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Indos
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1 hour before the start of the accident, one of the wifes of the officer get message through phone from one of the submarine officer by saying he is doing military drill in Bali strait. I hope all the families ikhlas and accept it. It happened during duty and in Ramadhan, so I hope they get shahid reward from Allah SWT.
Another submarine officer wife
Another submarine officer wife
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Titanium100
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Inna Lillahi wa inna ilayhi raji'un.. Inshallah shahid
chandieka
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new update on KRI Nanggala
tl;dr ship location is found and the ship is broken to 3 pieces most probable cause is due to outside pressure
previously the ship was/will (IDK which) carrying out a torpedo drill/shooting right?? if that correct then there should be a few (or full complement) of the torpedo somewhere in/on the wreak
tl;dr ship location is found and the ship is broken to 3 pieces most probable cause is due to outside pressure
previously the ship was/will (IDK which) carrying out a torpedo drill/shooting right?? if that correct then there should be a few (or full complement) of the torpedo somewhere in/on the wreak
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An army general, Brigadier General Putu IGP Dani NK, has been killed by Papuan rebels (OPM) in Papua... I believe he's the highest ranking officer ever been killed in this ongoing conflict... Innalillahi wa inna illaihi rojiuun...
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Head of BIN Papua Killed during Shootout with KKB
CNN Indonesia | Sunday, 25/04/2021 19:06 WIB
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Illustration. The head of BIN Papua died in a firefight with KKB. (Photo: iStockphoto / ugurhan)
Jakarta, CNN Indonesia -
The head of the Papua National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Brigadier General Putu IGP Dani NK died during a shootout with the Armed Criminal Group ( KKB ) in Dambet Village, Boega District, Puncak Regency, Papua, on Sunday (25/4) at 15:50 WIT.
Pangdam Cendrawasih, Maj. Gen. Yogo Triyono, confirmed the news. "It is true that he was shot by an armed separatist group (KSB)," he told CNNIndonesia.com .
"The complete chronology does not yet exist, we are still requesting it because of communication difficulties so that the complete chronology is not yet available," he added.
Reporting from Antara, Putu Dani initially came to Dambet Village at around 9:20 WIT with seven members using four motorbikes.
While in Dambet Village, Putu Dani was suspected of being shot and died.
"It is true that Brigadier General Putu Dani, who served as Ka Binda, was reported to have died in Beoga but until now there has been no complete report," said Papua Police Chief Inspector General Pol Mathius Fakhiri.
It is planned that Putu Dani's body will be evacuated to Boega and brought to Timika on Monday (26/4) tomorrow.
"It is true that Brigadier General Putu Dani's body is already in Beoga, and Monday is scheduled to be evacuated to Timika," said the XVII / Cenderawasih Regional Military Command Commander, Major General TNI Ignatius Yogo Triyono.
The distance between Kampung Dambet and Beoga is about three kilometers and is the last village reported to have been attacked by the KKB. The last action was to burn down people's homes and housing for teachers and elementary schools.
"The bodies arrived at Beoga at around 18.30 WIT," said Triyono.
Based on records, there have been at least four shootings by KKB against civilians in the Beoga area since the beginning of April.
First, on Thursday (8/4), KKB allegedly shot dead an elementary school (SD) teacher named Oktavianus Rayo. The next day, they shot another junior high school teacher named Yonathan Randen in Beoga District.
After the incident, three school buildings were burned down in the area. In fact, the burning continued until it finally burned down the houses of members of the Puncak Regency DPRD.
A week later, on Wednesday (14/4), KKB shot another motorcycle taxi driver named Udin in Omikia District, Puncak Regency. Then, the next day they shot a high school student named Ali Mom in Ilaga.
The victims, said the police, were asked to buy betel nuts and cigarettes. After being escorted to Uloni's village, Ali Mom was instead shot and hacked to death.
KKB itself has claimed responsibility for a number of shootings. This was done because the victim was suspected of being a spy for the TNI-Polri apparatus.
(dis / pris)
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Head of BIN Papua Killed during Shootout with KKB
CNN Indonesia | Sunday, 25/04/2021 19:06 WIB
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Jakarta, CNN Indonesia -
The head of the Papua National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Brigadier General Putu IGP Dani NK died during a shootout with the Armed Criminal Group ( KKB ) in Dambet Village, Boega District, Puncak Regency, Papua, on Sunday (25/4) at 15:50 WIT.
Pangdam Cendrawasih, Maj. Gen. Yogo Triyono, confirmed the news. "It is true that he was shot by an armed separatist group (KSB)," he told CNNIndonesia.com .
"The complete chronology does not yet exist, we are still requesting it because of communication difficulties so that the complete chronology is not yet available," he added.
Reporting from Antara, Putu Dani initially came to Dambet Village at around 9:20 WIT with seven members using four motorbikes.
