My-Analogous
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 9, 2009
- Messages
- 7,013
- Reaction score
- 2
- Country
- Location
Russian air Cheif checking up the JF 17 Thunder cockpit.
Something is cooking
JF-17 Thunder Multirole Fighter [Thread 5]
- Thread starter Jango
- Start date
- Status
Something is cooking
Side-Winder
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 17, 2013
- Messages
- 1,941
- Reaction score
- 19
- Country
- Location
Usman Ali 1999
FULL MEMBER
New Recruit
- Joined
- Jul 7, 2014
- Messages
- 11
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Thunder carrying some anti shipping missiles..
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
yea, he checking why they are having problem selling the MiG-29's
Well, they are not really. The Fulcrum is selling anyway.
Bratva
PDF THINK TANK: ANALYST
- Joined
- Jun 8, 2010
- Messages
- 13,832
- Reaction score
- 67
- Country
- Location
DrWatson775
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 26, 2011
- Messages
- 303
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Has anyone seen any other pictures of the Russian chief with the Thunder? Seems a bit odd him sitting there in the cockpit on him own with no one explaining or showing him anything. Could this be a photo-shop?
Its not a photoshop this happened, saw it on TV so a video of it is available as well.
Manticore
RETIRED MOD
- Joined
- Jan 18, 2009
- Messages
- 10,115
- Reaction score
- 114
- Country
- Location
Apr 2013
JF-17 Thunder - Information Pool | Page 32
99% of the info posted recently is old info posted earlier - had there been new info , it would have found its way in the info pool thread and bumped it up
Myth_buster_1
BANNED
- Joined
- Mar 17, 2008
- Messages
- 9,016
- Reaction score
- -1
- Country
- Location
104 is probably the oldest air frame with all sort of hours of flying and ground tests put on it.
Sulman Badshah
STAFF
- Joined
- Feb 22, 2014
- Messages
- 4,282
- Reaction score
- 34
- Country
- Location
It is old photo .. During russian Airforce chief visit to Pakistan
Flying Eagle
FULL MEMBER
New Recruit
- Joined
- Jul 8, 2014
- Messages
- 26
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
PAF BASE KAMRA
The SC
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 13, 2012
- Messages
- 32,233
- Reaction score
- 21
- Country
- Location
Would it be possible to produce some JF-17s as dedicated Tactical Electronic Warfare Aircrafts (TEWA)?
It is important and here is why:
------------------------------------------------------------
Tactical Electronic Warfare Aircraft In The Twenty-First Century
------------------------------------------------------------
[5.3] DECEPTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
* Since disruptive jamming tends to require large amounts of power, deception jamming tends to be more useful for defensive countermeasures systems. There are many deceptive jamming schemes and some are very ingenious.
The simple pulse repeater deception jammer has been mentioned. There are variations on the theme, such as "terrain bounce". As can be seen from watching a sunset on a beach, the flat surface of water reflects light well, and damp soil can similarly reflect radio waves. A terrain bounce jammer is a pulse repeater carried by low-flying aircraft that bounces the repeated pulses back at the ground at an angle, in hopes of persuading a missile to fly into the ground.
Terrain bounce is a form of "angle deception". Another form of angle deception is "sidelobe jamming", mentioned briefly in an earlier chapter. The idea is to pick up the transmission from a radar sidelobe, well off the boresight of the radar, and then ram a large return back down the sidelobe. The radar interprets the return as being on the mainlobe and so fails to lock onto the jammer source. Sidelobe jamming can be countered by adding a simple omnidirectional receiver antenna to the radar system; if the omnidirectional antenna detects a "true" return signal that is much more powerful than the one that the radar appears to be picking up, that's a big hint that sidelobe jamming is in progress.
Yet another angle deception scheme is known as "crosseye jamming". This involves fitting transmitter-receiver modules to each wingtip of an aircraft. In a typical scenario, the module on the left wingtip will receive a radar signal, shift it forward in phase, and pass it on to the module on the right wingtip to be transmitted back to the radar. At the same time, the module on the right wingtip will receive the same radar signal, shift it back in phase, and pass it on to the module in the left wingtip to be transmitted back to the radar. The phase-shifted signals will add up at the radar receiver to make the signal appear as if it came from some other direction -- it's much the same principle as used in a phased-array radar for electronic beam steering, except that the phase manipulation is being performed by the target. The crosseye jammer can slowly adjust the phase of the two return signals to "walk" the radar tracking off the aircraft.
