India's possible war deployment

[BanglaBhoot]

Pakistan has no desire for war but it may be forced on us. We will certainly have grievous casualties and horrific damage in a conventional war even without a nuclear exchange. Unfortunately, we have no option but to fight.

Ikram Sehgal

Considering that war clouds have not dissipated, one must look at the India's possible deployment vis-à-vis Pakistan, based mostly on their Order of Battle (ORBAT) during the 2002 crisis. The Indian Army has five Commands, Northern Command at Udhampur near Jammu looks after Kashmir, Western Command at Chandimandir looks after Punjab and Rajasthan with borderline at Bikaner, Southern Command at Poona looks after Gujrat and Maharashtra, Central Command at Lucknow has one Strike Corps including 31st Armoured Division meant for the western border and Eastern Command at Calcutta looks after Counter-Insurgency in Assam and the NEFA border with China. Pakistan Armed Forces essentially face their Northern, Western and Southern Commands, India has troops earmarked against Pakistan as Army Reserve in both Central and Eastern Commands.

Northern Command consists of three Corps, XV Corps at Srinagar comprising 19th Infantry Division (at Baramula) and 28th (Gurais). XIV Corps at Leh comprising 3rd Infantry Division (Leh) and 8th Mountain Division (Nimer). XVI Corps at Nagrota (Jammu) is a Corps plus with 5 Infantry Divisions, 10th (Akhnur), 25th (Rajauri), 26th (Jammu), 29th (Pathankot) and 39th (Yol). It also has three Independent Armoured Brigades, the 2nd, 3rd and 16th. There is an Artillery Brigade with each Corps. The 39th Infantry Division and the three Armoured Brigades are engaged in Counter-Insurgency duties and form the Command Reserve; the other Divisions are all deployed on the Line of Control (LOC).

Western Command consists of three Corps, XI Corps at Jullunder, deploying 7th Infantry Division (Ferozepur), 9th Infantry Division (Chandimandir) and 15th Infantry Division (Amritsar), 23rd Armoured Brigade and 55th Mechanised Brigade, the two Strike Corps being 2 Corps and X Corps at Ambala and Bhatinda respectively. 2 Corps has 1st Armoured Division, 14th RAPID Division, 22nd Infantry Division and 14th Independent Armoured Brigade while X Corps has the 18th and 24th RAPID Divisions, 16th Infantry Division and 6th Independent Armoured Brigade.

Southern Command consists of XII Corps (Jodhpur) with 11th and 12th Infantry Divisions deployed at Ahmedabad and Jodhpur and the XXI Strike Corps (Bhopal) with 33rd Armoured, 36th RAPID and 54th Infantry Division. There are three Direct Reporting Units, 30th Artillery Division, which usually moves to Western Command. 50th Independent Parachute Brigade and 333rd Missile Groups (India's nuclear artillery unit having Prithvi missiles) are meant to be deployed from Southern Command Area to Punjab and Rajasthan. During the 2002 crisis some formations moved from Eastern Command to facing Pakistan, 57 Mountain Division, 2nd Mountain Division and 27 Mountain Division.

The Indian Aerospace Forces (IAF) consists of five operational commands, Western Air Command (New Delhi) controlling air operations from Kashmir to North of Rajasthan, Southwestern Air Command located at Gandhinagar controlling air operations from Rajasthan to Maharashtra, Central Air Command at Allahabad, Eastern Air Command at Shillong and Southern Air Command at Trivandrum. Pakistan is primarily concerned with Western Air Command and Southwestern Command, with 8air deployments from the other Commands.

Western Air Command has an Air Operation Group at Udhampur (near Jammu) dedicated to occupied Jammu & Kashmir. Its fighting units are based at Leh, Srinagar, Udhampur, Jammu, and Pathankot (total 96 aircraft). In Punjab its bases are at Amritsar, Adampur 17, Halvara, Chandigarh, Ambala, Bathinda, Sirsa and Suratgarh (Total 332 Aircraft).

Southwestern Air Command was previously under operational control of Western Command, it now controls air operations in Rajasthan and Maharshtra. Its fighting units are based at Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Agra, Jodhpur, Uttarlai, Jamnagar and Pune (total 263 aircraft). To back these Central Air Command has two Squadrons of Mirage 2000H at Gwalior which can be switched to the other Commands facing Pakistan (36 aircraft). Total deployment against Pakistan in 2002 was in excess of 753 combat aircraft, almost the whole of the IAF.

