he has applied his ego and has become a self proclaimed expert. God save us from such experts. All talk and no walk.

So the answer to him is, No, nobody is listening (to you).

 

[gslv mk3]

^^Thats what I wanted to say too...

@Gessler @GR!FF!N @S-DUCT @BlueDot_in_Space

Your views please...

 

[BlueDot_in_Space]

Typical IAF ex-Chief Bull$hit.

Instead of focusing on his area of expertise and telling us how IAF can help in the development of Mk-II, he is offering condescending advice to ADA how to build an aircraft.

Everybody wants to offer 'expert opinions' and pretend to be experts. The only people who are not considered experts are people who are actually designing and building the aircraft.

He would have had a lot more credibility if he had applied his mind and had informed us what role IAF can play in the program. Instead he has applied his ego and has become a self proclaimed expert. God save us from such experts. All talk and no walk.

So the answer to him is, No, nobody is listening (to you).

This guy should be made aware that its IAF that jumped on to the Tejas MK2 bandwagon when ADA proposed the variant to Navy as per navy's requirement.

Tejas MK1 is more than enough to full fill the IAF requirements. But accepting that will mean stabilizing Tejas mk1 design and inducting it in large numbers which in turn will cause diarrhea to many top ranking officers of IAF because they will loose on prospect of being consultants to foreign arms manufacturers. We recently saw our IAF chief browne with this diarrhea attack when he was complaining about the delay in VVIP chopper deal.

IA and IAF strategy: The only way to keep the indigenous product from being inducted in large numbers is to keep changing the goal post.

 

[gslv mk3]

This guy should be made aware that its IAF that jumped on to the Tejas MK2 bandwagon when ADA proposed the variant to Navy as per navy's requirement. Tejas MK1 is more than enough to full fill the IAF requirements.

Mate I would love to hear your opinion from you.

Is LCA an overweight fighter as claimed by our media?Is it incapable of AoA greater than 22 degrees ?And is it less manueverable ?

 

[SpArK]

A well thought facts based article.

 

[shiv]

why dont we push Tejas MK1 to service ? maybe not active duty but one or two squadrons wont harm ?

 

[Gessler]

The article doesn't have much to say except the usual cancel-all-that's-happening-and-begin-doing-everything-from-start BS. The problem with most such article writers is their inability to accept the facts as they are. They suggest that we discard the realistic options and climb onto something totally bizarre and costly.

And even if we do listen to their plans, after a while someone else will come and say that what we did was completely wrong, and bring in their own suggestions like 'we should have done that' type of BS.

I say, Tejas Mk-1 and Mk-2 are indisputably wanted by the IAF.

 

[Srinivas]

A well thought facts based article.

LCA mark 2 is approved after pausing AMCA, the points in the article are valid but when compared to AMCA and LCA mark 2 , LCA mark 2 is the right decision to go with.

It is better to upgrade the existing fighter to 4.5 or 5th gen than building entirely a new fighter.

Most of the technologies will be derived from PAK-FA so no problem for advancements of technologies.

I think HAL and ADA are planning to incorporate some degree of stealth to the LCA mark 2.

 

[janon]

The article doesn't have much to say except the usual cancel-all-that's-happening-and-begin-doing-everything-from-start BS. The problem with most such article writers is their inability to accept the facts as they are. They suggest that we discard the realistic options and climb onto something totally bizarre and costly.
...

Actually it's quite the opposite. The writer is saying precisely the same as you - to keep things realistic. He is NOT saying cancel everything, he is saying that they should only aim for a few incremental changes in the Mk2. Make a mk1.5 instead of a Mk2, because as things are planned right now, Mk2 is almost an entirely different aircraft. I will quote the relevant part, where he suggests a "viable alternative":

Give a serious thought to modifying the Mk I with all the changes envisaged for the Mk II, other than the engine change. The only major challenge is to redesign the air intakes to ensure optimum pressure recovery. The rest would entail only modifications and improvements.

The question that comes up is whether a serious study has been done to explore this alternative. It would not need rocket science to presume that the time, effort and money required to do this would be far less than design and development of a ‘new’ aircraft. Whether this version is called theMK IAor Mk II is of no consequence, since such nomenclature is pure semantics.

In other words, go for small incremental upgrades, instead of major redesigning. And keep the timelines realistic, instead of claiming that such a vastly redesigned Mk2 will fly by 2014 - any sane person can see that that is unrealistic.

This article makes perfect sense.

 

[acetophenol]

Maintenance practices in the Tejas are probably among the most primitive in this class of aircraft and certainly not conducive to operational efficiency. The Gripen requires all of 33 minutes to replace the engine. The Tejas takes a couple of days because of poor estate management of ancillary connections on the engine. With a Hot Refuelling (engine running after landing) and rearming with air-to-air missiles, the Gripen is back in the air in 22 minutes. Hot refueling is not permitted by Indian Oil, who seems to dictate the Tejas operational efficiency. The IAF could circumvent this issue by getting their own refuellers that are manned by IAF personnel. (I wonder whether Indian Oil is aware that air to air refueling does not require the engines to be shut down in the air! So much for their safety practices).


Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian...k2-disaster-waiting-happen.html#ixzz2hcVDJlRm

that part really worries me

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Typical IAF ex-Chief Bull$hit.

Instead of focusing on his area of expertise and telling us how IAF can help in the development of Mk-II, he is offering condescending advice to ADA how to build an aircraft.

Everybody wants to offer 'expert opinions' and pretend to be experts. The only people who are not considered experts are people who are actually designing and building the aircraft.

He would have had a lot more credibility if he had applied his mind and had informed us what role IAF can play in the program. Instead he has applied his ego and has become a self proclaimed expert. God save us from such experts. All talk and no walk.

So the answer to him is, No, nobody is listening (to you).

No; you are the guy drawing some erroneus conclusions (probably based on insufficient information) and therefore undermining your own credibility.

A/Cmde. Parvez Khokhar has the right credentials to write and to even question the "LCA Project". Since I know him; I need to tell you that he has been not only a FCL in the IAF but a trained Test-Pilot. During his IAF days he has been connected to both the TACDE and ASTE. Hence he has also been exposed to the LCA/Tejas Flight-Testing Regime. Probably, if anything; he has been a tad charitable in his write-up above.

Now to the "meat of the matter". The Tejas Program in its current iteration i.e. Mk.1 is both a success and a failure. The successes are quite well known and documented. Most notably in materials and in the FCS (though creating that was painful and slow). Now the failures- most notably wrt the power-plant. The over-optimism that ADA (and DRDO) brought to the Kaveri project was thoroughly belied and the outcome of that is well-known. But that failure impacted the aircraft's design in other ways too. Since the ADA had to end up with an "off the shelf" power-plant; the aircraft's intakes are not matched to the Engine. This has put a penalty on the Engine's performance. Will that be mitigated by a more powerful engine i.e. the GE-F414IN? I do not think so, just as Parvez Khokhar has mentioned. The ADA has arrived at the present design of the intakes after a great deal of exertion and it is certainly a complicated piece of work. But conceptually still mismatched. The lack of the radar that IAF wants (and needs) to have in the contemparenous scenario is also showing itself in other ways. In the use of ballast weight to maintain trim. Can that impact the aircraft's AOA parameters??

A/Cmdre. Parvez Khokhar writes about the time required for an "Engine Change'. That is accurate too. Why did that come about? Again, because the aircraft is flying with an Engine that was not part of the original design. So the associated plumbing is more complicated than it should be. Will all of that be open to re-design? He has also spoken about other issues wrt to maintenance, and all valid ones at that. An aircraft will undergo most of its maintenance with the 'end-user'; so it does not make sense to have to send it back to the Manufacturer every-time; do you get that? Think about why Sulur has been chosen as the airfield to raise the first squadron and not Leh or Jaisalmer.

Then there is the archaic practice of not permitting "hot refuelling"! Only because the Fuel Supplier's safety Regns. do not permit it?

Yes; I do believe that the IAF should have had in place a 'Design Bureau' to oversee the Design, just as the IN has had a CNC (now DND) to lead the Design process. But that did not happen for two reasons: the DRDO did not allow it and the IAF did not insist on it. So the IAF confined itself to just issuing periodic ASRs. Not much good that is, in a "Design and Development" program.

Finally the AD is itself a "khichdi" organisation that was run by a designer Dr.K.Harinarayana who was less than required to manage the scope of such a project. About his capabilities as a Project Manager (remember that he is a Scientist) I will not say much; but it will not form the subject of a 'case-study' in any IIM.
And what was HAL's contribution to the whole design program? After all, they have been aircraft manufacturers all through their existence.

So in conclusion; your criticism of the original wrting @Shankranthi is misplaced and quite unfounded. If it was just a "knee-jerk reaction", then it can be allowed to pass. But if it was a considered opinion, then it is rather invalid.

p.s. A/Cmdre. Parvez Khokhar was never an IAF Chief. He just happened to be an excellent Pilot, well respected for his technical acumen.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

The article doesn't have much to say except the usual cancel-all-that's-happening-and-begin-doing-everything-from-start BS. The problem with most such article writers is their inability to accept the facts as they are. They suggest that we discard the realistic options and climb onto something totally bizarre and costly.

And even if we do listen to their plans, after a while someone else will come and say that what we did was completely wrong, and bring in their own suggestions like 'we should have done that' type of BS.

I say, Tejas Mk-1 and Mk-2 are indisputably wanted by the IAF.

