Iran's SAM Coverage

[gambit]

That is exactly what @PeeD tried to explain. That is called access denial. Whether you abort your mission and turn away because you touched an EM wall or you try to go around it and infiltrate the gaps, the system has made you change your behaviour.

In principle, every form of defense is tacitly 'access denial'. Even the often mocked Maginot Line was one such. Whether it is technically effective or that an adversary can refuse to meet it -- is a different issue.

A change of behavior is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is worse for the defender if that adversary is determined to find a way to penetrate the defenses.

And what makes you think Iran doesn't know about those gaps of its own system?

Of course Iran would know. We fully expect Iran to know of those gaps.

Believe me being short on fancy equipment has an interesting effect on you: It makes your smarter.

But not necessarily give you the win.

Then you should never go to war with nations who have a habit of braking rules. You should also never use an RPG-7 to shoot down a chopper but we did during war with Iraq and actually it worked very well.

Or you should not go after multi thousand ton destroyer with 30' speed boat. But now it doesn't seem like a bad idea at all.

You will find a lot of Dani's in Iran.

Breaking the rules. Thinking outside of the box. Etc...

We are not interested in jargon and catchy phrases.

Your F-22s are flying near Iranian borders all the time. What makes you think that those "ambiguous" readings have not been recorded and incorporated into Iran's radar software?

Now the debunking begins...

You have the wrong understanding of the word 'ambiguous' to start. Then you are confused between 'signal' and 'signature'. They are COMPLETELY different aspects of a target in radar detection. Anything can be a signal, but it takes specific items to be a signature.

Every radar system sees a body as a cluster of voltage spikes. The greater the contrast between the cluster and background, the easier it is for the radar to classify the TOTALITY of the cluster as a radar signal.

Further, target body complexity contribute to that classification. Or so it seems prior to the advent of 'stealthy' designs.

In designing a radar low observability body, three rules, or more like guidance, should be observed.

Control of :

- Quantity of radiators
- Array of radiators
- Modes of radiation

Prior to the advent of 'stealth', none of those rules were observed, leading to complex bodies that truly contribute to the ease of which a radar can classify those bodies as legitimate of un-ambiguous signals or targets.

A 'signature' implies uniqueness, like how your handwriting is unique. Each Boeing 727 is a unique body, but as a model, all 727s are relatively the same as they have common major structures. So for a radar system that sees a cluster of voltage spikes, like the graphic above, day after day, or even hour after hour, you can program your radar to classify an aircraft as a 727 or 737 or 747 or a Citation or a Beech. You do not even need manufacturer's assistance. You see these jets every hr of every day. You can even program your radar to filter out -- ignore -- lower RCS structures on each jet. So for a 727, you can program your radar to seek for a huge voltage spike like that created by the empennage and engines.

This would constitute a unique SIGNATURE for the 727 and would allow the radar to create a valid SIGNAL for display.

For a 747, it should be easy to envision a cluster of voltage spikes that contains four major spikes in a relatively aligned fashion and that would be the four engines on the wings. Every major airliner have a vertical and two horizontal stabs configuration, so this would be a common signature, but the four engines and a front end bulge are unique to the 747. So you can program your radar to filter out lower RCS structures and can still recognize that body as a 747.

This would constitute a unique SIGNATURE for the 747 and would allow the radar to create a valid SIGNAL for display.

You can do this for an F-15 or an A-10 or a Tornado. All complex bodies that are NOT obedient to the three rules above.

The B-2, the F-117, F-22, and F-35 are obedient to the above control rules, making them low radar observable or 'stealthy'.

That is not to say they do not have unique signatures but they are not obligate to give you those unique signatures. That is YOUR burden to create them via your own hardware.

What this mean is that regardless of whether a complex body is 'stealthy' or not, the real signature will NEVER match the perceived signature created by the seeking radar. This is applicable even in the visual spectrum. If you stand 10 meters away from an F-15, your eyes will not be able to discern out the individual panel fasteners so your brain will not create a visual signature that contains those fasteners, so essentially, you are already wrong about the F-15 to some degrees because the real F-15 have a signature that contains all those fasteners. Radar shares the same flaw with you.

