Iranian Missiles | News and Discussions

[Mithridates]

Cold launch, hot launch, what else is out there?

warm launch?? milky launch with sugar and dark launch.

 

[Ich]

warm launch?? milky launch with sugar and dark launch.

Maybe the sugar daddy launch. But for real: What type of launch mechnism could it be?

 

[Mithridates]

Maybe the sugar daddy launch. But for real: What type of launch mechnism could it be?

that could be too.
i don't know much about the missiles launched but i assume the most forces applies to the structure of missile when it tries to detach from ground, it should has something with that.

 

[TheImmortal]

He is not talking about launch type. As a solid fuel only needs about 15-30 mins to launch.

I think he may be alluding to survivability maybe Iran has developed a way to launch BMs without large and expensive TELs.

 

[Draco.IMF]

Iran is creating a new and unique missile launch concept. It is much more survivable than its previous concept while more cost effective than its super-hardened cavern silo launch system already unveiled (the highest performance launch concept of Iran and known to mankind).
Innovative and effective approach but I won't be the first one to reveal it in open source.

something like this?.....

 

[PeeD]

It is well visible, otherwise I wouldn't know about it (open source) --> it is visible because its a large, hardened (nuclear overpressure) structure.

 

[TheImmortal]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1153072141463691271

 

[mohsen]

Bad news for Zionists (and they were first to pick the news too), Hamas now in possession of pin-point accurate missiles:
Khamenei: Palestinians have ‘precision missiles’ | The Times of Israel

LOL, and Zionists wanted to stop Iranian missiles in other countries!

 

[PeeD]

There is meanwhile a good likelihood that this system shown at the 2017 parade in North Korea is connected to Iran.
Back then, North Koreans showed their lightweight liquid ICBMs and heavy weight ones. This one would be a untested solid fuel light ICBM.

Now what is the Iran link?
Well, it was a bold parade that showed 3 parallel strategic programs:
- Liquid lightweight (demonstrated)
- Liquid heavyweight (demonstrated)
- Solid lightweight (not demonstrated)

This sudden appearance of a heavyweight and solid lightweight added to the existing liquid lightweight they were certainly working on, looked amazing but not really credible.
So it might well be that this third solid lightweight was either a early demonstrator, a fake mock-up modeled on DF-31 or a mock-up of an Iranian system (planned to?) transferred to them. Bear in mind that any presented system must look credible enough for enemy experts to believe it.

North Korean missile school favors all-terrain and tracked vehicles for their missiles. When the showed a "Nodong" variant similar to the Ghadr around the late 2000's, it looked like a technology transfer from Iran but the didn't use the road-grade truck of Iranian Ghadr but a MAZ TEL variant.
Hence it looks suspicious: Their Nodong MAZ TELs were available for that Ghadr related Nodong variant but creating a credible looking MAZ based TEL for the new missile would be a difficult task.
Admitted: Their all-terrain TEL capabilities/numbers might not have been sufficient in 2017 to created MAZ variant trucks for the new missile and hence they were forced to use a road-truck TEL.

Next point: It is true that the core of Irans solid fuel missile team was martyred together with Shahid Tehrani Moghaddam, but the capabilities have been regained to some extend.
(according to Gand.o TV series it was sabotage via Mossad/MEK, intended leak?)
We know that Iran tests ICBM-size boosters via Armscontrolwonk while we don't know about North Korea doing something like that.
Both NK and Iran (Zolfaghar BM) have displayed capability of filament composite casings. Iran probably even carbon fiber based filament technology. Hence the <2m diameter and <18m length of this lightweight ICBM could be weithin miniaturization capabilities of both countries. Original DF-31 ICBM which is larger is very similar in TEL layout but should be a cruder high strength steel based design which requires ~30% larger size.
2008 vintage Sejil design also still used high strength steel based casing technology. The new missile would then represent a filament casing Sejil with diameter improved from 1,3m to 1,9m while keeping the 17-18m lenght, plus better TVC technology. Via those changes the range would improve from 2000km to 12000km.

Sounds much? Well the Dezul has 10-20% total larger dimensions than the Fathe-110 but improved the range from originally 250km 4-fold to 1000km. Now scale this to the Sejil and the new missile: 50% larger diameter than the Sejil, then a 6-fold range increase instead of 4-fold from Fateh to Dezful would be well feasible.

NK showed Aramid/Kevlar based filament technology but Iran looks to have carbon fiber based filament technology. NK has demonstrated solid-fuel-grade TVC vane technology compact and fast-acting enough for a container launched missile without fins, Iran not yet.

The new missile is a very compact ICBM around the same size as Irans Ghadr, Sejil and Shahab-3 TELs. It's warhead might weight just 600-800kg, sufficient for an advanced nuclear warhead but it would only make sense for a <50m CEP conventional warhead.
Iran has not demonstrated a cold launched container based missile, while NK has. Container launch increases cost and is not a must for a climate like Irans. Plus carbon fiber filament casings are also expensive.
So a important question is what economical sense such a single warhead ICBM would make if it does not use nuclear warheads primarily.
So this is the next point: Iran has demonstrated necessary accurate long range accuracy by the Khorramshahr-2 testing video. Can it be scaled to ICBM range or would the INS drift so much that no CEP of <50m is possible @ 12000km? Can terminal course corrections be performed at the incredible high thermal and aerodynamic stress of a ICBM range re-entry?
Huge technological hurdles but if it is possible for Iran, then a conventional lightweight, single warhead ICBM would make sense for Iran against very high value targets. Otherwise a heavy liquid ICBM with MRV, MIRV would be a significantly more cost effective approach.
With a CEP of >200m for a very good, high-speed terminally unguided warhead, a 600-800kg conventional warhead would probably already make no economic sense anymore.

So is the missile at the North Korean parade actually the fruit of Shahid Tehrani Moghaddam and his teams efforts used by NK to display a higher capability than it has?
I think there is a good chance for it.
Has Iran just gave a credible mock-up or transferred the technology to them? Well possible that the whole technology was transferred for their help in other fields.
Is the system robust enough without having being tested? Well possible; boosters with the size have been tested in Iran. Key open hurdle is re-entry and thermal technology barriers. But Irans and NKs understanding of BMs and simulation capabilities seems to be so advanced, that systems are robust enough when finished to work on correctly the first flight.

When I looked at photos from the DF-31 in the early 2000's I wondered when Iran can reach something similar. If this systems turns out to be the alleged light ICBM completed by Shahid Tehrani Moghaddams team (heavy solid ICBM/SLV project ended in the sabotage disaster?), then it is even better than the DF-31...

