In order to be able to gauge this hypothesis, I would need a breakdown of your reasoning with regards to the concrete example at hand. What are the precise characteristics of Iran's messaging on enemy sabotage / terrorism and on the success of security forces in neutralizing sabotage / terrorism? How do said characteristics lead to fatigue with users of this forum? How does fatigue in turn make users who are supposed to be intelligent and patriotic enough, apply the irrational double-standard I highlighted (what I basically did, was to notice a blatant discrepancy, I did not establish a causality as far as I can tell), and how can they fail to realize their own negative bias in this matter?
This said, I am of the belief (and have expressed my take in the past) that whatever statements Iranian officials make, it won't suffice to counterbalance the enemy's colossal propaganda-cum-censorship machinery. Basically, the overwhelming bulk of media and of the internet itself belong to the enemy as well as its footmen in and outside Iran, and given the enemy's insurmountable resource advantage, it will drown out dissenting voices including the Islamic Republic's at any rate.
I have been observing this kind of phenomenon first hand with a select few dissident movements in the west, whose communication output at the intellectual level and in terms of persuasion power would literally dwarf almost anything Iranians are usually exposed to - including the enemy's most professional psy-ops ventures à la BBC and anti-Iranian academia globally. Yet the powers to be know, through a combination of repression, flooding and much more insidiously, through social engineering, how to keep the broader masses from adhering to the messages offered by the movements in question.
Compounding the matter, we are yet to witness the advent of a successful formula for irregular / guerilla / asymmetric warfare in the informational and soft power realm. Simply put, while successful asymmetric Resistance and deterrence is possible in the field of military and hard power (including messaging directly aimed at impacting the battlefield), there is no such thing as asymmetric information warfare or asymmetric social engineering. Here sheer quantity and control of loudspeakers is king, and will always trump quality and fundamental operational doctrine. Some friendly commentators might tend to be putting too much hope on an impracticable ideal type of re-information and more deeply, farhangsāzi.
A third issue is how form affects the essence of messaging not to mention the social body. If you align your communication on the dominant norms of Hollywoodesque shallowness, the enemy has won already. You cannot convey the Revolution's noble aims and the justness of its struggle through "sexy" news shows and a bunch of raqqās "because that is what sells nowadays".
Thus the solution does not reside in improving messaging while leaving the gates wide open for the enemy to poison the environment with its suffocating propaganda apparatus, its disproportionate vectors of cultural aggression and social engineering. It lies in shutting down these infiltration channels and their subversive domestic relays (under many aspects, disinformation and psychological warfare is fraught with as much peril as kinetic aggression). In certain relevant instances taking a leaf out of western regimes' own book would suffice. Then and only then can refinement of the revolutionary camp's in-house PR incrementally bear fruit.