Indonesia Defence Forum

[Nike]

credit is not mine, instead for original uploader

 

[Old soldier never die]

credit is not mine, instead for original uploader

Is there Kh 31P on left pod sukhoi ???

 

[MarveL]

House questions defense budget cut

For the first time in the past five years, the government is planning to cut budget allocation for the defense sector, commencing in 2016.

The government plans to cut its defense allocation for next year by 6.3 percent, or Rp 7 trillion (US$490 million), to Rp 95.8 trillion.

Lawmakers from Commission I, which oversees defense and foreign affairs, have expressed concerns about the government’s decision given the government is on its way to revamp the country’s weapons and associated defense systems.

Chairman of Commission I Mahfudz Siddiq said that, during the last five years, the state had allocated a big chunk of the budget to the Defense Ministry, the military and the plan to procure weapon systems in order to meet the level of minimum essential forces (MEF).

“This is why we’re concerned, because there is a big gap reaching Rp 7 trillion from the 2015 budget allocated to the Defense Ministry and the military institution,” Mahfudz told The Jakarta Post after a hearing with members of the Defense Ministry and the Indonesian Military (TNI) at the House of Representatives.

The lower budget allocation for the defense sector would influence the welfare of soldiers and weapon systems procurement, he added. The government has been constantly increasing defense spending, from Rp 17 trillion in 2010 to Rp 102.3 trillion this year.

Despite the reduction for next year, defense spending is still the second-largest allocation in the draft state budget after public service sector that acquires Rp 764 trillion.

According to Mahfudz, TNI commander Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo revealed that the lower allocation of the budget for the military was due to the weak financial position of the government arising from global currency instability.

“Actually that’s not a reason to reduce the budget for the military and our defense sector. The government raised the allocated budget for the police up to Rp 10 trillion in 2016,” he said

Based on the budget allocation, Mahfudz said the government cut the budget mostly for weapon systems.

It was reported that the Defense Ministry and the military had planned to buy a squadron of Sukhoi jet fighters to replace the retired F5 Tiger squadron.

The ministry had also planned to purchase Boeing and Chinook helicopters to increase its fleet. Another plan was to allocate a certain amount of the budget for the maintenance of the new weapon systems.

In relation to threats and risks from the South China Sea conflict, Indonesia plans to strengthen its capacity and weapon systems in Natuna and other border areas.

Previously, Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu said the military and defense sector needed more funds to meet the target of MEF and to renew all weapon systems that had been old or damaged.

“This years’ budget is not enough, how can it be reduced again,” he question rhetorically.

He expected the government would not reduce the budget for the military and defense sector, regardless of the weakening rupiah.

Mahfudz said that one possible solution to the matter was to wait for the Defense Ministry to produce the draft of MEF II strategic planning (renstra) in order for the program to commence in 2016.

“Renstra should be adjusted to the President’s mission, for instance to create a maritime axis. The president will subsequently issue a presidential instruction [Inpres] on MEF. The Inpres will bind all parties, including the Finance Ministry and Bappenas [National Development Planning Board] to support the military to achieve the MEF’s target,” Mahfudz said.

House questions defense budget cut | The Jakarta Post

 

[anas_nurhafidz]

Is there Kh 31P on left pod sukhoi ???

yes...only left

Credit to Andonirexy

 

[pr1v4t33r]

 

[anas_nurhafidz]

Berani benar berhasil...Kommando!
Credit to original uploader

 

[pr1v4t33r]

 

[Reashot Xigwin]

Why is Indonesia Set to Cut its Military Budget for 2016?
Move would be another blow to Jakarta’s military modernization efforts.

By Prashanth Parameswaran
September 10, 2015

Indonesia is planning to cut its defense budget next year for the first time in five years, raising further doubts about the Asian power’s ability to transform its military.

Despite being the world’s largest archipelagic state and its fourth most populous country, Indonesia has significantly underinvested in its military relative even to its smaller Southeast Asian neighbors. Even with sharp increases in recent years, Indonesian defense spending as a percentage of GDP was the lowest in ASEAN at 0.8 percent in 2014, well below the regional average of 2.2. percent. President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo had come into office pledging to increase that figure to 1.5 percent of GDP and even double the budget in 2016 as Indonesia seeks to develop a Minimum Essential Force by 2024 (See: “An Indonesian Defense Revolution Under Jokowi?”).