Part II:

Yesterday "civilian" Israeli open source twitter published this about the testings at Shahrud:

https://twitter.com/x/status/1153698442235011072

So Shahid Tehrani Moghaddams program has entered a new phase of intensive testing recently.

What is being tested? According to the Armscontrolwonk crew a ~90t booster which is e.g about what is estimated for the Russian intercontinental range Bulava SLBM.
That booster was already tested years ago (3-5) but the intensity and numbers of tests increased very much in the last months. New boosters with higher thrust are now also tested.

So let me now connect this to by above earlier post: Irans light ICBM program which my has surfaced in North Korea, Irans main strategic technology partner.
The reason for Iran to give a difficultly developed ICBM may be simple: North Korea took the burden and did nuclear testings up to a hydrogen bomb. If data is shared with Iran as one could expect, then Irans ICBM technology in return makes sense.
So in the last post I explained why that system looks Iranian.
Now I want to show some results of scaling calculations from all released open source material.

First point: Would a conventional ICBM be feasible?
Key to that is miniaturization and materials on one side and level of precision striking on the other hand.
What do we know about Irans capabilities in this fields?

Materials: The turning point was the presentation of the Fateh-313, later the Zolfaghar up to the Dezful.
to make it short: These systems use composite booster casings.
The lowest performing material in this class is fiberglass from which the Russian Yars ICBM is made.
The highest performing material is carbon/graphite epoxy and while we don't know what earlier missiles used, a few months ago Iran presented the Dezful which has a characteristic black nozzle.
People at ACW confirm this: Already the Zolfaghar casing looked like a carnon/graphite casing instead of firberglass or Aramid.
So one key technology for lightweight miniaturization is already in Iran. At this point even best Russian systems such as the Bulava and certainly Yars/Topol as well as North Korean solids use aramid/fiberglass primarily.
What is the goal of all of this? Create a cost effective two-stage ICBM where other countries are forced to create more complex 3-stage systems.
Even more: Enable to reach necessary intercontinental ranges of 11.000km (U.S eastcoast) by just developing a new variant of the Sejil two-stage solid fuel MRBM.

At this point I need to open a case:
Fateh generation 1 missiles had a steel casing and 200km range.
Dezful ("Fateh" generation 7) has apparently a carbon/graphite casing and a range of 1000km.

Sejil generation 1 missiles had a steel casing and 2000km range.
Light ICBM cold hence achieve... calculation shows: exactly 10.000km assuming the same proportional technological improvement as Fateh-G1 to Dezful.

Now things are not as easy: Iran has two constrains: It wants a system not larger in length than the existing Sejil and Ghadr/Shahab-3 series of TELs. This lowers probability of detection ---> no 10x10 heavy off-road TEL as option (no forests to mask them). Size wise it hence must be also be able to the carried by those kind of trucks which dictates max. weight and diameter.
This is the reason why I believe the North Korean system to be the Iranian one actually: That TEL system has the same overall size as the Sejil.

My scaling calculations show that the weight would be less than two Sejils but more than the Bulava: ~40 tons. This is a good fit for the tested 90t boosters at Shahroud.
The larger diameter estimated to be 1,8m would then allow an heavier warhead then the Sejil, about twice as heavy or 2-3 Separate warheads.

This is a North Korean intended leak of such a two stage solid fuel ICBM.

At this point I need to give a reminder: North Korea had great achievements with their Pukguksong series of solid fuel missiles without the visible decade long testing work Iran did on its boosters. The made a big jump ahead of Irans current Sejil: They demonstrated cold launch which increases survivability of the TEL, a more compact TVC, and retractable fins.
However "their" casing technology is not carbon/graphite based not have they key technologies such as a boost termination system which the Sejil has. The helped Iran with its liquids and are masters in that field but their solid fuel technology seems to have been transferred by Iran to them.

The result of what is visible and what Iran has demonstrated in other systems creates one, amazing possebility: A two stage solid ICBM, as long as the Sejil, not reaching even twice its weight and a twice higher throw weight.
An ICBM that could probably be produced at 2-3 times the price of the Sejil, 15-20 times less then equivalent western nuclear ICBMs.
Here it can't be stressed enough what huge and elegant achievement the Dezul represents for Iran. Being able to strike Israel from Iran with a miniature, single stage 4,5t missile is an absolute nightmare for Israel: It requires a state of the art technology level to create a system with such a high performance: Key was the carbon-graphite technology.

So what other key technology is needed?
What was mentioned is sufficient for a nuclear light ICBM. However without a MaRV, it is not possible to achieve an accuracy below ~130m CEP: That is sufficient against soft targets when a ~1000kg warhead is used, more so with an air burst. This might be the intermediate step and deemed sufficient but the key are MaRVs. MaRVs would enable 10-30m accuracy levels and the throw weight could be split to 2-3 MaRVs each having 500kg warheads.

As said in the previous post, this is just fantasy at this point: No country in the world has achieved something like that: MaRV at intercontinental ranges have been tested as prototypes but simply too hard to master. Only confirmed system is the Russian Avangard which is even a step beyond classical MaRV. Technological difficulty is one point, price of such MaRVs another.

So where is Iran here? Iran has demonstrated high accuracy levels with its MaRV'ed Khorramshahr-2 MRBM.
The accuracy was so high that only 4 known guidance methods could have achieved it:
- Ground Radio corrected trajectory: Not robust enough in wartime
- GPS guidance: Not robust enough in wartime
- INS: Not known to be able to achieve such high accuracy levels. Drifts the longer the range gets.
- Astro-Navigation: Iran has not demonstrated a astro-nav system with such a high accuracy level, but U.S and Russians have.

From all those systems only an astro-nav system would be cost effective, robust and accurate enough. The MaRV would then use cost effective G-hardned accelerometers to compensate the atmospheric errors (needed to achieve <130m accuracy).
One thing must be realized here: U.S Pershing II of the 80's used a MaRV which required terminal guidance to achieve a accuracy like that shown in the Khorramshahr-2 test. Achieving the displayed accuracy without terminal guidance is very significant for one goal: MaRV for IRBM to ICBM level ranges (speeds), where terminal radar or optical guidance would be impossible due to the thermal effects of high speed re-entry.
So Iran has demonstrated MaRV technology that probably would work to a range beyond the stated 2000km, estimated 4000km would be possible with nose modifications. However beyond that, up to 11.000km, that MaRV would have to be completely redesigned and new technologies achieved.

