Japan Defence Forum

[Aepsilons]

Maximum range using rocket-assisted ammunition is 13 km and maximum rate of fire is 6 to 10 rds/min for 3 minutes and sustained rate of fire is 2 to 3 rds/min.

Mon ami @Gabriel92 --- Mon Dieu! A range of 13 kms and up to 10 rounds per minute ? This is going to be perfect for overseas activity. This mortar system looks handsome, too.

 

[Moon]

I was always intrigued about the Kawasak OH-1.

From the mid-1980s the Japan Defence Agency (JDA), began to consider a successor to the OH-6D light helicopters currently in service with the Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force. It was decided to procure an indigenous type for the scout/reconnaissance roles. In 1992 Kawasaki was selected as prime contractor with 60 percent of the programme, the balance being allocated equally between Fuji and Mitsubishi. The three companies established the Observation Helicopter Engineering Team to develop the programme, on which detailed work began in 1992.

The resulting OH-1, nicknamed Ninja, is a conventional machine that is relatively small and of typical gunship helicopter configuration. Its structure comprises, by weight, 40 per cent carbonfibre-reinforced plastics, and it features a fenestron type tail rotor.

Each crew member has two LCD colour multi-function displays, and the gunner has a head-up display. The mission avionics include a trainable roof-mounted Kawasaki package (forward of the main rotor) with a Fujitsu thermal imager, NEC colour TV camera and NEC laser rangefinder. Protection is enhanced by the installation of an infra-red jammer on the helicopter's spine to rear of the main gearbox.

The first of six prototypes made its initial flight on 6 August 1996, and the first of a possible 150 to 200 OH-1s was delivered to the JGSDF on 24 January 2000. A total of 14 OH-1s has been ordered for delivery by 2001. The JDA may revise the OH-1 to meet its AH-X light attack helicopter requirement. This would probably feature MTR-390 or T800 engines, allowing the introduction of a heavier weapons load and revised mission avionics. The projected designation of the AH-X production model is AH-2.



Cockpit and avionics
The helicopter accommodates two crew in tandem configuration. The front and rear cockpits house a pilot and a weapons officer/observer. Access is provided through upward-opening on the starboard side. The bullet-proof glass on the cockpit provides all-round visibility for the crew. The cockpits are equipped with armour protection and shock-absorbing seats to enhance crew safety.

"The OH-1 can fly at a maximum speed of 270km/hr."
The pilot cockpit is equipped with multi-function LCD displays, a head-up display (HUD), dual Hands on Collective and Stick (HOCAS) controls and an auto-pilot system. The roof-mounted electro-optical sensor turret houses a Fujitsu forward looking infrared (FLIR), a colour TV camera, a laser range-finder and target designator.

Armament
The wing stub assemblies on either side of the fuselage house four hard-points carrying external stores of 132kg. The hard-points can be armed with a wide range of weapons including a combination of missiles, rocket pods, cannon pods and gun pods. The inner pylons can carry external fuel tanks for extended range.

Engines and landing gear
The OH-1 is powered by two Mitsubishi TS1-M-10 turboshaft engines. Each engine generates a power output of 884shp. The Full Authority Digital Electronics Control (FADEC) system controls the engines.

The non-retractable landing gear of OH-1 includes two main landing gear units extending from forward fuselage and one unit under tail rotor assembly. Each unit is fitted with a single wheel.

Performance
The OH-1 can fly at a maximum speed of 270km/hr. It has a cruising speed of 220km/hr. The service ceiling of the helicopter is 16,010ft. The helicopter has a maximum ferry range of 550km.

The prototype is actually exposed in a museum.

Its cockpit

@Nihonjin1051 Any videos/more infos ?

Man Pakistan ought to purchase these helis they are ideal for recon in counter terror operations instead of using Mirages for that role or the dusty Cobras.

 

[frequency]

Life in the Naval Aviation Corp --Ozuki Airbase.

I thought you guys eat only sushi? That picture make me hungry

 

[SvenSvensonov]

@Nihonjin1051 - two developments.

First, increased Japanese - Philippine defense cooperation:

From January 29-31, Philippine defense secretary Voltaire Gazmin paid a three-day visit to Japan where he led talks with his counterpart Gen. Nakatani to boost the defense relationship between the two countries.

