illusion8
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As the 50th anniversary year of China's 1962 invasion of India, 2012 ought to serve as a time of reflection on the lasting lessons of that attack. Given that the Year of the Dragon in Chinese astrology begins on Monday, 2012 holds significance for China's other neighbours too. After all, the declared intent of the 1962 war - "to teach a lesson" - was publicly restated in the 1979 Chinese aggression against Vietnam and appeared to guide Beijing's top-heavy response in the 2010 boat incident with Japan.
The 1962 war was a classic example of the fusion of strategic deception and military surprise, two enduring elements in China's strategy. Integral to deception is taking an opponent by surprise, as emphasized in Sun Tzu's Art of War. Communist China has been involved in the largest number of military conflicts in Asia. In all these conflicts, Chinese forces struck with no forewarning. Indeed, a 2010 Pentagon report points out that China has repeatedly carried out military pre-emption in the name of defence: in 1950, 1962, 1969 and 1979. According to the report, "The history of modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which China's leaders have claimed military pre-emption as a strategically defensive act." The 1974 seizure of Paracel Islands was another example of offense as defence.
The 1962 attack - justified as a defensive act by Beijing, which used Nehru's unguarded remarks ("our instructions are to free our territory") to brand India the aggressor - stands out for China's masterly blending of deception and surprise. The invasion, mounted from two separate fronts, caught India off guard. The "stab-in-the-back" was best summed up by Nehru, who told the nation that an "unscrupulous opponent" had returned "evil for good."
The aggression was cleverly planned and timed. It coincided with the start of the Cuban missile crisis, which put the Soviet Union and the US on the edge of a nuclear Armageddon. The very day the US lifted its quarantine of Cuba to end the crisis, China ceased its 32-day aggression against India. The cunning timing - just when global attention was focused on averting a nuclear catastrophe - ensured that India received no outside help.
The deception began much earlier, in keeping with its perceived utility in both peacetime and wartime. One example was Premier Zhou En-lai's 1960 New Delhi visit, during which he dangled the carrot of a border settlement without putting his money where his mouth was.
Of course, it didn't take much effort to trick the Indians, who had convinced themselves that by merely signing the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, they had bought peace with China. This agreement actually provided a perfect cover for China to initiate aggressive plans against India. It took a war humiliation for India to wake up to the reality that a nation can get peace only if it is able to defend peace.
Today, as part of its larger game of deception, China identifies Taiwan as the primary focus of its defence strategy. That is to divert international attention from its single-mindedness on achieving broader military goals. Taiwan serves metaphorically as a red carpet on which to invite all the bulls while Beijing busily seeks to accomplish bigger tasks.
If the countries around India have become battlegrounds for China's moves to encircle India, it is because Beijing heeds Sun Tzu's counsel: "Contain an adversary through the leverage of having made its neighbourhood hostile." Indeed, the more than three-decade-old border talks with India mesh well with China's use of strategic deception.
As long as the territorial status quo is not accepted, the possibility that the Chinese military will strike again cannot be ruled out. Manmohan Singh's emphatic statement in the Lok Sabha last month that "China will not attack India" thus seems more than gratuitous. Disturbingly, the more timorous Singh has been, the more belligerent China has become.
India needs to counter the asymmetrical capabilities China is fashioning to take an adversary by surprise. Its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, for example, are being designed to "shock and awe" in space. China is already waging a quiet cyber-war, as if to underscore its ability to sabotage vital infrastructure in wartime. Moreover, its military is developing a blitzkrieg approach to warfare: a surprise blitz will seek to stun, confound and overwhelm an opponent.
The lasting lesson of 1962 is that India must be ready to repulse any kind of attack, including by undercutting the aggressor where it is the weakest. Otherwise, China's Achilles' heel - Tibet - will become a stronger launch-pad for aggressive acts.
Lasting lesson of 1962: don’t be caught off-guard again - The Times of India
The 1962 war was a classic example of the fusion of strategic deception and military surprise, two enduring elements in China's strategy. Integral to deception is taking an opponent by surprise, as emphasized in Sun Tzu's Art of War. Communist China has been involved in the largest number of military conflicts in Asia. In all these conflicts, Chinese forces struck with no forewarning. Indeed, a 2010 Pentagon report points out that China has repeatedly carried out military pre-emption in the name of defence: in 1950, 1962, 1969 and 1979. According to the report, "The history of modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which China's leaders have claimed military pre-emption as a strategically defensive act." The 1974 seizure of Paracel Islands was another example of offense as defence.
The 1962 attack - justified as a defensive act by Beijing, which used Nehru's unguarded remarks ("our instructions are to free our territory") to brand India the aggressor - stands out for China's masterly blending of deception and surprise. The invasion, mounted from two separate fronts, caught India off guard. The "stab-in-the-back" was best summed up by Nehru, who told the nation that an "unscrupulous opponent" had returned "evil for good."
The aggression was cleverly planned and timed. It coincided with the start of the Cuban missile crisis, which put the Soviet Union and the US on the edge of a nuclear Armageddon. The very day the US lifted its quarantine of Cuba to end the crisis, China ceased its 32-day aggression against India. The cunning timing - just when global attention was focused on averting a nuclear catastrophe - ensured that India received no outside help.
The deception began much earlier, in keeping with its perceived utility in both peacetime and wartime. One example was Premier Zhou En-lai's 1960 New Delhi visit, during which he dangled the carrot of a border settlement without putting his money where his mouth was.
Of course, it didn't take much effort to trick the Indians, who had convinced themselves that by merely signing the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, they had bought peace with China. This agreement actually provided a perfect cover for China to initiate aggressive plans against India. It took a war humiliation for India to wake up to the reality that a nation can get peace only if it is able to defend peace.
Today, as part of its larger game of deception, China identifies Taiwan as the primary focus of its defence strategy. That is to divert international attention from its single-mindedness on achieving broader military goals. Taiwan serves metaphorically as a red carpet on which to invite all the bulls while Beijing busily seeks to accomplish bigger tasks.
If the countries around India have become battlegrounds for China's moves to encircle India, it is because Beijing heeds Sun Tzu's counsel: "Contain an adversary through the leverage of having made its neighbourhood hostile." Indeed, the more than three-decade-old border talks with India mesh well with China's use of strategic deception.
As long as the territorial status quo is not accepted, the possibility that the Chinese military will strike again cannot be ruled out. Manmohan Singh's emphatic statement in the Lok Sabha last month that "China will not attack India" thus seems more than gratuitous. Disturbingly, the more timorous Singh has been, the more belligerent China has become.
India needs to counter the asymmetrical capabilities China is fashioning to take an adversary by surprise. Its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, for example, are being designed to "shock and awe" in space. China is already waging a quiet cyber-war, as if to underscore its ability to sabotage vital infrastructure in wartime. Moreover, its military is developing a blitzkrieg approach to warfare: a surprise blitz will seek to stun, confound and overwhelm an opponent.
The lasting lesson of 1962 is that India must be ready to repulse any kind of attack, including by undercutting the aggressor where it is the weakest. Otherwise, China's Achilles' heel - Tibet - will become a stronger launch-pad for aggressive acts.
Lasting lesson of 1962: don’t be caught off-guard again - The Times of India
How is it being caught "off guard" when he deliberately started hostilities with us?