Beside all this, there is another key problem that needs a technological solution:
- Either a very precise thrust termination system if a single heavy RV, without MaRV is used: Demonstrated basically with the Sejil.
- A crude, high altitude MaRV without a thrust termination system for trajectory correction.
- A Saman like bus system for multiple unguided RVs in a evolved anti-ABM system.
The Saman bus system is again a great achievement if successfully tested: It is a storeable, non-liquid bus system, something Russians are said to have integrated into their Bulava SLBM, creating a "all-solid" MIRV missile.
With the Saman bus, the "footprint" can be increased: distance of targets attacked by the individual RVs. That is why a Saman like bus would also make sense for a 2-3 MaRV payload of the light ICBM.
Most cost efficient approach would probably be to have point-point strike via 2-3 MaRVs which not need a bus system and correct their trajectory on their own (lower footprint and less anti-ABM capabilities).

Conclusion:
A conventional global-precision-strike weapon is not feasible for official nuclear powers but possible for Iran.
A solid fuel two stage ICBM requires primary the carbon/graphite technology displayed by Iran.
Conventional warheads requires guidance systems accuracy displayed by Iran.
Pin-point-strike requires, MaRV technology displayed at a lower-grade level by Iran.
Jump from two-stage Sejil to two-stage ICBM demonstrated by Iran in terms of technology via the improvement from Fateh G1 to Dezful.

PS: A good time to open this topic, now that Iran wants to pressure the west on Barjam.

 

[VEVAK]

You wouldn't be able to shoot it down because your air defense systems would be destroyed by then AND the MOAB are carried by stealth bombers.



Targeting Saudi Arabia would make things worse for you because you be pushing many countries in the ME against Iran, especially the world as well including Russia and China that would have their economies collapsed. 5000 air defenses or so is nothing. The U.S. was prepared to take on the Soviet Union at its prime that had more! And you doubt about the effectiveness of the bunker busters, but you know the U.S. always testing and studying how to penetrate bunkers.

Right because a large fleet of U.S. aircrafts and tomahawks are going to penetrate Iran's Air Defense and take out all the air defenses of a country larger than U.K., France, Germany & Italy combined while simultaneously hitting all 40 or so Iranian missiles bases with bombs as heavy as an F-16! LOL! Sure you are! Delusional much?

And that still doesn't address all of Iran's other capabilities like

1. Iran's Naval capabilities & yes U.S. can no doubt take out over 85% of Iran's blue water capabilities in a matter of hours but that hardly addresses Iran's naval capabilities within ~500km of it's shores from a vast stock of costal batteries, missile boats, FAC, Subs,.... And the biggest threat to them doesn't come from U.S. ships but from U.S. Air Power. Which would require a rather large amount of U.S. Aircrafts to stay back to try to deal with them at the start of any conflict. And even if you manage to take them out you'd still have to deal with 1000's of speed boats that will be sent to mine the Persian Gulf!

2.Iran's vast UCAV capabilities that don't require large runways & can be armed with weapons like Iran's akhgar missile that can be Air launched from 25km out at a relatively low altitude (Rendering SHORAD systems useless against the UCAV's, which would required a good number of U.S. Fighters to remain back for defense and interception.) Because although they may not have large warheads, their payload is more than sufficient to take out radars, SAM, un-bunkered aircrafts,....

3.Even if the U.S. was to hit all ~40 or so large Missile bases simultaneously which is doubtful that still wouldn't address smaller more hidden bases & bunkers equipped with LACM & Fateh class (250km-1000km range) spread in smaller numbers across a country as large as Iran.

4.U.S. would also have to engage and carryout attacks against Iran's Air Force because even though the fleet is equipped with outdated old platforms they are still armed with PGM's and Air Launched Cruise Missiles which the US can't risk to ignore.

5.U.S would also have to deal with Iranian special forces and pro Iranian forces that are already deployed within 50km of a vast number of U.S. bases across the region.

Also it's important to note that the U.S. has NEVER been in a direct conflict with a country that has even come close to having Iran's missile capabilities whether in stock or accuracy let alone both Or Iran's UCAV capabilities OR AIDS capabilities Or Anti ship missile capabilities or ISW capabilities or ECM capabilities or Cyberwarfare capabilities and since WW2 U.S. has not gone to war with a singe country with Iran's Naval capabilities or against a country capable of producing over 95% of it's own yearly weapons acquisition.


So your assumption about the U.S. ability to take out Iran with conventional weapons is nothing but a delusion!
And yes the U.S. can no doubt fire ICBM's and nuke every City in Iran in a single day and bring Iran to it's knees but short of vast use of nukes the U.S. conventional capabilities that would result in a definite victory over Iran simply does not exist!
Look at Yamen, the Saudi's are spending more money on their military than Russia! And they are buying mostly American weapons and after how many years and involving how many other countries they can't so much as stop Missiles from being fired at them from one of the financially poorest countries of the region in a country the fraction the size of Iran & not even a fraction of Iran's military, financial, technological, industrial,..... capabilities.

So wake the hell up! This delusion you've been living under is ONLY that "a DELUSION" and nothing more!

 

[TheImmortal]

Part II:

Yesterday "civilian" Israeli open source twitter published this about the testings at Shahrud:

https://twitter.com/x/status/1153698442235011072

So Shahid Tehrani Moghaddams program has entered a new phase of intensive testing recently.

What is being tested? According to the Armscontrolwonk crew a ~90t booster which is e.g about what is estimated for the Russian intercontinental range Bulava SLBM.
That booster was already tested years ago (3-5) but the intensity and numbers of tests increased very much in the last months. New boosters with higher thrust are now also tested.

So let me now connect this to by above earlier post: Irans light ICBM program which my has surfaced in North Korea, Irans main strategic technology partner.
The reason for Iran to give a difficultly developed ICBM may be simple: North Korea took the burden and did nuclear testings up to a hydrogen bomb. If data is shared with Iran as one could expect, then Irans ICBM technology in return makes sense.
So in the last post I explained why that system looks Iranian.
Now I want to show some results of scaling calculations from all released open source material.

First point: Would a conventional ICBM be feasible?
Key to that is miniaturization and materials on one side and level of precision striking on the other hand.
What do we know about Irans capabilities in this fields?

