I can't believe the attack that was filmed with an ATGM launch targeting zionist personel has killed only 1 or killed nothing, the explosion is huge
Hiding real casualties to provide morale for their troops and not provoking panic in ots population
Iranian Chill Thread
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Hiding real casualties to provide morale for their troops and not provoking panic in ots population
SalarHaqq
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Re-post of a recommended read.
The following paper reveals the limits of a military dependent upon fancy expensive technology and meticulous surveillance. In light of the recent Palestinian offensive, it shows that when it comes to hi-tech and density of surveillance networks, too much of it can actually be counter-productive.
08.10.2023 08:32 PM
A Palestinian demonstrator throws rocks towards Israeli soldiers during clashes in the city of Ramallah in the occupied West Bank on October 8, 2023.Photograph: JAAFAR ASHTIYEH/Getty Images
The Gaza Strip is one of the most densely populated areas on the planet. It’s also one of the most heavily locked down, surveilled, and suppressed. Israel has evolved an entire intelligence apparatus and aggressive digital espionage industry around advancing its geopolitical interests, particularly its interminable conflict in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Yet on Saturday, Hamas militants caught Israel unaware with a series of devastating land, air, and sea attacks, killing hundreds of people and leaving thousands wounded. Israel has now declared war.
Hamas’ surprise attack on Saturday is shocking given not only its scale compared to previous attacks, but also the fact that it was planned and carried out without Israel’s knowledge. Hamas’ deadly barrage underscores the limitations of even the most intrusive surveillance dragnets. In fact, experts say the sheer quantity of intelligence that Israel collects on Hamas, as well as the group’s constant activity and organizing, may have played a role in obscuring plans for this particular attack amid the endless barrage of potentially credible threats.
“There's no doubt that the scale and scope of this Hamas attack indicate just a colossal intelligence failure on behalf of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and in Shin Bet, the internal security agency,” says Raphael Marcus, a visiting research fellow at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies who focuses on the region. “They have such technical prowess and also a legacy of excellent human source capability.”
Israel is known for heavily monitoring Gaza and anyone who could be connected to Hamas using both traditional intelligence-gathering techniques and digital surveillance like facial recognition and spyware. Israel has proved its hacking skills and technical sophistication on the global stage for years, participating in the development of innovative malware for both digital espionage and cyber-physical attacks. The fact that Hamas was able to plan such an unprecedented and complex attack speaks to the limitations and inevitable blind spots of even the most comprehensive surveillance regime.
Jake Williams, a former US National Security Agency hacker and current faculty member at the Institute for Applied Network Security, emphasizes that when you have a firehose of intelligence streaming in from an array of sources, and when the climate is as fraught as that between Israel and Palestine, the challenge is organizing and parsing the information, not gathering it.
“Intelligence in an environment like Israel isn't finding a needle in a haystack—it's finding the needle that will hurt you in a pile of needles,” Williams says. “Given the number of Hamas members involved in the invasion, it's not plausible to me that Israel missed every human intelligence reflection of the planning. But I feel confident that there are always Hamas operatives talking about credible plans to attack the IDF. So Israel can't respond with force to every threat, even every credible one. They'd be at a heightened state of alert or actively engaged all the time, and that's probably actually worse for security.”
Though details of exactly how the attack happened are still emerging, it seems that oversights related to grappling with this signal-and-noise conundrum played a role.
“In retrospect, there was some information, but, like happens in all intelligence failures, it wasn't given sufficient consideration. It was misunderstood,” says Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser. “I think in the last days, from my understanding, there were some warning signs. And actually, the intelligence establishment had been warning for the past about half-year that there was going to be a significant conflict with Hamas, that they were bent on escalating the situation. But then they misread the signs.”
Colin Clarke, the director of research at the Soufan Group, an intelligence and security consultancy, says the Hamas attack would have “required months of preparation” and intelligence failures likely happened with both human intelligence and signals intelligence, where electronic and communications data is collected. “I’m still astonished that a breakdown in intelligence occurred at this level,” Clarke says. “I don’t think anybody, including the Israelis, were prepared for an operation this complex and multi-pronged.”