India's Navy has three Naval Commands. Western Naval Command at Mumbai provides naval defence of Arabian Sea. A new naval base has come up between Mumbai and Cochin at Binaga Bay, with an advance base at Dwarka. The Navy's Missile Boat HQ is at Colaba. Eastern Naval Command, is based at Vizagaptam with a submarine base, it provides naval defence of Bay of Bengal. The Southern Naval Command at Kochi is mainly a training base. Both the Western and Eastern Naval Commands will be involved in operations against Pakistan. Their surface fleet consists of one aircraft carrier, 7 Guided Missile Destroyers, 7 Guided Missile Frigates, 3 Frigates, 4 Corvettes, 10 large patrol craft, 5 Fast Patrol Boats, 3 Fast attack Missile Boats and 18 Minesweepers. They have 1 nuclear powered submarine and 13 diesel-powered submarines in service (1 Foxtrot Class, 9 Sindhughosh Class and 3 Shashikumar Class). India's Naval Air Arm with HQs at Goa consists of a squadron of Jaguars and Sea Harriers each, other than 6 Sea-Kings and 20 Cheetak helicopters. The Jaguar squadron (at Poona) is operated by the IAF.
Emulating Soviet Fleet tactics the Indian Navy focuses on anti-ship capabilities with an emphasis on attack submarines. It has the capacity to support a multi-service heliborne cum para cum amphibious operation, provided it has adequate air cover. This amphibious capability is built around 304th Army Independent Brigade at Vizagapatam. Their Marine Commando Force (Marcos for short) is based at Mumbai, Cochin and Vizagapatam. The Indian Navy has a heavy lift capacity with 2 new 5600 ton Magar Class Landing Vessels with 4 Landing Craft Vehicles and Personnel (LCVP).
Four Polnochny Class vessels have helicopter platforms. They also have 7 locally built 500-ton Landing Craft Utility (LCU). They also have 11 Cosmos midget submarines of Italian origin that can ride the back of Foxtrot Class submarines. A few hovercrafts are on order for fast short-range assault operations.

India's Army and Aerospace Force combat strength is almost totally deployed against Pakistan but if you were to hear Indian defence analysts (all for western consumption), their main worry is China and not Pakistan. One would rather that they worry about us and deploy most of their forces against what they proclaim to be their real threat, from China.
The Indians can deploy four Strike Corps against Pakistan, one each against the Southern part of Azad Kashmir, Central Punjab, Southern Punjab and one against Sindh. They have the necessary balance to focus their attack in a combination of two or even three Corps but time and space dictate they cannot move more than one Strike Corps on any axis and they have to cater for our counter-offensive. Since no ground offensive is possible in the desert without heavy air cover, their air deployment in 2002 suggested that the focus of their Strike Corps could well be in the south (Western and Southern Commands). One should expect a combined heliborne, para and/or amphibious operation. Both the Indian Strike Corps, 2 Corps from Western Command at Jaisalmer and 21 Corps at Barmer from Southern Command could be reinforced with additional Divisions from Eastern Command (moving through Jodhpur) and have integral Helicopter Attack Squadrons, Engineer, Artillery and Air Defence Brigades. The deployment of the Army's Direct Reporting Unit, 30th Artillery Division will give the fulcrum of the line of attack. Jodhpur in 2002 had a concentration of heavy lift MI-8/M-17 helicopters, supplemented by AN-32s at Agra, Gwalior and Chandigarh. Agra is the peace station for another Direct Reporting Unit, the 50th Independent Parachute Brigade.

With all 3 Armoured Divisions and all 4 RAPID Divisions and at least 2 out of 5 Independent Armoured Brigades concentrated in Rajasthan, the resource allocation makes their offensive targets obvious, along the Jaisalmer-Rahimyar Khan axis or along the Barmer-Mirpurkhas axis, most probably both. They could also possibly attempt helicopter troop transportation/amphibious LST and launch XXI Strike Corps for a link-up. They practiced this in 2002. The area between Badin and Sajawal east of the Indus thus becomes vulnerable. Given Pakistan's counter-riposte potential this could end up being "a bridge too far". The Indian Navy cannot blockade Karachi Port with the same impunity they did in 1971, our Exocet-armed Mirages and enhanced submarine fleet will keep them well off-shore, even outside our 200 miles territorial limit. Our Navy would love to get the Indian aircraft carrier within combat aircraft range.