So right from the beginning, regardless of whether you use long wavelengths or not, any perceived signature you create will be ambiguous because the 'stealthy' shaping made it difficult for your radar to discern even the major structures.

If you have an ambiguous signature, you cannot have an un-ambiguous signal. This is not an alternate universe with different laws of physics and logic.

You said: "What makes you think that those "ambiguous" readings have not been recorded and incorporated into Iran's radar software?"

An ambiguous radar return means an un-trackable or an unstable signal. It does not mean an un-detectable signal. You detected it. The problem from 'stealth' is that the radar managed to create a signal, from some RCS structures, one second, but failed to create a signal on the next second, and so on. This is what make a 'stealthy' body an ambiguous signal.

Your radar may detect -- over one week -- a cluster of ambiguous signals at 20,000 ft at 0800 hr and 1400 hr.

So what ?

You are going to program your radar to look for a cluster of ambiguous signals at 20,000 ft ? What good will that do ? This is a combat aircraft, not a predictable airliner on airport approach under strict ground control. When something is predictable, you can write codes, procedures, rules, and regulations. But just because a four-ship formation of F-22 is predictable this week, what make you think they will be predictable next week ? Because NATO forced Vega-31 ( F-117 ) to be predictable, thereby made it easier to be shot down, the US is going to force the F-22 to be equally predictable so Iranian air defense can shoot it down ?

This is why I believe you were confused between 'signature' and 'signal' when you made that statement.

 

[gambit]

Seesh, calm down gambit. We aren't going to burn @Arminkh at the stake.

You are playing a very dirty game here gambit. You claim superiority in all aviation related military fields and speak in a condescending rather than teaching tone to whoever challenges you. Once someone (@PeeD) with good knowledge challenges you, you try to discredit them so you can justify your arrogant tone.

This is the work of trolling, not intelligent debate.

Hey...For all the yrs I have been on this forum, anyone is free to discredit me. So far, no one have ever used the sources that I provided, find their own sources to confirm, and return to prove conclusively that I either lied or misled the forum.

Open question for all of you...

What tracking mechanism is good for used against a descending ballistic warhead ? Bonus point for adding why is that mechanism used.

 

[PeeD]

Well since @gambit didn't reply to my post and gave me a grade, so lets talk about topics which are more favorable for him.

We have all the topics from frequency suppression/active cancellation to IADS saturation with decoys up to directed energy EM weapons against sensitive radars. These are all cards which gambit might have but probably don't want to play yet and feels therefore to be in a very superior position here.

So lets talk about a capability on that topic he wants to talk about as claimed veteran pilot. This capability might or might not exist yet in Russia or Iran, it may or may not be even deemed necessary:

A virtual signature database. Ufimetsevs code which is used for computerized RCS estimation and more advanced variants can be used to create RCS models of any aircraft from which good photos exist.
This models in a database can be compared to the actual returns the radar provides: Vector and hence aspect and position relative to the radar can be calculated for a just second long RCS spike --> this can be cross checked to database information for any further return.

Now there are some uncertainties, how realistic is the simulation model? In Irans case the simulated model can be benchmarked against the RQ-170 on the test range pole. The results will correct the simulation model and validate it. In the best case the already existing simulation model had sufficient convergence with the test range data. Russians can validate their baseline RAM absorption factors against F-117 airframe pieces from 99. Once the computer model is validated for Iran against the RQ-170 and its RAM performance, it can be modified for any other aircraft with a high certainty.
Emission signatures of different stealth assets can be created in that way with computerized comparison and identification (not comparing the returns in several nights per hand on paper)
US stealth designs do RCS management, basically all radar returns are concentrated into a certain aspect in the best way possible. At 32° to the boresight of the B-2, a radar would receive a spike 100 times stronger than the average RCS. As range, speed and direction are known a comparison with the database will instantly tell that this VLO target has a defined wing aspect ratio different to the F-22 and different to the F-117.
If the database is accurate enough, based on that information and the calculated effective RCS, the VLO target could be even identified as F-35 or B-2. More importantly the characteristics of the signature would enable to define whether it is a real target, ECM or decoy.

This is beyond the text book information taught to US pilots. So if Americans have a B-2 with a classified active radar wave cancellation in their mind, I come up with a advanced signature identification system as hinted by Arminkh.

