Indian Navy News & Discussions

[sathya]

How pathetic, the softly softly approach to the media clearly hasn't worked out even after 26/11 where these f*ckers got people KILLED by broadcasting ops live they are STILL doing it to this day.

Media needs a supervision and should be told their place.
independent committee/board like election committee or judiciary should be formed to look after the negative impacts of them

 

[Juggernautjatt]

Why navy didn't use UAV squadron against Pak boat
A vital asset – one closest to the scene of the dramatic December 31 Coast Guard operation – that could have helped identify and elicit more information about the ‘terror’ boat was with the Navy’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadron at Porbandar. Yet, on December 31, the squadron had no information whatsoever nor was it pressed into action even after the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) tracked a communication between a Karachi-based handler and crewmembers of a boat said to be carrying terror operatives from Pakistan.

If sources in the Navy’s Western Command are to be believed there was little information available to them to launch an operation similar to the one carried out by the Coast Guard on December 31.
INAS 343 – the UAV base – when commissioned at Porbandar in January 2011 was considered to be a shot in the arm for the Indian Navy considering Karachi’s proximity, about 450 kilometres from Porbandar, and particularly the presence of Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) in the Pakistani city.

The UAV squadron with Israeli Herons and Searcher MK-II was well suited to carrying out a reconnaissance, identifying and even intercepting any further calls being made by the crew of the ‘terror’ boat that sank about 356 kilometres off the Porbandar coast. Though one of the UAVs had crashed in November last year, the Navy had three more capable of gathering both electronic and imagery intelligence. Navy sources said that the Searcher MK-II – a third generation UAV – is equipped with a sophisticated electro optic camera and with equipment to gather communication intelligence (COMINT).

The NTRO-Coast Guard operation also raises serious questions about the standard operating procedures laid down by the cabinet committee on coastal security (CCCS) after the 26/11 Mumbai terror strike. To avoid a fiasco of the magnitude of 26/11, the CCCS had appointed the Indian Navy as the nodal agency for coastal security. The decision saw INS Angre in Mumbai being designated as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) for the western maritime frontier.

Hotlines to coordinate with various agencies, and state-of-the-art rapid messaging service technology to communicate with ships were installed to thwart any threat in real time. The JOC (West) was to operate under the command Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief (FOC-in-C) of the Western Naval Command.

“If the JOC was alerted about any such actionable intelligence, the Navy would have definitely moved its assets,” said a navy official, requesting anonymity. The criticality of the region, the unresolved border issues near Sir Creek coupled with Pakistan’s escalation of firing on the Line of Control (LoC) had seen the Western Command deploy its assets in the region, the official said.
Why navy didn't use UAV squadron against Pak boat - Hindustan Times

 

[RISING SUN]

Why navy didn't use UAV squadron against Pak boat
A vital asset – one closest to the scene of the dramatic December 31 Coast Guard operation – that could have helped identify and elicit more information about the ‘terror’ boat was with the Navy’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadron at Porbandar. Yet, on December 31, the squadron had no information whatsoever nor was it pressed into action even after the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) tracked a communication between a Karachi-based handler and crewmembers of a boat said to be carrying terror operatives from Pakistan.

If sources in the Navy’s Western Command are to be believed there was little information available to them to launch an operation similar to the one carried out by the Coast Guard on December 31.
INAS 343 – the UAV base – when commissioned at Porbandar in January 2011 was considered to be a shot in the arm for the Indian Navy considering Karachi’s proximity, about 450 kilometres from Porbandar, and particularly the presence of Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) in the Pakistani city.

The UAV squadron with Israeli Herons and Searcher MK-II was well suited to carrying out a reconnaissance, identifying and even intercepting any further calls being made by the crew of the ‘terror’ boat that sank about 356 kilometres off the Porbandar coast. Though one of the UAVs had crashed in November last year, the Navy had three more capable of gathering both electronic and imagery intelligence. Navy sources said that the Searcher MK-II – a third generation UAV – is equipped with a sophisticated electro optic camera and with equipment to gather communication intelligence (COMINT).