* "Inverse gain jamming" or "inverse amplitude jamming" is an angle-deception technique used to disrupt tracking radars that use a sweeping procedure, such as the old nodding height-finder radars and conical scan radars. An RWR system will detect such radars from their cyclic fluctuation in intensity, and then will activate the inverse-gain jammer in response. The inverse gain jammer feeds back an enhanced return during the low-intensity part of the scan cycle and little or no additional return during the high-intensity part of the scan cycle. This fools the radar into either judging it has a lock on target when it doesn't, or doesn't have a lock on target when it does.
There are counter-countermeasures against inverse gain jamming. One is to use two antennas, one for transmit and one for receive, and only rotate the receive antenna to perform conical scan -- eliminating the telltale cyclic fluctuation of the transmit signal. This scheme is known as "conical scan on receive only (CSORO)" or more generally "Lobe On Receive Only (LORO)". An inverse gain jammer can counter this countermeasure to an extent by blindly generating its inverse-gain cycle and testing it to see if it forces the radar to break lock.
* There are also "range deception" techniques. The simple pulse repeater is an example of a range deception scheme, but there is a more sophisticated variation on the same theme, known as "range-gate pull-off (RGPO)". When an aircraft is illuminated by a range-tracking radar, the RGPO jammer initially acts like a radar transponder, picking up the radar pulse, amplifying it, and sending back immediately. This actually increases the magnitude of the return, which would seem counterproductive. However, the jammer is simply "setting up" the radar for a fall, using the strong echo to force the radar receiver's automatic gain control to reduce gain.
The RGPO jammer then emits a delayed pulse along with the instantaneous pulse, gradually increasing the power of the delayed pulse while pulling down the power of the instantaneous pulse down to zero. When this occurs, the radar remains locked on the delayed pulse, which is still powerful enough to ensure that the receiver's AGC remains set to a low level. Under such conditions, the radar will not notice the actual echo from the aircraft and, because of the strong delayed pulse, will not be able to correctly estimate the distance to the aircraft.
The jammer will then increase the pulse delay, making the aircraft seem even farther out of range. The jammer then switches off, leaving the radar with a broken target lock. If the radar tries to lock onto the aircraft again, the range deception jammer plays the same game once more. Radars can defeat this range deception game by varying PRF or pulse band, forcing the jammer to start over. Radars can also monitor the magnitude of the return, checking to see if the return seems to brighten excessively; if so, the radar can then track on the "leading edge" of the return, focusing on the actual return and ignoring the delayed pulse.
There is a similar "velocity gate pull-off" scheme that works much the same way, except that the frequency of the deception signal is adjusted instead of the time delay to give a false Doppler frequency for the target.
* One of the latest fads in defensive countermeasures is the "towed decoy". A towed decoy is a pulse repeater, containing a miniature TWT to echo radar signals tracking the aircraft, causing a radar-guided missile to home on the decoy. Signals and power are provided over the towline, and the assembly is cut loose with a "guillotine" assembly before landing.
The first to be used in action was the Raytheon "AN/ALE-50", which was towed behind B-1B bombers and F-16 fighters during the NATO Kosovo campaign in the Balkans in 1999. It worked so well that crews called it the "Little Buddy". It has been followed by the "AN/ALE-55" towed decoy, which uses a fiber-optic cable instead of an electrical cable. Other nations have now introduced towed decoys into service. Some pilots were dubious of towed decoys at first, but modern radar-guided AAMs and SAMs are hard to trick, and they can pull up to 40 gees in turns, making them impossible to outmaneuver.
Another interesting concept in modern deceptive countermeasures is to build a jammer system that actually sends an antiphase copy of the radar signal back at a radar receiver, with the antiphase signal mostly or completely eliminating the return echo, rendering the jammer platform invisible to radar. This is very tricky to do and it is unclear if any contemporary jammer systems can do it, but it may be a feature of some modern jammers whose details remain classified.