But in a huge blow to those ambitions, local media reports reveal that the Indonesian government plans to cut its defense allocation next year by 6.3 percent, or Rp 7 trillion ($490 million), down to Rp 95.8 trillion. This would in effect reverse a trend seen over the past few years where budgets have risen from Rp 17 trillion in 2010 to 102.3 trillion in 2015. It would also further slow the pace of Indonesia’s military modernization which is badly needed given the country’s aging systems, limited capabilities and growing aspirations to be an influential power (See: “Between Aspirations and Reality: Indonesian Foreign Policy After the 2014 Elections”).

Indonesia’s newly installed military chief Gatot Nurmantyo indicated that the cut was due to the weak financial position of the government arising from global currency instability (See: “What Does Indonesia’s New Military Chief Pick Mean?”).

“When we drew up the draft 2015 state budget, we assumed that one US dollar would be worth Rp 12,500. The fact now is that one dollar is equal to Rp 14,000,” Gatot told reporters.

The reasoning itself is far from surprising. Indeed, as I pointed out in a piece back in May, few expected Jokowi’s ambitious plan to double Indonesia’s defense budget to materialize given the global financial conditions and its effects on Indonesia (See: “Will Indonesia Double its Military Budget in 2016?”). As I noted in that piece, Jokowi had vowed to double the defense budget in 2016 if the economy grew by 7 percent. But with growth slipping to just 4.7 percent in the second quarter – its slowest pace in nearly six years – and the rupiah down 13 percent this year amid sluggish growth in China, Japan and the Eurozone, that seemed very unlikely to occur.

But a cut – as opposed to a slower increase – has significant implications because it will require reductions in certain areas, whether it be new equipment or personnel costs. Gatot has indeed already indicated that he will order a reduction in the procurement of new weapons in response to the planned budget cut. However, he also hinted that priority would still be placed on new equipment for the navy and air force even with the cuts in line with Jokowi’s so-called global maritime fulcrum (See: “Indonesia’s Maritime Ambition: Can Jokowi Realize It?”). For instance, he noted that the Air Force could prioritize buying radars and Sukhoi SU-35 jet fighters, while the Navy could aim to procure submarines, frigates and radars.

“As we plan to turn Indonesia into a maritime axis, we should strengthen our presence in airspace and the sea,” he said.

Gatot’s comments may seem encouraging in that they suggest that Jokowi’s priorities will remain and that major acquisition programs will be shielded despite the cuts. And to be sure, the amount of money available for defense is only one – albeit a major – factor in Indonesia’s ongoing military modernization process. But at the same time, the focus on how a shrinking pie is divvied up will not distract Indonesia watchers from the fact that a pie, already far too small, is getting even smaller instead of continuing to grow at a faster pace.

Why is Indonesia Set to Cut its Military Budget for 2016? | The Diplomat

Kayak gua ja pemerintah nunggu harga dolar turun buat beli barang.

Can the US Marines Help Build Indonesia’s Amphibious Capabilities?
The effort could play an important role in the rebalance.

By Grant Newsham and Swee Lean Collin Koh
September 10, 2015


Many of the Marine Corps’ allies are in the Pacific, so Marines ahve the opportunity to train and share techniques with the Pacific nations. Indonesia Marines and U.S. Marines with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, run during a morning physical training session May 23 during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 2013 in Antralina, Indonesia.
(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. John C. Lamb/Released)



As a vast archipelagic nation-state prone to natural disasters, having a strong amphibious capability would appear to be a natural requirement for Indonesia. And as a part of the Indonesian Navy, the Marine Corps (Korps Marinir or KORMAR) has a key role to play in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). Under the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) blueprint, Indonesia envisages by 2024 a greenwater navy capable of undertaking missions within its immediate regional waters as well as limited outreach beyond.

Under former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, KORMAR, much like its sister branches, did experience some qualitative improvements. There was expected to continue under current President Joko Widodo, who in November 2014 outlined a vision of Indonesia as a Global Maritime Fulcrum. Of the five pillars of this vision, enhancing maritime defense lends further impetus for the ongoing MEF plan. Moreover, this pillar implicitly goes beyond continuing the primary focus of equipment upgrades. In particular, there is more to amphibious capacity-building than simply acquiring the hardware.