The NTRO-Coast Guard operation also raises serious questions about the standard operating procedures laid down by the cabinet committee on coastal security (CCCS) after the 26/11 Mumbai terror strike. To avoid a fiasco of the magnitude of 26/11, the CCCS had appointed the Indian Navy as the nodal agency for coastal security. The decision saw INS Angre in Mumbai being designated as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) for the western maritime frontier.

Hotlines to coordinate with various agencies, and state-of-the-art rapid messaging service technology to communicate with ships were installed to thwart any threat in real time. The JOC (West) was to operate under the command Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief (FOC-in-C) of the Western Naval Command.

“If the JOC was alerted about any such actionable intelligence, the Navy would have definitely moved its assets,” said a navy official, requesting anonymity. The criticality of the region, the unresolved border issues near Sir Creek coupled with Pakistan’s escalation of firing on the Line of Control (LoC) had seen the Western Command deploy its assets in the region, the official said.
Why navy didn't use UAV squadron against Pak boat - Hindustan Times

And why the hell will indian defence agencies will give operational deployment to news channels in this secret operation. No one knows whether uavs were launched or not.

 

[Krate M]

First of all considering that the involvement of intelligence agencies in the affair, a bit of secrecy is absolutely necessary.
We don't know the full picture, but I am happy with the way things are.
If we followed the strict SOP, it would be easy for the enemy. For example, if the enemy had some humint resources near navy base, they can relay the news of UAV takeoff and then the enemy would be alert.
My worst case scenario has been negated, so current worst case scenario is that the boat did not contain innocent people, how the security forces deal with them is up to them.

 

[Abingdonboy]

Why navy didn't use UAV squadron against Pak boat
A vital asset – one closest to the scene of the dramatic December 31 Coast Guard operation – that could have helped identify and elicit more information about the ‘terror’ boat was with the Navy’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadron at Porbandar. Yet, on December 31, the squadron had no information whatsoever nor was it pressed into action even after the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) tracked a communication between a Karachi-based handler and crewmembers of a boat said to be carrying terror operatives from Pakistan.

If sources in the Navy’s Western Command are to be believed there was little information available to them to launch an operation similar to the one carried out by the Coast Guard on December 31.
INAS 343 – the UAV base – when commissioned at Porbandar in January 2011 was considered to be a shot in the arm for the Indian Navy considering Karachi’s proximity, about 450 kilometres from Porbandar, and particularly the presence of Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) in the Pakistani city.

The UAV squadron with Israeli Herons and Searcher MK-II was well suited to carrying out a reconnaissance, identifying and even intercepting any further calls being made by the crew of the ‘terror’ boat that sank about 356 kilometres off the Porbandar coast. Though one of the UAVs had crashed in November last year, the Navy had three more capable of gathering both electronic and imagery intelligence. Navy sources said that the Searcher MK-II – a third generation UAV – is equipped with a sophisticated electro optic camera and with equipment to gather communication intelligence (COMINT).

The NTRO-Coast Guard operation also raises serious questions about the standard operating procedures laid down by the cabinet committee on coastal security (CCCS) after the 26/11 Mumbai terror strike. To avoid a fiasco of the magnitude of 26/11, the CCCS had appointed the Indian Navy as the nodal agency for coastal security. The decision saw INS Angre in Mumbai being designated as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) for the western maritime frontier.

Hotlines to coordinate with various agencies, and state-of-the-art rapid messaging service technology to communicate with ships were installed to thwart any threat in real time. The JOC (West) was to operate under the command Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief (FOC-in-C) of the Western Naval Command.