 

[gambit]

A virtual signature database.

The US have the Benefield Anechoic Facility at Edwards AFB.

http://www.edwards.af.mil/Portals/50/documents/772/AFD-141126-062.pdf?ver=2016-06-23-110423-950

We have the physical measurements of our jets, of which we can very accurately derive the virtual RCS measurements of other jets. Beats using photos.

 

[PeeD]

The US have the Benefield Anechoic Facility at Edwards AFB.

http://www.edwards.af.mil/Portals/50/documents/772/AFD-141126-062.pdf?ver=2016-06-23-110423-950

We have the physical measurements of our jets, of which we can very accurately derive the virtual RCS measurements of other jets. Beats using photos.

You better get photos for the PAK-FA RCS simulation model.

Anyway, as Iran uses VHF- to S- band for its search radars, the accuracy of the simulation model can be quite coarse, excluding small for simulation un-relevant details details. This surface continuity problems are taken as perfect ones, playing in favor for the real VLO asset.

Because we think Americans are the masters of applied stealth (while I don't believing their -40 DBSM figures) it's best to benchmark the simulation models against the creations of the world leaders in this field.
Irans RCS test range is not as perfect as the US one, a old school open air range but it's sufficient to measure the RQ-170 LO performance (whether a low tech expandable design or not).

So I guess Iranians may know if the -40 DBSM figures from Lockheed are legit or PR-fantasy. And if they have such a virtual database as described, the RQ-170 is a good benchmark tool.

 

[Arminkh]

In principle, every form of defense is tacitly 'access denial'. Even the often mocked Maginot Line was one such. Whether it is technically effective or that an adversary can refuse to meet it -- is a different issue.

A change of behavior is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is worse for the defender if that adversary is determined to find a way to penetrate the defenses.


Of course Iran would know. We fully expect Iran to know of those gaps.


But not necessarily give you the win.


Breaking the rules. Thinking outside of the box. Etc...

We are not interested in jargon and catchy phrases.


Now the debunking begins...

You have the wrong understanding of the word 'ambiguous' to start. Then you are confused between 'signal' and 'signature'. They are COMPLETELY different aspects of a target in radar detection. Anything can be a signal, but it takes specific items to be a signature.

Every radar system sees a body as a cluster of voltage spikes. The greater the contrast between the cluster and background, the easier it is for the radar to classify the TOTALITY of the cluster as a radar signal.

Further, target body complexity contribute to that classification. Or so it seems prior to the advent of 'stealthy' designs.

In designing a radar low observability body, three rules, or more like guidance, should be observed.

Control of :

- Quantity of radiators
- Array of radiators
- Modes of radiation

Prior to the advent of 'stealth', none of those rules were observed, leading to complex bodies that truly contribute to the ease of which a radar can classify those bodies as legitimate of un-ambiguous signals or targets.

A 'signature' implies uniqueness, like how your handwriting is unique. Each Boeing 727 is a unique body, but as a model, all 727s are relatively the same as they have common major structures. So for a radar system that sees a cluster of voltage spikes, like the graphic above, day after day, or even hour after hour, you can program your radar to classify an aircraft as a 727 or 737 or 747 or a Citation or a Beech. You do not even need manufacturer's assistance. You see these jets every hr of every day. You can even program your radar to filter out -- ignore -- lower RCS structures on each jet. So for a 727, you can program your radar to seek for a huge voltage spike like that created by the empennage and engines.

This would constitute a unique SIGNATURE for the 727 and would allow the radar to create a valid SIGNAL for display.

For a 747, it should be easy to envision a cluster of voltage spikes that contains four major spikes in a relatively aligned fashion and that would be the four engines on the wings. Every major airliner have a vertical and two horizontal stabs configuration, so this would be a common signature, but the four engines and a front end bulge are unique to the 747. So you can program your radar to filter out lower RCS structures and can still recognize that body as a 747.

This would constitute a unique SIGNATURE for the 747 and would allow the radar to create a valid SIGNAL for display.

You can do this for an F-15 or an A-10 or a Tornado. All complex bodies that are NOT obedient to the three rules above.

The B-2, the F-117, F-22, and F-35 are obedient to the above control rules, making them low radar observable or 'stealthy'.