Japan and the Philippines have a long relationship that extends beyond contemporary concerns about China. As I have noted previously, it was in Manila that former Japanese prime minister Takeo Fukuda delivered his famous “Fukuda Doctrine” speech in 1977, which heralded Tokyo’s new approach to Southeast Asia after the relationship had been marred by Japanese occupation during WWII. But while economics has long been a major part of the relationship, under Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and amid growing anxiety about Chinese actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea, both countries have been strengthening their defense ties under a strategic partnership inked in 2011.

The recent visit was another sign that the relationship between the two sides could grow closer still in this dimension. The list of proposed measures in their joint press statement, released on January 30 and seen byThe Diplomat, is ambitious. Yes, the two sides did brief each other on maritime security issues, which have brought them ever closer over the past few years. But they also signed a memorandum of understanding outlining specific steps to enhance defense cooperation and exchanges between their two defense ministries.

Some of the measures agreed upon include regular dialogues at the ministerial and vice-ministerial level as well as talks and visits by the various armed services, which will help further collaboration. But there was also mention of specific cooperative endeavors both bilaterally and with other partners. Japan would commence a capacity building project for the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, while both sides would also explore cooperation in defense equipment and technology. These are initiatives that could go beyond the transfer of ten patrol boats to the Philippines originally announced in 2013, particularly with reports that Manila had handed over a ‘military wish list’ of sorts to Tokyo to assist with its ongoing defense modernization.

More broadly, in a sign of the two countries working in other fora with like-minded partners, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force will work with the Philippine navy as fellow members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium to contribute to the development and implementation of the Code for Unplanned Sea Encounters at Sea. There is also indication of both countries being integrated as part of existing partnerships, with mention of working to make its air force part of the “Cope North Guam” exercises – a Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise. This would build conceptually on Japan’s previous participation — to varying degrees — in U.S.-Philippine bilateral exercises last year.

Of course, the jury is still out on how much of this will materialize in the coming months. But there is little doubt that both sides are keen on “elevating” their defense relationship, as the joint statement put it, with potentially significant changes for regional security.

Japan, Philippines Boost Defense Ties | The Diplomat

Second, it seems Okinawa's anti-US presence governor is being hammered by Tokyo and the LDP:

While the world focuses its attention on the impact the hostage crisis in the Middle East will have on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s attempts to prepare Japan for a more active security role in the world, nascent trouble is brewing much closer to the home islands. Ever since the anti-base candidate won the gubernatorial race in Okinawa, relations between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-controlled central government and the Ryukyu Islands have been contentious, to put it mildly. The LDP has reacted to the indigenous anti-base movement by slashing special funding for Okinawa, snubbing the newly elected governor during his trips to Tokyo, and proceeding with the relocation plans despite popular protests.

Takashi Onaga was elected governor of Okinawa on November 16, toppling the LDP-backed incumbent, Hirokazu Nakaima. Nakaima had supported Tokyo’s agreement with the U.S. to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan to the Henoko district of the city of Nago. Meanwhile, Onaga ran on an anti-base platform: he and his supporters believe that the burden of maintaining U.S. forces should be distributed more evenly throughout Japan. His victory, as well as the victory of all four candidates who opposed the relocation plan in the December 14 Lower House snap election, sends a loud and clear signal that Okinawans oppose the central government’s plan for their prefecture.

The LDP has used its structural advantage as the ruling party in the central government to respond swiftly and punitively. The special budget for Okinawa promotion has been slashed. In 2013, Abe’s government had earmarked 350.2 billion yen (about $2.9 billion) in its budget for the promotion of Okinawa in fiscal year 2014. This was even greater than the amount the office in charge of Okinawa promotion had requested. The government even went as far as to promise more than 300 billion yen every year until fiscal 2021. While this pledge has been upheld, the decrease to 334 billion yen in grants for fiscal 2015 – less than the 379.4 billion yen requested by the responsible Cabinet Office – is a telltale sign of LDP displeasure.

