India's Cold Start

[indiapakistanfriendship]

Having heard some discussions on this from some on the Pakistan side, the issue is the nature of the Pakistani reaction. The doctrine as espoused hopes to contain the conflict within the dictated space but Pakistani response may not be limited to that space alone.

Blain that's where International presure and third party interference will play a key role.

 

[blain2]

Blain that's where International presure and third party interference will play a key role.

In all of the past wars, this (hope from Intl pressure) has been too much of a gamble and usually things go to full-fledged war before outside interference really makes a difference.

 

[TALWAR]

In all of the past wars, this (hope from Intl pressure) has been too much of a gamble and usually things go to full-fledged war before outside interference really makes a difference.

Nope, I dont agree with you.
What do you say about kargil ?

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

The cold start is not for deep penetration. It is to ensure that the effect is there without causing reasons for a nuclear exchange.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Nope, I dont agree with you.
What do you say about kargil ?

And how long did Kargil, limited in scope, last before international pressure was brought to bear?

If Pakistan's response to the application of the Cold Start doctrine is the immediate escalation of the conflict, then there will not be much time for "international pressure" to prevent that.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Merged the two threads

 

[blain2]

Nope, I dont agree with you.
What do you say about kargil ?

Kargil is exactly the point. Pakistani side thought that they could contain the conflict within the theater but there was absolutely no guarantee that India was going to play by the rules. In the past, (65) Indian forces attacked Pakistani position across the IB towards Lahore to relieve pressure elsewhere. What is to say the same may not happen in the future for Pakistan?

If we assume that before things escalate in the future foreign intervention will take place, then the reaction to something like Cold Start would take that possibility into the calculus.

I do not think that anyone can say with surety that Pakistani response would be limited. The study in itself discusses the same point. Lots of assumptions here.

 

[Flintlock]

Kargil is exactly the point. Pakistani side thought that they could contain the conflict within the theater but there was absolutely no guarantee that India was going to play by the rules. In the past, (65) Indian forces attacked Pakistani position across the IB towards Lahore to relieve pressure elsewhere. What is to say the same may not happen in the future for Pakistan?

Lol...rules...

 

[blain2]

I am assuming you are suggesting that rules go by the way side in case of a war, right? If so then this is an assessment with which I (or anyone else in this day and time) would agree.

A better part of the study discusses the same issue. See "misperception".

 

[indiapakistanfriendship]

I do not think that anyone can say with surety that Pakistani response would be limited. The study in itself discusses the same point. Lots of assumptions here.

Blain if you study the report twice, you can understand that cold start means limited offensive in rapid period and no way indicates limited wargighting cpabilities.Of course Pakistan will not stop with limited counter offensive, here is where the pivot corps come into play, once the pivot corps(10 strike groups)launch the offensive, the strike divisions will join them and take over the role of offensive force while the bulk of pivot corps will hold the territory. Thus in coldstart there is no lull in warfighting capabilities, the capabilities seem to be intact, the only change is the division of three strike corps into smalle divisions, rapid mobilisation and enhancement in the offensive capabilities of pivot corps(holding corps) and above all, limited objectives or holding limited grographical areas rather than dividing Pakistan into two.

 

[blain2]

I read this study exactly twice ;-) once last year and again when posted here. What you are stating is the obvious purpose of CS as stated here and in other Indian write ups about this doctrine. Read between the lines and you will understand what I am trying to get at. Actually you do not even have to do that because the author states the same himself. The IBGs have a benefit, but that benefit is only to speed up the mobilization and go into Pakistan as quickly as possible. This benefit however is not without caveats and these caveats revolve around the uncertainty about the Pakistani reaction. How, where and to what extent are all unanswered. Who is to say that Pakistan would not ingress down south if the IBGs are moving against the Pakistani Punjab?

The frontage is large enough between the two countries to allow both countries to open up away from where the IBGs are engaged.

 

[indiapakistanfriendship]

Who is to say that Pakistan would not ingress down south if the IBGs are moving against the Pakistani Punjab?