While in Dambet Village, Putu Dani was suspected of being shot and died.
"It is true that Brigadier General Putu Dani, who served as Ka Binda, was reported to have died in Beoga but until now there has been no complete report," said Papua Police Chief Inspector General Pol Mathius Fakhiri.
| See also: Head of BIN Papua Died in Beoga |
It is planned that Putu Dani's body will be evacuated to Boega and brought to Timika on Monday (26/4) tomorrow.
"It is true that Brigadier General Putu Dani's body is already in Beoga, and Monday is scheduled to be evacuated to Timika," said the XVII / Cenderawasih Regional Military Command Commander, Major General TNI Ignatius Yogo Triyono.
The distance between Kampung Dambet and Beoga is about three kilometers and is the last village reported to have been attacked by the KKB. The last action was to burn down people's homes and housing for teachers and elementary schools.
"The bodies arrived at Beoga at around 18.30 WIT," said Triyono.
Based on records, there have been at least four shootings by KKB against civilians in the Beoga area since the beginning of April.
First, on Thursday (8/4), KKB allegedly shot dead an elementary school (SD) teacher named Oktavianus Rayo. The next day, they shot another junior high school teacher named Yonathan Randen in Beoga District.
After the incident, three school buildings were burned down in the area. In fact, the burning continued until it finally burned down the houses of members of the Puncak Regency DPRD.
A week later, on Wednesday (14/4), KKB shot another motorcycle taxi driver named Udin in Omikia District, Puncak Regency. Then, the next day they shot a high school student named Ali Mom in Ilaga.
The victims, said the police, were asked to buy betel nuts and cigarettes. After being escorted to Uloni's village, Ali Mom was instead shot and hacked to death.
KKB itself has claimed responsibility for a number of shootings. This was done because the victim was suspected of being a spy for the TNI-Polri apparatus.
(dis / pris)
Reashot Xigwin
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The Strategic Impact of Indonesian KF-21s
Using the phrase “arms race” is attention grabbing, but a more discerning assessment is necessary when it comes to weapons acquisitions.
By Liang Tuang Nah
April 16, 2021
Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, left, bumps elbows with South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong prior to their meeting at the foreign ministry in Seoul Friday, April 9, 2021.
Credit: Jeon Heon-kyun/Pool Photo via AP
On April 9, a prototype of an advanced multi-role combat jet, the KF-21 Boramae (“young hawk” in Korean) was introduced by South Korea with President Moon Jae-in and Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto in attendance. While it is clear that Seoul’s decision to develop an indigenous fighter jet is driven by desires for defense industry self-sufficiency, along with national pride, Prabowo’s presence signifies Jakarta’s commitment to acquiring the KF-21, thereby further diversifying Indonesia’s air force fleet to limit reliance on any one foreign supplier. The bulk of Indonesian warplanes currently come from the United States and Russia.
Will the Boramae Impact the Regional Strategic Status Quo?
Based on publicly sourced research, the KF-21 is touted to be superior to contemporary non-stealthy advanced fighters like the U.S. F-16 or the French Dassault Rafale. The Boramae’s selling points include greater operational range, more advanced avionics and electronic warfare capabilities, along with a Korean-made active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which has improved target detection and tracking capability versus earlier radar technologies, leading to more effective weapons delivery. Moreover, the KF-21 is designed to possess baseline radar evading stealth capabilities, which are inferior to full-fledged stealth fighters like the F-35, but give it an edge over potential non-stealthy adversaries.
When coupled with a weapons package comprising advanced infrared and radar guided air-to-air missiles for shooting down enemy aircraft, and air-to-ground munitions including accurate missiles and guided bombs, it can be seen why casual observers might infer that Indonesia’s pending order of 50 KF-21s might impact the future balance of military air power in Southeast Asia.
Important Context for the KF-21 Acquisition
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Using the phrase “arms race” is attention grabbing, potentially leading to greater media circulation and corresponding advertising revenue. However, it pays to be more discerning and dispassionate when analyzing national weapons acquisition. Regarding future Indonesian KF-21s, it can be argued that Jakarta has two major considerations: expansive territorial defense and aircraft fleet obsolescence, neither of which should be alarming or sensational.
Concerning Indonesian airspace, the TNI-AU (Indonesian Air Force) has 1,904,569 square km of land to cover and a far larger sovereign airspace over Indonesian soil and internal waters, which it needs to patrol. Additionally, operational and security considerations may, from time to time, necessitate missions over Indonesia’s expansive maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ). All of this requires a sufficiently large air fleet which the TNI-AU arguably does not possess, since it currently has only 101 armed aircraft and six maritime patrol planes to police or guard its extensive airspace responsibilities. Furthermore, not all of these airframes are always available or airworthy since a proportion will at any time be undergoing maintenance or grounded awaiting spare parts delivery. Seen in this light, the TNI-AU’s acquisition of 50 Boramae fighters in the next few years does not look like an unreasonable proposition for national security maintenance.