It is the first time in five years that subsidies for Okinawa have been reduced. These special subsidies, applied only to Okinawa, had been steadily increasing since 2010 (when Okinawa received 229.8 billion yen) in order to ameliorate local anger toward the U.S. military presence. Now Tokyo appears to have given up on buying off the Okinawans. The government’s shifting priority can be clearly seen in its decision to more than double the amount of money set aside in fiscal year 2015 for the Futenma relocation plan.

Onaga has also been snubbed on multiple occasions while trying to make overtures to the central government to discuss the base issue, as well as other issues important to the prefecture. When Onaga made a courtesy call to Tokyo in December, he was unable to meet most of the officials he requested meetings with, and could only meet with Shunichi Yamaguchi, the state minster in charge of Okinawa promotion. During his trip to Tokyo from January 6 to 8, he was not welcomed to the meeting to discuss the government’s budget for fiscal year 2015, and his request for a meeting with the agriculture minister Koya Nishikawa to discuss the central government’s grant for sugar cane was ignored. The only meeting he was able to attend was the National Governors’ Association meeting. Onaga went to Tokyo again on January 14 specifically to discuss the base issue, but was denied a meeting with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga. Onaga met with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kazuhiro Sugita instead.

Numerous LDP officials have made blatant remarks about refusing to meet Onaga because of his position on the base issue. One way that the LDP may try to alienate him even further is by requiring him to coordinate meeting requests through the LDP’s prefectural office. This in stark contrast to former Governor Nakaima, who coordinated talks directly with the government officials.

On the ground in Okinawa, protesters clashed with authorities on January 14 over the transfer of heavy machinery to the U.S. Marine Corps’ Camp Schwab, and again on January 15 as installation work began for a floating pier necessary for a drilling survey. The Japanese Coast Guard forcibly removed 19 protesters in kayaks from the water, while riot police clashed with more conventional opponents. In Tokyo, protesters encircled the Diet on January 25 until police removed them. Organizers of the protest, including pacifist groups, report that7,000 people participated.

A day later, Onaga pledged to convene a panel of experts to examine Nakaima’s approval for the landfill project in December 2013, and stated, “If the panel judges that the authorization has flaws, then I’d respect that conclusion as much as possible.” He continued, “Even if there are no flaws, my policy of not allowing a new base to be built in the Henoko district won’t change and I’d like to think about what to do.” On the same day, Okinawan Vice Governor Mitsuo Ageda visited the Defense Ministry’s Okinawa Defense Bureau in Kadena to meet with Director-General Kazunori Inoue and formally request the relocation work be temporarily suspended.

Yet preparations toward relocation continued unabated the very next day. Abe reiterated the government’s position on January 27: “The most important thing is to definitely avoid perpetuating the Futenma base, which is situated in the middle of an urban area. We will steadily carry out the relocation work while obtaining understanding from residents and ensuring safety.”

No one doubts that it is a good idea for Okinawan residents to close the base at Ginowan. But Abe’s promise to “[obtain] understanding from residents” sounds hollow when Abe and his party refuse to even meet with the people’s democratically and legitimately elected governor. The people had several opportunities to make a choice – with the November gubernatorial election and the December snap election – and the five-to-zero score for anti-base candidates leaves no ambiguity about what the people want. States do sometimes require sacrifices by their people in their pursuit of security; however, shutting down debate by refusing to even meet with the representative of dissenting opinions is not the way a democracy should comport itself.

Going forward, stay tuned to the outcome of Onaga’s special panel and other tactics Onaga might try, such as forestalling or at least suspending construction on the grounds of environmental concerns.

Tokyo Snubs Okinawa’s New Anti-Base Governor | The Diplomat

 

[Aepsilons]

@Nihonjin1051 - two developments.

First, increased Japanese - Philippine defense cooperation:

From January 29-31, Philippine defense secretary Voltaire Gazmin paid a three-day visit to Japan where he led talks with his counterpart Gen. Nakatani to boost the defense relationship between the two countries.

Japan and the Philippines have a long relationship that extends beyond contemporary concerns about China. As I have noted previously, it was in Manila that former Japanese prime minister Takeo Fukuda delivered his famous “Fukuda Doctrine” speech in 1977, which heralded Tokyo’s new approach to Southeast Asia after the relationship had been marred by Japanese occupation during WWII. But while economics has long been a major part of the relationship, under Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and amid growing anxiety about Chinese actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea, both countries have been strengthening their defense ties under a strategic partnership inked in 2011.