For instance, even an advanced, relatively well-funded navy such as the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) faces similar challenges. In the aftermath of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011, the JMSDF arrived on scene within a matter of hours. However, since it had no real amphibious capability – despite having some amphibious hardware – there was practically nothing to be done except to sit offshore while an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 survivors – who otherwise could have been saved – froze to death in the first 24-48 hours. Hence, there are some very practical reasons for developing and improving amphibious capabilities.

Opportunity for Engagement

Building amphibious capabilities certainly includes intensifying training, including engagement with foreign counterparts. Being traditionally more accustomed to bilateral, intra-Southeast Asian joint training and exercises, it is apparent that KORMAR seeks to develop a new area of expertise in broader region-wide initiatives. Notably, it played a key role in Indonesia-hosted Exercise Komodo, a multinational HA/DR exercise held in early 2014. And during the most recent Rim of the Pacific exercise hosted by the U.S., KORMAR deployed a contingent that performed admirably.

However, the Indonesians have room for improvement. An ambitious slew of initiatives is in the works: upgrading of aging hardware, improving personnel welfare, and developing human capital. The last aspect ties in with former Indonesian Navy chief Admiral Marsetio’s idea of a “World Class Navy” – increasing the quality of Indonesian naval servicemen (KORMAR personnel included), which can be accomplished through enhanced professional military education and training. This includes expanded interactions with foreign counterparts to learn and share best practices. It is thus clear that capacity-building for KORMAR is going to be more than acquiring new amphibious fighting vehicles or landing vessels. Although Jakarta might fulfill these requirements on its own, it can benefit from external assistance in its capacity-building efforts.

Washington has an opportunity to step up to this. In the revised version of “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” published in March this year, an increase in U.S. strategic attention to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is envisaged. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is designated to maintain a Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Expeditionary Unit in the region, and deploy a Marine Rotational Force to Australia as well as introducing new assets, such as the MV-22 Osprey. One of the objectives spelt out in this revised U.S. document is to enhance regional partnerships through expanded maritime security operations, shared maritime domain awareness and longer multilateral engagements. The aim is to build and sustain regional capacities to deal with local maritime security challenges.

Seen in this light, the USMC has a major role to play in helping to build the amphibious capacities of regional militaries, not least the Indonesians. The only question is how. To date, Washington has maintained a set of military engagements with Jakarta since the lifting of the arms embargo. This includes the extension of technical aid, such as helping Indonesia build an integrated maritime surveillance system network for maritime security purposes, as well as continuing the customary joint training and exercises, such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) series.

Expanding the Scope

Just recently, the U.S. and Indonesia completed this year’s iteration of the CARAT exercise. This is useful, but what matters more is what happens the 360 days of the year when the Americans are not around to help sustain Indonesia’s amphibious capacity-building efforts. The U.S. Department of Defense’s current approach of conducting short-duration joint training and exercises with the Indonesians a few times annually is so short-term that it tends to shortchange amphibious development. This is hardly in line with the stated goals of the revised maritime strategy for the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, not least if one considers Indonesia a key U.S. partner seen in the light of its geostrategic position.

Perhaps the key to drawing out the Indonesians is having Marines permanently assigned to KORMAR, as a means of building a more durable relationship via daily interactions. This approach has proven effective in Australia, Japan and South Korea. Stationing the right USMC personnel in Indonesia could help Jakarta play a larger role in Indo-Asia-Pacific and also assist in its Global Maritime Fulcrum vision. However, any such move would have to be calibrated, taking into consideration several potential hurdles in the way.

For example, Jakarta may be concerned about creating the wrong perceptions by allowing this permanent USMC presence. Domestically, it may also constitute a time-bomb with some constituents likely perceiving it as a move by Washington to further intensify its military footprint in the region. Even moderates will be worried whether it might trigger a potential regional backlash, not least having Indonesia seen by Beijing as being complicit in a U.S.-led containment effort.

One way to circumvent these obstacles is to proceed gradually. For a start, one USMC officer serving as advisor can based in Indonesia with KORMAR, or if necessary in the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta. The idea is to furnish a platform from which the officer can constantly interact with KORMAR, and promote and assist Indonesia’s amphibious capability building. The candidate would have to be carefully selected. He or she would need to have appreciable knowledge of Indonesia and its culture. This officer also needs to be able to operate in think-tank, media, and defense policy circles in order to sell “amphibiosity.” Fortuitously, the USMC has a number of potential candidates.