The frontage is large enough between the two countries to allow both countries to open up away from where the IBGs are engaged.

Blain this is where pivot corps play an important role, not all pivot corps will be in offensive, I vision several of them still adhering to holding position, so any marked increase in tempo of the war from Pakistans side will be held off using pivot corps.

I am talking assuming that when you state escalation of the conflict you dont include nuclear weapons in calculation, however if you are taking into account nuclear weapons along with conventional capabilities, then I guess you are right.

 

[blain2]

Blain this is where pivot corps play an important role, not all pivot corps will be in offensive, I vision several of them still adhering to holding position, so any marked increase in tempo of the war from Pakistans side will be held off using pivot corps.

I am talking assuming that when you state escalation of the conflict you dont include nuclear weapons in calculation, however if you are taking into account nuclear weapons along with conventional capabilities, then I guess you are right.

Yaar you guys have a similar setup as us. Offensive formations (Strike Corps) and then holding Corps. Instead of using large strike corps, you break them down into Div plus entities and ingress into Pakistan. The idea is that if Pakistan opens up frontage somewhere else, that means that some of the energy bleeds off the idea of IBGs and Cold Start. You may have defensive/holding Corps but such has been the case in all of the past wars but even then formations have been diverted into defensive positions by both countries when pressure increases in certain areas. Pakistan is bound to exploit this situation where it can.

 

[con]

I read this study exactly twice ;-) once last year and again when posted here. What you are stating is the obvious purpose of CS as stated here and in other Indian write ups about this doctrine. Read between the lines and you will understand what I am trying to get at. Actually you do not even have to do that because the author states the same himself. The IBGs have a benefit, but that benefit is only to speed up the mobilization and go into Pakistan as quickly as possible. This benefit however is not without caveats and these caveats revolve around the uncertainty about the Pakistani reaction. How, where and to what extent are all unanswered. Who is to say that Pakistan would not ingress down south if the IBGs are moving against the Pakistani Punjab?

The frontage is large enough between the two countries to allow both countries to open up away from where the IBGs are engaged.

You are missing one important aspect of Cold Start. The objective is not Pakistan,but PA.

 

[vish]

The way I see it; Cold Start is our version of a "poke in the eye." Cold Start is meant to be a rapid response operation that will be exercised in case a high-profile attack takes place. It is meant to be "mid-way" before the world realizes and has time enough to react.

Cold Start evisions IBGs getting into Pakistani territory with the primary aim of destroying PA's ability to fight a war. Holding territory is a secondary, albiet important, goal. In essence, Cold Start assumes that the war will be short (less than 1 week) before international intervention causes a ceasefire or Pakistan's "first and early use" nuclear threshold is lowered.

These IBGs will follow pre-decided plans and work accordingly. In essence the Indian Armed Forces want to create an infrastructure set-up and organizational set-up that allows it to bypass India's biggest strategic weakness: the lack of political will.

Let's say a high profile attack takes place; the international community looks like it will allow us to get away with a shot. The PMO decides to give it a "go" within a day or so. Now, during Operation Parakram, this "go" took a long time to translate into reality. Cold Start intends to change all that; every bit, nut and bolt of those IBGs would be already pre-positioned and be on the run before our leaders get a re-think. By the time they decide to call the "go" off, the IA has done its job.

There is one major risk herein: escalation (nuclear or otherwise). Conventional escalation would be immediate but if the PA is caught off-guard (which considering that the "go" came in just a day or so later is more or less given) then its impact would be circumspect. This is where the ambiguity in Pakistan's nuclear response comes into play. Even if one nuke is used, it wouldn't be long before dozens are on their way.

If the war does prolong and continues conventionally (which is very very unlikely to happen), it is evisioned that if the IBGs cannot hold, they'll continue to "search and destroy" and then come back into Indian territory.

The best thing about Cold Start is that it acts as a deterrent against hawks in Pakistan and elsewhere.

This is my speculation; I may be wrong.