That is not to say they do not have unique signatures but they are not obligate to give you those unique signatures. That is YOUR burden to create them via your own hardware.

What this mean is that regardless of whether a complex body is 'stealthy' or not, the real signature will NEVER match the perceived signature created by the seeking radar. This is applicable even in the visual spectrum. If you stand 10 meters away from an F-15, your eyes will not be able to discern out the individual panel fasteners so your brain will not create a visual signature that contains those fasteners, so essentially, you are already wrong about the F-15 to some degrees because the real F-15 have a signature that contains all those fasteners. Radar shares the same flaw with you.

So right from the beginning, regardless of whether you use long wavelengths or not, any perceived signature you create will be ambiguous because the 'stealthy' shaping made it difficult for your radar to discern even the major structures.

If you have an ambiguous signature, you cannot have an un-ambiguous signal. This is not an alternate universe with different laws of physics and logic.

You said: "What makes you think that those "ambiguous" readings have not been recorded and incorporated into Iran's radar software?"

An ambiguous radar return means an un-trackable or an unstable signal. It does not mean an un-detectable signal. You detected it. The problem from 'stealth' is that the radar managed to create a signal, from some RCS structures, one second, but failed to create a signal on the next second, and so on. This is what make a 'stealthy' body an ambiguous signal.

Your radar may detect -- over one week -- a cluster of ambiguous signals at 20,000 ft at 0800 hr and 1400 hr.

So what ?

You are going to program your radar to look for a cluster of ambiguous signals at 20,000 ft ? What good will that do ? This is a combat aircraft, not a predictable airliner on airport approach under strict ground control. When something is predictable, you can write codes, procedures, rules, and regulations. But just because a four-ship formation of F-22 is predictable this week, what make you think they will be predictable next week ? Because NATO forced Vega-31 ( F-117 ) to be predictable, thereby made it easier to be shot down, the US is going to force the F-22 to be equally predictable so Iranian air defense can shoot it down ?

This is why I believe you were confused between 'signature' and 'signal' when you made that statement.

As I mentioned, my choice of words may not be correct from a field expert perspective. However, I think I delivered the point I wanted to make: Stealth airplanes are stealthy to the common types of radars that were being used by more advance countries up to maybe 2 decades ago and what is still being used by less advanced nations.

However, now that every one knows about those airplanes and the principles of their radar evasion, it is not impossible to come up with other methods to not only detect them but to shoot them down like any other airplane.

There are many different ways to skin the cat. One is the patent I sent you.

Thanks for correcting me on the choice of words, but my point stands the same.

Iran has been obsessed with US war methods and strategies. They fully know the first wave of attack is air and missile attack and they very well know that whoever can effectively resist against those attacks, has a very good chance to now level the field. They have been studying and designing their own equipment based on that for the past 30 years. There are scientific ways to detect and eliminate a stealth fighter and I'm sure Iran has researched and developed equipment based on those ways. How they detected and traced RQ170 should be a clue.

The fact is, US has never gone against a worthy enemy after 2nd world war to really put its state of the art (or at least what you guys like to call them) equipment under a stress test. Hopefully a war will never start between Iran and US but if it does, I for one expect a lot of nasty surprises for US side.

 

[gambit]

As I mentioned, my choice of words may not be correct from a field expert perspective. However, I think I delivered the point I wanted to make: Stealth airplanes are stealthy to the common types of radars that were being used by more advance countries up to maybe 2 decades ago and what is still being used by less advanced nations.

However, now that every one knows about those airplanes and the principles of their radar evasion, it is not impossible to come up with other methods to not only detect them but to shoot them down like any other airplane.

There are many different ways to skin the cat. One is the patent I sent you.

Thanks for correcting me on the choice of words, but my point stands the same.

Your choice of words reflected a superficial understanding of radar detection and 'stealth'.

You guys often said that Iran is not Iraq. But then the F-22/35 is not the F-117.

Here is another item for you...

The F-117 used the angled faceting technique for 'stealth'. The F-22/35 and B-2 uses mainly curved surfaces. Radar signals that bounces off each TYPE of surfaces will exhibit different polarization on the reflected signal, creating different signatures for the same surface area.