Now, are you speaking (writing) as the IAF spokesperson?

 

[Shankranthi]

No; you are the guy drawing some erroneus conclusions (probably based on insufficient information) and therefore undermining your own credibility.

A/Cmde. Parvez Khokhar has the right credentials to write and to even question the "LCA Project". Since I know him; I need to tell you that he has been not only a FCL in the IAF but a trained Test-Pilot. During his IAF days he has been connected to both the TACDE and ASTE. Hence he has also been exposed to the LCA/Tejas Flight-Testing Regime. Probably, if anything; he has been a tad charitable in his write-up above.

Now to the "meat of the matter". The Tejas Program in its current iteration i.e. Mk.1 is both a success and a failure. The successes are quite well known and documented. Most notably in materials and in the FCS (though creating that was painful and slow). Now the failures- most notably wrt the power-plant. The over-optimism that ADA (and DRDO) brought to the Kaveri project was thoroughly belied and the outcome of that is well-known. But that failure impacted the aircraft's design in other ways too. Since the ADA had to end up with an "off the shelf" power-plant; the aircraft's intakes are not matched to the Engine. This has put a penalty on the Engine's performance. Will that be mitigated by a more powerful engine i.e. the GE-F414IN? I do not think so, just as Parvez Khokhar has mentioned. The ADA has arrived at the present design of the intakes after a great deal of exertion and it is certainly a complicated piece of work. But conceptually still mismatched. The lack of the radar that IAF wants (and needs) to have in the contemparenous scenario is also showing itself in other ways. In the use of ballast weight to maintain trim. Can that impact the aircraft's AOA parameters??

A/Cmdre. Parvez Khokhar writes about the time required for an "Engine Change'. That is accurate too. Why did that come about? Again, because the aircraft is flying with an Engine that was not part of the original design. So the associated plumbing is more complicated than it should be. Will all of that be open to re-design? He has also spoken about other issues wrt to maintenance, and all valid ones at that. An aircraft will undergo most of its maintenance with the 'end-user'; so it does not make sense to have to send it back to the Manufacturer every-time; do you get that? Think about why Sulur has been chosen as the airfield to raise the first squadron and not Leh or Jaisalmer.

Then there is the archaic practice of not permitting "hot refuelling"! Only because the Fuel Supplier's safety Regns. do not permit it?

Yes; I do believe that the IAF should have had in place a 'Design Bureau' to oversee the Design, just as the IN has had a CNC (now DND) to lead the Design process. But that did not happen for two reasons: the DRDO did not allow it and the IAF did not insist on it. So the IAF confined itself to just issuing periodic ASRs. Not much good that is, in a "Design and Development" program.

Finally the AD is itself a "khichdi" organisation that was run by a designer Dr.K.Harinarayana who was less than required to manage the scope of such a project. About his capabilities as a Project Manager (remember that he is a Scientist) I will not say much; but it will not form the subject of a 'case-study' in any IIM.
And what was HAL's contribution to the whole design program? After all, they have been aircraft manufacturers all through their existence.

So in conclusion; your criticism of the original wrting @Shankranthi is misplaced and quite unfounded. If it was just a "knee-jerk reaction", then it can be allowed to pass. But if it was a considered opinion, then it is rather invalid.

p.s. A/Cmdre. Parvez Khokhar was never an IAF Chief. He just happened to be an excellent Pilot, well respected for his technical acumen.

Parvez Khokhar is just stating the obvious which is know to most enthusiasts of LCA.

Old engine dint work, new engine brought in, Air frame not suitable, not enough power, newer engine, modification of airframe to accommodate that ...voila MK2.

Only valid input was about maintenance and that should have been addressed by IAF via requirements, Long before the specs. were frozen.

IAF is squarely responsible for not being part of the design bureau or design review. DRDO did the best it could under the circumstances. HAL too should have been part of the PDR, CDR, maybe it was. But it is always the buyers responsibility. IAF should have been the coordinating body insisting on bringing all the relevant partners into the picture. A responsibility they abdicated (for whatever reasons). Again they can learn a few lessons from IN.

ADA with no experience in developing such a complex program did a Fantastic job. Dr. Kota Harinarayana did a fantastic job with Program Management too. I don't know how much exp. you have in design & development, but it is not like normal Proj. Mgmt.

IIM will be lucky if they get to learn from such real life R&D project. Don't be so keen to dismiss their incredible effort.

Parvez Khokhar article brings nothing new into the debate except stating the obvious. No one knows what is the current status of the Mk2 so no one can really say when it will be ready, except for the people who are actually building it. Its as simple as that. No one else gets to have their say in it.

 

[livingdead]

The IAF guy has been quite charitable to the ADA and DRDO, both these entities are much worse. There should be gagging order on these research people, only claim that they can make are the ones certified by end user.