If this pilot scheme is successful, the logical next step would be to station a small USMC advisory team. This phase can possibly be accomplished without local political opposition so long as the USMC officer works the ground correctly and assiduously. In sum, enhancing USMC engagement with KORMAR would have to start small and aim for gradual progress appropriate for Indonesia’s amphibious capacity-building.

Some Final Thoughts

Unless the idea of amphibious operations is continuously pushed, it tends to fade into the background and be seen as a distraction from more “important” military operations. There seems to be a sort of equilibrium in most militaries, by which the individual armed services naturally focus on the core functions and capacities they consider most important, foremost being warfighting capabilities such as fighter jets, tanks, and combat ships and submarines. Moreover, the individual services do not naturally cooperate with each other. Yet amphibious capabilities require “some of each,” as the services must cooperate for joint operations combining sea/ground/air capabilities. This can be deemed contrary to the natural order of things in any military.

Not surprisingly, then, amphibious capabilities tend to be overlooked and when the need arises the services scramble to respond – and usually not very well. Once the need “recedes,” things go back to the equilibrium. This certainly applies to the case of Indonesia. Following the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, Jakarta endeavored to bolster HA/DR capabilities. The purchase of new landing platform, dock vessels was one major initiative. But over the past decade, it is also evident that the equilibrium has taken hold as Indonesia began to pay less attention to amphibious capabilities.

Inserting a USMC officer into Indonesia would be intended to keep this equilibrium from asserting itself, at least initially. The USMC has substantial expertise and knowledge to share with its Indonesian counterpart. And such new initiatives would be in line with the stated objectives of the revised maritime strategy. In consequence, a “building block” approach by doing it the correct way, with minimum political fuss, will facilitate not just KORMAR’s amphibious capacity-building but also enhance the U.S. military partnership with Indonesia. This will help more fully manifest Washington’s commitment to its Asia “rebalancing” efforts.

Grant Newsham is senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, based in Tokyo, and a retired U.S. Marine Colonel. He served as the first U.S. Marine Liaison Officer to the Japan Ground Self Defense Force from 2011-2013 and was instrumental in the development of the Japan Self Defense Force’s nascent amphibious capability. He remains active in amphibious development in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Swee Lean Collin Koh is associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He primarily researches on naval modernization in Southeast Asia.

Can the US Marines Help Build Indonesia’s Amphibious Capabilities? | The Diplomat

 

[anas_nurhafidz]

Army's Heli
Credit to original uploader

 

[prima99]

GREAT NEWS!! KFX/IFX development is delayed! hooorayyyyy!!

so why don't just cancel the develepment for the **** of it? saving money to buy more tanks? what the ****???

Proyek Pesawat Tempur RI-Korsel Ditunda, Menhan: Dana Investasi

Jakarta - Program kerjasama pengembangan pesawat tempur KFX/IFX antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan (Korsel) dievaluasi oleh pemerintahan Presiden Jokowi-JK. Menurut Menhan Ryamizard Ryacudu, penundaan kerjasama ini sudah dengan berbagai pertimbangan.

Menurut Ryamizad, salah satu pertimbangan, masih ada yang lebih prioritas dibanding proyek pengembangan pesawat tempur generasi 4,5 itu. Seri KFX/IFX sendiri setara dengan jet tempur tipe F-18 Super Hornet, Eurofighter Typhoon, hingga Dessault Rafale.

"Bukan batal, tapi ditunda. (Alasannya) kan banya kegiatan, banyak yang lebih penting. Kalau pesawat terbang kan enggak terlalu penting, kita bisa beli sewaktu-waktu. Bisa diundurlah, sabar 10 tahun lagi," ungkap Ryamizard usai mengunjungi pasukan TNI AL di Lantamal III, Tanjung Priok, Jakut, Senin (7/9/2015).

Kerjasama antara RI dengan Korsel ini tidak hanya dengan skema G to G (government to government) namun juga diperkuat dengan skema B to B (business to business) antara PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PT DI) dan Korea Aerospace Industries (KIA). Di mana dalam kerjasama ini disepakati diadakannya transfer of technology (ToT).

Untuk versi Indonesia atau IFX, prototype rencananya akan diluncurkan pada tahun 2020 dan kemudian pada 2022, IFX akan diproduksi secara massal di Indonesia dengan disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan TNI. Pada 2014, PT DI bersama Kementerian Pertahanan dan Korsel telah memasuki tahap engineering manufacturing development dengan proses hingga 10 tahun ke depan.