In 2002 Indians moved Directly Reporting Unit 333rd Missile Group consisting of 3 Prithvi Batteries with 4 launchers each to the border areas. Their two Strike Corps in the Rajasthan Desert (II and XXI) provide a better target for a possible Pakistan tactical nuclear strike. If at anytime our conventional forces lose ground threatening our North-South communications, we will use the weapons at our disposal.

Pakistan has no desire for war but it may be forced on us. We will certainly have grievous casualties and horrific damage in a conventional war even without a nuclear exchange. Unfortunately, we have no option but to fight. Does the Indian political (and military) leadership have the stomach to withstand the injury we have the capacity to inflict? That is not rhetoric, that is a commitment.

(Ikram Sehgal is an internationally renowned columnist and the Editor of the Pakistan Defence Journal)

 

[BanglaBhoot]

India cannot disregard China while choosing to attack Pakistan, feel Chinese Strategists

By D. S. Rajan

(To be read with an earlier article of the writer, entitled “ China’s Reaction to Mumbai Terror Strikes: Pro-Pakistan Bias? – South Asia Analysis Group Paper No.2972 dated 8 December 2008, South Asia Analysis Group )

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has so far officially taken a cautious and neutral stand with regard to India-Pakistan tensions arising out of November 26,2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, asking both the sides to ‘strengthen dialogue and bilateral cooperation’. Even after the recent visit of Chinese special envoy He Yafei to Islamabad and New Delhi, there has been no visible categorical position on the part of Beijing, especially despite the evidences to the origins of perpetrators reportedly given by India to the visiting Chinese leader. In the main, China is yet to acknowledge in public the basic fact, now recognized by rest of the world, that the terrorists came to Mumbai from Pakistan and that they have had a Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LET) connection. The only redeeming feature from the Indian posit of view could probably have been China’s backing to the UN Security Council resolution of 11 December 2008, banning Pakistan’s Jamat-ul-Dawah as a global terrorist organization.

On the other hand, strategists in China, close to the power structure, are exhibiting a strong pro-Pakistan bias in their analyses of the situation. The Chinese media observations earlier that the terrorists could have come from within India and references to social tensions in India as factors behind terrorist attack need to be seen as attempts, though in vain, to exonerate Pakistan. These are not being repeated now; also there is a tendency not to stress the possibilities of an India-Pakistan war as done earlier by the Chinese experts.

New themes being taken up by the PRC scholars now include that the China factor could deter an Indian attack on Pakistan and that China must maintain its alliance with Pakistan in its geo-political interests. Two assessments of PRC strategic experts, appearing in the online edition of the China International Institute of Strategic Studies (CIISS, in Chinese) assume importance in this context. A comment (11 January 2008) criticizes ‘Indian circles’ with ‘colonial mind’, for viewing the very recent ‘winter training exercise’ of the 4th PLA Infantry Divn of the Xinjiang MR in Karakorum Mountain as ‘a Chinese reinforcement effort to help Pakistan in the Sino-Indian border’. Describing the exercise as ‘normal’ as that Divn is responsible for region’s security, it states that such fears may possibly go to expose India’s underlying intentions to attack Pakistan; India at the same time realizes that it cannot disregard China and that with fighting Pakistan in the front and China in the back, it might face defeat. Pointing out that immediately after the Mumbai attack, India desired to conduct a ‘surgical strike’ against Pakistan, the comment adds that New Delhi could gradually understand this folly against chances of getting no support to such operation from ‘old friends’; under the compulsion arising out of the premise that it has to deal with China factor permanently, India is searching now for other options.

A second evaluation (CIISS, 9 January 2008) while underscoring the point that the PRC should respect and ally with ‘brother’ Pakistan in recognition of the latter’s consistent support to China internationally, identifies following factors as reflecting the geo- political importance of Pakistan to China - Pakistan is China’s tool to restrict India, Pakistan is China’s gateway to the Middle East and a forward base for its naval vessels for entering the Indian Ocean, particularly the Persian Gulf, Pakistan is China’s contact point for Iran and Central Asia which can help in countering Eastern Turkestan terrorist activities in Xinjiang, China’s West can benefit from the economic and trades ties with Pakistan and lastly, Pakistan can help China in playing its role in the third world.

