The incident of USS Enterprise in 1969 was very instructive in regards to making aircraft carriers survivable in the long-term. The USS Enterprise endured 18 powerful explosions in a row causing 8 large holes in its flight desk and deep into the ship as well as rupture of a massive fuel tank in the process. The aircraft carrier could still be made operational in a span of hours. Remember this - The aircraft carrier was far less capable on many counts back then.
Right.
www.thedrive.com
And same logic does not hold in case of Iran?
U.S. Navy's Hugely Versatile SM-6 Missile Keeps Scoring Hits
Latest test aimed at improving the weapon's capabilities against ballistic missiles in light of emerging threats.
Please be under no illusion.
FYI
Brilliant...
They are fully equipped to defeat ASBMs (and more) while going on the offensive at the same time while operating close to Iran (or any regional power whatsoever). I suggest you dig into the theme of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of the USN to understand how many operations this force is capable of executing in one go.
nationalinterest.org
Brilliant...
1. Interceptors are supposed to be FAST ENOUGH to intercept incoming missiles.
2. MRBMs attain impressive speeds on average.
The MRBM class target that was defeated in the FTM-27-E2 test is two stage solid propellant and equipped with an MaRV configured to engage moving ships in order to simulate flight characteristics of Chinese DF-21D class ASBM.
Please step out from that bubble of yours.
This is argument for the sake of argument, and you continue to miss the point.Well, Hollywood is in the house. In reallity it was
"Twisted and scarred by the blaze, with fifteen of her jets reduced to smoldering wrecks, the Enterprise limped back into Pearl Harbor, where she underwent fifty-one days of repairs costing $126 million ($866 million in 2017 dollars)."
In 1969, a Freak Accident Nearly Destroyed a Navy Aircraft Carrier
Could it have been avoided?
DF-21D can exceed MACH 11 in sheer speed, and it is equipped with an MaRV configured to engage a moving ship. This MaRV is propelled to impressive speed levels by two stage solid fuel rocket propellants (Boost - Midcourse). Initial re-entry speed is estimated 3.7 KM/sec (very close to MACH 11 mark). Assuming hampering impact of atmospheric conditions, re-entry speed of the MaRV released by DF-21D will remain noticeably above MACH 5 anyways (around MACH 8 mark).
See above.
You expect USA to invade another superpower out of the blue? By the same token, why doesn't Russia or China take their chances with USA? Juvenile statement TBH.
aerospace.org
Good discussions so far, lets keep it up.
War is all about who you are fighting, why, where and how. In this discussion, lets make sure we keep the "where" part in mind closely. This will not be a naval vs naval warfare in open oceans, rather we are discussing Iran's A2/AD capability starting from the Persian Gulf and extending beyond; context makes all the difference. I have been following American missile defence programs closely and to be frank with you, they are not on the level that you are assuming. Yes they have made good developments, but their capability is not on the level to reliably and consistently deal with these "new" missile threats, more specifically "lower tier" and full on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Iranian missiles today in the form of Zolfiqar, Haj Qassem etc are "lower tier" hypersonic glide vehicles, in the sense that they are somewhere in between purely ballistic missiles and full on HGVs. Have a read of the very interesting paper below to see the important differences between the types of missiles today:
THE MISSILE THREAT: A TAXONOMY FOR MOVING BEYOND BALLISTICThe Missile Threat: A Taxonomy for Moving Beyond Ballistic | The Aerospace Corporation
Missiles are not just ballistic anymore, even many of the ones that are called ballistic. We need to evolve accordingly. Using old classifications, we risk mischaracterizing the threats missiles pose and pursuing incorrect and ineffective ways to mitigate them. The new approach offers a more...
View attachment 676071
These definitions are important because when we talk about the ability of a missile defence to defend against missiles, we need to consider the different types. I have not seen much evidence to think the likes of SM-6 could deal with the newer Iranian systems, they fall short kinetically. That is not to say it is impossible for them to destroy the targets at all, but remember to be useful, these missile defences have to reliably and consistently destroy their targets. There is no evidence the likes of SM-6 can deliver that against these likes of Zolfiqar Bair, H-Qassem, K1/2 etc in the manner I outlined above . I think @PeeD @AmirPatriot could share theirs thoughts if they are free. The Americans have yet to simulate these new missiles and to show the success of these defences against them.
More-over, do not forget that a major part of Iran's tactics is to overwhelm the enemy's air defences. Meaning even if in this hypothetical scenario the Americans could deliver a 100% 1:1 kill ratio (not even close to reality), they would eventually be saturated (recall the "where"). Other issues such as decoys, E-warfare etc are nothing new to Iran. If one could speak Persian you could see ample articles on these issues in the Iranian corners of the internet. So I think this notion that these Anti ship ballistic missiles not possessing a major threat to the US navy does not mirror reality right now. But this is a cat and mouse game where the other side is constantly creating new defences so likes of Iran and China must and will keep up.
The green is part is merely revelation of Dr. Loren Thompson whose quote I shared in post # 19 - not a lie. Your interpretation of the incident on the other hand...
Good discussions so far, lets keep it up.
