Iran's SAM Coverage

[Muhammed45]

@gambit

I feel a kind of f16.net arrogance of I know it better because you are nobody. I respect your claim to have been a pilot, at least don't classify me as I have said nothing about my background.



This is what Lockheed said. Ufimetsevs work was one of a collection on a topic including radars. It was just the most civil-rated work that was allowed to be published. It's a strange kind of arrogance to believe that such basic work on wave scattering would have been somehow missed by Soviet "stupids". No, they had more advanced calculation models and released this one and Lockheed skunkworks was clever enough to pick it up.
Good for you and you applied this for tactical use at a high pricetag. But this tactical extra on which the F-117 was designed made it otherwise so low performing (speed, agility, range) that it soon became unsurvivable on todays battlefield.
Soviets were fully aware of it, but not ready to sacrifice enough performance parameters for it. Just now they apply it to some extend on the PAK-FA and there they are not stupid enough to go for an all-aspect application. Americans have the money and faith to their stealth, good for them.



Good for you that you presented what I wrote already years ago (does not mean you know better than me, you may or may not).

Well good, you can detect Iranian VHF-radars on long range, what you want to do now? This are high power systems rated at 500km+, with magnitudes higher jamming resistance than Danis export P-18.
Because you want to be professional, let me be professional too:
If the MuF-2 radar is rated at 500km against a 15m² supersonic bomber target it will have a range of 188km against a ~0,3m² F-22/-35 (no RAM effects, due to VHF-band, head-on).
This are the numbers with which we non-Americans work who just consider physics, no one takes Lockmart statements like of "size of a pea" seriously. Due to the jamming resistance and high range no stand-off jammer degradation is considered.
So we have a radar coverage circle of 2x~200km=400km of a radar of which dozens are in service and the numbers is increasing at fast pace. Iran is a large country but how many 2-time redundant mobile MuF-2 radars teams do you think Iran needs to give full coverage of the whole airspace?
Yes you detect them (if they go online) at longer range but in the end the system density counts.
Comparing this to Danis, non-stand-off export P-18 that had hardly a range of 25km due to heavy jamming, one realizes in what bad situation he was (and that P-18 was not taken out...).



You want to have a professional talk, then realize that by pure I mean it has no active emitters like MTI and SAR radar such as the also quite pure B-2 (LPI or not). Its facet stealth shaping was more primitive than never "round" designs, but it degrades the aerodynamic performance, to stealth shaping performance should be at least as good as F-22/-35.

Irans chances against US stealth are quite high because Irans concentrates on a ground based IADS and it's performance is increasing at very fast pace. Let's say Americans have never faced a IADS of even a friction of power and lets hope they h´never have to do.

Brilliant post.
Nice read

 

[agarrao a las kalandrakas]

F-22/F-35 stealth capabilities are interesting, but Hollywood and western media has done a good job brain washing people, talking about their "invisibility", and things like "the size of a golf ball", "the size of a peanut" and so on...

The VERY different plane in this equations, IMHO, is B-2. B-2 plays in a full different league than F-22/F-35, not only because its extraordinary high cost, but because it may use magnetohydrodynamics tech to reduce its radar signature.
It may use a plasma, generated by itself while flying, to produce a plasma shield, in order to absorb the energy of the EM waves (radar) incoming. Either absorb the wave or transmit the wave, but not reflecting it (this, ideally. But in reality, the system is not perfect, and always there is a signal reflection, so there will never be invisibility, but a great reduction in RCS). The extraordinary high cost for a B-2, being a subsonic bomber, tell us this is a different bird.

So the plasma shield of B-2 is state of the art in stealthiness. B-2 is far more advanced than F-22, and the truly dangerous plane in US inventory, in case of attack to an adversary with a solvent AD network (not Libia or Irak).

 

[gambit]

@gambit

I feel a kind of f16.net arrogance...

Outside of a pure engineering forum, there is practically no better resource than f-16.net for information about the F-16 in specific and military aviation in general. We -- and I am a member there -- have everyone from enlisted to officers, from maintenance crew to pilots, from engineers to admin. We even have the lady who provide the voice for the F-16's avionics warning system "Bitchin' Betty".