Materials: The turning point was the presentation of the Fateh-313, later the Zolfaghar up to the Dezful.
to make it short: These systems use composite booster casings.
The lowest performing material in this class is fiberglass from which the Russian Yars ICBM is made.
The highest performing material is carbon/graphite epoxy and while we don't know what earlier missiles used, a few months ago Iran presented the Dezful which has a characteristic black nozzle.
People at ACW confirm this: Already the Zolfaghar casing looked like a carnon/graphite casing instead of firberglass or Aramid.
So one key technology for lightweight miniaturization is already in Iran. At this point even best Russian systems such as the Bulava and certainly Yars/Topol as well as North Korean solids use aramid/fiberglass primarily.
What is the goal of all of this? Create a cost effective two-stage ICBM where other countries are forced to create more complex 3-stage systems.
Even more: Enable to reach necessary intercontinental ranges of 11.000km (U.S eastcoast) by just developing a new variant of the Sejil two-stage solid fuel MRBM.

At this point I need to open a case:
Fateh generation 1 missiles had a steel casing and 200km range.
Dezful ("Fateh" generation 7) has apparently a carbon/graphite casing and a range of 1000km.

Sejil generation 1 missiles had a steel casing and 2000km range.
Light ICBM cold hence achieve... calculation shows: exactly 10.000km assuming the same proportional technological improvement as Fateh-G1 to Dezful.

Now things are not as easy: Iran has two constrains: It wants a system not larger in length than the existing Sejil and Ghadr/Shahab-3 series of TELs. This lowers probability of detection ---> no 10x10 heavy off-road TEL as option (no forests to mask them). Size wise it hence must be also be able to the carried by those kind of trucks which dictates max. weight and diameter.
This is the reason why I believe the North Korean system to be the Iranian one actually: That TEL system has the same overall size as the Sejil.

My scaling calculations show that the weight would be less than two Sejils but more than the Bulava: ~40 tons. This is a good fit for the tested 90t boosters at Shahroud.
The larger diameter estimated to be 1,8m would then allow an heavier warhead then the Sejil, about twice as heavy or 2-3 Separate warheads.

This is a North Korean intended leak of such a two stage solid fuel ICBM.

At this point I need to give a reminder: North Korea had great achievements with their Pukguksong series of solid fuel missiles without the visible decade long testing work Iran did on its boosters. The made a big jump ahead of Irans current Sejil: They demonstrated cold launch which increases survivability of the TEL, a more compact TVC, and retractable fins.
However "their" casing technology is not carbon/graphite based not have they key technologies such as a boost termination system which the Sejil has. The helped Iran with its liquids and are masters in that field but their solid fuel technology seems to have been transferred by Iran to them.

The result of what is visible and what Iran has demonstrated in other systems creates one, amazing possebility: A two stage solid ICBM, as long as the Sejil, not reaching even twice its weight and a twice higher throw weight.
An ICBM that could probably be produced at 2-3 times the price of the Sejil, 15-20 times less then equivalent western nuclear ICBMs.
Here it can't be stressed enough what huge and elegant achievement the Dezul represents for Iran. Being able to strike Israel from Iran with a miniature, single stage 4,5t missile is an absolute nightmare for Israel: It requires a state of the art technology level to create a system with such a high performance: Key was the carbon-graphite technology.

So what other key technology is needed?
What was mentioned is sufficient for a nuclear light ICBM. However without a MaRV, it is not possible to achieve an accuracy below ~130m CEP: That is sufficient against soft targets when a ~1000kg warhead is used, more so with an air burst. This might be the intermediate step and deemed sufficient but the key are MaRVs. MaRVs would enable 10-30m accuracy levels and the throw weight could be split to 2-3 MaRVs each having 500kg warheads.

As said in the previous post, this is just fantasy at this point: No country in the world has achieved something like that: MaRV at intercontinental ranges have been tested as prototypes but simply too hard to master. Only confirmed system is the Russian Avangard which is even a step beyond classical MaRV. Technological difficulty is one point, price of such MaRVs another.

So where is Iran here? Iran has demonstrated high accuracy levels with its MaRV'ed Khorramshahr-2 MRBM.
The accuracy was so high that only 4 known guidance methods could have achieved it:
- Ground Radio corrected trajectory: Not robust enough in wartime
- GPS guidance: Not robust enough in wartime
- INS: Not known to be able to achieve such high accuracy levels. Drifts the longer the range gets.
- Astro-Navigation: Iran has not demonstrated a astro-nav system with such a high accuracy level, but U.S and Russians have.

From all those systems only an astro-nav system would be cost effective, robust and accurate enough. The MaRV would then use cost effective G-hardned accelerometers to compensate the atmospheric errors (needed to achieve <130m accuracy).
One thing must be realized here: U.S Pershing II of the 80's used a MaRV which required terminal guidance to achieve a accuracy like that shown in the Khorramshahr-2 test. Achieving the displayed accuracy without terminal guidance is very significant for one goal: MaRV for IRBM to ICBM level ranges (speeds), where terminal radar or optical guidance would be impossible due to the thermal effects of high speed re-entry.
So Iran has demonstrated MaRV technology that probably would work to a range beyond the stated 2000km, estimated 4000km would be possible with nose modifications. However beyond that, up to 11.000km, that MaRV would have to be completely redesigned and new technologies achieved.

Beside all this, there is another key problem that needs a technological solution:
- Either a very precise thrust termination system if a single heavy RV, without MaRV is used: Demonstrated basically with the Sejil.
- A crude, high altitude MaRV without a thrust termination system for trajectory correction.
- A Saman like bus system for multiple unguided RVs in a evolved anti-ABM system.
The Saman bus system is again a great achievement if successfully tested: It is a storeable, non-liquid bus system, something Russians are said to have integrated into their Bulava SLBM, creating a "all-solid" MIRV missile.
With the Saman bus, the "footprint" can be increased: distance of targets attacked by the individual RVs. That is why a Saman like bus would also make sense for a 2-3 MaRV payload of the light ICBM.
Most cost efficient approach would probably be to have point-point strike via 2-3 MaRVs which not need a bus system and correct their trajectory on their own (lower footprint and less anti-ABM capabilities).

Conclusion:
A conventional global-precision-strike weapon is not feasible for official nuclear powers but possible for Iran.
A solid fuel two stage ICBM requires primary the carbon/graphite technology displayed by Iran.
Conventional warheads requires guidance systems accuracy displayed by Iran.
Pin-point-strike requires, MaRV technology displayed at a lower-grade level by Iran.
Jump from two-stage Sejil to two-stage ICBM demonstrated by Iran in terms of technology via the improvement from Fateh G1 to Dezful.