War is all about who you are fighting, why, where and how. In this discussion, lets make sure we keep the "where" part in mind closely. This will not be a naval vs naval warfare in open oceans, rather we are discussing Iran's A2/AD capability starting from the Persian Gulf and extending beyond; context makes all the difference. I have been following American missile defence programs closely and to be frank with you, I am not convinced they are on the sort of level people are thinking. Yes they have made good developments, but their capability is not on the level to reliably and consistently deal with these "new" missile threats, more specifically "lower tier" and full on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Iranian missiles today in the form of Zolfiqar, Haj Qassem etc are "lower tier" hypersonic glide vehicles, in the sense that they are somewhere in between purely ballistic missiles and full on HGVs. Have a read of the very interesting paper below to see the important differences between the types of missiles today:
THE MISSILE THREAT: A TAXONOMY FOR MOVING BEYOND BALLISTIC
The Missile Threat: A Taxonomy for Moving Beyond Ballistic | The Aerospace Corporation
Missiles are not just ballistic anymore, even many of the ones that are called ballistic. We need to evolve accordingly. Using old classifications, we risk mischaracterizing the threats missiles pose and pursuing incorrect and ineffective ways to mitigate them. The new approach offers a more...
View attachment 676071
These definitions are important because when we talk about the ability of a missile defence to defend against missiles, we need to consider the different types. I have not seen much evidence to think the likes of SM-6 could deal with the newer Iranian systems to that extent. That is not to say it is impossible for them to destroy the targets at all, but remember to be useful, these missile defences have to reliably and consistently destroy their targets. There is no evidence the likes of SM-6 can deliver that against these likes of Zolfiqar Bair, H-Qassem, K1/2 etc in the manner I outlined above . I think @PeeD @AmirPatriot could share theirs thoughts if they are free. The Americans have yet to simulate these new missiles and to show the success of these defences against them.
defense-update.com
FYI
Orbital nabs $1.1B contract for Missile Defense targets
Washington (UPI) Sep 23, 2019 - Orbital Sciences Corp. received a $1.1 billion contract with the Missile Defense Agency for missile defense targets, the Defense Department announced.www.spacewar.com
Northrop Grumman awarded $1 billion for missile defense targets
U.S. weapons maker Northrop Grumman received a $1,1 billion contract by the Missile Defense Agency for the missile defense targets, according to a statement issued Monday by U.S. Department of Defense. Under this new contract, Orbital Sciences Corp. (OSC), a business unit of Northrop Grumman, is...defence-blog.com
Some countries spend that much on procuring a new strike platform.
It is obvious that Americans adhere to a costly testing regime to make sure that American defensive applications will deliver results when the situation demands it - reliability and consistency are important considerations in short.
Testing record of SM-6 class interceptors have not received much publicity (intentional censorship) because these interceptors were pitted against complex targets on average (Category 3 - 5) and defeated each.
SM-6 ‘Dual 1’ Defeats Ballistic and Cruise Missiles on a Live Firing Test - Defense Update:
The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and US Navy conducted a successful series of missile intercepts in the Pacific Ocean last week, demonstrating the capability of a newly modified missile interceptor to defeat short range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with the same weapon. The SM-6 was...
During FTM-27 Event 1, in December 2016, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer (which hosts the Aegis BMD 5.0 Capability Upgrade) engaged a complex medium-range ballistic missile target with a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles. FTM-27 Event 1 was the first demonstration of Aegis BMD Sea-Based Terminal capability against complex ballistic missile targets. - DOT&E
During FTM-27 Event 2, in August 2017, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer engaged a complex medium-range ballistic missile target with a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles. The test, which was a follow-on from FTM-27 Event 1, further demonstrated aspects of the Baseline 9.C1 Sea-Based Terminal engagement capability. - DOT&E
SM-6 class interceptors are equipped with cutting-edge seekers (AMRAAM technologies incorporated) to obtain lock(s) on incoming target(s) and capable of executing extremely high-G maneuvers while in the process to engage them (vastly superior maneuverability factor).
SM-6 seeker and terminal guidance electronics derive from technology developed in the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile program. - DOT&E
SM-6 retains the legacy Standard Missile semi-active radar homing capability. - DOT&E
SM-6 receives midcourse flight control from the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) via ship’s radar; terminal flight control is autonomous via the missile’s active seeker or supported by the AWS via the ship’s illuminator. - DOT&E
While inherent capabilities of the interceptor are important considerations, they benefit from inputs coming from the incredibly sophisticated Aegis Combat System for the needful.
FYI
In order for enemies to attack a carrier, they must successfully complete a complex sequence of events that the Navy calls a "kill chain." First the carrier must be found; then its location must be fixed; then a track of its movement must be established; then the carrier must be engaged; and finally, the results of the engagement must be assessed. In practice, each of these steps consists of a series of subsidiary tasks. Like broken links in a chain, if any of the tasks in the kill chain is not accomplished in a timely fashion, the entire process breaks down. In the event of hostilities, the Navy plans to disrupt every step in an enemy’s kill chain, from strikes against sensors searching for carriers to jamming of enemy command links to interception of weapons seeking to engage the carrier. Several features of the carrier strike group severely impede any adversary’s ability to execute an effective attack:
- Carriers are always moving, so even if found they can disappear into hundreds of square miles of ocean within minutes.
- Carrier air wings can intercept and destroy enemy combat systems long before they get anywhere near the carrier.
- Carriers deploy with surface, air and undersea escorts that can defeat diverse overhead, surface and submerged threats.
- Carrier sensors are netted with those of other friendly assets to assure optimum detection and targeting of nearby threats.
- Carriers are nearly impossible to sink given their extensive armoring and hundreds of watertight compartments.
Source: https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/...-Logic-of-Aircraft-Carrier-Strike-Groups2.pdf