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?p=67255#67255

I respect your claim to have been a pilot, at least don't classify me as I have said nothing about my background.

If you chose to remain anonymous, as most of us do online, then you will be judged on the CONTENTS of your posts.

This is what Lockheed said. Ufimetsevs work was one of a collection on a topic including radars. It was just the most civil-rated work that was allowed to be published. It's a strange kind of arrogance to believe that such basic work on wave scattering would have been somehow missed by Soviet "stupids". No, they had more advanced calculation models and released this one and Lockheed skunkworks was clever enough to pick it up.

How does that make it false ? Because an American said it, that means it must be false ?

A man like Ufimtsev would have his work vetted by the government before allowance for public disclosure. Any potential application for the military will have the work be reviewed further and more in-depth. The Soviet Union had secret cities where scientists and engineers worked and for their higher intelligence, education, and productivity, these people were rewarded much more than the average citizens.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closed_city

The idea that somehow the Soviet government recognized the military value of radar avoidance but allowed Ufimtsev to publish his ray scattering math -- strained credulity.

No, the Soviet missed the military application of Ufimtsev's math. The reality is that even if Lockheed did not find Ufimtsev's math, the F-117 would have been developed anyway. Maybe not as effective as with the math, but would have created problems for most radars in existence at that time. Lockheed -- and others -- were already aware of the scattering behaviors of rays and waves and they knew that there should be a way of predicting such behaviors.

In any project, the first thing to do is to find out if anyone has done something the same or at least similar. That is what Lockheed did and they found Ufimtsev's math. If they did not found it, or if Ufimtsev's math was not allowed for disclosure, Lockheed would have develop an alternate.

The US is the rightful credit holder of 'stealth'. Simple as that.

Good for you and you applied this for tactical use at a high pricetag. But this tactical extra on which the F-117 was designed made it otherwise so low performing (speed, agility, range) that it soon became unsurvivable on todays battlefield.
Soviets were fully aware of it, but not ready to sacrifice enough performance parameters for it. Just now they apply it to some extend on the PAK-FA and there they are not stupid enough to go for an all-aspect application. Americans have the money and faith to their stealth, good for them.

Now you are making excuses for their gross error.

Let us take the MIG-25, for example.

The MIG-25 is a piece of junk. But they needed an XB-70 interceptor as the US were testing, with progressive successes, in flying the XB-70. The XB-70 was built on the principle of 'compression lift' where the supersonic body essentially 'surfs' on its own shockwaves, saving fuel and extending range. The Soviets would have no defense against the XB-70 should it come to production and the Soviets could not gambled on the chance that the US would not build that bomber. They had to make the MIG-25 no matter how poorly its overall performance.

Radar is still the primary detection method. The idea that somehow the Soviets knew that they would build a limited performance aircraft but one that could bypass most radars in existence, but declined to build because of the poor flight performance -- is simply absurd.

The XB-70 was a temporary threat while the radar -- as that primary method of detection -- was a constant threat. Bombers and fighters came and gone but the radar continues and improves. The XB-70 earned a response in the form of the poor agility and range performance but fast MIG-25, but the American radar threat would not have earned a response in the form of a Soviet version of the F-117 ?

A fast American bomber got a fast Soviet interceptor. But the American radar got nothing even though there was a mean for a Soviet 'stealth' fighter/bomber and the Soviet government decline to build it because it would not be as agile as the other Soviet fighters ? Are you serious in believing this line of thinking ?

Good for you that you presented what I wrote already years ago (does not mean you know better than me, you may or may not).

Well good, you can detect Iranian VHF-radars on long range, what you want to do now? This are high power systems rated at 500km+, with magnitudes higher jamming resistance than Danis export P-18.

Good. So now we know that you know of at least the basics of radar principles, we can move on to tactics.

What can we do once we detect the Iranian long wavelengths radars ? How about avoiding them ? When I was active duty, the US routinely practices what we called 'sensor avoidance' training missions. Basically, we fly circuitous routes to our targets. All radar nets, even Iranian ones, have gaps. You cannot -- or should not -- overlap coverage fields lest you contaminate your stations. That is common sense and has been in play for as long as there have been radars.