Going by the latest views of Chinese experts, unlike in early stages after the Mumbai attack, they seem to be ruling out now an India-Pakistan armed conflict. Important however are their hints that China would back Pakistan in the unforeseen event of an Indian attack or ‘surgical’ operation against Pakistan. This could even come in the form of a Chinese diversionary tactic in ‘Southern Tibet’ (Arunachal Pradesh of India), as surmised earlier by a scholar (Reference 8 December 2008 article mentioned in the beginning). In this context, Pakistan’s statement that with China’s backing, it does not suffer from isolation internationally, assumes some meaning. Worth noting is the conclusion of China-Pakistan Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations (5 April 2005), which is being seen within China as binding the two ‘allies’ against any foreign threat to each other (Professor Yu Dunxin, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, APP, 22 November 2006). The ‘legal’ importance of the treaty for the long term China-Pakistan Strategic Partnership has been stressed once again as late as October 2008 during President Zardari’s visit to China. The subsequent defence pact (15 December 2008) between the two sides, signed well after the Mumbai attack, has added substance to China-Pakistan alliance.

For China, modernization is the declared goal; ‘harmonious world’ and peaceful periphery are sine-qua-non-for this purpose. Hence, Beijing may not like any turbulence in the neighbouring South Asia and give priority to defusing the situation in the Sub-Continent. The Chinese special envoy’s visit appears to echo the same. China (along with the US) has certain leverage with Pakistan and India can not be wrong in hoping that the PRC would be able to convince the Pakistan authorities to attend to India’s concerns on cross-border terrorism. But, China could be caught in a dilemma if its peace making efforts fail for some reasons and if India, for which the Mumbai attack is more than a terrorism issue, targeted at the country’s economic rise, is forced to carry out punitive measures such as a surgical operation against a Pakistan which is failing to act against the terrorists based in its soil. Beijing could then be compelled to shed its neutrality and treaty-bound as it is, could go to the aid of Pakistan; if India implements other counter measures like cutting trade links and recalling envoy etc, Beijing in all probability may criticize India in order to show that it is on the side of Pakistan. Implications of such Chinese tilt towards Pakistan, if takes place, for the South Asian power balance would be obvious, as so far Beijing by choice has been following a ‘balanced’ South Asia policy, providing equal weight to relations with the two regional rivals. More importantly, any ganging up of China and Pakistan against India on the terrorism issue could cause damage to the Sino-Indian relation, which, as being described by Beijing, stands at ‘best time of history’.

India cannot disregard China while choosing to attack Pakistan, feel Chinese Strategists

 

[jamesy]

^^well it applies to both our respective govts and not just india.
they move troops, make all the rhetoric for domestic consumption, but no one has the balls to make any decisive action

 

[BanglaBhoot]

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICIES ON PAKISTAN REACH A DEAD-END

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan have been brought to a dead-end with the dawn of the year 2009. Painfully, it needed the Mumbai 9/11 murderous massacres on November 26, 2008 by Pakistani Special Forces trained Islamic Jihadi commando terrorists to bring home the realization to India’s political leaders and the policy establishment that India’s policies and formulations on Pakistan have been an utter failure.

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan, and more specifically in the first decade of the 21st Century, stand failed because Pakistan as a state in fractional asymmetry to India, strategically and politically, existing on borrowed and reflected strengths of the United States and China has forced India to run out of decisive options in the post-Mumbai 9/11 phase.

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan have failed in the lost 63 years because India submitting itself to external pressures and shirking from the use of her preponderant strengths over Pakistan, fostered a perception in the Pakistani military establishment that India could be trifled with impunity and without punitive reprisals.

Pakistan as a “garrison state” run by a military adventurist Pakistan Army required an Indian foreign policy based on Indian national security determinants only, without conceding strategic space to the national interests of the intrusive external powers in South Asia.

Strangely, in the last fifteen years, India’s political leaders and its foreign policy establishment failed to translate India’s growing global economic clout into political and strategic muscle to attain its foreign policy objectives of neutralizing Pakistan and its state- sponsored terrorism against India in the name of Islamic Jihad.

