S-2
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Dec 25, 2007
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"That war also made Arabs realize that Israeli's can be defeated on the battle ground."
My guess is that the IDF learned more from that experience than did POG (Party of God) or arab militaries. Southern Lebanon offers some unique operating characteristics that can't be easily replicated elsewhere.
So too does fighting a militia rather than a conventional armed force. The rules of engagement invariably change-even for the IDF. Lebanon 2006, in short, wasn't the Golan nor the Chinese Farm in 1973.
It wasn't a conventional battle and didn't even approach the intensity of Israel's 1982 incursion to Lebanon. A few battalions made a limited incursion with ill-defined objectives, poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and little mission preparation.
In many respects, the results were predictable.
My guess is that the IDF learned more from that experience than did POG (Party of God) or arab militaries. Southern Lebanon offers some unique operating characteristics that can't be easily replicated elsewhere.
So too does fighting a militia rather than a conventional armed force. The rules of engagement invariably change-even for the IDF. Lebanon 2006, in short, wasn't the Golan nor the Chinese Farm in 1973.
It wasn't a conventional battle and didn't even approach the intensity of Israel's 1982 incursion to Lebanon. A few battalions made a limited incursion with ill-defined objectives, poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and little mission preparation.
In many respects, the results were predictable.