You should also know there there is a difference between maximum range and maximum USABLE range. The latter is where range ambiguity is largely eliminated.

Scientists gives us explanations and principles. Engineers takes those and gives us devices. Then tacticians -- that would be users -- figures out ways to use those devices effectively and efficiently.

So TACTICALLY speaking, the maximum usable range is about %75 of the maximum range. Am not going to debate with you on the finer points of the math on whether it is %70 or %80 of maximum range.

If I am in the cockpit and my ECM tells me I have touched an EM wall, I do not care on whether the seeking radar's maximum usable range is %25 or %20 or even just %10 further. I will make a turn away. I know of you, but because of that maximum usable range, you will not know of me. Why should I attempt to confuse you with jamming ? I do not care how smart are Iranian scientists and engineers. You cannot defy the laws of physics. Your maximum USABLE range will be less than your maximum range.

You want to have a professional talk, then realize that by pure I mean it has no active emitters like MTI and SAR radar such as the also quite pure B-2 (LPI or not). Its facet stealth shaping was more primitive than never "round" designs, but it degrades the aerodynamic performance, to stealth shaping performance should be at least as good as F-22/-35.

Here is the truth on how and why the F-117 was shot down...

We who knows fighters in general and the F-117 in particular laughs every time we read a journalist wrote that the F-117 was the most 'advanced' combat aircraft at that time. In using the words 'most advanced' it implies the jet was loaded with top-end avionics. Everything from radar to countermeasures. The best the US could equip.

The F-117 used the flight control system ( FLCS ) from the F-16. Landing gear components from the A-10. Engines had their afterburner removed. And the list of known sub systems and components goes on. The only thing 'advanced' about it is the shape.

So the reality is that the F-117 was the American version of the MIG-25 -- specialized. The MIG-25 was fast. The F-117 was low radar observable. And both jets sacrificed everything else for their respective high points: fast for one and 'stealthy' for the other.

The F-117 cannot carry a gun and missiles. It has no radar and no radar warning receiver ( RWR ) because back then the existing RWR antennas would have compromised the jet's low radar observability shaping. So the way we flew the F-117 was for other aircrafts to layout a path for the jet. A path that is as EM clear as possible.

Being low radar observable or 'stealthy' does not give license to be careless with radars. But if the jet was to be inside a radar beam, the intention is to be ambiguous inside that maximum range and maximum usable range. Not 'invisible' and we never claimed so, just ambiguous.

If the target is ambiguous, you cannot -- or should not -- shoot.

Over Yugoslavia, the F-117 was NOT flown under US rules but under NATO rules. Big differences in degrees of freedom of combat tactics. If the F-117 is inside a radar beam, the pilot would not know it. So when the F-117 was forced to fly the same ingress routes mission after mission, the repeated ambiguous radar return inevitably became UN-ambiguous. Not electrically un-ambiguous but perceptually un-ambiguous.

Most radars, including military ones, gives two primary adjustments: freq and clutter rejection threshold.

Freq adjustment affects beamwidth, specifically USABLE beamwidth. There is an inverse relationship between beamwidth and array size/shape. Essentially, the larger the array, the finer the beamwidth. So for a mobile system, there is a limit to that freq adjustment. On the other hand, clutter rejection threshold can be from zero to maximum. Zero means reject nothing and displays everything.

What Dani did was a combination of freq and clutter rejection threshold adjustment -- OVER TIME. One combination one day on one detection of some ambiguous returns. One combination the next day on one detection of some more ambiguous returns. And so on. Over a few days, Dani came to a conclusion that he is looking at something that while ambiguous in signal strength it was consistent over time. YOU would have come to the same conclusion.

The rest is history.

Irans chances against US stealth are quite high because Irans concentrates on a ground based IADS and it's performance is increasing at very fast pace. Let's say Americans have never faced a IADS of even a friction of power and lets hope they h´never have to do.

Does Iran have signals intelligence ( SIGINT ) flights ? We do.

 

[Arminkh]

If I am in the cockpit and my ECM tells me I have touched an EM wall, I do not care on whether the seeking radar's maximum usable range is %25 or %20 or even just %10 further. I will make a turn away. I know of you, but because of that maximum usable range, you will not know of me. Why should I attempt to confuse you with jamming ? I do not care how smart are Iranian scientists and engineers. You cannot defy the laws of physics. Your maximum USABLE range will be less than your maximum range.