The measure of India’s failure in its Pakistan policies has been brought home by the signal change in tunes within a month, of the United States ad Britain from siding with India, to the defense of Pakistan and its instruments of state not being involved in Mumbai 9/11. Where did they get evidence of this? Or is this only a surmise?

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan have reached a dead-end not only because of India’s own policy flaws and systemic failures but also more significantly because the United States as Pakistan’s vital strategic patron has time and again forgiven Pakistan’s strategically destablizing policies against India. In this process Pakistan stood further emboldened, conscious that Pakistan would not be disciplined by the United States.

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan have reached a dead-end and a policy audit is required in addition to looking into the immediate future, as to where should India now go from here.

This is covered under the following heads in brief outline:

* India’s Political Leadership: Faulty Political and Strategic Perceptions on Pakistan
* India’s Foreign Policy Establishment: Rudderless Policy Formulations on Pakistan
* United States Needs to be De-hyphenated from India’s Pakistan Policies
* The Way Ahead: Immediate Indian Imperatives of Hard-Line Declaratory Policies towards Pakistan

India’s Political Leadership: Faulty Political and Strategic Perceptions on Pakistan

The Indian political leadership, irrespective of political affiliations, has successively failed in providing a realistic political template of assessments on Pakistan, on which the Indian foreign policy establishment and the Indian military establishment could base their operational strategies on.

The Indian political leadership’s failure, strictly in the political sense, arises from:

* Perceptional failings in their readings of Pakistan’s political dynamics, Pakistani political leaders, and the propensities of the Pakistan Army. Historical patterns are neither studied nor paid attention to in their assessments, if any.
* Indian political leaders failing to perceive that, 60 years of India’s peaceful and conciliatory policies towards Pakistan, restraint against grave provocations and Track II diplomacy has not yielded any success to India in the evolution of a peaceful India-Pakistan relationship.
* Political leadership not indulging in independent analysis of Pakistani events but totally dependant on estimates of party think-tanks comprising retired senior diplomats, intelligence officials and military officers, most of whom try to ‘situate’ their assessments to be in line with their political patrons’ views or being out of touch with contemporary realities

Indian political leaders have failed to strike personal links with political leaders of major countries which could facilitate informal and non-institutional exchange of political perceptions and also as an alternative to pressurize Pakistan. Indian political leaders have denied themselves vital inputs by:

* Remaining strategically ill-equipped by not spending time on frequent briefings and brain-storming with India’s uniformed fraternity but relying on bureaucratic inputs.
* Not facilitating the growth of an independent Indian strategic culture.
* Not giving primacy to India’s national security determinants over political expediency in Pakistan policy formulations.
* Strategic fears in the Indian political leadership and their policy advisors that should India undertake military strikes against Pakistan, there would be forceful retaliation by Pakistan. Of course there would be Pakistani retaliation and expectedly so. Should that deter India as an emerging power to stop using the prerogatives of its power and buckle down against Pakistani “War of Terror” against India.

Cumulatively arising from the above, in relation to Pakistan, India’s political leadership was led to the following strategic blunders:

* Nehru agreeing to a cease-fire in Kashmir on 1948-49 when the Indian Army was virtually on the doorsteps of Muzaffrabad and the whole of Kashmir would have been of India.
* Shastri agreeing to return the Haji Pir Bulge & Kargil Heights after India’s victory over Pakistan in 1965 war.
* Indira Gandhi agreeing to return 90,000 Pakistan prisoners of war captured by Indian Army in 1971 without written guarantees from Bhutto on Kashmir and relying on his verbal assurances.
* Rajiv Gandhi very nearly agreed to a compromise on Siachen with Benazir Bhutto.
* Vajpayee policy blunders of convening Agra Summit and not pushing PRAKARM to its logical conclusion.

Dr. Manmohan Singh, the present Indian Prime Minister, has more strategic blunders to account for in relation to Pakistan, namely:

* Implicitly trusting Musharraf under US nudging

* Siachen was virtually sold out.
* India’s Pakistan policy was totally subordinated to United States policies, perceptions and strategic interests in Pakistan.
* Signing the infamous Havana Declaration with Musharraf and setting up a Joint Terror Mechanism – a virtual “Dance with the Wolves”.
* Following it, major terrorist strikes against India from Pakistan kept taking place without any reprisals from India.
* Policy paralysis in not exercising the hard option against Pakistan post-Mumbai 9/11.