BACK_TO_TOP
[5.4] OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES / SEAD
* Offensive countermeasures systems tend to be more "brute force" than defensive countermeasures systems. Offensive jamming is generally based on high-power disruptive jamming schemes. The idea behind deception jamming is to make a platform seem to be something or somewhere it's not; in offensive jamming, concealing the jamming platform is not the objective, it's ensuring that other platforms can't be seen on radar. A dedicated jamming platform can commit large amounts of power to its disruptive jamming systems, giving them greater effectiveness.
Of course, disruptive jamming can also be used against communications signals, and in fact communications jamming well predates radar jamming. It is somewhat more difficult than radar jamming; jamming a radar means dealing with a relatively faint return trace, while jamming a communications channels means dealing with a strong direct transmitter channel. One trick is to feed back a voice conversation after a delay, resulting in an incoherent garble. In some cases, communications jamming is used in complement with radar jamming, in attempts to block channels used by ground controllers to communicate with interceptor aircraft.
If a jamming aircraft actually accompanies aircraft on strikes over defended airspace, it is a "penetration jammer". If it remains outside of defended airspace, it is a "standoff jammer".
The best-known Western offensive jamming aircraft is the Grumman "EA-6B Prowler". It carries a crew of four, features a built-in ELINT receiver system feeding a digital processor, and can be fitted with up to four AN/ALQ-99 jamming pods, each powered by a turbine spinner on the nose. One Prowler, it is said, could completely disrupt civilian radio and TV communications over the entire US East Coast. It is now being replaced by the Boeing "EA-18G Growler" ECM derivative of the Super Hornet fighter.
* There is a more drastic approach to dealing with enemy radars: destroy them, a scheme referred to as "Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)". The US found this an urgent need during the Vietnam War, leading to the development of two pieces of technology: a RHAWS, to detect, classify, and target radars, and an "antiradar missile (ARM)" to home in on the radar and destroy it. A series of "Wild Weasel" aircraft were fitted with a RHAWS and with ARMs to have it out with enemy radar sites. Once the radar was destroyed, the "blinded" air-defense site could be pounded with bombs.
The first US ARM to go into widespread operational service was the "AGM-45 Shrike", which was a Sparrow AAM with a radar seeking head. It was replaced by the current Western standard ARM, the "AGM-88 High-Speed Antiradiation Missile (HARM)", which is something like a scaled-up Shrike, with much improved systems. Shrikes had to be fitted with a different anti-radar seeker head before a mission, depending on what kind of radar they were intended to engage. A HARM is bigger, faster, and carries a single seeker that can home in on a wide range of radars. EA-6B Prowlers may carry HARMs along with their jamming equipment to provide a more aggressive antiradar capability.
HARM has been continually refined during the course of its service. HARM is likely to be eventually replaced by a "multimode" missile that can be used as an AAM, an ARM, or even a ground-attack missile, allowing an aircraft to carry a single class of missile to deal with different classes of threats and targets.
[5.0] Modern Electronic Countermeasures
It is important and here is why:
------------------------------------------------------------
Tactical Electronic Warfare Aircraft In The Twenty-First Century
------------------------------------------------------------
[5.3] DECEPTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
* Since disruptive jamming tends to require large amounts of power, deception jamming tends to be more useful for defensive countermeasures systems. There are many deceptive jamming schemes and some are very ingenious.
The simple pulse repeater deception jammer has been mentioned. There are variations on the theme, such as "terrain bounce". As can be seen from watching a sunset on a beach, the flat surface of water reflects light well, and damp soil can similarly reflect radio waves. A terrain bounce jammer is a pulse repeater carried by low-flying aircraft that bounces the repeated pulses back at the ground at an angle, in hopes of persuading a missile to fly into the ground.
Terrain bounce is a form of "angle deception". Another form of angle deception is "sidelobe jamming", mentioned briefly in an earlier chapter. The idea is to pick up the transmission from a radar sidelobe, well off the boresight of the radar, and then ram a large return back down the sidelobe. The radar interprets the return as being on the mainlobe and so fails to lock onto the jammer source. Sidelobe jamming can be countered by adding a simple omnidirectional receiver antenna to the radar system; if the omnidirectional antenna detects a "true" return signal that is much more powerful than the one that the radar appears to be picking up, that's a big hint that sidelobe jamming is in progress.