That is exactly what @PeeD tried to explain. That is called access denial. Whether you abort your mission and turn away because you touched an EM wall or you try to go around it and infiltrate the gaps, the system has made you change your behaviour.

And what makes you think Iran doesn't know about those gaps of its own system?

Believe me being short on fancy equipment has an interesting effect on you: It makes your smarter.

If the target is ambiguous, you cannot -- or should not -- shoot.

Then you should never go to war with nations who have a habit of braking rules. You should also never use an RPG-7 to shoot down a chopper but we did during war with Iraq and actually it worked very well.

Or you should not go after multi thousand ton destroyer with 30' speed boat. But now it doesn't seem like a bad idea at all.

You will find a lot of Dani's in Iran.

What Dani did was a combination of freq and clutter rejection threshold adjustment -- OVER TIME. One combination one day on one detection of some ambiguous returns. One combination the next day on one detection of some more ambiguous returns. And so on. Over a few days, Dani came to a conclusion that he is looking at something that while ambiguous in signal strength it was consistent over time. YOU would have come to the same conclusion.

That is called learning and adapting. Something that these days can be built into software using deep learning methods or neural network. Your F-22s are flying near Iranian borders all the time. What makes you think that those "ambiguous" readings have not been recorded and incorporated into Iran's radar software?

 

[PeeD]

@gambit

How does that make it false ? Because an American said it, that means it must be false ?

A man like Ufimtsev would have his work vetted by the government before allowance for public disclosure. Any potential application for the military will have the work be reviewed further and more in-depth. The Soviet Union had secret cities where scientists and engineers worked and for their higher intelligence, education, and productivity, these people were rewarded much more than the average citizens.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closed_city

The idea that somehow the Soviet government recognized the military value of radar avoidance but allowed Ufimtsev to publish his ray scattering math -- strained credulity.

In military history it would not be the first time, that a technology is released to an adversary to lure it into a certain development. I don't think it's false because Americans said it but I wonder how you can even believe that Soviets would have missed the purpose of a math model for wave scattering? Everyone from the Soviets to the Americans knew about RCS reduction, even 3rd Reich Germans did. Likely that Soviets knew about rather crude attempts of Americans in the A-12/SR-71 program to affect EM scattering.
So one must highly wonder how Lockheed and Americans could expect that Soviets missed this one.

Today we know that there were smarter scientist around Ufimtsev at his institute and their mathematical models on this clearly radar related topic were not allowed for publication.
So it looks like Soviets had better codes for radar simulation and released the least potent one for some unknown reason to the public.

In any project, the first thing to do is to find out if anyone has done something the same or at least similar. That is what Lockheed did and they found Ufimtsev's math. If they did not found it, or if Ufimtsev's math was not allowed for disclosure, Lockheed would have develop an alternate.

The US is the rightful credit holder of 'stealth'. Simple as that.

I have no problems to call the US the creators of applied stealth, this is not the point. The point is that Soviets were much better informed on stealth than the Americans want to believe. They not only were, but Russians today have a very good knowledge about theoretical stealth and can predict its performance in accurate simulations.
This is the point I wanted to make: If Russian scientist predict a head-on RCS of 0,1-0,3m² (~-12DBSM) for the F-22 compared to the 0,0001m² marble of Lockheed, then I at best take something in between.
Russians have the theoretical models for prediction, they certainly are not new on this field.

Now you are making excuses for their gross error.

Let us take the MIG-25, for example.

The MIG-25 is a piece of junk. But they needed an XB-70 interceptor as the US were testing, with progressive successes, in flying the XB-70. The XB-70 was built on the principle of 'compression lift' where the supersonic body essentially 'surfs' on its own shockwaves, saving fuel and extending range. The Soviets would have no defense against the XB-70 should it come to production and the Soviets could not gambled on the chance that the US would not build that bomber. They had to make the MIG-25 no matter how poorly its overall performance.

You set kinematic performance equal to radar degrading performance. They are not equal.