"Itu tidak prioritas. Tapi kemudian hari kita harus bisa buat pesawat. Masak kita beli terus," kata Ryamizard saat ditanya lalu bagaimana kelanjutan nasib proyek tersebut.

Menhan pun membantah ditundanya proyek ini dikarenakan masalah politik di negeri Ginseng itu. Ryamizard juga mengatakan, dana investasi yang telah dikeluarkan untuk kepentingan riset proyek pembangunan pesawat tempur ini tidak akan hilang karena adanya penundaan. Untuk diketahui, Indonesia telah mengucurkan dana sebesar Rp 600 miliar untuk riset dan pengembangan awal KFX/IFX.

"Kan ditunda. Jadi tidak hilang, hanya ditunda. Sementara uang yang ada saat ini bisa digunakan untuk prioritas lain," tegas jenderal purnawirawan bintang 4 itu.

Sementara itu Dirjen Perencanaan Pertahanan Kemenhan, Marsda M Syaugi menjelaskan, dana yang sedianya akan digunakan dalam proyek KFX/IFX akan dialihkan ke pengadaan alutsista di matra-matra lain. Ia juga membantah penundaan ini dikarenakan Korsel yang tak mau menerapkan skema ToT.

"Bukan tidak mau membagi (alih teknologi), tapi proyek itu ditunda karena situasinya belum terlalu penting. Sehingga dialihkan ke hal-hal yang urgent," tukas Syaugi di lokasi yang sama.

Sebelumnya Wapres JK saat berkunjung ke Korsel mengungkapkan mengenai penundaan ini. Pemerintah Indonesia disebutnya fokus pada pengadaan alutsista selain pengembangan pesawat tempur.

"Padahal kita butuh tank, senjata, butuh banyak. Jadi kita memberikan prioritas dulu yang kita butuhkan lebih banyak. Ya dia (PM Korsel-Hwang Kyo Ahn) juga minta (dilanjutkan) walaupun kita sudah evaluasi di kabinet. Ya kita lebih lanjutkan yang dibutuhkan banyak," terang JK di Seoul, Kamis

 

[pr1v4t33r]

Indonesian Navy 70th Anniversary

 

[Reashot Xigwin]

A New Indonesia Military Boost Near the South China Sea?
The country’s defense minister says it will strengthen its air defenses “to be prepared.”

By Prashanth Parameswaran
September 11, 2015

Earlier this week, the Indonesian defense minister said that the country would boost its defenses near the South China Sea in anticipation of future threats.

Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu said that Indonesia will equip the Natuna islands near the South China Sea with a port and extend its military air base runway so that it can accommodate more planes. He also added that more jet fighters would be stationed at the Ranai military air base in Natuna.

“We are not in a war situation, but the South China Sea is very close to us,” Ryamizard added. “We have to be prepared. Our weapon systems are good, but we need to add more so that we don’t need to worry all the time.”

To close observers, Ryamizard’s comments are consistent with Indonesia’s general approach to South China Sea disputes. As I have written before, while Indonesia is not a claimant, Jakarta has long been concerned that a portion of the surrounding waters of its resource-rich Natuna islands overlaps with China’s expansive nine-dash line claim (See: “Natuna is Indonesian, Not Chinese: Jokowi Adviser”).

In response, since the 1990s Indonesia has been using a mix of diplomatic, legal, and security measures to fashion a delicate approach to oppose China’s claims without officially recognizing (and thus legitimizing) them (See: “No, Indonesia’s South China Sea Approach Has Not Changed”). Within this approach, the South China Sea – and the Natunas, in particular – have been a central feature in Indonesian defense thinking. For instance, the Natunas have been included as one of the main flashpoints to watch since the 2000s as the Indonesian military (TNI) works towards achieving a Minimum Essential Force by 2024 (See: “Between Aspiration and Reality: Indonesian Foreign Policy After the 2014 Elections”).

Even before President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo took power, China’s growing assertiveness – which has included encroachments into Indonesian waters and instances of direct confrontation – has prompted Indonesian military officials to be more outspoken about the South China Sea issue and led to several announced shifts in capabilities including in the Natuna Islands. In February 2014, during a visit to China, then TNI chief General Moeldoko announced that Indonesia would station additional forces around the Natuna waters to “anticipate any instability.” In March, Indonesian Army Chief of Staff General Budiman announced that Indonesia would upgrade its airbase facilities with the long-term goal of permanently deploying a squadron of Sukhoi fighter aircraft and four Boeing AH-64E Apache attack helicopters on the Natuna Islands.