PS: A good time to open this topic, now that Iran wants to pressure the west on Barjam.

A great amount of information unfortunately it lead to a conclusion that began right where it started: with nothing.

To equate NK’s jump in ICBM technology or solid fuel to Iran is a bit of naive nationalism. It’s clear a nation state has helped NK in this quite impressive jump from failure and failure to 3 long range modern powerful missiles. But I believe that state to be China along with consent from Russia as the engine that powers them is a Russian engine and not anything that I believe Iran could easily reverse engineer on its own let alone engineer and export.

Iran has been linked to an ICBM program since the 90’s. The truth is Iran is struggling in that department and years after Tehrani’s death Iran still has not moved from engine stand testing stage.

You lead the reader on great informative journey detailing the ways that Iran could create a cost effective conventional ICBM while at the same time sharing important information about both NK and Iran Missile programs.

However, the journey falls apart at issue of accuracy, where you ultimately doubt if it is even possible to get the <20M accuracy needed for such a missile given the requirements.

So again we are right back where we started.

 

[VEVAK]

Part II:

Yesterday "civilian" Israeli open source twitter published this about the testings at Shahrud:

https://twitter.com/x/status/1153698442235011072

So Shahid Tehrani Moghaddams program has entered a new phase of intensive testing recently.

What is being tested? According to the Armscontrolwonk crew a ~90t booster which is e.g about what is estimated for the Russian intercontinental range Bulava SLBM.
That booster was already tested years ago (3-5) but the intensity and numbers of tests increased very much in the last months. New boosters with higher thrust are now also tested.

So let me now connect this to by above earlier post: Irans light ICBM program which my has surfaced in North Korea, Irans main strategic technology partner.
The reason for Iran to give a difficultly developed ICBM may be simple: North Korea took the burden and did nuclear testings up to a hydrogen bomb. If data is shared with Iran as one could expect, then Irans ICBM technology in return makes sense.
So in the last post I explained why that system looks Iranian.
Now I want to show some results of scaling calculations from all released open source material.

First point: Would a conventional ICBM be feasible?
Key to that is miniaturization and materials on one side and level of precision striking on the other hand.
What do we know about Irans capabilities in this fields?

Materials: The turning point was the presentation of the Fateh-313, later the Zolfaghar up to the Dezful.
to make it short: These systems use composite booster casings.
The lowest performing material in this class is fiberglass from which the Russian Yars ICBM is made.
The highest performing material is carbon/graphite epoxy and while we don't know what earlier missiles used, a few months ago Iran presented the Dezful which has a characteristic black nozzle.
People at ACW confirm this: Already the Zolfaghar casing looked like a carnon/graphite casing instead of firberglass or Aramid.
So one key technology for lightweight miniaturization is already in Iran. At this point even best Russian systems such as the Bulava and certainly Yars/Topol as well as North Korean solids use aramid/fiberglass primarily.
What is the goal of all of this? Create a cost effective two-stage ICBM where other countries are forced to create more complex 3-stage systems.
Even more: Enable to reach necessary intercontinental ranges of 11.000km (U.S eastcoast) by just developing a new variant of the Sejil two-stage solid fuel MRBM.

At this point I need to open a case:
Fateh generation 1 missiles had a steel casing and 200km range.
Dezful ("Fateh" generation 7) has apparently a carbon/graphite casing and a range of 1000km.

Sejil generation 1 missiles had a steel casing and 2000km range.
Light ICBM cold hence achieve... calculation shows: exactly 10.000km assuming the same proportional technological improvement as Fateh-G1 to Dezful.

Now things are not as easy: Iran has two constrains: It wants a system not larger in length than the existing Sejil and Ghadr/Shahab-3 series of TELs. This lowers probability of detection ---> no 10x10 heavy off-road TEL as option (no forests to mask them). Size wise it hence must be also be able to the carried by those kind of trucks which dictates max. weight and diameter.
This is the reason why I believe the North Korean system to be the Iranian one actually: That TEL system has the same overall size as the Sejil.

My scaling calculations show that the weight would be less than two Sejils but more than the Bulava: ~40 tons. This is a good fit for the tested 90t boosters at Shahroud.
The larger diameter estimated to be 1,8m would then allow an heavier warhead then the Sejil, about twice as heavy or 2-3 Separate warheads.

This is a North Korean intended leak of such a two stage solid fuel ICBM.

At this point I need to give a reminder: North Korea had great achievements with their Pukguksong series of solid fuel missiles without the visible decade long testing work Iran did on its boosters. The made a big jump ahead of Irans current Sejil: They demonstrated cold launch which increases survivability of the TEL, a more compact TVC, and retractable fins.
However "their" casing technology is not carbon/graphite based not have they key technologies such as a boost termination system which the Sejil has. The helped Iran with its liquids and are masters in that field but their solid fuel technology seems to have been transferred by Iran to them.

The result of what is visible and what Iran has demonstrated in other systems creates one, amazing possebility: A two stage solid ICBM, as long as the Sejil, not reaching even twice its weight and a twice higher throw weight.
An ICBM that could probably be produced at 2-3 times the price of the Sejil, 15-20 times less then equivalent western nuclear ICBMs.
Here it can't be stressed enough what huge and elegant achievement the Dezul represents for Iran. Being able to strike Israel from Iran with a miniature, single stage 4,5t missile is an absolute nightmare for Israel: It requires a state of the art technology level to create a system with such a high performance: Key was the carbon-graphite technology.

So what other key technology is needed?
What was mentioned is sufficient for a nuclear light ICBM. However without a MaRV, it is not possible to achieve an accuracy below ~130m CEP: That is sufficient against soft targets when a ~1000kg warhead is used, more so with an air burst. This might be the intermediate step and deemed sufficient but the key are MaRVs. MaRVs would enable 10-30m accuracy levels and the throw weight could be split to 2-3 MaRVs each having 500kg warheads.

As said in the previous post, this is just fantasy at this point: No country in the world has achieved something like that: MaRV at intercontinental ranges have been tested as prototypes but simply too hard to master. Only confirmed system is the Russian Avangard which is even a step beyond classical MaRV. Technological difficulty is one point, price of such MaRVs another.

So where is Iran here? Iran has demonstrated high accuracy levels with its MaRV'ed Khorramshahr-2 MRBM.
The accuracy was so high that only 4 known guidance methods could have achieved it:
- Ground Radio corrected trajectory: Not robust enough in wartime
- GPS guidance: Not robust enough in wartime
- INS: Not known to be able to achieve such high accuracy levels. Drifts the longer the range gets.
- Astro-Navigation: Iran has not demonstrated a astro-nav system with such a high accuracy level, but U.S and Russians have.

