http://www.satribune.com/archives/july04/P1_book.htm
Gang-of-Four Planned Kargil, Keeping Pakistan in the Dark
Special SAT Report
WASHINGTON, July 22: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not
aware of the Kargil Operation when he received Indian PM
Vajpayee in Lahore on Feb 20, 1999, a new book written by a
senior former police officer from Pakistan, and published
by a New York Publishing house, has revealed.
The book, Pakistans Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army,
and Americas War on Terror, is authored by Mr Hassan
Abbas, who is currently a Research Fellow at the Harvard
Law School and a PhD. candidate at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served in the
administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1994-95)
and General Musharraf (1999-2000).
The book examines the rise of religious extremism in
Pakistan, and analyzes its connections to Pakistan Army's
policies and the fluctuating US-Pakistan relations. It
includes profiles of leading Pakistani Jihadi groups with
details of their origins, development, and capabilities
based on interviews with Pakistani intelligence officials,
and operators of the militant groups.
The book contains new historical materials on Operation
Gibraltar (1965 War with India), conspiracy behind General
Zia-ul-Haqs plane crash in 1988, a botched military coup
by fundamentalists in army in 1993-4, the story of National
Accountability Bureau (from an insiders perspective) and
lastly about how General Musharraf handled the volatile
situation after the 9/11 attacks.
Besides General Musharrafs detailed profile, the book
evaluates the India-Pakistan relations vis-à-vis the
Kashmir conflict, and Dr AQ Khans nuclear proliferation
crisis. The book offers predictions for Pakistan's domestic
and regional prospects.
Author Hassan Abbas gives a graphic description of how the
Kargil disaster was planned and managed by the Army led by
General Musharraf who led a Gang of Four and quotes
Pakistan High Commissioner to UK, Maleeha Lodhi as saying:
Even corps commanders and other service chiefs were
excluded from the decision-making process.
So much so that even the very able DGMO, Lieutenant General
Tauqir Zia, was initiated into the secret after the gang of
four had already taken the irrevocable decision of going
ahead with the operation, the book says.
The chapter on the Kargil Episode asks Who is to be Blamed
and gives a detailed account of what happened based on
authors interviews with many serving and retired army
officers. It says:
In May 1999, just three months after the frozen road to
Indo-Pak dialogue had thawed enough to get a promise for
more going, Pakistan launched its operation against the
Kargil Heights in the far north of Indian-held Kashmir,
just across the LOC. These heights dominated the main
Indian supply route to Leh, where India had a small
cantonment to house one brigade. It was the Indian routine
at Kargil to descend the heights at the start of the winter
snows and reoccupy them the following spring. With these
heights in Pakistani hands, it meant that supplies to Leh
could not be maintained.
And though India did have an alternate route, it was not an
all-weather, all-season road. India would therefore have no
option but to recover the heights and open the road to Leh
or allow its garrison to perish. Though, of course, even if
India had any number of alternative roads, its pride alone
would have sufficed for them to mount an operation for the
relief of Kargil.
This operation had been discussed at least twice before in
earlier years and turned down both times. General
Zia-ul-Haq was the first army chief invited by the Military
Operations (MO) directorate to see a presentation on this
operation. After sitting through it, he resorted in his
most chaste Urdu, which he would normally do only when he
wanted to take someone to task. His ensuing conversation
with the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), as
narrated by a senior army officer, went somewhat like this:
Zia: When we take Kargil, what do you expect the Indians to
do? . . . I mean, dont you think they will try and
recapture it?
DGMO: Yes sir, but we think that the position is
impregnable and we can hold it against far superior forces.
Zia: Now thats very good, but in that case, dont you
think the Indians will go for a limited offensive elsewhere
along the line of control, take some of our territory, and
use it as a bargaining chip?
DGMO: Yes sir, this is possible, but . . .
Zia: And if they are beaten back there also, dont you
think they will attack across the international frontier,
which may lead to a full-scale war?