Crucial intelligence oversights could have happened as the result of numerous intersecting failures, says King’s College London’s Marcus. The Israeli intelligence apparatus may have misunderstood Hamas’s intentions, misread the context of crucial leads, been distracted by Israel’s political efforts with Saudi Arabia, or been grappling with domestic challenges. Israeli forces have complained, for example, of a brain drain from the IDF as individuals get pulled toward the private sector.
“I think that this wasn't just a military failure—I think that this was a dramatic failure of national leadership,” says Freilich, who authored Israel and the Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Cyber Power. The ambush calls to mind the outbreak of fighting during Ramadan in October 1973 in which an Arab bloc targeted Israel with a surprise attack on the Jewish holy day Yom Kippur to set off nearly 20 days of fighting.
Palestinians in occupied territories, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have faced surveillance and controls for years, with many calling the conditions an apartheid. In September 2021, Israeli forces announced the completion of a 40-mile-long barrier around the Gaza Strip—the sliver of land between Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea—that is essentially a “smart wall” equipped with radar, cameras, underground sensors, and an array of other surveillance instruments.
As the conflict ramps up into full-scale war, there is significant concern about the number of civilians impacted, with Amnesty International saying it is “deeply alarmed” by the civilian deaths in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. The Hamas assault has killed at least 700 and injured more than 2,000 Israelis on Saturday, according to the latest available figures. Video footage and reports shared online depict Hamas gunmen killing civilians, leaving bloody bodies scattered through the streets, and taking dozens of hostages. In response, Israel is launching large-scale airstrikes against Hamas targets in Gaza, while working to retake militant-controlled areas and preparing for offensive actions, including a possible ground invasion of Gaza. At least 370 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed and more than 2,000 wounded so far.
Israel Defense Forces say women and children have been taken hostage. Israel has also cut power to Gaza and internet monitoring firms say there has been a decrease in connectivity. As the fog of surveillance gives way to the fog of war, the current situation in Israel serves as an important illustration that unrelenting surveillance does not equate to or guarantee security.
Additional reporting by Morgan Meaker
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/israel-hamas-war-surveillance
The following paper reveals the limits of a military dependent upon fancy expensive technology and meticulous surveillance. In light of the recent Palestinian offensive, it shows that when it comes to hi-tech and density of surveillance networks, too much of it can actually be counter-productive.
08.10.2023 08:32 PM
Israel’s Failure to Stop the Hamas Attack Shows the Danger of Too Much Surveillance
Hundreds dead, thousands wounded—Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel shows the limits of even the most advanced and invasive surveillance dragnets as full-scale war erupts.A Palestinian demonstrator throws rocks towards Israeli soldiers during clashes in the city of Ramallah in the occupied West Bank on October 8, 2023.Photograph: JAAFAR ASHTIYEH/Getty Images
The Gaza Strip is one of the most densely populated areas on the planet. It’s also one of the most heavily locked down, surveilled, and suppressed. Israel has evolved an entire intelligence apparatus and aggressive digital espionage industry around advancing its geopolitical interests, particularly its interminable conflict in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Yet on Saturday, Hamas militants caught Israel unaware with a series of devastating land, air, and sea attacks, killing hundreds of people and leaving thousands wounded. Israel has now declared war.
Hamas’ surprise attack on Saturday is shocking given not only its scale compared to previous attacks, but also the fact that it was planned and carried out without Israel’s knowledge. Hamas’ deadly barrage underscores the limitations of even the most intrusive surveillance dragnets. In fact, experts say the sheer quantity of intelligence that Israel collects on Hamas, as well as the group’s constant activity and organizing, may have played a role in obscuring plans for this particular attack amid the endless barrage of potentially credible threats.
“There's no doubt that the scale and scope of this Hamas attack indicate just a colossal intelligence failure on behalf of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and in Shin Bet, the internal security agency,” says Raphael Marcus, a visiting research fellow at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies who focuses on the region. “They have such technical prowess and also a legacy of excellent human source capability.”
Israel is known for heavily monitoring Gaza and anyone who could be connected to Hamas using both traditional intelligence-gathering techniques and digital surveillance like facial recognition and spyware. Israel has proved its hacking skills and technical sophistication on the global stage for years, participating in the development of innovative malware for both digital espionage and cyber-physical attacks. The fact that Hamas was able to plan such an unprecedented and complex attack speaks to the limitations and inevitable blind spots of even the most comprehensive surveillance regime.