From all those systems only an astro-nav system would be cost effective, robust and accurate enough. The MaRV would then use cost effective G-hardned accelerometers to compensate the atmospheric errors (needed to achieve <130m accuracy).
One thing must be realized here: U.S Pershing II of the 80's used a MaRV which required terminal guidance to achieve a accuracy like that shown in the Khorramshahr-2 test. Achieving the displayed accuracy without terminal guidance is very significant for one goal: MaRV for IRBM to ICBM level ranges (speeds), where terminal radar or optical guidance would be impossible due to the thermal effects of high speed re-entry.
So Iran has demonstrated MaRV technology that probably would work to a range beyond the stated 2000km, estimated 4000km would be possible with nose modifications. However beyond that, up to 11.000km, that MaRV would have to be completely redesigned and new technologies achieved.

Beside all this, there is another key problem that needs a technological solution:
- Either a very precise thrust termination system if a single heavy RV, without MaRV is used: Demonstrated basically with the Sejil.
- A crude, high altitude MaRV without a thrust termination system for trajectory correction.
- A Saman like bus system for multiple unguided RVs in a evolved anti-ABM system.
The Saman bus system is again a great achievement if successfully tested: It is a storeable, non-liquid bus system, something Russians are said to have integrated into their Bulava SLBM, creating a "all-solid" MIRV missile.
With the Saman bus, the "footprint" can be increased: distance of targets attacked by the individual RVs. That is why a Saman like bus would also make sense for a 2-3 MaRV payload of the light ICBM.
Most cost efficient approach would probably be to have point-point strike via 2-3 MaRVs which not need a bus system and correct their trajectory on their own (lower footprint and less anti-ABM capabilities).

Conclusion:
A conventional global-precision-strike weapon is not feasible for official nuclear powers but possible for Iran.
A solid fuel two stage ICBM requires primary the carbon/graphite technology displayed by Iran.
Conventional warheads requires guidance systems accuracy displayed by Iran.
Pin-point-strike requires, MaRV technology displayed at a lower-grade level by Iran.
Jump from two-stage Sejil to two-stage ICBM demonstrated by Iran in terms of technology via the improvement from Fateh G1 to Dezful.

PS: A good time to open this topic, now that Iran wants to pressure the west on Barjam.

A few questions

1. On an ICBM why can't an INS corrected by counter imaging & or radar mapping technology capable of identifying and filtering clouds.... be used for trajectory correction before you get to the Atlantic & again be used for terminal guidance once over the Atlantic and up until a spinning RV is released right before you hit the atmosphere over your target

2. On wider diameter missile if from the start you accept that your building them to save money only on boosters, personal & storage not guidance systems, buses,.... what exactly would the technical problems be if for example a large booster was to release 8-9 independent PBV's each equipped with a single warhead, navigation, guidance & control systems sensors,..... meant mainly to tackle targets within 2000km of Iran's boarders.
And theoretically such a platform should be much harder to intercept post boost since a single missile launch from central Iran suddenly turns into multiple hypersonic course correcting, independently guided & powered projectiles in space just as it's about to exits Iran's boarders(in space) making it much harder for anti ballistic missiles systems to react....

And I'd say just because it hasn't been done before it doesn't mean it's beyond Iran's reach & one of the reason it hasn't been done is because most countries with the capability to build such boosters simply go the ICBM rout....

3.For practical use I just don't see ICBM's as a practical weapon without a nuclear stockpile. As I said, simply put Iran would have to be suicidal to hit US soil even with a conventional ICBM without 1st building up a nuclear deterrence. And the only target beyond 5,000km worth the cost of an ICBM would be US soil.

Also, with current U.S. behavior I just don't see any reason as to why Iran wouldn't move quickly towards building a good size nuclear stockpile. And although Nukes are rather useless weapon in a practical sense, if their one and only use is to prevent a nuclear attack on your own soil while allowing you to respond conventionally against any enemy anywhere then they are well worth it since we are already paying the political cost for it to a point that they are now messing with our shipping so I really don't see any reason to hold back! Iran has to clearly explain to China, Russia & EU that the U.S. has left us with no choice but to leave the NPT we tried a deal & none of you were willing to properly stand against US absurdities & EU did a lot of talking but in action an EU country using EU sanctions as an excuse confiscated our Tanker like a bunch of pirates so there is nothing left to say, we're out!

 

[PeeD]

To equate NK’s jump in ICBM technology or solid fuel to Iran is a bit of naive nationalism. It’s clear a nation state has helped NK in this quite impressive jump from failure and failure to 3 long range modern powerful missiles. But I believe that state to be China along with consent from Russia as the engine that powers them is a Russian engine and not anything that I believe Iran could easily reverse engineer on its own let alone engineer and export.

China would probably assist them with one of their programs if at all, the liquid one. North Koreans just somehow had leverage on the source country to get that kind of solid fuel technology.
Iran and North Korea are unofficial strategic partners.
I agree that China is a option for their solid technology, Russia is much less likely and Iran is most likely. Simply because as strategic partners North Korea has leverage on Iran by their readiness to do nuclear tests at least. But they have nothing to offer to the Chinese which would likely support them on one technology able to hit the U.S.

There is no typical engineering signature of North Korean solid technology being of Iranian origin but their lack of testings from small motors to larger ones over a long time-span indicates that they very likely got support from somewhere. Likely Iran, less likely China.

Irans path on the other hand is clear, has its own signature and started at the end of the war.

Iran has been linked to an ICBM program since the 90’s. The truth is Iran is struggling in that department and years after Tehrani’s death Iran still has not moved from engine stand testing stage.

Engine stand testing is the key hurdle. Iran has political reasons not to test 2000km+ BMs and nuclear weapons.
Iran and North Korea do the other hurdle, re-entry testings via exposing the RV to rocket motor exhaust gases.
All mainly because the political backlash such testings would result in.
Their competence level in these testings is very high by now. Irans Khorramshahr with MaRV was the 2-3 testing of any baseline Khorramshahr variant. Same goes for the North Koreans which also just need 1-2 tests to achieve success.
The two, 90 ton thrust main motor tests at Shahroud withing 45 days show that the program is very active by now.
We can be very confident that probably all necessary subsystems for the non-MaRV light ICBM are ready with high confidence levels. The Sejil is a flight dynamics proof of concept for such a light ICBM (except for the heat shield/RV issue).