India’s Foreign Policy Establishment: Rudderless Policy Formulations on Pakistan

As a spin-off of the above and without institutional assertiveness by India’s diplomatic establishment, India’s foreign policy on Pakistan growingly stood encroached by the Prime Minister’s Office. The resultant outcome has been as what can be described as rudderless policy formulations on Pakistan, divorced from institutional strategic vision, deliberation and analysis.

This stood further compounded by the following factors:

* India’s High Commissioners in Pakistan, with few exceptions, focused more on being “cultural ambassadors” rather than the diplomatic representatives of South Asia’s only regional power and consequently indulging in hard-headed diplomacy.
* Reliance on “Special Envoys” system of the Prime Minister which distorted policy formulations. Nor did any substantial diplomatic gains accrued from the system of “Special Envoys”.
* Unjustified confidence in Track II diplomacy with Pakistan. It has not produced any results.
* Indian Foreign Office’s propensity lately to take cues from Washington on Indian foreign policy formulations on Pakistan and reliance on US assessments of Pakistan’s political and military establishment.
* India’s diplomatic establishments inability in the last 63 years to come up with policies which could provide “Indian leverages on Pakistan”. India today has no independent political, military, economic or multi-lateral leverages over Pakistan.

The lowest ebb in India’s foreign policy establishment role lately was in the following:

* Incessant helpless refrain that India will do business with whosoever was in power in Pakistan. Did that presage dealing with the Taliban also?
* The Prime Minister not being dissuaded from signing the Havana Agreement with Musharraf and thereby devaluating and neutralizing India’s stands and credibility on Pakistan’s proxy war and state-sponsored terrorism. Mumbai 9/11 can be in a sense said to have been the out come of this mis-step.
* Not prevailing on the political leadership to go in for the hard-option post-Mumbai 9/11.

India’s foreign office and its diplomatic establishment must realize that they are as much “custodians of India’s national security” as are the armed forces, and in this custodial responsibility they should not allow the politicians (who come and go and are influenced by domestic political considerations) to play around with India’s security due to perceptive failures or ignorance of strategic realities.

United States Needs to be De-hyphenated from India’s Pakistan Policies Formulations

United States involvement in the shaping of India’s Pakistan-policies formulations would have been a welcome step had the United States played the rule of an “honest broker” in South Asia. The record has been otherwise, even with President Bush who has been the best US President that India could have so far.

United States actions and role in post-Mumbai 9/11 fall into the above category. It does not inspire confidence in India. After supporting India’s demands initially on Pakistan in relation to a Mumbai 9/11 they have down-slided to support Pakistan’s adamancy

As far back as December 2002, the observations made by this Author in his Paper: “ India’s Foreign Policy Predicaments” (SAAG Paper 570 dated 24.12.2002) need to be highlighted once again in the present context:

* “US policies and actions post-9/11 belies the earlier stated and mutual high expectations of a “natural allies” relationship.”
* If it were truly so, then the combination of 9/11 and 13/12 would have spurred the United States to recognize, respect and integrate the Islamic Jehadi threats against India with the overall American operations against global terrorism (read Islamic Jehadi terrorism)”
* “More inexplicable has been the US shielding of Pakistan from Indian military wrath post 13/12. It virtually amounted to a Papal condonation of Pakistan’s mortal sins”.
* “India therefore needs to develop a more conditional foreign policy relationship with USA.”
* “India’s foreign policy responses to the United States must depend on the American respect for India in the context of its South Asian policies. India is in a position to lay down bench-marks, this strength should emanate from her strategic potential in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.”

History seems to be repeating itself once again. Instead of Pakistan being subjected to punitive approaches by the United States for its role in Mumbai 9/11, the United States is pressurizing India to exercise restraint. On the contrary moves are afoot once again to use the Kashmir issue as a leverage against India and in favor of Pakistan and further US military supplies to Pakistan continue.

Just as the United States claims it has de-hyphenated its India-Pakistan relationships, India must realize that in terms of her national security interests, India has to “de-hyphenate” the United States-Pakistan relationship” in its foreign policies on Pakistan.