The recent visit was another sign that the relationship between the two sides could grow closer still in this dimension. The list of proposed measures in their joint press statement, released on January 30 and seen byThe Diplomat, is ambitious. Yes, the two sides did brief each other on maritime security issues, which have brought them ever closer over the past few years. But they also signed a memorandum of understanding outlining specific steps to enhance defense cooperation and exchanges between their two defense ministries.

Some of the measures agreed upon include regular dialogues at the ministerial and vice-ministerial level as well as talks and visits by the various armed services, which will help further collaboration. But there was also mention of specific cooperative endeavors both bilaterally and with other partners. Japan would commence a capacity building project for the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, while both sides would also explore cooperation in defense equipment and technology. These are initiatives that could go beyond the transfer of ten patrol boats to the Philippines originally announced in 2013, particularly with reports that Manila had handed over a ‘military wish list’ of sorts to Tokyo to assist with its ongoing defense modernization.

More broadly, in a sign of the two countries working in other fora with like-minded partners, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force will work with the Philippine navy as fellow members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium to contribute to the development and implementation of the Code for Unplanned Sea Encounters at Sea. There is also indication of both countries being integrated as part of existing partnerships, with mention of working to make its air force part of the “Cope North Guam” exercises – a Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise. This would build conceptually on Japan’s previous participation — to varying degrees — in U.S.-Philippine bilateral exercises last year.

Of course, the jury is still out on how much of this will materialize in the coming months. But there is little doubt that both sides are keen on “elevating” their defense relationship, as the joint statement put it, with potentially significant changes for regional security.

Japan, Philippines Boost Defense Ties | The Diplomat

Second, it seems Okinawa's anti-US presence governor is being hammered by Tokyo and the LDP:

While the world focuses its attention on the impact the hostage crisis in the Middle East will have on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s attempts to prepare Japan for a more active security role in the world, nascent trouble is brewing much closer to the home islands. Ever since the anti-base candidate won the gubernatorial race in Okinawa, relations between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-controlled central government and the Ryukyu Islands have been contentious, to put it mildly. The LDP has reacted to the indigenous anti-base movement by slashing special funding for Okinawa, snubbing the newly elected governor during his trips to Tokyo, and proceeding with the relocation plans despite popular protests.

Takashi Onaga was elected governor of Okinawa on November 16, toppling the LDP-backed incumbent, Hirokazu Nakaima. Nakaima had supported Tokyo’s agreement with the U.S. to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan to the Henoko district of the city of Nago. Meanwhile, Onaga ran on an anti-base platform: he and his supporters believe that the burden of maintaining U.S. forces should be distributed more evenly throughout Japan. His victory, as well as the victory of all four candidates who opposed the relocation plan in the December 14 Lower House snap election, sends a loud and clear signal that Okinawans oppose the central government’s plan for their prefecture.

The LDP has used its structural advantage as the ruling party in the central government to respond swiftly and punitively. The special budget for Okinawa promotion has been slashed. In 2013, Abe’s government had earmarked 350.2 billion yen (about $2.9 billion) in its budget for the promotion of Okinawa in fiscal year 2014. This was even greater than the amount the office in charge of Okinawa promotion had requested. The government even went as far as to promise more than 300 billion yen every year until fiscal 2021. While this pledge has been upheld, the decrease to 334 billion yen in grants for fiscal 2015 – less than the 379.4 billion yen requested by the responsible Cabinet Office – is a telltale sign of LDP displeasure.

It is the first time in five years that subsidies for Okinawa have been reduced. These special subsidies, applied only to Okinawa, had been steadily increasing since 2010 (when Okinawa received 229.8 billion yen) in order to ameliorate local anger toward the U.S. military presence. Now Tokyo appears to have given up on buying off the Okinawans. The government’s shifting priority can be clearly seen in its decision to more than double the amount of money set aside in fiscal year 2015 for the Futenma relocation plan.