Yet another angle deception scheme is known as "crosseye jamming". This involves fitting transmitter-receiver modules to each wingtip of an aircraft. In a typical scenario, the module on the left wingtip will receive a radar signal, shift it forward in phase, and pass it on to the module on the right wingtip to be transmitted back to the radar. At the same time, the module on the right wingtip will receive the same radar signal, shift it back in phase, and pass it on to the module in the left wingtip to be transmitted back to the radar. The phase-shifted signals will add up at the radar receiver to make the signal appear as if it came from some other direction -- it's much the same principle as used in a phased-array radar for electronic beam steering, except that the phase manipulation is being performed by the target. The crosseye jammer can slowly adjust the phase of the two return signals to "walk" the radar tracking off the aircraft.
* "Inverse gain jamming" or "inverse amplitude jamming" is an angle-deception technique used to disrupt tracking radars that use a sweeping procedure, such as the old nodding height-finder radars and conical scan radars. An RWR system will detect such radars from their cyclic fluctuation in intensity, and then will activate the inverse-gain jammer in response. The inverse gain jammer feeds back an enhanced return during the low-intensity part of the scan cycle and little or no additional return during the high-intensity part of the scan cycle. This fools the radar into either judging it has a lock on target when it doesn't, or doesn't have a lock on target when it does.
There are counter-countermeasures against inverse gain jamming. One is to use two antennas, one for transmit and one for receive, and only rotate the receive antenna to perform conical scan -- eliminating the telltale cyclic fluctuation of the transmit signal. This scheme is known as "conical scan on receive only (CSORO)" or more generally "Lobe On Receive Only (LORO)". An inverse gain jammer can counter this countermeasure to an extent by blindly generating its inverse-gain cycle and testing it to see if it forces the radar to break lock.
* There are also "range deception" techniques. The simple pulse repeater is an example of a range deception scheme, but there is a more sophisticated variation on the same theme, known as "range-gate pull-off (RGPO)". When an aircraft is illuminated by a range-tracking radar, the RGPO jammer initially acts like a radar transponder, picking up the radar pulse, amplifying it, and sending back immediately. This actually increases the magnitude of the return, which would seem counterproductive. However, the jammer is simply "setting up" the radar for a fall, using the strong echo to force the radar receiver's automatic gain control to reduce gain.
The RGPO jammer then emits a delayed pulse along with the instantaneous pulse, gradually increasing the power of the delayed pulse while pulling down the power of the instantaneous pulse down to zero. When this occurs, the radar remains locked on the delayed pulse, which is still powerful enough to ensure that the receiver's AGC remains set to a low level. Under such conditions, the radar will not notice the actual echo from the aircraft and, because of the strong delayed pulse, will not be able to correctly estimate the distance to the aircraft.
The jammer will then increase the pulse delay, making the aircraft seem even farther out of range. The jammer then switches off, leaving the radar with a broken target lock. If the radar tries to lock onto the aircraft again, the range deception jammer plays the same game once more. Radars can defeat this range deception game by varying PRF or pulse band, forcing the jammer to start over. Radars can also monitor the magnitude of the return, checking to see if the return seems to brighten excessively; if so, the radar can then track on the "leading edge" of the return, focusing on the actual return and ignoring the delayed pulse.
There is a similar "velocity gate pull-off" scheme that works much the same way, except that the frequency of the deception signal is adjusted instead of the time delay to give a false Doppler frequency for the target.
* One of the latest fads in defensive countermeasures is the "towed decoy". A towed decoy is a pulse repeater, containing a miniature TWT to echo radar signals tracking the aircraft, causing a radar-guided missile to home on the decoy. Signals and power are provided over the towline, and the assembly is cut loose with a "guillotine" assembly before landing.