Why is this significant ?

It means that even if the F-117 and the F-22 shares the same total RCS, the F-22 will create a more 'hazy' or indistinct signature, making it difficult for the seeking radar to create a valid signal for display.

It means that if the F-117 displays an RCS of .001m2 for one second, the F-22 will display that same .001m2 erratically over that same one second time span. All because of using curvatures.

This is why sea surface, as a clutter type of signal, is so problematic for most radars. You have a variety of angled and curved surfaces from one micro sec to the next. The seeking radar cannot anticipate which polarization it will see from one micro sec to the next to correctly process the signals from sea surface.

Not only that, the F-22/35 have countermeasures that are at least one generation ahead of its peers while the F-117 had none. If Zoltan Dani had faced the F-35 back then, he and his crew would have died anonymously on the battlefield.

The fact is, US has never gone against a worthy enemy...

Why is this a negative ?

It is the goal of every country to be more powerful than its allies, friends, and enemies.

 

[Blue In Green]

Your choice of words reflected a superficial understanding of radar detection and 'stealth'.

You guys often said that Iran is not Iraq. But then the F-22/35 is not the F-117.

Here is another item for you...

The F-117 used the angled faceting technique for 'stealth'. The F-22/35 and B-2 uses mainly curved surfaces. Radar signals that bounces off each TYPE of surfaces will exhibit different polarization on the reflected signal, creating different signatures for the same surface area.

Why is this significant ?

It means that even if the F-117 and the F-22 shares the same total RCS, the F-22 will create a more 'hazy' or indistinct signature, making it difficult for the seeking radar to create a valid signal for display.

It means that if the F-117 displays an RCS of .001m2 for one second, the F-22 will display that same .001m2 erratically over that same one second time span. All because of using curvatures.

This is why sea surface, as a clutter type of signal, is so problematic for most radars. You have a variety of angled and curved surfaces from one micro sec to the next. The seeking radar cannot anticipate which polarization it will see from one micro sec to the next to correctly process the signals from sea surface.

Not only that, the F-22/35 have countermeasures that are at least one generation ahead of its peers while the F-117 had none. If Zoltan Dani had faced the F-35 back then, he and his crew would have died anonymously on the battlefield.


Why is this a negative ?

It is the goal of every country to be more powerful than its allies, friends, and enemies.

The goals of a country is to serve it's citizens, give protection and prosperity to itself, not engage in reckless pissing contests with other states resulting in a more destabilized world (and it is reckless).

US world order is no more.

.......... but hey let's go to war with Iran and North Korea and China and see if we can win, might as well cause hey were 'Murica and freedom and Jesus and cheeseburgers something, something democracy.

 

[PeeD]

Iranian VHF-band radars are fully solid state, have digital software based signal processing that includes potent MTI methods. Alone the use of VHF-band waves creates a much more discrete RCS pattern, all the small curvature details become "overlayerd" by the significant topological features of the VLO design.
So in total the sum of the RCS value gets important for these radars not fluctuations inside that sum.

X-band fire control radars have to cope with such effects via the digital software signal processing and here too, key performance parameters like raw RCS performance are much more important.

As for F-35 vs. Danis SA-3: Yes probably, but then we would have generation difference of about 60 years, lets keep it at those 30 years of the reality.
So if you want, the rule of thumb seems to dictate lagging behind ~20 years should be sufficient against US stealth.
No, the real difference is that Iranian radars have stand-off range performance compared to Danis export P-18 and all the benefits of the digital age.
I wonder at what range the F-35 ESM sensor suite can locate a 200km far VHF band radar with sidelobe canceling and LPI modes at what accuracy, sufficient for a JASSM shot? Doubtful.

 

[AmirPatriot]

I didn't think it would be a good idea to make a new thread for essentially an update + expansion of the same thing, so here goes...

Iran's SAM Coverage - Updates and Future

By Amir Tuesday, September 11, 2018
This is an updated overview of Iran's air defences. I made a blog post on the subject a year ago, promising it to be a "2 part post" of current and future air defences. The much delayed second part is included in this blog post.

As before, I will be using Sean O'Connor's 2010 IMINT & Analysis blog post as a basis for my own work, to find SAM sites. This blog post contains no SAM site locations that aren't already in the public sphere.