The Way Ahead: Immediate Indian Imperatives of Hard-Line Declaratory Policies Towards Pakistan

The following recommendations were made by the Author in the above quoted Paper in December 2002 in terms of India’s declaratory policy assertions.

* “Kashmir is non-negotiable and all external powers need to lay-off this issue.”
* “India’s dominance model may be an anathema for Pakistan but that country has to adjust and adapt to this strategic reality. India’s foreign policy initiatives must emphasize to external powers to respect this reality and prevail over their protégé Pakistan, to recognize it.”
* “India must declare that any threats to its external or internal security will be met with disproportionate force if necessary.”
* “No external pressures will be accepted by India to deflect it from its pursuance of just war or preemptive strikes to deter aggression against India.”

These assertions would eater to the neutralization of Pakistan’s main strategies against India in terms of Kashmir, proxy war and terrorism. They as declaratory policies would lay down ‘red lines’ for Pakistan.

Six years down the line, Indian political leadership nor its policy establishment has made any such assertions due to obliviousness to national security imperatives or having no time from political chicanery pre-occupations or lacking the sheer will to make forceful declarations.

Post-Mumbai 9/11, India has already fore-closed its military strike options in reprisals against Pakistan, and all that it has left now is to indulge in the non-military options to pressurize Pakistan.

The following non-military options, if implemented immediately could be perceived as hard-line options to foreclose any further state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan in the wake of Mumbai 9/11.

* Break diplomatic relations with Pakistan.
* Abrogate the Havana Agreement
* Declare Pakistan as a “terrorist state” and the ISI as a “terrorist organization.”
* Snap all CBM’s implemented on Kashmir from cross-border travel to trade etc.
* Review Indus Waters Treaty and stop flow of river waters to Pakistan
* Snap all Pak transit overflights
* Stop train and air services to Pakistan.
* Peace Process and Composite Dialogue to be called off.
* Black-list all countries selling defense equipment to Pakistan and not invite them to tender for Indian military purchases.
* Resume ‘covert operations’ against Pakistan with focus on Pakistan’s military establishment and terrorist organization.
* India should give political, moral and material support to the “freedom fighters” in Baluchistan, Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir.
* Isolate Pakistan in South Asia by disbanding SAARC and focus on alternative regional organizations excluding Pakistan.
* Psychological warfare, visibly exposing Pakistan Army’s and ISI disruptive activities in neighbouring countries. “Radio Free Pakistan” and TV channels be established. The emphasis in this campaign should be that India and Indians are not against the Pakistani people and that India is definitely against the Pakistan Army establishment, the ISI and their affiliated terrorist organisations indulging in unrestrained “War of Terror” against India, Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s frontier areas.
* Establish a maritime ‘cordon sanitairre’ in the North Arabian Sea excluding all trade by dhows and fishing trawlers traffic.
* No tourists from Pakistan or foreigners transiting through Pakistan be given entry to India.
* India should not pursue the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project both in the present context and otherwise too.

In the execution of the above measures, India should not become amendable to any external pressures. Should Pakistan consequently ratchet on the above, the military confrontation along the LOC or the other borders, India should prepare itself for war.

USSR’s first Foreign Minister, Leon Trotsky was recently quoted by noted Indian journalist M J Abbar, in another context as: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”

India’s political leaders should be mindful of this maxim as war is a recurrent reality in global affairs and cannot be wished away.

Concluding Observations

India’s peaceful and conciliatory approaches to Pakistan and traditional exercise of restraint despite grave provocations by Pakistan in the last 63 years have been misread by Pakistan as responses from a timid state devoid of political will for hard responses. It seems to be convinced that Indian political leaders lack the courage to come up with firm responses.

The dead-end reached by India in its foreign policies towards Pakistan is a by-product of the above. India can only by-pass this dead-end by hard-line policies if not hard strike reprisals for Mumbai 9/11.

India’s political leaders can no longer ignore the overwhelming Indian public opinion that the time has come for India to deal with Pakistan firmly.

Pakistan cannot be saved from its ‘dysfunctional state’ downslide by India’s permissiveness of tolerating endless Pakistan-originated terrorists strikes. Nor can Pakistan be saved from military rule by Indian restraint.