Onaga has also been snubbed on multiple occasions while trying to make overtures to the central government to discuss the base issue, as well as other issues important to the prefecture. When Onaga made a courtesy call to Tokyo in December, he was unable to meet most of the officials he requested meetings with, and could only meet with Shunichi Yamaguchi, the state minster in charge of Okinawa promotion. During his trip to Tokyo from January 6 to 8, he was not welcomed to the meeting to discuss the government’s budget for fiscal year 2015, and his request for a meeting with the agriculture minister Koya Nishikawa to discuss the central government’s grant for sugar cane was ignored. The only meeting he was able to attend was the National Governors’ Association meeting. Onaga went to Tokyo again on January 14 specifically to discuss the base issue, but was denied a meeting with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga. Onaga met with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kazuhiro Sugita instead.

Numerous LDP officials have made blatant remarks about refusing to meet Onaga because of his position on the base issue. One way that the LDP may try to alienate him even further is by requiring him to coordinate meeting requests through the LDP’s prefectural office. This in stark contrast to former Governor Nakaima, who coordinated talks directly with the government officials.

On the ground in Okinawa, protesters clashed with authorities on January 14 over the transfer of heavy machinery to the U.S. Marine Corps’ Camp Schwab, and again on January 15 as installation work began for a floating pier necessary for a drilling survey. The Japanese Coast Guard forcibly removed 19 protesters in kayaks from the water, while riot police clashed with more conventional opponents. In Tokyo, protesters encircled the Diet on January 25 until police removed them. Organizers of the protest, including pacifist groups, report that7,000 people participated.

A day later, Onaga pledged to convene a panel of experts to examine Nakaima’s approval for the landfill project in December 2013, and stated, “If the panel judges that the authorization has flaws, then I’d respect that conclusion as much as possible.” He continued, “Even if there are no flaws, my policy of not allowing a new base to be built in the Henoko district won’t change and I’d like to think about what to do.” On the same day, Okinawan Vice Governor Mitsuo Ageda visited the Defense Ministry’s Okinawa Defense Bureau in Kadena to meet with Director-General Kazunori Inoue and formally request the relocation work be temporarily suspended.

Yet preparations toward relocation continued unabated the very next day. Abe reiterated the government’s position on January 27: “The most important thing is to definitely avoid perpetuating the Futenma base, which is situated in the middle of an urban area. We will steadily carry out the relocation work while obtaining understanding from residents and ensuring safety.”

No one doubts that it is a good idea for Okinawan residents to close the base at Ginowan. But Abe’s promise to “[obtain] understanding from residents” sounds hollow when Abe and his party refuse to even meet with the people’s democratically and legitimately elected governor. The people had several opportunities to make a choice – with the November gubernatorial election and the December snap election – and the five-to-zero score for anti-base candidates leaves no ambiguity about what the people want. States do sometimes require sacrifices by their people in their pursuit of security; however, shutting down debate by refusing to even meet with the representative of dissenting opinions is not the way a democracy should comport itself.

Going forward, stay tuned to the outcome of Onaga’s special panel and other tactics Onaga might try, such as forestalling or at least suspending construction on the grounds of environmental concerns.

Tokyo Snubs Okinawa’s New Anti-Base Governor | The Diplomat

@SvenSvensonov


In regards to the issue of Okinawa and the developing defense cooperation in Southeast Asia, notably the ones with Indonesia and the Philippines , Japan has a fraternal link to these countries. One character explains this --
悌-- and in light of this Fraternal relationship , Japan will expand on the already prominent cultural, economic and political cooperation -- to that of defense and strategic relationship.

Philippines and Indonesia -- are both part of the Malay Archipelago and due to the nature of their maritime domain -- present an opportunity for Japan to engage with them through greater naval cooperation and exercises. And I see this as a great step in stabilizing the Western Pacific and Asia.

 

[Hamartia Antidote]

Japan Plans To Acquire Global Hawks, Adding to Asia's Fleet


Japan Plans To Acquire Global Hawks, Adding to Asia's Fleet | Defense: Aviation International News

You really have to post a pic of somebody standing next to it to get the full WTF effect!

 

[Aepsilons]

Yes, the two sides did brief each other on maritime security issues, which have brought them ever closer over the past few years. But they also signed a memorandum of understanding outlining specific steps to enhance defense cooperation and exchanges between their two defense ministries.

