To be honest no, that isn't the case.
Not really sure why you're misinterpreting my statements and losing the discussion thread. You claimed it was acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and China which made the US lift sanctions on these countries. I showed how this is not the case, since other factors presided over Washington's decision to lift sanctions in these two instances.
China is not a threat to the zionist entity. Zionism is a central part of the ideological basis of the US regime. Zionist symbols are integrated into official United States emblems, zionism is intrinsically linked to freemasonry (as per one rabbi, freemasonry is merely an adapted version of the Kabbala), and masonry in turn is the single most salient element in the US regime's ideological foundations - a simple look at the urban architecture of Washington D.C., seat of federal institutions, will make that more than clear. The dominant Anglo-Saxons settlers in northern America were Puritanical Protestants of zionist persuasion, as evidenced by their belief in Rapture theology.
It's not Japan nor south Korea, nor India, nor any of the countries bordering the South China Sea which US presidents - no matter their political obedience, routinely and ritually praise and portray and the single closest entity to America, with sort of an organic link binding them together: it's Isra"el" and Isra"el" only.
Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether China will turn against the globalist oligarchy, which largely controls the US regime (including Democrat, classic Republican and fake opposition Trumpist camps). The revolutionary core of the Islamic Republic, however, is pursuing policies that are completely incompatible with the globalist design for a Universal Republic.
It's simply another example of a country against which the US maintained sanctions after it manufactured nuclear weapons. Again, it's necessary to stick to the thread of the discussion, I'm not speaking in a vacuum but strictly reacting to what was said before: here I was responding to the suggestion that nuclear weapons may encourage the US to lift sanctions. And that's not the case, be it with China, Pakistan, Iran or the DPRK.
No contradiction. Nuclear weapons aren't an existential necessity for Iran. Not at this time nor under current circumstances. They may one day become unavoidable, but that's not the case right now.
Where did I claim it's because of the prospect of additional sanctions that Iran doesn't need nuclear weapons at the moment? I'm saying Iran's nuclear program isn't the essential reason behind the US regime's sanctions policy against Iran. And secondly, that nuclear weapons won't add much to Iran's deterrence at this point in time and given the geopolitical context. No contradiction, no hypocrisy, nothing of the sort here.
As for the negotiations, once more I'll have to reference users mohsen and sanel1412's explanations on the subject. While adding that the limitations in question, many of which are subject to sunset clauses, do not deprive Iran of its break-out capability, nor of access to the entire spectrum of civilian nuclear technology. And thirdly, that considering Iran's principled stance at the negotiations, it is not guaranteed at all that the JCPOA is going to be revived in its original form to begin with.
I'm suggesting that the largest nuclear arsenal in the world will not deter an adversary from resorting to specific forms of military action. That the belief according to which nuclear weapons will preclude any and all (military) casualties and damage is incorrect. And, that those US casualties in Iraq weighed more and were more impactful on the geopolitical reality than Hajj Qasem's martyrdom.
Furthermore, one might turn the quoted argument around and declare that it's ridiculous to even envisage that Iran would have used megaton nuclear weapons on the US for the murder of shahid Soleimani.
There's strictly nothing ridiculous about reminding these facts. What they do, however, is to debunk the supposition that in view of relevant parameters, nuclear weapons will improve Iran's security equation the way that has been suggested they would.
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What is full scale / non-full scale deterrence? Could you point me to a work of international relations theory introducing the concept?
Secondly, what I'm insisting on is this: Iran has undeniably achieved deterrence against the US on what actually matters in the big picture, on what actually might prove game-changing in the bilateral conflict. As much as I cherish Hajj Qasem, his martyrdom was not a game-changing event in the Iran-US confrontation, it did not trigger a deterioration of Iran's geostrategic standing vis a vis Washington.