Jake Williams, a former US National Security Agency hacker and current faculty member at the Institute for Applied Network Security, emphasizes that when you have a firehose of intelligence streaming in from an array of sources, and when the climate is as fraught as that between Israel and Palestine, the challenge is organizing and parsing the information, not gathering it.
“Intelligence in an environment like Israel isn't finding a needle in a haystack—it's finding the needle that will hurt you in a pile of needles,” Williams says. “Given the number of Hamas members involved in the invasion, it's not plausible to me that Israel missed every human intelligence reflection of the planning. But I feel confident that there are always Hamas operatives talking about credible plans to attack the IDF. So Israel can't respond with force to every threat, even every credible one. They'd be at a heightened state of alert or actively engaged all the time, and that's probably actually worse for security.”
Though details of exactly how the attack happened are still emerging, it seems that oversights related to grappling with this signal-and-noise conundrum played a role.
“In retrospect, there was some information, but, like happens in all intelligence failures, it wasn't given sufficient consideration. It was misunderstood,” says Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser. “I think in the last days, from my understanding, there were some warning signs. And actually, the intelligence establishment had been warning for the past about half-year that there was going to be a significant conflict with Hamas, that they were bent on escalating the situation. But then they misread the signs.”
Colin Clarke, the director of research at the Soufan Group, an intelligence and security consultancy, says the Hamas attack would have “required months of preparation” and intelligence failures likely happened with both human intelligence and signals intelligence, where electronic and communications data is collected. “I’m still astonished that a breakdown in intelligence occurred at this level,” Clarke says. “I don’t think anybody, including the Israelis, were prepared for an operation this complex and multi-pronged.”
Crucial intelligence oversights could have happened as the result of numerous intersecting failures, says King’s College London’s Marcus. The Israeli intelligence apparatus may have misunderstood Hamas’s intentions, misread the context of crucial leads, been distracted by Israel’s political efforts with Saudi Arabia, or been grappling with domestic challenges. Israeli forces have complained, for example, of a brain drain from the IDF as individuals get pulled toward the private sector.
“I think that this wasn't just a military failure—I think that this was a dramatic failure of national leadership,” says Freilich, who authored Israel and the Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Cyber Power. The ambush calls to mind the outbreak of fighting during Ramadan in October 1973 in which an Arab bloc targeted Israel with a surprise attack on the Jewish holy day Yom Kippur to set off nearly 20 days of fighting.
Palestinians in occupied territories, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have faced surveillance and controls for years, with many calling the conditions an apartheid. In September 2021, Israeli forces announced the completion of a 40-mile-long barrier around the Gaza Strip—the sliver of land between Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea—that is essentially a “smart wall” equipped with radar, cameras, underground sensors, and an array of other surveillance instruments.
As the conflict ramps up into full-scale war, there is significant concern about the number of civilians impacted, with Amnesty International saying it is “deeply alarmed” by the civilian deaths in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. The Hamas assault has killed at least 700 and injured more than 2,000 Israelis on Saturday, according to the latest available figures. Video footage and reports shared online depict Hamas gunmen killing civilians, leaving bloody bodies scattered through the streets, and taking dozens of hostages. In response, Israel is launching large-scale airstrikes against Hamas targets in Gaza, while working to retake militant-controlled areas and preparing for offensive actions, including a possible ground invasion of Gaza. At least 370 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed and more than 2,000 wounded so far.
Israel Defense Forces say women and children have been taken hostage. Israel has also cut power to Gaza and internet monitoring firms say there has been a decrease in connectivity. As the fog of surveillance gives way to the fog of war, the current situation in Israel serves as an important illustration that unrelenting surveillance does not equate to or guarantee security.
Additional reporting by Morgan Meaker
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/israel-hamas-war-surveillance
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Stryker1982
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They don't need to show their cards on the early days.
Given the production of Almas is practically verified, you can bet they would have some inventory on it. Who else would need it more than them. Probably much less than Dehlaviye they've been stockpiling for years.