“If the JOC was alerted about any such actionable intelligence, the Navy would have definitely moved its assets,” said a navy official, requesting anonymity. The criticality of the region, the unresolved border issues near Sir Creek coupled with Pakistan’s escalation of firing on the Line of Control (LoC) had seen the Western Command deploy its assets in the region, the official said.
Why navy didn't use UAV squadron against Pak boat - Hindustan Times

What nonsense is this, a MAJOR win by the Indian security forces is being dissected and treated by some in the media as a failure?

I certainly am starting to buy into the assentations made in this article:

2. Revenge attack for denying access: It is a well known fact that “access journalism” has received a major setback ever since Narendra Modi government took charge. Access journalism is where a reporter receives special treatment and “exclusive” information from government authorities, and later the same is published in newspapers as information coming through “sources”.

(a journalist also invents sources, but that’s another issue and we will let that go right now)

The Modi government is increasingly denying journalists such access. There have been many occasions when journalists have got information through Twitter feeds i.e. at the same time when any common man of the country got. This drying up of access has hurt the ego of many journalists who feel that their “power”, which is due to information asymmetry, is being threatened by the new government.

To get even with the government, the journalist has to flex muscle and show his or her “power”. And he or she can do it by planting speculative stories that hurts the image of the government.

This particular case could be one example of such revenge attack with a message to the government – “start giving us importance or we will malign your image and weaken people’s faith in you.”

3 reasons why journalists like Praveen Swami attacked Indian narrative on Pak boat incident


The Indian media has been shut out (rightly) by the new GoI of operational matters and now certain members of the media are cooking up all sorts of $hit as a result.

 

[Penguin]

Because the RFI that was sent out by the navy said:



Indian Navy Information Resource and Facilitation Centre - Content

View attachment 179610

The problem is, that IN once again sent out requests with such general requirements, that the vendors don't actually know what the navy really wants. The gave basic specs and requirements, which could be fulfillied by Mistral or Dodko, or a shortened Juan Carlos class LHD as well, but doesn't show any specific requirement that would point to an LHD directly, like a flight deck with 5 or 6 landing spots and a hangar that can accomodate 10 or more helicopters. So now it's basically up to the vendor what they offer in the competition and not based on the request of the navy.

So, there is no Multirole support vessel RFI, just one for LPDs.

Ships like Mistral, Dokdo, Juan Carlos would not likely be the aim of the IN as far as their ability to operates jets is concerned. Unless IN starts operating both B abd C model of the F-35. So, 'flattops' are only wanted for their usefulnes in helicopter support. An LPD can easily house 4 large (EH 101 size) or 6 medium (NH-90 size) heli's without a throughdeck design. So the question is, what is the marginal cost of the extra helo capacity of an LHD relative to such an LPD and how does that marginal cost compare to the added operational flexibilities/capabilities (is it worth the bother?).

As the Bay class shows, an LPD can also be very simple, even if the underlying design (Enforcer) allows for more complex vessels (helicopter capable Rotterdam, helicopter capable command ship Johan de Witt). The Enforcer range also includes a throughdeck LHD design.

 

[satishkumarcsc]

Why navy didn't use UAV squadron against Pak boat
A vital asset – one closest to the scene of the dramatic December 31 Coast Guard operation – that could have helped identify and elicit more information about the ‘terror’ boat was with the Navy’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadron at Porbandar. Yet, on December 31, the squadron had no information whatsoever nor was it pressed into action even after the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) tracked a communication between a Karachi-based handler and crewmembers of a boat said to be carrying terror operatives from Pakistan.

If sources in the Navy’s Western Command are to be believed there was little information available to them to launch an operation similar to the one carried out by the Coast Guard on December 31.
INAS 343 – the UAV base – when commissioned at Porbandar in January 2011 was considered to be a shot in the arm for the Indian Navy considering Karachi’s proximity, about 450 kilometres from Porbandar, and particularly the presence of Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) in the Pakistani city.