Turning to the issue of air fleet obsolescence, it should be mentioned that the additional 50 KF-21s are probably meant to replace some or all of Indonesia’s out-of-date warplanes. A quick look at the TNI-AU’s fighter inventory reveals a few models that are growing long in the tooth, and would be obsolete in the next decade. Examples include the Russian made Su-27, which was acquired in 2002 and 2006 (five aircraft in total), U.S. made F-16As and F-16Bs ordered in 1989 (10 still in service), and British made BAE Hawk Mk 109 and Mk 209 jets delivered by 1997 (total of 30 in service). If all these jets were retired due to uneconomical maintenance costs or aging unsafe airframes, the replacement Boramae fighters would only bring the TNI-AU’s combat fleet to 106, an increase of only five aircraft, which hardly deserves media attention.
Operational Issues Relevant to TNI-AU Modernization
Lastly, there are intangible and tangible issues related to an air force’s operational readiness and effectiveness, which most journalists never consider. Intangible factors like doctrinal effectiveness and pilot quality are hard to measure while tangible aspects such as availability of spare parts and sufficient stocks of compatible munitions are seldom investigated by the press.
With reference to doctrine, these refer to guidelines on how best to employ military force to achieve set objectives, while pilot readiness is often judged based on a few factors such as the number of annual flying hours, performance during international military exercises, and combat experience of the air force in question. Inasmuch as military doctrine is often classified, there are no means of examining authenticated TNI-AU doctrine; hence it is prudent to withhold comment about the efficacy of Indonesian air force tactics and strategy.
As for the aviators, competence should not be underestimated but one should note that the real-world operational experience of the TNI-AU only covers counterinsurgency missions against domestic rebels, not operations against the combat forces of other states. Also, it is not known whether Indonesian pilots receive the same number of flying hours as NATO air forces (100-150 hours/year), but it must be noted that concrete issues like spare parts availability can affect airworthiness to such an extent that fleets can be grounded, forcing pilots to resort to ground based simulators. For example, in 2005 logistical deprivation from a U.S. embargo resulted in minimal to nil operational availability for U.S.-made Indonesian assets like F-16s and A-4s.
Finally, the impactfulness of an air force rests to a substantial extent on its stocks of missiles and bombs delivered by its aircraft. Putting aside the quality of such armaments, open source research reveals no information about the amount of airborne weapons maintained by the TNI-AU. But it is notable that they procure both Russian and U.S. munitions, leading to greater complexity and strain on the logistical system, which might well hamper operational availability and the air force’s potential. Since the KF-21 is slated to employ both U.S. and European missiles, the eventual incorporation of an Indonesian Boramae fleet could overstretch the TNI-AU’s supply network.
Rational Analysis Versus Hype
If anything, the KF-21 sale is an exercise in military, strategic, and industrial diplomacy by the Moon administration in support of Seoul’s ASEAN-centric “New Southern Policy.” From Jakarta’s perspective, the Boramae acquisition is probably intended to effect timely defense modernization for the TNI-AU while preserving status quo national interests. As such, overeager commentators should be encouraged to exercise restraint, especially when they understand little about the national imperatives of regional middle powers, and limitations or inner workings of their militaries.
Using the phrase “arms race” is attention grabbing, but a more discerning assessment is necessary when it comes to weapons acquisitions.
By Liang Tuang Nah
April 16, 2021
Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, left, bumps elbows with South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong prior to their meeting at the foreign ministry in Seoul Friday, April 9, 2021.
Credit: Jeon Heon-kyun/Pool Photo via AP
On April 9, a prototype of an advanced multi-role combat jet, the KF-21 Boramae (“young hawk” in Korean) was introduced by South Korea with President Moon Jae-in and Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto in attendance. While it is clear that Seoul’s decision to develop an indigenous fighter jet is driven by desires for defense industry self-sufficiency, along with national pride, Prabowo’s presence signifies Jakarta’s commitment to acquiring the KF-21, thereby further diversifying Indonesia’s air force fleet to limit reliance on any one foreign supplier. The bulk of Indonesian warplanes currently come from the United States and Russia.
Will the Boramae Impact the Regional Strategic Status Quo?
Based on publicly sourced research, the KF-21 is touted to be superior to contemporary non-stealthy advanced fighters like the U.S. F-16 or the French Dassault Rafale. The Boramae’s selling points include greater operational range, more advanced avionics and electronic warfare capabilities, along with a Korean-made active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which has improved target detection and tracking capability versus earlier radar technologies, leading to more effective weapons delivery. Moreover, the KF-21 is designed to possess baseline radar evading stealth capabilities, which are inferior to full-fledged stealth fighters like the F-35, but give it an edge over potential non-stealthy adversaries.
