Quite the ad hominems dished out by way of an introduction. Oh well, I'll just concentrate on whatever content will actually be addressing my points, especially since comparing what I wrote to "I"SIS-like discourse is far from warranting a reply.
I fail to see any connection between my comments and the belief that every Jewish Iranian is necessarily allied with or sympathetic towards the zionists - some are (especially among expatriates), make no mistake about it, but not all of course, and I've myself observed this often enough here. So the contention isn't justified.
Zionists are bound to care about what's going on in Ukraine if alone for the facts that:
1) Ukraine proportionally has a large number of Jewish oligarchs susceptible to be recruited by the zionists or to support zionism. Note: I said susceptible, not guaranteed to. But still, it offers considerable windfall for Tel Aviv to exploit, and the Isra"el"i regime is definitely not known for passing on such opportunities.
2) Tel Aviv, while having significant ties with Moscow, is not happy at all about Russian help for the government of President Assad against terrorist forces, at least so long as President Assad refuses to abandon his Iranian(-led) allies and evict them from his country. There's no doubt about this. It follows that the zionists will use any adapted, indirect means at their disposal to try and pressure Russia into revising its stance on Syria and on Iran to the detriment of the Resistance. And Ukraine happens to be a perfect type of staging ground for such a stratagem.
That Isra"el" rejected Ukrainian demands for weapons doesn't mean they're indifferent to the events or uninterested in using the Ukrainian crisis to advance their interests. Just that they're involved in an elaborate and carefully calibrated game. Tel Aviv isn't going to support Kiev all too directly, because this would cause a strong reaction from Russia and undermine the zionist strategy, which consists in trying to push Moscow, without antagonizing it frontally, to completely part ways with the Resistance. Else, zionists would risk jeopardizing their relations with Russia, and they rightfully don't consider this would be in their interest, since they are deriving multiple benefits from their ties with Russia.
Moreover, Putin defined Isra"el"i arms sales to Ukraine as a red line in 2015 already. See:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/putin-warns-israel-not-to-sell-arms-to-ukraine/
Tel Aviv wouldn't want the Russians to counter by operating further rapprochement with to the Resistance, which is probably what Moscow would do if Isra"el" was to supply weaponry to Kiev.
And how does it invalidate my arguments? I agree, Russia is acting in its own interests. And, these happen to align with the interests of Iran and the Resistance in Syria, to such an extent that the zionists are seriously irked by it.
Which is precisely why they're trying to raise the costs of this sort of a policy for Moscow and convince the Russians to review their position in the Levant. And they're going about it indirectly, pitting their NATO and Ukrainian assets against Russia until Moscow gives in, or so they hope.
In Syria, both Russia and Iran need each other for the time being. Furthermore, Russia's not considered an enemy by Iran (although it's not a full fledged strategic ally either), but NATO does fall into the hostile category, so Iran has no immediate reason to pick sides with Kiev and its western patrons in the ongoing conflict. This is especially true if we view everything through the lens of national interests like you suggest we should.
You see, claims like these are massively propagated by the west and the zionists with the aim of obfuscating the rock solid alliance and close brotherly relationship thay exists between Syria and Iran. It's simple though, if the Russians thought they could safeguard their local interests without Iran, then what you're stating would have have taken place years ago already.
How often have mainstream media outlets tried to suggest Putin "is just about to ditch Iran" in Syria? Correct, countless times. It all proved to be nothing more than psy-ops. Sure, this reflects the actual goal pursued by the west and the zionists, hence the psy-ops. However, three key factors aren't lost on Moscow:
1) No matter how the number of SAA units Russia will train, no matter how many high-ranking protégés it can muster within the Syrian establishment, the Syrian state has been weakened and destructured to such an extent during the war that these Russian resources won't represent a viable substitute the Iranian role on the ground, especially when considering the relative strength of the enemy. And this is bound to remain so for the foreseeable future. So Russia will not be able to protect her interests against NATO- and zionist-backed - and thus extremely resourceful terrorists without substantial Iranian input.
2) Now more than ever, Moscow has understood perfectly well that western regimes cannot be trusted, that they've taken aim at Russia's very existence as a unified and capable nation-state, and that their assurances and promises aren't worth a penny. This applies to the west's and Isra"el"'s repeated proposals to Moscow, asking the Russians to evict Iran from Syria in exchange for guarantees that Russian interests will then be taken into account, and that anti-Russian, extremist terrorists won't be unleashed on Syria a second time around.
3) Russia also knows that Iran will fight with everything in her power to keep intact the geographical integrity of the Resistance Axis including Syria. In other terms, Moscow knows it will have to make an enemy of the Iranians and confront the Resistance kinetically, not just in Syria but across the region, if it ever tries to oust them by force. As if it didn't have enough on its hand with NATO already.
They don't dare to attack Iran either. In fact, they will wage direct full-scale war exclusively on battered, mostly disarmed nations unable to defend themselves, or on small ones deprived of the necessary critical mass and clout to put up a meaningful fight: Serbia-Montenegro / Yugoslavia in 2000, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011, etc.
When facing adversaries more formidable than that, they will resort to a host of hybrid instruments in an attempt to defeat and in effect destroy and dismantle them irreversibly - from sanctions to armed proxies, psy-ops, relentless propaganda, domestic fifth columns and "colored revolution" attempts, intelligence war and sabotage, you name it. They will play the long game as they say.