DGMO: Thats possible, sir.
Zia: So in other words, you have prepared a plan to lead us
into a full-scale war with India!
This sardonic observation by Zia ul-Haq caused the demise of
the first Kargil proposal. The second time the plan was
mooted, it was shot down on the same grounds, that is, it
was an easy tactical operation that was untenable in the
long run unless Pakistan were prepared to go into a
full-scale war with India, in which Kargil would be a
secondary objective.
The third and final operational plan for Kargil was put
forward by its inspirational father, Lieutenant General
Mohammad Aziz Khan, chief of the general staff (CGS).
Himself a Kashmiri, he was fully committed to the cause of
Kashmiri freedom, and not the sort of man who held any
commitment lightly. He is very religious and not known to
be a hypocrite.
The tactical parents of the Kargil plan were two. The first
was Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad, the commander of 10th
Corps, in whose area of operations the objective lay. He
was a comparatively weaker personality than Aziz, with a
romance about history. It is believed that he was convinced
by the conviction of Aziz, which, combined with his own
historical dream, made him a hostage to the Kargil idea.
The second parent of the plan was Major General Javed
Hassan, commander of the Pakistani troops in the Northern
Areas (Force Command Northern Areas, FCNA) who would
actually have to carry out the operation. He had one of the
best minds in the army and even more ambition. He gave his
unstinting support to the operation, less through any sense
of conviction and more because of the promise that such a
position held of bringing him into General Pervez
Musharrafs charmed inner circle.
Musharraf was taken in by the enthusiasm of two of his
closest generals, and, being eternally levitated by an
irrepressible streak of unreal optimism, he became the
strongest advocate of the operation. The absolute secrecy
that was one of the preconditions of the success of the
operation, to secure it against any possibility of leaks,
also made it proof against any possibility of a second
opinion, and thus against any collusion with a sense of
reality.
According to Maleeha Lodhi, Even corps commanders and other
service chiefs were excluded from the decision-making
process. So much so that even the very able DGMO,
Lieutenant General Tauqir Zia, was initiated into the
secret after the gang of four had already taken the
irrevocable decision of going ahead with the operation.
The next task was to bring the prime minister on board. For
this, a presentation was organized. The exact date of this
presentation is a million-dollar question, as this may
consequently decide how history will judge both Musharraf
and Nawaz. According to Niaz A. Naiks narration of the
events to Prof. Robert Wirsing, Nawaz Sharif was given a
briefing by the army on the Kashmir issue on March 27 or
28, 1999, which probably was the one where the Kargil Plan
was discussed.
Similarly, according to Owen Bennett Jones, the army
contends that a specific briefing on the Kargil Plan was
given in the second week of March 1999, where Nawaz granted
formal approval of the plan. Most probably, both Naik and
Jones are referring to the same meeting, and it certifies
that at the time of Nawazs meeting with Vajpayee on
February 20, 1999, he was not aware of the Kargil
operation.
Anyhow, Nawaz came to hear the Kargil presentation
accompanied by the recently retired CGS of the army,
Lieutenant General Iftikhar Ali Khan, who was Nawazs
secretary of defense. Iftikhar knew Musharraf, Mahmood, and
Aziz well and should have used his rank and influence to
abort the operation, but he did not, though he certainly
showed his reservations. Nawazs other adviser was Majid
Malik, a minister in the cabinet and a retired lieutenant
general who had served as DGMO and CGS during his military
career a generation earlier. He had a sharp mind and asked
all the right questions of the assembled generals, and
pointed out all the weaknesses in their overall plan, and
its immediate and larger implications.
This should have educated Nawaz Sharif adequately to put the
operation on hold pending a detailed reexamination of the
project, but it did not. Sharif agreed with the plan,
though the operation was already in its final stages and
Nawaz was not aware of that. Probably in his reverie, he
was looking to the glory that would come his way when the
fruits promised by operation were harvested.