When coupled with a weapons package comprising advanced infrared and radar guided air-to-air missiles for shooting down enemy aircraft, and air-to-ground munitions including accurate missiles and guided bombs, it can be seen why casual observers might infer that Indonesia’s pending order of 50 KF-21s might impact the future balance of military air power in Southeast Asia.
Important Context for the KF-21 Acquisition
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.
Using the phrase “arms race” is attention grabbing, potentially leading to greater media circulation and corresponding advertising revenue. However, it pays to be more discerning and dispassionate when analyzing national weapons acquisition. Regarding future Indonesian KF-21s, it can be argued that Jakarta has two major considerations: expansive territorial defense and aircraft fleet obsolescence, neither of which should be alarming or sensational.
Concerning Indonesian airspace, the TNI-AU (Indonesian Air Force) has 1,904,569 square km of land to cover and a far larger sovereign airspace over Indonesian soil and internal waters, which it needs to patrol. Additionally, operational and security considerations may, from time to time, necessitate missions over Indonesia’s expansive maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ). All of this requires a sufficiently large air fleet which the TNI-AU arguably does not possess, since it currently has only 101 armed aircraft and six maritime patrol planes to police or guard its extensive airspace responsibilities. Furthermore, not all of these airframes are always available or airworthy since a proportion will at any time be undergoing maintenance or grounded awaiting spare parts delivery. Seen in this light, the TNI-AU’s acquisition of 50 Boramae fighters in the next few years does not look like an unreasonable proposition for national security maintenance.
Turning to the issue of air fleet obsolescence, it should be mentioned that the additional 50 KF-21s are probably meant to replace some or all of Indonesia’s out-of-date warplanes. A quick look at the TNI-AU’s fighter inventory reveals a few models that are growing long in the tooth, and would be obsolete in the next decade. Examples include the Russian made Su-27, which was acquired in 2002 and 2006 (five aircraft in total), U.S. made F-16As and F-16Bs ordered in 1989 (10 still in service), and British made BAE Hawk Mk 109 and Mk 209 jets delivered by 1997 (total of 30 in service). If all these jets were retired due to uneconomical maintenance costs or aging unsafe airframes, the replacement Boramae fighters would only bring the TNI-AU’s combat fleet to 106, an increase of only five aircraft, which hardly deserves media attention.
Operational Issues Relevant to TNI-AU Modernization
Lastly, there are intangible and tangible issues related to an air force’s operational readiness and effectiveness, which most journalists never consider. Intangible factors like doctrinal effectiveness and pilot quality are hard to measure while tangible aspects such as availability of spare parts and sufficient stocks of compatible munitions are seldom investigated by the press.
With reference to doctrine, these refer to guidelines on how best to employ military force to achieve set objectives, while pilot readiness is often judged based on a few factors such as the number of annual flying hours, performance during international military exercises, and combat experience of the air force in question. Inasmuch as military doctrine is often classified, there are no means of examining authenticated TNI-AU doctrine; hence it is prudent to withhold comment about the efficacy of Indonesian air force tactics and strategy.
As for the aviators, competence should not be underestimated but one should note that the real-world operational experience of the TNI-AU only covers counterinsurgency missions against domestic rebels, not operations against the combat forces of other states. Also, it is not known whether Indonesian pilots receive the same number of flying hours as NATO air forces (100-150 hours/year), but it must be noted that concrete issues like spare parts availability can affect airworthiness to such an extent that fleets can be grounded, forcing pilots to resort to ground based simulators. For example, in 2005 logistical deprivation from a U.S. embargo resulted in minimal to nil operational availability for U.S.-made Indonesian assets like F-16s and A-4s.
Finally, the impactfulness of an air force rests to a substantial extent on its stocks of missiles and bombs delivered by its aircraft. Putting aside the quality of such armaments, open source research reveals no information about the amount of airborne weapons maintained by the TNI-AU. But it is notable that they procure both Russian and U.S. munitions, leading to greater complexity and strain on the logistical system, which might well hamper operational availability and the air force’s potential. Since the KF-21 is slated to employ both U.S. and European missiles, the eventual incorporation of an Indonesian Boramae fleet could overstretch the TNI-AU’s supply network.
Rational Analysis Versus Hype
If anything, the KF-21 sale is an exercise in military, strategic, and industrial diplomacy by the Moon administration in support of Seoul’s ASEAN-centric “New Southern Policy.” From Jakarta’s perspective, the Boramae acquisition is probably intended to effect timely defense modernization for the TNI-AU while preserving status quo national interests. As such, overeager commentators should be encouraged to exercise restraint, especially when they understand little about the national imperatives of regional middle powers, and limitations or inner workings of their militaries.
radialv
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Where is the other one, KRI Spica?
Indos
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I think Spica is still under maintenance, it is why they dont use it on the search.
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