However, the journey falls apart at issue of accuracy, where you ultimately doubt if it is even possible to get the <20M accuracy needed for such a missile given the requirements.

So again we are right back where we started.

50% of my post is relevant to a non-MaRV variant with typical ICBM level accuracy (500-130m) well sufficient for nuclear warheads.
50% of the rest is dedicated to the idea of a economic conventional ICBM of decreased complexity and large degree of miniaturization.
The nuclear variant, which I think we have seen in the North Korean parade, likely has been ready since several years but we will likely never see it until it is phased out by a next generation system: It will remain a secret weapon.
But the possibility of a conventional ICBM could bring it out of the realm of strategic secret weapons. I think Iran has proven its feasibility. The MaRV variant of it would be the ultimate goal of it, capable to hit hardened "counter-force" targets conventionally.
A key aspect of my message is this: Irans open solid fuel technology level is now at Dezful-level and will increase. We now know about carbon-carbon/graphite nozzles and composite casings. With this trend, a conventional two stage ICBM will become more and more a economic option for Iran.

1. On an ICBM why can't an INS corrected by counter imaging & or radar mapping technology capable of identifying and filtering clouds.... be used for trajectory correction before you get to the Atlantic & again be used for terminal guidance once over the Atlantic and up until a spinning RV is released right before you hit the atmosphere over your target

This is another guidance method but never achieved anywhere was far as known. This guidance method would allow for an antiship-ICBM. China should have such a system for IRBM class missiles. ICBMs simply create such a huge thermal "mess" that equipping them with a radar able to do its job in such a environment is deemed as a very difficult task. Even at IRBM ranges the DF-26 probably has a low velocity RV that deaccelerates to MRBM level speeds before starting the terminal engagement procedure.
This is something that is not desired of course, re-entry speed is the key to overcome enemy ABM.
Against static targets, astro-nav is a ideal solution employed by the leaders in this field, U.S and Russia.

2. On wider diameter missile if from the start you accept that your building them to save money only on boosters, personal & storage not guidance systems, buses,.... what exactly would the technical problems be if for example a large booster was to release 8-9 independent PBV's each equipped with a single warhead, navigation, guidance & control systems sensors,..... meant mainly to tackle targets within 2000km of Iran's boarders.
And theoretically such a platform should be much harder to intercept post boost since a single missile launch from central Iran suddenly turns into multiple hypersonic course correcting, independently guided & powered projectiles in space just as it's about to exits Iran's boarders(in space) making it much harder for anti ballistic missiles systems to react....

That is a good option for Iran which I have also described in the past. Individual PBV's would not be necessary, you could use a Khorramshahr-2 MaRV and add an exo-atmospheric gas control system to it, even cold gas if magnitude of maneuvering is low.
However this is judged to be cost-inefficient. Exo-atmospheric maneuvering for ABM avoidance seems to be skipped in favor for decoys, thermal decoys and chaff clouds.
So just detaching the MaRVs from the last stage + decoys and maybe ECM jamming would be the best solution here. Reduced strike footprint is also not important as the MaRV will spread out once in re-entry phase.
The reason Iran has not done this yet is the Khorramshahr: Iran uses more expensive solid fuel missiles for the "tactical", time-critical, immediate, mobile portion of strikes e.g against ABM assets. Liquids do the "strategic" portion of fixed targets that need to be taken out. That's why several MaRVs fired from a large diameter solid fuel missile is not very cost efficient for Iran.
I support a development of it however to make a technological statement within the 2000km limitation.

3.For practical use I just don't see ICBM's as a practical weapon without a nuclear stockpile. As I said, simply put Iran would have to be suicidal to hit US soil even with a conventional ICBM without 1st building up a nuclear deterrence. And the only target beyond 5,000km worth the cost of an ICBM would be US soil.

Here is where JCPOA/Barjam would be useful: with the nuclear program under safeguard control, the U.S would have very fragile justification to answer the launch of a single Iranian ICBM with a nuclear counter-attack.
I agree that Iran should have a hidden nuclear arsenal before doing it but here is the difference between North Korea and Iran: North Korea would have no chance to employ such a conventional ICBM at all as a nuclear power.

This is and was the only reason why I supported Barjam.
With the Dezful Iran has a weapon today that can strike all of northern Israel, it's main opponent.
1998 Iran needed the 17,5 ton "strategic" Shahab-3 to do that, now a 1/4, 4,5 ton tactical Dezful is doing it.
This trend will apply to a ICBM, a 23 ton Sejil would be replaced by a 35 ton ICBM, on a truck of the same size and a price just twice higher...

Iran has to clearly explain to China, Russia & EU that the U.S. has left us with no choice but to leave the NPT we tried a deal & none of you were willing to properly stand against US absurdities & EU did a lot of talking but in action an EU country using EU sanctions as an excuse confiscated our Tanker like a bunch of pirates so there is nothing left to say, we're out!

This is the least elegant emergency solution that is always there, the easy route (excluded are domestic issues with a economically unsatisfied population). However I want to see a Iran that can strike targets globally at will, without a fragile fleet and carriers. If Iran is potent enough it may achieve this + having a emergency secret nuclear arsenal + a survivable and hardened latent/break-out capability.

 

[VEVAK]

China would probably assist them with one of their programs if at all, the liquid one. North Koreans just somehow had leverage on the source country to get that kind of solid fuel technology.
Iran and North Korea are unofficial strategic partners.
I agree that China is a option for their solid technology, Russia is much less likely and Iran is most likely. Simply because as strategic partners North Korea has leverage on Iran by their readiness to do nuclear tests at least. But they have nothing to offer to the Chinese which would likely support them on one technology able to hit the U.S.

There is no typical engineering signature of North Korean solid technology being of Iranian origin but their lack of testings from small motors to larger ones over a long time-span indicates that they very likely got support from somewhere. Likely Iran, less likely China.

Irans path on the other hand is clear, has its own signature and started at the end of the war.



Engine stand testing is the key hurdle. Iran has political reasons not to test 2000km+ BMs and nuclear weapons.
Iran and North Korea do the other hurdle, re-entry testings via exposing the RV to rocket motor exhaust gases.
All mainly because the political backlash such testings would result in.
Their competence level in these testings is very high by now. Irans Khorramshahr with MaRV was the 2-3 testing of any baseline Khorramshahr variant. Same goes for the North Koreans which also just need 1-2 tests to achieve success.
The two, 90 ton thrust main motor tests at Shahroud withing 45 days show that the program is very active by now.
We can be very confident that probably all necessary subsystems for the non-MaRV light ICBM are ready with high confidence levels. The Sejil is a flight dynamics proof of concept for such a light ICBM (except for the heat shield/RV issue).