Kinematic performance of the mach 3 magnitude of the Mig-25 increases survivability enormously. All interception envelopes from aircraft to missile will be greatly decreased. So let me put it simply: Against an advanced adversary the kinematics of the Mig-25 provides much higher survivability than the stealth of the F-117. If not for any other reason then because you can escape the battle field when you want it. You can apply hit and run tactics against a much superior force.
So I agree that the Mig-25 also sacrificed much, but it was worth it. The sacrifices of the F-117 made it just useful against a primitive adversary with no useful IADS and no VHF-band radars. It's so short legged and slow that once compromised it will have a hard time to escape (B-2 would just dive down to very low level and try to bleed out the interceptor due to its huge range performance).

In fact the kinematics of the Mig-25 enabled Iraqis to fly it under immense US air superiority conditions of 1991 and still shot down a F/A-18 (the only Iraqi air to air kill of that war).

It was the Soviets decision to make sacrifices for something like the Mig-25 and not for something like the F-117.

Good. So now we know that you know of at least the basics of radar principles, we can move on to tactics.

What can we do once we detect the Iranian long wavelengths radars ? How about avoiding them ? When I was active duty, the US routinely practices what we called 'sensor avoidance' training missions. Basically, we fly circuitous routes to our targets. All radar nets, even Iranian ones, have gaps. You cannot -- or should not -- overlap coverage fields lest you contaminate your stations. That is common sense and has been in play for as long as there have been radars.

Thanks for the description. Yes that's how it is done. So what kind of operational limitations are created in terms of attacking time critical targets and how much longer the routes/times get by flying around them? We talk about fully solid state, digital systems with coherent compressed wave to wave frequency hopping mode (hence their contamination is low). Their sheer output is so high, that avoiding them easily means tho avoid a 400km diameter circle, not a 2 x 28km =56km Serb P-18 circle.
Sure there will be gaps at medium to low level, however alone them covering the medium to high altitude and force the US stealth assets to fly low, would have huge impacts on the range and speed performance.

You should also know there there is a difference between maximum range and maximum USABLE range. The latter is where range ambiguity is largely eliminated.

Scientists gives us explanations and principles. Engineers takes those and gives us devices. Then tacticians -- that would be users -- figures out ways to use those devices effectively and efficiently.

So TACTICALLY speaking, the maximum usable range is about %75 of the maximum range. Am not going to debate with you on the finer points of the math on whether it is %70 or %80 of maximum range.

If I am in the cockpit and my ECM tells me I have touched an EM wall, I do not care on whether the seeking radar's maximum usable range is %25 or %20 or even just %10 further. I will make a turn away. I know of you, but because of that maximum usable range, you will not know of me. Why should I attempt to confuse you with jamming ? I do not care how smart are Iranian scientists and engineers. You cannot defy the laws of physics. Your maximum USABLE range will be less than your maximum range.

Thanks for your descriptions in the envelopes.
Yes, that's why the probability of detection Pd against a X RCS target is considered, a certain amount of ECM/Jamming penalty added to it and calculated for a Y RCS target. The result will be that I can say with confidence what range which radar has against what target and with what Pd.
It's clear that the radar will have RCS spikes if the target has a aspect different to the head-on considered (actually in most cases). Those spikes will be detected at longer ranges and are excluded in my numbers.

Here is the truth on how and why the F-117 was shot down...

Good, sounds reasonable enough for me.
I even used that engagement to calculate the RCS of the F-117. Dani said his P-18 detected the F-117 at 28km, considering the stand-off ECM jamming that was in the air and the low jamming resistance of the export P-18 (50% range degradation, low estimation), I get a RCS of 0,02m². This is the absolute minimum RCS value acceptable to me and Russians have it about a magnitude higher (0,2m²). Russians likely know the jamming intensity on that night and hence can clearly estimate the F-117 real RCS.
The below fuselage intake F-22/-35 would have a higher RCS against ground based systems than the older F-117.

If the target is ambiguous, you cannot -- or should not -- shoot.

Not the case for Irans ROE. There are strict kill boxes in which not friendly aircraft will be. Anything in there will be targeted. Anything found by the volume search system will be delegated to a SAM system which will use it's pencil beam to track and paint to possible target, down to passive engagement via thermal sight system.