TheImmortal
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This is problem with Middle East mentality. There is nothing to “show off” and 13 lives have already been lost (more counting today) firing these anti tank missile. As @Hack-Hook once said, usually these require teams of 2-3. And a drone or helicopter with IR can pick them up rather quickly even in dense foliage of south Lebanon plus the heat trail of the missile stays for a period of time.
Mossad already knows what HZ has in its arsenal with a x% probability. The intelligence on how much may be less reliable.
Quite frankly I’m surprised that Israel is having difficulty preventing these attacks. Israel has plenty of drones with 12-24 endurance to stay in the air and patrol.
Given that nearly all of these attacks have happened during the day (a limitation of ATGM crews) then that means roughly a 12 hour window where you need 10-20 drones flying along the border looking for any sign of a group of 2-3 in random bush. Given Iran even has such drone capability and has FLIRs that can look at 30KM distance then I’m sure Israel has that and more.
So very peculiar that this is happening. It was expected of Syrian army during the civil war due to massive geography of the war and limited air and ground resources of the SAA + resistance forces, but not expected of Israel. Even SAA was able to reduce the TOW missile threat drastically by installing Shorta and local developed versions of the laser jammer on everything and anything(even seen it on Toyota trucks back in the day) That and an early warning receiver is all you need, plus a counter battery radar.
HZ ATGMs all rely on the laser designator to help the operator guide it to the target so if you can jam the laser then the missile last second goes off course.
Shtora
Almas (Iranian spike) is a luxury weapon. Kornet cost $25K to export by Russia so it likely cost Iran <$10K to make maybe even $5K. Iranian spike and LR is likely much more, short range is not ideal as it’s range is 2.5KM (about one mile) where as Iranian Kornet is at least 5KM depending on the model. So Iranian Spike LR is not costing less than $25K. India signed a deal with Israel for $525M for 8300 missiles costing about $65K per missile and that was for short range.
Where as Sadid is optically guided with 8KM range and will be fitted with foldable wings so it can likely be launched out of most large mortar tubes. Add in a pair of cheap VR goggles and the operator can guide missiles directly on top of Targets even without direct LOS.
If HZ was using Sadid I guarantee you the casualties would be 3-4x more on Israeli side as many of the targets have obstructed LOS, so unless a dumbass soldier is standing out in the open in contrast to terrain it’s harder to get a group kill.
Hell even Iranian switchblades would be a better fit for this type of warfare
You can easily transport just local people traveling from Syria to Lebanon each with 5-10 of these in a suitcase.
As I said, the axis needs to update their strategies. Cost maybe be more and I know this fascination with martyrdom is ingrained in their minds (one of the negative aspects of Martyr Solemani was this comfort and belief in his battle plans), but the usage of the latest weaponary must be used. These weapons help Iranian military industrial complex much more than old Iranian remodeled Kornet design. That is 2010 acceptable level tech.
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Mehdipersian
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Hezbullah attack on Terorist soldiers of Israhell
No, HZ is blinding the EW and COMMINT of IDF. So that could mean that HZ is preparing for a huge attack operation.
Maybe some of those weapons (Sadid or Almas) has been given to HZ. But all parts wants to keep their best cards for later. So if IDF wants (better said, are forced to enter) Lebanon, then HZ will activate more accurate and resolutive weapons (Sadid or Almas). I´am just speculating. You can see how HZ are using old 9M14 Malyutkas against fixed target. I think it is wise to use old ordinance first. Anyway those 9M14 seems to be a newer version judging speed and accurate path of flight.
TheImmortal
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Like I said, Israeli cabinet wanted all out war to save their jobs and likely from any legal trials of incompetence.
It is not in Israel’s DM, PM, or president benefit for the war to be done early or a ceasefire to occur. Hence why they all said a long war (10 years!) might be in order. Their hope is with enough time passing the public will forget how inept they were on 10/7.
I doubt Israeli Public will forget.
jauk
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These are not tools unlike you who seems to be one of your own shallow understanding.
…and this person claims they’re‘ Palestinian’. Clearly lying. Which highlights why they’re here.
Attachments
same old gibberish from our resident mental patient
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