Under Jokowi, Indonesia has continued to focus on the Natunas as part of its foreign policy priorities of preserving Indonesia’s sovereignty and strengthening its maritime capabilities (See: “The Trouble With Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Priorities Under Jokowi”). To take just one example, earlier this year, the Natunas were selected as one of several potential locations for a new military base – although, as I indicated then, that development stemmed from a broader concern about threats to border areas which come not only from China, but some of Jakarta’s other neighbors too (See: “A New Indonesia Military Base Near the South China Sea?”). Just last week, Indonesia’s Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Ade Supandi said that Indonesia needed to maintain security and stability in the South China Sea in the face of rising threats.

“[We should] maintain security and stability in the South China Sea, especially with the recently increasing intensity of threats,” Supandi said.

Ryamizard’s comments suggest that these upgrades are likely to proceed as planned under Jokowi’s tenure and that Jakarta continues to see the South China Sea as one of the key security challenges it needs to be concerned about.

A New Indonesia Military Boost Near the South China Sea? | The Diplomat

 

[Indos]

Kerjasama KFX/IFX adalah kerjasama dua negara, enggak bisa ditunda begitu aja, apalagi lockheed udah masuk. Ini ada rasa kebanggaan bangsa dan diperlukan untuk merealisasikan apa yg Jokowi katakan bahwa Indonesia butuh revolusi mental. Penundaan proyek ini akan menghantam pemerintahan secara politik, adalah sebuah kebodohan baik dilihat dari sisi dalam negeri maupun luar negeri (hubungan dgn Korea dan USA) untuk menunda program secara sepihak. Margin yg tipis antara Jokowi dan Prabowo kemarin akan berulang lagi 5 tahun ke depan, dan ini ada amunisi baru dari pihak oposisi di Pemilu berikutnya.

Perlu diganti nih penasehat politik Jokowi.

 

[prima99]

Kerjasama KFX/IFX adalah kerjasama dua negara, enggak bisa ditunda begitu aja, apalagi lockheed udah masuk. Ini ada rasa kebanggaan bangsa dan diperlukan untuk merealisasikan apa yg Jokowi katakan bahwa Indonesia butuh revolusi mental. Penundaan proyek ini akan menghantam pemerintahan secara politik, adalah sebuah kebodohan baik dilihat dari sisi dalam negeri maupun luar negeri (hubungan dgn Korea dan USA) untuk menunda program secara sepihak. Margin yg tipis antara Jokowi dan Prabowo kemarin akan berulang lagi 5 tahun ke depan, dan ini ada amunisi baru dari pihak oposisi di Pemilu berikutnya.

Perlu diganti nih penasehat politik Jokowi.

"delay" is soft word for "cancelled" i think. otherwise it'll be even more foolish to delay the development just because we have bought some Su-35. they say they're going to buy tanks rather than continuing the project. like, seriously? whatever happened to Maritime military strenghtening plan?

the country's under Joke-a-wee's rule becomes a joke. it's the HSR that delayed before, now it's the KFX/IFX. this consequetive delays makes Indonesia to be branded as incompetent third world country. even the Japanese are laughing at us. see this

I voted for him as he is a honest one. But after I see what he is doing in energy policy, lowering the price of oil once again after rising it because of political pressure and "stupid economist that he hires," and the result is weak Rupiah I can see now that we badly need a smart leader. And now KFX/IFX which has a strong relation with mental revolution program that he even put as his "fresh" program.

It is better to hold any other program than this prestigious program. This flip flop thinking is the reason of why we cannot become a high tech nation even though we are the first who can make rocket in Asia after Japan and has already had a nuclear power plan (research) in 1960's.

no doubt there will be no other countries willing to invite us in join development with Indonesia in the future. we can't even make jet fighters by ourselves and when there's a chance that we can finally make one, we fucked it up, superb. someone should sue those hypocrites in the govt and get someone with better brains, seriously.

well, **** the KFX/IFX. it's going to be failed either way. now the question is, which country trust Indonesia enough to lend their hands in their military development? the HAL/FGFA seems to be a promising project, yet i doubt they even want Indonesia to join them.

 

[anas_nurhafidz]

Tanker tanker...we need tanker
Credit to ori uploader