What Dani did was a combination of freq and clutter rejection threshold adjustment -- OVER TIME. One combination one day on one detection of some ambiguous returns. One combination the next day on one detection of some more ambiguous returns. And so on. Over a few days, Dani came to a conclusion that he is looking at something that while ambiguous in signal strength it was consistent over time. YOU would have come to the same conclusion.

American Ah-64 took out the remaining Iraqi P-18 in 91 because they knew about their capability against F-117 while the Iraqis thought they were old junk...

Dani did something that was within the capability of the P-18. The points on this issue are following:

- Danis tactics and emission control, prevented NATO forces to take out his single P-18 in the course of the war. He used this export system with 60's intentionally degraded and compromised technology to shot down a 80's system. This 20 years difference should have prevented a shot down. The fact that it did not, just tells us the reality about claimed superiority.

- Irans current systems are completely different in performance. Danis art to shoot down a 20 year more advanced system is not necessary because the gap between Iranian radars and US stealth is much slimmer.

Does Iran have signals intelligence ( SIGINT ) flights ? We do.

Iran has ground based SIGINT on its vast mountains. Your SIGINT is good, but until you have a campaign plan against this highly mobile IADS, Iranian offensive forces have already started their work. And until your SEAD/DEAD campaign starts to take out Irans IADS capability, Irans offensive forces are already near the end of their campaign.
Against Iran you must have completed the task in days, not weeks of campaign or months of gathering troops and starting degradation of enemy capability.
The facts and numbers speak for themselves: in more than a month, NATOs huge superiority failed to take out the one single Serb site that did all the effort.
Now Irans IADS is at least a 100 times stronger (not in numbers like Iraq in 91 but in numbers and capability)...

American public has a very wrong picture of the real capabilities at hand. There was no effective SCUD hunt in 91... Lindsey Graham really thinks the US could take out North Korean mobile ICBMs conventionally before they can start them... They have no idea how difficult it is to take out many small mobile targets in a huge country. This impression is falsely provided by the military industry, surgical strikes by invisible assets...

 

[AmirPatriot]

Does Iran have signals intelligence ( SIGINT ) flights ? We do.

In addition to what @PeeD said Iran does have a real if ageing SIGNIT capability in the single RC-130 "Khofash" and single ELINT Boeing 707-3J9C.

 

[gambit]

Your F-22s are flying near Iranian borders all the time. What makes you think that those "ambiguous" readings have not been recorded and incorporated into Iran's radar software?

@PeeD

The highlighted is wrong in principles and applications.

You insisted that you be treated as someone knowledgeable of radar principles and I relented. If you know what you are talking about, you would not require a text book to know from the start that what your fellow Iranian said is flat out wrong in many ways.

I can debunk that statement in one post, using one graphic, one explanation, and not a single math equation. Nothing I say will be of the 'secret' nature. It all depends on how well a person understands basic radar operations and data processing.

But I will leave it up to you. Regardless that Mr. Arminkh is a fellow Iranian, your fidelity to scientific truth comes first. He is wrong and I challenge you to show him how. Not only that, you must do it PUBLICLY.

If you refuse, for any reason, or if you agree that he is correct, then I will resume my previous assertion that you do not know even basic radar principles.

I will give a clue: He is wrong about the word 'ambiguous'.

The fact that four people 'Thanked' a technically incorrect post as useful is revealing.

 

[Arminkh]

@PeeD

The highlighted is wrong in principles and applications.

You insisted that you be treated as someone knowledgeable of radar principles and I relented. If you know what you are talking about, you would not require a text book to know from the start that what your fellow Iranian said is flat out wrong in many ways.

I can debunk that statement in one post, using one graphic, one explanation, and not a single math equation. Nothing I say will be of the 'secret' nature. It all depends on how well a person understands basic radar operations and data processing.

But I will leave it up to you. Regardless that Mr. Arminkh is a fellow Iranian, your fidelity to scientific truth comes first. He is wrong and I challenge you to show him how. Not only that, you must do it PUBLICLY.

If you refuse, for any reason, or if you agree that he is correct, then I will resume my previous assertion that you do not know even basic radar principles.