Iran's full Air Defence Coverage as of the date of this post




Iran has deployed some of its new domestic SAM systems. Read my analysis of Iran's SAM coverage, present and possible future.

https://irangeomil.blogspot.com/2018/09/irans-sam-coverage-updates-and-future.html

 

[T-72B]

I didn't think it would be a good idea to make a new thread for essentially an update + expansion of the same thing, so here goes...

Iran's SAM Coverage - Updates and Future

By Amir Tuesday, September 11, 2018
This is an updated overview of Iran's air defences. I made a blog post on the subject a year ago, promising it to be a "2 part post" of current and future air defences. The much delayed second part is included in this blog post.

As before, I will be using Sean O'Connor's 2010 IMINT & Analysis blog post as a basis for my own work, to find SAM sites. This blog post contains no SAM site locations that aren't already in the public sphere.


Iran's full Air Defence Coverage as of the date of this post




Iran has deployed some of its new domestic SAM systems. Read my analysis of Iran's SAM coverage, present and possible future.

https://irangeomil.blogspot.com/2018/09/irans-sam-coverage-updates-and-future.html

Okay @AmirPatriot i read your blog and there's some question i may ask:
-where is Sayyad-3 sites?
-and how many system in each sites or batteries?

 

[AmirPatriot]

Okay @AmirPatriot i read your blog and there's some question i may ask:
-where is Sayyad-3 sites?
-and how many system in each sites or batteries?

1. There are "Sayyad" sites, but because Sayyad-3 has only very recently been put into production, I'm assuming it is not yet in service.

2. Each range ring is equivalent to 1 system (system=the combination of radars, missiles, and command post). Even if some sites are at the same location, I have marked them as individual systems.

 

[T-72B]

1. There are "Sayyad" sites, but because Sayyad-3 has only very recently been put into production, I'm assuming it is not yet in service.

2. Each range ring is equivalent to 1 system (system=the combination of radars, missiles, and command post). Even if some sites are at the same location, I have marked them as individual systems.

And by the way the sites for 1 sites of HQ-2 and S-200 is equal to 6 missile sites right? And how many Iran Sayyad-2 missile system and Raad (3rd Khordad,Tabas and one i forget) missile system?

 

[Farhan Bohra]

This is the first of a 2 part post focusing on the current and future of Iran's air defence coverage, based on current basing and air defence sites.

Background

I will be relying on work done by Sean O'Connor of IMINT & Analysis blog (he now works for IHS Janes) who already identified existing sites, and in essence modernising the record of what systems are occupying these sites.

But we must first, still, look at the old picture provided by Sean, from his old blog.







As you can see, the majority of Iran's air defences in 2010 were outdated. HAWK and HQ-2/Sayyad-1 made up the majority of Iran's medium range air defences. 2K12 Kub and the only modern type, the TOR-M1E, made up short and very short range air defences (VSHORAD) components of the Iranian air defences. 7 S-200 sites (with 2 S-200 missiles on launch rails each) made up the very long range component of the IRIADF.

For the full analysis of Iran's old network, read Sean O'Connor's analysis here.

Follow the link below for the current air defence analysis!

http://irangeomil.blogspot.com/2017/08/irans-sam-coverage.html

@PeeD and @eagle2007 would appreciate any additions or comments you guys may have.

How do you know the area of deployments? And how do you know capabilities and operationalization?

Or are you saying such SAM remain active 24/7?

 

[AmirPatriot]

And by the way the sites for 1 sites of HQ-2 and S-200 is equal to 6 missile sites right? And how many Iran Sayyad-2 missile system and Raad (3rd Khordad,Tabas and one i forget) missile system?

S-200s only have 2 missiles per site. http://geimint.blogspot.com/2007/07/s-200-sam-system-site-analysis.html?m=1

How do you know the area of deployments? And how do you know capabilities and operationalization?

Or are you saying such SAM remain active 24/7?

I gave a link in my blog post to the analysis by Sean O'Connor which included the locations of all sites I have put on my blog post. I can see them on Google earth.

And yes, SAMs typically reside at prepared, fixed locations. Their mobility allows them to use a "shoot and scoot" tactic in a war.