The first to be used in action was the Raytheon "AN/ALE-50", which was towed behind B-1B bombers and F-16 fighters during the NATO Kosovo campaign in the Balkans in 1999. It worked so well that crews called it the "Little Buddy". It has been followed by the "AN/ALE-55" towed decoy, which uses a fiber-optic cable instead of an electrical cable. Other nations have now introduced towed decoys into service. Some pilots were dubious of towed decoys at first, but modern radar-guided AAMs and SAMs are hard to trick, and they can pull up to 40 gees in turns, making them impossible to outmaneuver.
Another interesting concept in modern deceptive countermeasures is to build a jammer system that actually sends an antiphase copy of the radar signal back at a radar receiver, with the antiphase signal mostly or completely eliminating the return echo, rendering the jammer platform invisible to radar. This is very tricky to do and it is unclear if any contemporary jammer systems can do it, but it may be a feature of some modern jammers whose details remain classified.
BACK_TO_TOP
[5.4] OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES / SEAD
* Offensive countermeasures systems tend to be more "brute force" than defensive countermeasures systems. Offensive jamming is generally based on high-power disruptive jamming schemes. The idea behind deception jamming is to make a platform seem to be something or somewhere it's not; in offensive jamming, concealing the jamming platform is not the objective, it's ensuring that other platforms can't be seen on radar. A dedicated jamming platform can commit large amounts of power to its disruptive jamming systems, giving them greater effectiveness.
Of course, disruptive jamming can also be used against communications signals, and in fact communications jamming well predates radar jamming. It is somewhat more difficult than radar jamming; jamming a radar means dealing with a relatively faint return trace, while jamming a communications channels means dealing with a strong direct transmitter channel. One trick is to feed back a voice conversation after a delay, resulting in an incoherent garble. In some cases, communications jamming is used in complement with radar jamming, in attempts to block channels used by ground controllers to communicate with interceptor aircraft.
If a jamming aircraft actually accompanies aircraft on strikes over defended airspace, it is a "penetration jammer". If it remains outside of defended airspace, it is a "standoff jammer".
The best-known Western offensive jamming aircraft is the Grumman "EA-6B Prowler". It carries a crew of four, features a built-in ELINT receiver system feeding a digital processor, and can be fitted with up to four AN/ALQ-99 jamming pods, each powered by a turbine spinner on the nose. One Prowler, it is said, could completely disrupt civilian radio and TV communications over the entire US East Coast. It is now being replaced by the Boeing "EA-18G Growler" ECM derivative of the Super Hornet fighter.
* There is a more drastic approach to dealing with enemy radars: destroy them, a scheme referred to as "Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)". The US found this an urgent need during the Vietnam War, leading to the development of two pieces of technology: a RHAWS, to detect, classify, and target radars, and an "antiradar missile (ARM)" to home in on the radar and destroy it. A series of "Wild Weasel" aircraft were fitted with a RHAWS and with ARMs to have it out with enemy radar sites. Once the radar was destroyed, the "blinded" air-defense site could be pounded with bombs.
The first US ARM to go into widespread operational service was the "AGM-45 Shrike", which was a Sparrow AAM with a radar seeking head. It was replaced by the current Western standard ARM, the "AGM-88 High-Speed Antiradiation Missile (HARM)", which is something like a scaled-up Shrike, with much improved systems. Shrikes had to be fitted with a different anti-radar seeker head before a mission, depending on what kind of radar they were intended to engage. A HARM is bigger, faster, and carries a single seeker that can home in on a wide range of radars. EA-6B Prowlers may carry HARMs along with their jamming equipment to provide a more aggressive antiradar capability.
HARM has been continually refined during the course of its service. HARM is likely to be eventually replaced by a "multimode" missile that can be used as an AAM, an ARM, or even a ground-attack missile, allowing an aircraft to carry a single class of missile to deal with different classes of threats and targets.
[5.0] Modern Electronic Countermeasures
- Status
Similar threads
Latest posts
-
Imran Khan vs Pakistan: Protest of Treachery - Casualty Report- Latest: Pakistan Space Agency
-
-
-
Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts
-
Imran Khan vs Pakistan: Protest of Treachery - Casualty Report
- Latest: Pakistan Space Agency
-
-
-
-
Bajwa calls Bushra's allegations against Saudi Arabia 'baseless'
- Latest: Novus ordu seclorum