Pakistan can only be saved by the people of Pakistan rising against their military establishment as did the Iranians. who overthrew the powerfully backed Shah of Iran and his Imperial Ground Forces in 1979 as a result of groundswell of public unrest.

As written elsewhere by this Author, India needs to assert itself against Pakistan boldly and fearlessly, if it believes that it has a ‘Manifest Destiny” to emerge as “the regional power” and an aspirant for global power status.

India s should not be cowed down or its leaders deterred by fears of Pakistan’s military retaliation. Of course, there would be human and material losses. But then India’s political leaders need to recognize the strategic reality that:

“Power Status does not come cheaply and nor does it come without the guts to bear losses in the pursuit of power. Power accrues only to those who are bold and audacious.”

India’s Foreign Policies On Pakistan Reach A Dead-End

 

[ahmeddsid]

China can be Disregarded If a War with Pakistan Breaks out, Because the Chinese Will be the Winners, Indian economy will slip back, and China will have a free run! They wont ever attack India at this stage I feel. They will Provide assistance to Pakistan to Prolong the war as much as possible because ultimately it helps them.

 

[rajk20002002]

More I read the work of Mr Munshi, more I know about his mental make up. Please go through the following link;

DeshCalling: A Nationalist Agenda for Bangladesh - By MBI Munshi Bar-at-Law

For Mr Munshi anyone having good relations with India is automatically antinational. According to him AL is antinational. He sings for all ex army rulars of BD. There is some deep rooted Indo-phobia he is suffering from. Fopr him any government trying to develop better relations with India is antinational. To me his actions are more a part of problem and not the solution. Most of his solutions one way or the other lead to poor Indo-BD relations also do no good to the development of BD.

RK

 

[BanglaBhoot]

More I read the work of Mr Munshi, more I know about his mental make up. Please go through the following link;

DeshCalling: A Nationalist Agenda for Bangladesh - By MBI Munshi Bar-at-Law

For Mr Munshi anyone having good relations with India is automatically antinational. According to him AL is antinational. He sings for all ex army rulars of BD. There is some deep rooted Indo-phobia he is suffering from. Fopr him any government trying to develop better relations with India is antinational. To me his actions are more a part of problem and not the solution. Most of his solutions one way or the other lead to poor Indo-BD relations also do no good to the development of BD.

RK

What the hell has this got to do with this thread? Is there something wrong with you that you have to crap all threads. You are an utter nuisance. Discuss the issue of the thread not what I wrote in a completely different context.

 

[SherdiL!]

Indian cant fight a war with us eye-to-eye it would be fun but i guess thats how it is.Today India still sufers from the white mens complex

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Most of his solutions one way or the other lead to poor Indo-BD relations also do no good to the development of BD.

Most of the solutions I have proposed make BD independent from India and not behave like a servant. My concern is the national interest and security of the country. If the Indians do not like it they can **** themselves for all I care.

 

[was]

China can be Disregarded If a War with Pakistan Breaks out, Because the Chinese Will be the Winners, Indian economy will slip back, and China will have a free run! They wont ever attack India at this stage I feel. They will Provide assistance to Pakistan to Prolong the war as much as possible because ultimately it helps them.

indian economy is nothing in confront of china,s trillions of reserves

 

[rajk20002002]

What the hell has this got to do with this thread? Is there something wrong with you that you have to crap all threads. You are an utter nuisance. Discuss the issue of the thread not what I wrote in a completely different context.

Yes it has. To understand your threads its important to understand your ideology and your mindset. I hope that makes some sense.. We are not here to discuss the symptoms, but to understand the disease and the entire process of its spread.

RK

 

[ahmeddsid]

I feel Mr Munshi is totally Biased when It concerns India.

 

[rajk20002002]

Most of the solutions I have proposed make BD independent from India and not behave like a servant. My concern is the national interest and security of the country. If the Indians do not like it they can **** themselves for all I care.

Ofcourse you are very much entitled to your solutions. However, any of your solution if it affects us adversely, we have to take note of that and act accordingly. You are very much free not to care focourse.

RK

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Yes it has. To understand your threads its important to understand your ideology and your mindset. I hope that makes some sense.. We are not here to discuss the symptoms, but to understand the disease and the entire process of its spread.

RK

I did not write the three articles that started this thread so where does my ideology and mindset come into it?

 

[ahmeddsid]

but u do identify and correspond with these articles right?