If you really doubt the west's hostile intentions towards Russia, which became evident even during the early post-Soviet period when NATO could not invoke the specter of supposed Russian expansionism as a pretext because Russia was at its most fragile and vulnerable point in modern history, then frankly any conclusion drawn will be biased.
Putin cannot merely imitate China, Russia isn't as heavyweight as China and is thus obliged to define more restrictive red lines. By the quoted logic, Iran shouldn't have intervened in Syria and Iraq either. However, such a decision would have represented a fatal mistake. You mustn't let the enemy encroach unhindered around your borders and alter the status quo in such a way as to put in charge your most rabid, aggressive enemies in every one of your neighboring states. At one point you'll have to cut the enemy's hands off, preferably when you have international law on your side too (as was the case of Iran and allies in Syria but, it is true, not of Russia this time around).
My friend, I'm well aware of the history of the Iran-Iran war. And I can tell you that most of the content on that Wikipedia page is baseless and a revision of history. They're mentioning weapons Iran is not known for ever operating nor maintaining in its inventory.
I previously described what actually happened. And why we can't compare Iran during the Sacred Defence to present day Ukraine. To suggest otherwise would leave out too many key aspects pertaining to the two respective contexts. To break it down anew:
1) Iran didn't deal with Isra"el", but with the Americans. The latter transferred American-made but Isra"el"i-owned weapons to Iran because they had to cover their tracks, since the whole undertaking was kept hidden from Congress (an illegal action).
2) The US wasn't ready nor willing to supply any weapons to Iran. Iran coerced them into this by escalating in Lebanon, with pro-Iranian forces striking US Marine barracks, eliminating high ranking CIA officers and abducting scores of western journalists and other citizens, who might or might not have been spies too. Did Ukraine first have to hit NATO hard in order to convince them to supply a handful of overpriced weapons, and clandestinely at that?
3) Iran knew it was dealing with enemies, but was facing a dilemma due to the fact that its armed forces were inherited from an ousted, western-equipped former regime, and Iran didn't have the means yet to develop an indigenous defence industry. Otherwise no arms transfers would have taken place. Is Ukraine facing a similar dilemma?
4) Iran was fighting the west and the zionists even during and right after the Iran-Contra affair, in a variety of theaters, either directly or indirectly. Iran was and is a fully independent nation standing up to and challenging the world's foremost imperial power. Does this apply to the Ukrainian client state as well?
5) Iran could not have averted the war, since it had not provoked Iraq. Saddam was simply a short sighted, gullible and trigger happy leader. Ukraine however provoked Moscow for seven full years before Russia finally declared war on them. Kiev wouldn't have lost its identity, nor its wealth, nor its security, nor its sovereignty and independence if it chose to remain neutral between NATO and Russia. Yet the Ukrainians decided otherwise.
6) The weapons Iran obtained were few and far between. And Iran was no longer facing an existential threat at that moment in time (1986), in fact the bulk of the fighting was taking place on Iraqi soil. So these arms wasn't actually decisive for Iran's survival. Also, those in the Iranian establishment who pleaded for and conducted this marginal arms deal with the US were heavily criticized by the rest of the establishment. To this day they're considered practically as traitors by many inside the system.
7) Whatever scarce and inconsequential amounts of weapons it is that Iran received from the west, the Iraqis were supplied incomparably larger quantities from the same west. Does this apply to Russia vis a vis the Ukraine as well?
This shows that the two cases are distinct. I shared what I've learnt over the years in a sincere manner, now of course you're free to take it or to leave it, but then you'd be relying on distortions devised by sources which in fact are not exactly friends of Iran, if they aren't outright enemies that is.
I mean no offense, but most of these videos weren't very serious, were they? If you consider someone who fires tear gas on protesters in a situation of war as the very ultimate incarnation of evil, then what this will tend to show, is that I'm hardly the one blinded by propaganda from either side.
As for the clip with the civilian car, remember the footage which emerged at the beginning of this war, where an APC overran a civilian automobile driven by a female Ukrainian? Of course the incident was immediately blamed on Russia by western online propagandists, before it turned out that it was actually a Ukrainian military vehicle, that the driver of the car luckily wasn't killed, and that the whole episode was caused by a mistake on the part of the APC crew... So obviously, there are good reasons not to take every claim from pro-Ukrainian users that one can find on the internet at face value, but to wait until there's solid confirmation, if at all.
I don't see how siding with the NATO clients in Kiev would be the sounder approach from the perspective of the Resistance. I can understand if a friend of the Resistance will prefer to adopt a neutral stance on this war and be critical of both sides, for their own reasons, I can even understand if they align on the Ukrainian regime again for their own subjective reasons, but to opine that anyone who doesn't is not staying true to the ideological principles of the Resistance as well as to Iran's interests, in my eyes would imply that one has to be mistaken at a certain point in one's analysis.
Just for your information, the only camp in Iran whose members or backers are seen defending the Ukrainian regime is the liberal camp (reformists, moderates), i.e. the western-apologetic one which hardly believes in anti-imperial Resistance anymore. Which is opposed to Iran's intervention in Syria, which has a problem with Iran arming the Palestinians and Hezbollah. The revolutionaries however are not supporting Kiev, most tend to be neutral (granted, more than me probably), while some may have a preference for Russia.