I will give a clue: He is wrong about the word 'ambiguous'.

The fact that four people 'Thanked' a technically incorrect post as useful is revealing.

I'm sure @PeeD was not able to sleep last night trying to choose between being labeled as someone who doesn't know even basic radar principals or disgrace one of his countrymen!

I would be honoured to be corrected and taught something new by one of my country men.

You know, the problem with any nation at the peak of their strength, is that they feel genetically and intellectually superior to rest of the world. We as Persians, Romans and Germans have been fooled by this false overconfidence and have dearly paid the price.

Now it seem to be your turn thinking you can bend physical rules.

Anything that moves in the electromagnetic field of a radar will leave a sign behind if not by reflecting it back, by obstructing it. If it is metallic, it will disturb earth's magnetic field and that can be detected and recorded. So from the airplane itself to its turbine blades, all will have their own unique signature that a smart and motivated team can detect, measure and classify.

Here is patent, explaining how you can detect a stealth aircraft by detecting the attenuation of the radar wave due to obstruction or absorption of the wave by the aircraft. so it is exploiting the very characteristic that is supposed to make the aircraft stealthy:

https://www.google.ca/patents/US8890744

I won't even talk about the laser sensors that detect air turbulence caused by an aircraft.

Since you seem to be a fan of propaganda, here is one for you: I recall, Iran's head of AD force once said we can detect when jets turn on their engines on the other side of Persian gulf. Something theoretically possible using Erath magnetic field distortion.

 

[PeeD]

@gambit

Arminkh is a respected Iranian here yes. His definition of target ambiguity is different to yours.

You talk about the internal effects of a radar where less sophisticated systems have range ambiguity effects which delivers a false target range and increases false alarm rate. In radar technology ambiguity has hence a strict definition directly related to the range ambiguity effect. For all other non-radar-technicians target ambiguity means a weak fluctuating target return that can't be recognized.

Arminkh talks about a general issue of target identification. There are PR-stunts by Lockheed and the likes where some of their drones with the use of decoys saturate a S-300/400 inside a IADS. The IADS takes the bate of the MALD decoys and waste all their missiles on them. A nice 3D CGI advertising video.
So he tried to explain that by the use of multi-band "sensor fusion cross-checking", SIGINT/ELINT, IIR/EO and doppler signature returns, an IADS has the means to clarify if the "ambiguous" target detected is a genuine one or not.
Radar systems have made great leaps with today's processing power. RCS prediction models of stealth and non-stealth targets at any aspect in a certain band can be cross-checked with multiple frequency band returns to enable coarse identification and decoy rejection.
In VLO designs there are sometimes (unavoidable) RCS spikes literally 100 times higher than the minimum frontal RCS and these will create relative short "ambiguous" (to use that wording) return. An advanced computerized IADS with high capability could even use those spikes for interpretation.

I wrote a quite long post which included the application of the radar equation, wich may shows that I have some kind of knowledge on radars which may be sufficient for a much more general topic. I have not seen something similar from your side yet nor did I request it from the forum user gambit.

 

[gambit]

@gambit

Arminkh is a respected Iranian here yes. His definition of target ambiguity is different to yours.

You talk about the internal effects of a radar where less sophisticated systems have range ambiguity effects which delivers a false target range and increases false alarm rate. In radar technology ambiguity has hence a strict definition directly related to the range ambiguity effect. For all other non-radar-technicians target ambiguity means a weak fluctuating target return that can't be recognized.

Arminkh talks about a general issue of target identification. There are PR-stunts by Lockheed and the likes where some of their drones with the use of decoys saturate a S-300/400 inside a IADS. The IADS takes the bate of the MALD decoys and waste all their missiles on them. A nice 3D CGI advertising video.
So he tried to explain that by the use of multi-band "sensor fusion cross-checking", SIGINT/ELINT, IIR/EO and doppler signature returns, an IADS has the means to clarify if the "ambiguous" target detected is a genuine one or not.
Radar systems have made great leaps with today's processing power. RCS prediction models of stealth and non-stealth targets at any aspect in a certain band can be cross-checked with multiple frequency band returns to enable coarse identification and decoy rejection.
In VLO designs there are sometimes (unavoidable) RCS spikes literally 100 times higher than the minimum frontal RCS and these will create relative short "ambiguous" (to use that wording) return. An advanced computerized IADS with high capability could even use those spikes for interpretation.