However, close associates of Nawaz contend that the said
briefing never mentioned that regular troops would be
involved in the operation, and the discussion was framed
entirely in terms of increasing the heat in Kashmir.
Interestingly, in the latest book on the Kargil issue,
Shireen Mazari, a Pakistani academic known for her
pro-military stance, asserts that the Kargil operation was
in fact planned to counter similar moves expected by the
Indians in the area, and this military move was in reality
a defensive action finalized after credible intelligence
reports confirmed Indian designs for incursions across the
LOC! This theory is not corroborated by any other source.
In reality, the Kargil plan was for Pakistan to send in a
mixture of Kashmiri fighters and regular/paramilitary
troops (the Northern Light Infantry Regiment) to occupy the
heights above Kargil before the Indian Army moved in to
reoccupy them at the end of the snow season and cut off the
supply route to Leh.
The operation was to be projected as a solely Kashmiri
mujahideen operation, denying absolutely any Pakistani
involvement in it or that Pakistan had any control or
influence over these elements. It is worth noting that
until the occupation of the heights became an accomplished
fact, neither any of the other service chiefs nor the rest
of the corps commanders or Musharrafs personal staff
officers knew anything about the operation.
The result was that, when the Indian Air Force joined the
action, the Pakistan Air Force was in no position to
respond while the armys quartermaster general and master
general of ordnance, both of whose support was vital for
any army operation, were also left totally in the dark.
Thus if Kargil had led to general war, the army would have
learned that its newest fleet of tanks, of which it was so
proud, had no APDSFS antitank ammunition! The other effect
of the secrecy surrounding Kargil was that no one in the
Pakistani diplomatic corps was equipped to deal with the
questions arising in the wake of the operation, while it
also split the generals into two groups, that is, those who
were in and those who were left out.
The masterminds of the operation were driven by the belief
that their nuclear capability provided a protective shield
to Pakistan, and that India would acquiesce to this capture
just like Pakistan was compelled to swallow Indias seizure
of the Siachen peaks in 1984. All the four generals
involved in the Kargil project had remained instructors in
different military training institutions during their
careers, teaching young officers how vital it is to weigh
the pros and cons of a military offensive in terms of
understanding the possible ramifications and enemy
reactions. It is strange that these generals forgot such a
basic military lesson and seriously miscalculated Indian
capabilities both in terms of military strength and
political influence in the international arena.
The Indians reacted in an outburst of justifiable rage,
citing Pakistans bad faith for having welcomed their prime
minister to Lahore while concurrent preparations for the
Kargil operation were already under way. In Pakistan there
was no widespread feeling of regret, though few knew what
had really happened.
Within the army the general feeling about India was that had
made its nuclear tests in the belief that this would force
Pakistan to show its hand, and that if this came short,
Pakistan would be pushed into the status of an Indian
satellite; but when this did not happen, Vajpayee came to
Lahore to restart a long suspended dialogue merely to lull
a nuclear Pakistan to sleep while cooking up some other
perfidious scheme against it, and any measure against such
an enemy was entirely justified. Pakistans explanation of
the events at Kargil, though, had a skeptical reception in
international circles to begin with, and later their
version was entirely discredited.
For India, the exposure of their neighbors duplicity must
have been satisfying, but surely not enough. After Indias
first abortive attacks to reclaim the heights, it started a
large military buildup by moving all its 130mm artillery
regiments to the target area and picking up a substantial
amount of smart munitions around the world. It is an
amazing commentary on the coordination between the
mujahideen occupying Kargil heights and those fighting
inside held Kashmir that when the Indian reinforcements
were snaking up the winding roads in endless convoys, there
was no reported attempt at an ambush by the latter to
disrupt this operation.
When the buildup was complete, India subjected the objective
to air strikes and massive artillery barrages day after
day, followed by determined and courageous infantry attacks
in very difficult conditions. The Pakistan Army top brass
had confided to various friends who had their trust that
their men on the heights were adequately provisioned and
well dug in to withstand the rigors of a long campaign. The
truth, as it later transpired, was that the digging in was
minimal because the rocky soil just did not allow this.