50% of my post is relevant to a non-MaRV variant with typical ICBM level accuracy (500-130m) well sufficient for nuclear warheads.
50% of the rest is dedicated to the idea of a economic conventional ICBM of decreased complexity and large degree of miniaturization.
The nuclear variant, which I think we have seen in the North Korean parade, likely has been ready since several years but we will likely never see it until it is phased out by a next generation system: It will remain a secret weapon.
But the possibility of a conventional ICBM could bring it out of the realm of strategic secret weapons. I think Iran has proven its feasibility. The MaRV variant of it would be the ultimate goal of it, capable to hit hardened "counter-force" targets conventionally.
A key aspect of my message is this: Irans open solid fuel technology level is now at Dezful-level and will increase. We now know about carbon-carbon/graphite nozzles and composite casings. With this trend, a conventional two stage ICBM will become more and more a economic option for Iran.



This is another guidance method but never achieved anywhere was far as known. This guidance method would allow for an antiship-ICBM. China should have such a system for IRBM class missiles. ICBMs simply create such a huge thermal "mess" that equipping them with a radar able to do its job in such a environment is deemed as a very difficult task. Even at IRBM ranges the DF-26 probably has a low velocity RV that deaccelerates to MRBM level speeds before starting the terminal engagement procedure.
This is something that is not desired of course, re-entry speed is the key to overcome enemy ABM.
Against static targets, astro-nav is a ideal solution employed by the leaders in this field, U.S and Russia.



That is a good option for Iran which I have also described in the past. Individual PBV's would not be necessary, you could use a Khorramshahr-2 MaRV and add an exo-atmospheric gas control system to it, even cold gas if magnitude of maneuvering is low.
However this is judged to be cost-inefficient. Exo-atmospheric maneuvering for ABM avoidance seems to be skipped in favor for decoys, thermal decoys and chaff clouds.
So just detaching the MaRVs from the last stage + decoys and maybe ECM jamming would be the best solution here. Reduced strike footprint is also not important as the MaRV will spread out once in re-entry phase.
The reason Iran has not done this yet is the Khorramshahr: Iran uses more expensive solid fuel missiles for the "tactical", time-critical, immediate, mobile portion of strikes e.g against ABM assets. Liquids do the "strategic" portion of fixed targets that need to be taken out. That's why several MaRVs fired from a large diameter solid fuel missile is not very cost efficient for Iran.
I support a development of it however to make a technological statement within the 2000km limitation.



Here is where JCPOA/Barjam would be useful: with the nuclear program under safeguard control, the U.S would have very fragile justification to answer the launch of a single Iranian ICBM with a nuclear counter-attack.
I agree that Iran should have a hidden nuclear arsenal before doing it but here is the difference between North Korea and Iran: North Korea would have no chance to employ such a conventional ICBM at all as a nuclear power.

This is and was the only reason why I supported Barjam.
With the Dezful Iran has a weapon today that can strike all of northern Israel, it's main opponent.
1998 Iran needed the 17,5 ton "strategic" Shahab-3 to do that, now a 1/4, 4,5 ton tactical Dezful is doing it.
This trend will apply to a ICBM, a 23 ton Sejil would be replaced by a 35 ton ICBM, on a truck of the same size and a price just twice higher...



This is the least elegant emergency solution that is always there, the easy route (excluded are domestic issues with a economically unsatisfied population). However I want to see a Iran that can strike targets globally at will, without a fragile fleet and carriers. If Iran is potent enough it may achieve this + having a emergency secret nuclear arsenal + a survivable and hardened latent/break-out capability.

We'll have to disagree on your assessment that Iran could retaliate against U.S. soil without having a nuclear deterrence. Again, simply put a U.S. President reckless enough to start a war with a country as powerful as Iran will no doubt be reckless enough to respond to a conventional ICBM attack on U.S. soil with Nukes. These aren't ppl that care much about international law!

I also disagree with you on Sea based weapons like light carriers & missile cruisers, for Iran's use a +450ft long missile cruiser & UAV carrier armed with a large number of UAV's & UCAV's (like the Saegheh) will go a long way and should most definitely be considered as a priority project for Iran's Navy because at the end of the day Iran can NOT afford to build a military based on the assumption that the U.S. is the one and ONLY threat now and forever. And Iran most defiantly needs to take better advantage of it's vast coastline by building coastal cities that with it comes the requirement of creating jobs and expansion of ship building both in the civilian and military sector should be on top of the list especially in areas east of Jask and using military as a starting point to create infrastructure, training personal & providing security is the best and only way forward.

As for further diplomacy on the JCPOA at the end of the day when a company like Pequot where a large portion of it's income is dependent on Iran runs with it's tail tucked in and not because their government wants it but simply out of fear of the U.S might do to them then what exactly is the point of further dialogue with the EU after a year of fruitless talks? If economic hardship in Iran is continuing to mount it's mainly due to this governments failure to swiftly react to U.S. actions after their withdraw of the JCPOA that could have potentially brought them back down to reality! Also, when Trump appoint ppl like Bolton and Pompeo around him then clearly there is absolutely 0 room for any kind of real diplomacy with this U.S. administration.
And the tactic of waiting out Trump and hoping for a more logical U.S. administration ONLY works if you don't show weakness by doing nothing. Fact is the next US administration will have NO reason to quickly remove sanctions and have this matter settled. However, what they will do is quite predictable. They will take advantage of the situation and drag it out with kind words while pressure mounts until Iran finally makes a major backroom concession in exchange and unless this administration plans to give up our missile program as easy as they gave up our SLV Program then they best go full force on the nuclear program by going well beyond Iran's civilian needs before hand. And unless Iranian politicians are now under the delusion keh Democrat ha ashegheh cheshmo abroomon shodan then they best act. And that's only if Trump doesn't get reelected! And I believe the best way to ensure that he doesn't get reelected is to test a Nuke before the U.S. elections to show the utter failure of his foreign policy but to properly do that Iran has to leave the JCPOA & the NPT before hand to show that those agreements and mechanisms actually worked when they were in place. And I don't believe that to be an easy rout but rather a necessary rout due to the economic pressures we have faced because we are already being punished for something we haven't actually done so we might as well do the deed already and get it over with!

 

[Surenas]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1154515756375318529