I wrote a quite long post which included the application of the radar equation, wich may shows that I have some kind of knowledge on radars which may be sufficient for a much more general topic. I have not seen something similar from your side yet nor did I request it from the forum user gambit.

So essentially...You agree that Mr. Arminkh is TECHNICALLY correct ?

Let us have it on record.

 

[PeeD]

In this case not. I don't think there is a technical way to interpret ambiguous returns in some kind of signature database in order to identify the target.

I described what I think Arminkh wanted to say.

 

[AmirPatriot]

@PeeD

The highlighted is wrong in principles and applications.

You insisted that you be treated as someone knowledgeable of radar principles and I relented. If you know what you are talking about, you would not require a text book to know from the start that what your fellow Iranian said is flat out wrong in many ways.

I can debunk that statement in one post, using one graphic, one explanation, and not a single math equation. Nothing I say will be of the 'secret' nature. It all depends on how well a person understands basic radar operations and data processing.

But I will leave it up to you. Regardless that Mr. Arminkh is a fellow Iranian, your fidelity to scientific truth comes first. He is wrong and I challenge you to show him how. Not only that, you must do it PUBLICLY.

If you refuse, for any reason, or if you agree that he is correct, then I will resume my previous assertion that you do not know even basic radar principles.

I will give a clue: He is wrong about the word 'ambiguous'.

The fact that four people 'Thanked' a technically incorrect post as useful is revealing.

Seesh, calm down gambit. We aren't going to burn @Arminkh at the stake.

You are playing a very dirty game here gambit. You claim superiority in all aviation related military fields and speak in a condescending rather than teaching tone to whoever challenges you. Once someone (@PeeD) with good knowledge challenges you, you try to discredit them so you can justify your arrogant tone.

This is the work of trolling, not intelligent debate.

 

[Arminkh]

@gambit

Arminkh is a respected Iranian here yes. His definition of target ambiguity is different to yours.

You talk about the internal effects of a radar where less sophisticated systems have range ambiguity effects which delivers a false target range and increases false alarm rate. In radar technology ambiguity has hence a strict definition directly related to the range ambiguity effect. For all other non-radar-technicians target ambiguity means a weak fluctuating target return that can't be recognized.

Arminkh talks about a general issue of target identification. There are PR-stunts by Lockheed and the likes where some of their drones with the use of decoys saturate a S-300/400 inside a IADS. The IADS takes the bate of the MALD decoys and waste all their missiles on them. A nice 3D CGI advertising video.
So he tried to explain that by the use of multi-band "sensor fusion cross-checking", SIGINT/ELINT, IIR/EO and doppler signature returns, an IADS has the means to clarify if the "ambiguous" target detected is a genuine one or not.
Radar systems have made great leaps with today's processing power. RCS prediction models of stealth and non-stealth targets at any aspect in a certain band can be cross-checked with multiple frequency band returns to enable coarse identification and decoy rejection.
In VLO designs there are sometimes (unavoidable) RCS spikes literally 100 times higher than the minimum frontal RCS and these will create relative short "ambiguous" (to use that wording) return. An advanced computerized IADS with high capability could even use those spikes for interpretation.

I wrote a quite long post which included the application of the radar equation, wich may shows that I have some kind of knowledge on radars which may be sufficient for a much more general topic. I have not seen something similar from your side yet nor did I request it from the forum user gambit.

Thanks @PeeD This is exactly what I tried to say. I'm no radar expert by any stretch of imagination so my use of words maybe misplaced.

 

[idune]

With introduction of new OTH radar, Iran detection range far grater - upto (beyond) Mediterranean. Is that correct?

 

[gambit]

In this case not. I don't think there is a technical way to interpret ambiguous returns in some kind of signature database in order to identify the target.

I described what I think Arminkh wanted to say.

I will give you a C+ for that answer. You did not correct him but I guess in saying he was wrong, despite the lack of details, that will be good enough.