Unlike what you say it wasn't an accurate missile attack and Like what
@Hack-Hook said Yemeni army has done the same thing that Saddam did with Al Hussian missile ...and they've had NK R-17s as the basis of their design.
1.More recently, the rebels have been launching missiles they claim to be domestic clones of Scuds, called the Burqan-1 and -2. These are believed to be modified Scuds with extended range. An
analysis by
Jane’s concluded that though it is possible these are derived from North Korean or Iranian technology,
they are most likely local modifications.
2.It is possible that the Burkan series is a previously unseen Scud derivative that Yemen acquired
from North Korea before the conflict. For example, Syria has a North Korean missile known as the
'Scud D' with a range of around 700 km that has never been seen in public. However, if such a
weapon was obtained from North Korea prior to the outset of the war, it seems strange that the
rebels would wait 18 months before launching one of these missiles. It is therefore more plausible
that this time was spent modifying existing Scud types to extend their range, as well as building
TELs capable of launching larger missiles.
The stated dimensions of the Burkan-1 suggest that it is a standard Scud that has been
lengthened with additional sections welded into its fuselage and fuel tanks so that it can carry the
additional propellant needed to extend its range. Iraq carried out similar modifications to produce
Al Hussein missiles capable of reaching Tehran during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. There are
reports that each Al Hussein was initially made using parts from three R-17s.
The Burkan-2 appears to use a new type of warhead section that is locally fabricated. Both Iran
and North Korea have displayed Scud derivatives with shuttlecock-shaped warheads, but none of
these match the Yemeni version. The range of the Burkan missiles also appears to have been
extended by a reduction in the weight of their warheads. It can be problematic to take too much
mass from the nose of a ballistic missile as this shifts the missile's centre of gravity in relation to its
centre of pressure, making it less stable in flight. This was a problem for Iraq's Al Hussein missiles,
which tended to break up on re-entry, creating multiple targets for US Patriot batteries to engage
during the 1990-91 Gulf War.
Yemen's rebels may be experiencing similar problems. The first two Burkan-2 missiles may have
come down in the desert on their way to Riyadh, which would explain why there were no
corroborating reports of those attacks. The coalition statement regarding the third Burkan-2 attack
certainly raised questions about the accuracy of the missile. It seems unlikely that the rebels would
have deliberately targeted the remote town of Al-Rayn as implied; if Riyadh was the intended
target as stated by the rebels, then the missile was significantly off course and came down well
short of the Saudi capital.
In fact the first attempt to fire B2
failed, the second one
missile was significantly off course and raised questions about the accuracy of the missile:
Unsurprisingly, the first firing of a Burkan-2 – on the evening of Oct. 29, 2017 – failed. The missile malfunctioned and exploded high above Sa’ada. The second was the one that targeted King Khalid International on Nov. 4. The Houthis are perfectly capable of bombarding Saudi Arabia without Iran’s help.