I have a question for you Jungibaaz. Any war or conflict is based on certain assumptions. I see a pattern in the assumptions that Pakistani military as well as the Pakistani people tend to make for India.
1. That Indians, particularly Hindus, will not fight back or don't know how to fight
2. Indian military when given the first blow (tactical or otherwise) will start cowering and running away
These two assumptions led Pakistan to launch the 65 war with the famous quote of Pakistani Generals that is along the lines of 'Hindu if given the right blow will run away' and the assumptions made that India will not expand the theater of war from Kashmir (Loc) to IB. This is in context of Op. Gibraltar and India then expanding the war to IB (Lahore).
The same assumptions in '99. Musharraf famously wrote in his book that India 'over-reacted' in its response to Kargil. His plan was predicated on India submitting itself to Pakistani strategic and tactical design without fighting back. Kaiser Tufail in his blog and interview has worded it much better than I ever can.
Sentiments such as these are expressed by many, dare I say most, Pakistani people. It seems that there is relatively little feedback or learning loop on the sociological or psychological aspects from one war to the next. I'm curious to learn your views for why this is? Surely learning from each incident would only make Pakistani people and military more effective rather than less.
Caveat - in my view Pakistan military after 1999 seems to be dissociating from the above-mentioned assumptions and has become much more circumspect about the outcome of war. However, it seems the people are not there.
To satisfy the jingoes, I would also add that Indian people have certain assumptions on Pakistan as well. But the feedback loop seems to be relatively stronger and the Indian military seems much much more circumspect about war than their Pakistani counterparts.
Please feel free to correct me on if you feel my reading is not correct.
These observations are partially valid, but they're not always applicable, nor do they tell the whole story. And also, I can make some of the same observations of Indians when it comes to Pakistan that are similar and opposite to this. I've had to cut the end of this post short as it was getting too lengthy.
Let me just start by saying that these two wars and their triggers are complex, in fact, one might argue that to pin-point a single event/policy decision is simplistic and can therefore be wrongly used to assign all blame to that thing with prefaces the event. For example, one has to wonder whether Kargil would have ever occurred had India have not occupied Siachen in the past, whether the 65 war was inevitable or also heavily influenced by preceding actions on the LoC years before and the policies of Nehru's India in Kashmir. Similarly, viewing these things as just failures of leadership and policy owing entirely to perceived problems in national psyche is flawed as it is incomplete. And any discussion of all of the above without considering the political nature of underlying events and their inception, we're not going to obtain a good picture with which to draw any meaningful conclusions from.
IMHO, the whole us vs Hindu India, our people supposing ourselves more martially oriented etc is probably some small part of national psyche with some roots in history, as well as present day attitudes and cultures. I don't want to dig too deep into this subject as it uncovers a much broader underlying discussion that relates to Pakistani identity and its many sources and varying viewpoints that result thereof. The observations you have highlighted particularly lend themselves to a cultural reading of our history that partially involves more closely aligning ourselves to our religion, more cultural origins from the west, and many attempts to disassociate anthropomorphic origins of modern day Pakistanis as a people from other South Asians. Like I said, I won't speak too much as to why these sort of views exist, but I will say that they are not necessarily dominant.
On the other end of the spectrum there is a real recognition of the diversity of Pakistan, its origins as a south asian nation, common history with others etc. Again, brushing over the topic, I've discussed a little bit more in the past on this forum what I view is something lacking from Pakistanis' own understanding of their identity. Some of these result from natural insecurities that any new fledgling state might face, especially one that is multi-polar politically, multi-lingual and multi-ethnic as Pakistan is. Others issues developed over time, or rather the counter: an identity to assuage or take the place of those insecurities didn't formalise properly as it should have done over the decades
However, I would now add the caveats and possible counter-points that I said I would add to your analysis. I understand that you probably don't view those two observations of the views of Pakistanis as being the only reasons for the observed outcomes regarding 65 and Kargil, so I'm not dismissing your views as mere conjecture, I'll just add around them.
The first point is that to try and view what caused these policy failures merely through the lens of national psyche and its effects on policy is incomplete. The observations may be relevant but they do not describe all the causality at work behind the culmination of policy failure. I lay a lot of the blame for the triggers of ill-conceived conflicts at the feet of the political structure dominant in Pakistan. In both conflicts, we had dictators start the wars. I am aware that technically Musharraf wasn't a dictator at that time. But it doesn't matter to me to make the distinction. Pakistan's army chief's have been in the past and are still to this day more powerful than civilian leaders, and the army as an institution is far more powerful than the sum of the remaining civilian institutions. It is also largely unaccountable when it wants to be. I am demarcating this by saying the 'sum of remaining civilian institutions' because Pakistan's military establishment has never governed alone, hybrid regimes involved compliant and complicit civilians, and even in the various stages of 'democracy' in Pakistan are in fact hybrid regimes whereby the military and part of the civilian establishment together co-influence the democratic government of the time.
It is my opinion that governments that democratic structures and organisation allow for better decision making and planning, and full assessment of said decisions and their implications can be conducted, as compared to the whims of a man, or a group of a single clique. An example of this can be observed in Kargil, Musharraf's plan was tactically brilliant. We seized key strategic peaks cost-free, obtained commanding positions that if the conditions fit, could be easily held or would be traded at a much higher price.
But had his idea have been properly scrutinised by others, as happens in better political systems, he would have seen the deep flaws with regards to war-gaming possible escalation, the effects of international pressure, diplomatic efforts by us and the opposing side, the optics and international perception of such an action. Musharraf in addition to the above, did not even take in to confidence the majority of the army leadership, let alone other branches of the military, let alone the government. Hence he and his Gang of Four, all like-minded people, who were oblivious to the obvious risks that might have been pointed out by an observer with another perspective. In fact, worse than that, he ignored the already known flaws of the Kargil plan that were pointed out when it was first floated as an idea a decade before, and that plan was rejected on the basis of those flaws. This is what eventually led to those troops being left high and dry without proper support in the face of an onslaught, and Pakistan having to publicly back off when India escalated. So you must ask yourself how much of the blame for this poorly though-out Kargil plan are you going to assign solely to this supposed stereotype of cowardice of the enemy and their unwillingness to fight, I personally don't place as much.
