1) NGO's can't really be classified into domestic and foreign ones insofar as they are non-governmental organizations, as their name indicates. At best can one operate a distinction based on the country they're registered in, and the nationality of their personnel and representatives.
2) Yes, NGO's registered abroad are active in Iran and think tanks counseling the USA regime are considering them as a weapon to instrumentalize. This is illustrated by the following document:
Baquer Namazi, Senior Advisor Population Council and Director, Iran NGO Initiative
www.wilsoncenter.org
3) That being said, the enemy does not need to rely on NGO's registered outside Iran: the liberal fifth column (reformists, moderates) is doing its dirty work already. Including in the NGO department, where hundreds of such organizations staffed by liberals are busy undermining the Leadership's guidelines, working against the Islamic Revolution and advancing the zio-American agenda in Iran.
One example would be the NGO claiming to offer free education to orphaned children, which was caught brainwashing youngsters with the very same sexualized material imposed on nations by UNESCO's Agenda 2030, which Supreme Leader Khamenei (h.a.) had to intervene personally in order to prevent it from being integrated into public school programs by the liberal-majority Majles. There are tons of similar examples. When the enemy has a treasonous fifth column up and running, direct presence of its own institutions is no longer a top priority.
Kind of doubt it, unless you waged jihad on Doctors Without Borders when they set up shop and began operating an inflatable clinic in Iran at the onset of the coronavirus crisis. The principlist government of seyyed Ra'isi chased them away, rightly so.
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.o...oke-approval-msf-coronavirus-treatment-center
There were very little protests, and most took place in middle class neighborhoods.
These were quickly followed by violent riots. Rioters in turn represent a minority among their social class.
Until you familiarize yourself a little more with modern Iranian history, in particular with authors and politicians such as Iraj Mirza, Kasravi, Taqizade, Hedayat, Dashti, Ansari, Fuladvand to name just a few, you'll be deprived of the knowledge enabling adequate commentary on this question.
In Iran there's a minority political current of islamophobic tendency, which is unrelated to the present day education system in the Islamic Republic. This islamophobic current historically was not spawned by the Islamic Republic, nor did it appear as a reaction to the latter's policies.
Indeed, it all began when Naser ed-Din shah of the Qajar dynasty made two fateful and jinxed visits to Europe in 1873 and 1878. The shah fell victim to what patriotic and revolutionary thinkers would later term as westoxification - a form of neo-colonial inferiority complex towards the zionist-dominated west, whereby national culture and civilization including and especially its religious Islamic dimension, are regarded as a factor of backwardness and under-development, and whereby aping the west even superficially is seen as a guarantee of progress and prosperity.
This is distinctly different from, say, the Meiji's conviction that western technology ought to be combined with local values and spirit: the political inferiority complex we're talking about takes aim at and generates shame for anything rooted in domestic social reality.
Thence, it developed along two iterations: one, downright admiration for the west and its secular liberalism; and two, a romanticized reinvention of a distant, pre-Islamic past as the advocated cornerstone of national identity, which, in an oftentimes unavowed manner, adopts the same liberalism and secularism characterizing the former ideology (as a matter of fact, most Iranian ultra-nationalists happen to be liberals on the societal-cultural level, as well as secularists on the political level, even though some of them will denounce the west and its imperialism; likewise, they have no problem with zionism by and large, in contrast to the great majority of Islamically-oriented Iranians, even if some of these nationalists might engage into occasional judeophobic speech).
The toxic western-submissive view first spread to elements within Qajar court notability and aristocracy. Then, western imperialists as well as western-based freemasonry cultivated it amongst Iran's political scene during the so-called Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1910, when the monarchy was brought to accept the creation of the first Iranian parliament. However this revolutionary movement, which was initially marked by strong anti-imperialist and patriotic leanings and was largely led by traditional clerics, came to be hijacked by freemasonry and its agents in Iran. Those same elements were responsible for the dastardly execution of an Islamic and national hero, sheykh Fazlollah Nuri, who had recognized and opposed the hijacking of the Constitutional revolution by secularist liberal freemasons linked to western imperial powers.
From that point on, the two above mentioned political families which emerged during late 19th century / early 20th century modernity, the liberals and ultra-nationalists, both of which are staunchly secularist, gave rise to varying degrees of islamophobia with full support from western imperialists, zionists, freemasons and Haifan Bahai activists.