This is only natural. I should note that the Philippines is important for Japan because there are over 120,000 Japanese nationals living in the Philippines, and an additional 12,000 working in the Philippines. There are over 1,300 Japanese businesses and projects in Philippines, making the Philippines the largest Japanese base in ASEAN. After the Philippines is Indonesia , and third is Thailand. So, what does this mean? It means that it is only natural for us to develop greater defense ties with the Philippines -- considering the significant Japanese footprint in the Philippine Economy.

 

[initial_d]

I h

@SvenSvensonov


In regards to the issue of Okinawa and the developing defense cooperation in Southeast Asia, notably the ones with Indonesia and the Philippines , Japan has a fraternal link to these countries. One character explains this --
悌-- and in light of this Fraternal relationship , Japan will expand on the already prominent cultural, economic and political cooperation -- to that of defense and strategic relationship.

Philippines and Indonesia -- are both part of the Malay Archipelago and due to the nature of their maritime domain -- present an opportunity for Japan to engage with them through greater naval cooperation and exercises. And I see this as a great step in stabilizing the Western Pacific and Asia.

I hope japan could sell its soryu class sub to indonesia.....

 

[Aepsilons]

You really have to post a pic of somebody standing next to it to get the full WTF effect!
View attachment 189887

She's a beauty, definitely. Can't wait to see these babies flying the Rising Sun...

I h

I hope japan could sell its soryu class sub to indonesia.....

You're the second Indonesian member to say that ! First was Ms. @madokafc ! haha !

 

[initial_d]

She's a beauty, definitely. Can't wait to see these babies flying the Rising Sun...



You're the second Indonesian member to say that ! First was Ms. @madokafc ! haha ![

She's a beauty, definitely. Can't wait to see these babies flying the Rising Sun...



You're the second Indonesian member to say that ! First was Ms. @madokafc ! haha !

Not just the soryu, we are interested in japanese radar too, its good that our two nation could cooperate more in military and defense, hopely japan could invest more in economic in indonesia rather than in china (we both know that china is a threat to our nation security)

 

[Hamartia Antidote]

Not just the soryu, we are interested in japanese radar too, its good that our two nation could cooperate more in military and defense, hopely japan could invest more in economic in indonesia rather than in china (we both know that china is a threat to our nation security)

I thought you guys were more worried about Australia? (Seems a bit of a misplaced worry to me. BTW Indonesia is #1 on theirs...and Japan is way down the list..even below Israel lol)

 

[initial_d]

I thought you guys were more worried about Australia? (Seems a bit of a misplaced worry to me)

We were not worry or fear of australia, australia doesnt have the capability to attack my country, but the chinese have.....that worry me, especialty that china has claimed most of south china sea

 

[Hamartia Antidote]

We were not worry or fear of australia, australia doesnt have the capability to attack my country, but the chinese have.....that worry me, especialty that china has claimed most of south china sea

Well I wont argue with that. Expect the Chinese Navy to be cruising the Flores Sea in the future.

 

[initial_d]

Its n

Well I wont argue with that. Expect the Chinese Navy to be cruising the Flores Sea in the future.

its not gonna happen, if the chinese insist going south, we will choke their economy with closing malaca strait and sunda strait, we will expect short and decisive war, and with indonesian military modernisation we might have the chance, especially most south east asia nation will unite againts china, china will think twice doing so, drawing U.S into the game will also make them restrained, for now china only dare bullying weak nation like the phillipine.

 

[Aepsilons]

Its n
its not gonna happen, if the chinese insist going south, we will choke their economy with closing malaca strait and sunda strait, we will expect short and decisive war, and with indonesian military modernisation we might have the chance, especially most south east asia nation will unite againts china, china will think twice doing so, drawing U.S into the game will also make them restrained, for now china only dare bullying weak nation like the phillipine.

They wouldn't be stupid enough to dare engage Indonesia as that would unite the already contentious ASEAN membership against a common foe. Secondarily, it would bring in international resolve. At this critical juncture -- they (Chinese) focusing on balancing their economic growth -- cannot afford a war. And one lesson they see -- in regards to the punishment Russia is experiencing right now through these international sanctions -- is that It cannot afford to go against the international order and expect no repercussions.