The result was not only that the troops were exposed to
harsh weather and the shrapnel of exploding shells, but
also to the splinters of rocks that followed the
explosions. For most, their only safety was to scramble to
the comparative security of the reverse slopes during the
bombardment, and then get back to the other side of the
hill to meet the infantry attacks that normally followed
the artillery barrages.
Pakistani reserves of supplies and ammunition were woefully
inadequate to begin with, and became alarmingly low as the
operation progressed, with many having to survive by eating
the pitiful vegetation that braved the rocky slopes. Under
these circumstances, the resistance they put up was both
heroic and magnificent, and the quality of junior
leadership again proved admirable. But Pakistani generals
again failed miserablyas the plan and preparations were
defective.
Kargil left an already friendless Pakistan in almost total
diplomatic isolation. Even China, whose president had
counseled Pakistan as recently as late 1996 to go slow on
Kashmir and concentrate instead on the economic viability
of the country, felt constrained to distance itself from
Islamabads latest adventure. Major General Javed Hassan,
the commander on the spot, was being threatened by words
and gestures of subordinates that could only be described
as mutinous. Lieutenant General Mahmood, on whom reality
started to dawn fatefully late in the day, saw his adequate
jaw falling at an alarming rate.
And though the conviction and inner reserves of Lieutenant
General Aziz, helped by blissful ignorance, kept him as
gung-ho as ever and also helped keep Musharrafs optimism
afloat, the prime minister had become a case stricken by
fright. Under these circumstance, Nawaz was left to plead
desperately for a meeting with President Clinton, who found
that his schedule allowed him a few free hours on July 4,
1999.
It is widely believed that at this meeting Nawaz swore
complete ignorance about the Kargil operation till
everything terrible hit the fan. Blaming everything on his
generals, he just begged to be bailed out. Clinton told him
quite unequivocally that whether the mujahideen occupying
the Kargil heights listened to Pakistan or not, the
immediate step it would have to take was to evacuate
Kargil. As a sop he promised the Pakistani prime minister
that following this evacuation, he would treat the issue of
Kashmir with active interest.
In the midst of this crisis in June 1999, General Zinni,
then commander in chief of the US Centcom (Central
Command), had visited Pakistan accompanied by G. Lanpher,
deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, to
impress upon Pakistans military commanders the need for
de-escalation. This team also visited India during the
tour.
However, according to Shireen Mazari, some senior Pakistani
army officers are of the view that the United States
prevented India from coming to the negotiating table with
Pakistan, and in this context she also mentions the visit
of Henry Kissinger to India in early June, who was
apparently carrying a message from the US government not
to negotiate with Pakistan.
It is a moot point whether such was the case, but it was
obvious that US sympathies were with India in this
conflict. To any neutral observer of the international
political scene, this was a predictable outcome as US
interests were increasingly being linked with those of
India in the region, but Pakistans military hierarchy was
apparently oblivious of what was so clearly written on the
wall.
The evacuation of Kargil was followed by a hum of resentment
all over Pakistan. The loved ones of those who had given
their lives on the desolate and remote slopes there wanted
to know that if unilateral withdrawal was to be the end of
the whole exercise, what the point was of sacrificing the
lives of their sons and brothers? The people of Pakistan
had been subjected to the largest whispering campaign in
history to expect a great victory.
When the operation fizzled out like a wet firecracker, they
were a nation left speechless in anger and disbelief.
Musharraf and the planners could not give any excuses in
public, but privately they let it be known that the blame
for the scuttling of a brilliant operation lay on a
panic-prone prime minister, who could not stand up to the
US president. Nawaz Sharif too could not say anything in
his defense publicly, but privately he let it be known that
his generals had taken him for a ride, and that he had to
bend over backward to get the US president to help Pakistan
out of a very sticky situation."
For More Details about the Book, Click Here. Email contact
of the author: ***************@yahoo.com