Traditionally, national / local cultural identity on the one hand and the dominant religion of the land (i.e. Islam) on the other hand were not seen as antinomic in Iran. As long as this was the case, Iranian society was experiencing unparalleled stability and appeasement. Namely under the Safavid, Afsharid and Zand dynasties, as well as the early Qajar period. But as soon as western-seeded ideological currents allergic to Islam set out to challenge the consensus, episodes of tumult followed.
The Iranian context differs starkly from the Indonesian. Any attempt at comparative sociology will have to take into account this background information.
However, there are global tendencies at play as well, brought about by the zio-American imperial monster and its far-reaching tentacles of cultural imperialism. Said tendencies run counter to religiosity including Islamic religiosity and no Islamic nation is spared.
If and when the AKP is replaced by secularists, it will be squarely on the electoral system of democracy. For the latter is supposed to feature political alternation as a key aspect of institutional life. A democracy where one and the same party is elected over and over again with no end in sight, is considered a dysfunctional one, not a true democracy so to say.
Moreover, this notion that Turkish society has become more religious and more conservative as compared to the 1960's-1970's is not a correct one. Many Iranian secularists who're having issues with sharia law hold this belief. Truth is that Turkey under the anti-clerical Atatürk and subsequent decades used to be a more conservative place than it is today. Never have nudity, homosexualism, alcoholism and the like been more widespread than they are now.
This was confirmed by a senior user from Turkey, who set the record straight for Iranian forumers sharing this supposition:
View attachment 910880
The Islamic ruling party in Turkey, and in Indonesia's case the military deep state, are projecting an outwardly image of societal re-Islamization because it's a practical tool of governance and legitimation in periods of political and social transition. Also because it can help contain backlash from the traditional segments of society against the nefarious impact of globalist post-modernity. Under the surface however, the cultural institutions that allow a society to function in the traditional way are unabatedly and gradually being struck one by one as a consequence of these countries' integration into the dominant global order.
Interestingly enough, in terms of development the supposedly "medieval, ideological" government of Iran has trumped the secularist, "non-ideological" (a fallacious notion anyway) regime of the ousted Pahlavi monarchs. Be it in the field of industries, agriculture, infrastructures, R&D and technology, public education (including of women), public health, no matter what aspect one will look at the Islamic Republic's record literally dwarfs that of the secularist former regime of the shah.
In another thread, I composed a comprehensive overview proving the point. I'd advise studying it prior to formulating a counter-factual claim:
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/iran-player-refuse-to-sing-national-anthem.755139/post-14089084
Since I wrote the above by the way, Iran climbed to rank ten in worldwide automobile production, as well as to rank seven in worldwide steel production.
Generally speaking, why should this be so much of a concern to you? I don't see many Iranians caring about what Chinese authorities do at home.
I wouldn't bother about the user, brother. They'll argue endlessly for the sake of pushing a secularist, liberal and western-exonerating ideology. To this end, they'll go as far as blatantly contradict themself, so long as it serves their talking point at that precise moment depending on the topic at hand.
For instance, when I highlighted how Iran, by seeking inspiration from China's Great Firewall, could improve the filtering of subversive material the internet is literally being flooded with by Iran's existential enemies and their oppositionist footmen, the same user kept suggesting that internet censorship is a useless endeavour doomed to failure because people will end up circumventing it with VPN's and so on. Now they're striking the exact opposite tone, lamenting the effects of filtering because this way, they can try to depict the Islamic Republic as a government that limits free speech in contrast to western regimes.
The second video is from Sohrevardi avenue - not a working class district, it's rather home to upper middle class people.
The first, which claims to be recorded in southern Tehran, has scenes spliced in from shopping malls located in upscale neighborhoods. And interestingly, features numerous very short sequences of a second or less - presumably because its makers cherry picked hejab-less females and were wary of showcasing their minority status.
The third video is from central Tehran, again more of a lower middle class than a pure working class district. But even there we can see how the majority of females are in fact observing hejab.
In actual working class areas, hejabis are more dominant even.
At any rate and as user AuZ observed, what can be seen in these clips isn't a new phenomenon in the sense that it predates recent riots. It was thus not induced by the latter.
Question was about you not us.