The UAV squadron with Israeli Herons and Searcher MK-II was well suited to carrying out a reconnaissance, identifying and even intercepting any further calls being made by the crew of the ‘terror’ boat that sank about 356 kilometres off the Porbandar coast. Though one of the UAVs had crashed in November last year, the Navy had three more capable of gathering both electronic and imagery intelligence. Navy sources said that the Searcher MK-II – a third generation UAV – is equipped with a sophisticated electro optic camera and with equipment to gather communication intelligence (COMINT).

The NTRO-Coast Guard operation also raises serious questions about the standard operating procedures laid down by the cabinet committee on coastal security (CCCS) after the 26/11 Mumbai terror strike. To avoid a fiasco of the magnitude of 26/11, the CCCS had appointed the Indian Navy as the nodal agency for coastal security. The decision saw INS Angre in Mumbai being designated as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) for the western maritime frontier.

Hotlines to coordinate with various agencies, and state-of-the-art rapid messaging service technology to communicate with ships were installed to thwart any threat in real time. The JOC (West) was to operate under the command Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief (FOC-in-C) of the Western Naval Command.

“If the JOC was alerted about any such actionable intelligence, the Navy would have definitely moved its assets,” said a navy official, requesting anonymity. The criticality of the region, the unresolved border issues near Sir Creek coupled with Pakistan’s escalation of firing on the Line of Control (LoC) had seen the Western Command deploy its assets in the region, the official said.
Why navy didn't use UAV squadron against Pak boat - Hindustan Times

Coastal security is the job of coast gaurd...not the Navy

 

[sancho]

So, there is no Multirole support vessel RFI, just one for LPDs.

Not according to the RFI and not according to the requirements IN asked for, which was so broad that LHDs could be offered too. Don't know if there were credible changes in the RFP to make it more specific, but the Navy initially clearly aimed on INS Jalashwa kind of ships. However, as we have discussed before, India has no need for proper landing vessels and would have far more advantages with a bigger fleet of Joint Support Ships, to cover disaster relief operations, which will be the prime role.

 

[Penguin]

Not according to the RFI and not according to the requirements IN asked for, which was so broad that LHDs could be offered too. Don't know if there were credible changes in the RFP to make it more specific, but the Navy initially clearly aimed on INS Jalashwa kind of ships. However, as we have discussed before, India has no need for proper landing vessels and would have far more advantages with a bigger fleet of Joint Support Ships, to cover disaster relief operations, which will be the prime role.

Perhaps, but joint support ships are NOT (repeat NOT) landing ships. They combine some or all of several functions (replenishment, sealift, helicopter support, command, hospital). The Dutch 27k ton Doorman JSS doesn't have a well deck and cannot dock landing craft. To dock or not to dock, is a very fundamental issue here. (i.e. the number of helicopters and hangar and deck facilities then becomes secondary). In that sense, a very broadly formulated LPD requirement is very logical: you want to make sure that there is a docking well.

Joint Logistic Support Ship - Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding
Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG - Joint Support Ship
Queenston-class auxiliary vessel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJoint Support Ship (JSS) | Investing in Equipment | National Defence | Canadian Forces

 

[sancho]

To dock or not to dock, is a very fundamental issue here.

We have discussed that before and agreed to disagree, because you keep ignoring that the design of modern vessels is flexible and based on the customer requirements. There is nothing that stops a vendor to add RAS capability to and LPD / LHD design as the Enforcer design or similar concepts shows. I even showed you how DCNS easily could modify the Brave class to a JSS, simply by adding a modified rear section of the Mistral class.
Wrt Indian Navy, the limited operational use of INS Jalashwa gives a hint on how usefull amphibious landing capabilities actually are. Four LPD's alone would be far too much for most of the operations (unless China takes over A&N ), but 4 x LHDs with all the necessary helicopters would be an even bigger overreaction. All IN actually needs are a larger fleet of JSS, primarily for the blue water support role, that however could be used in disaster relief, or amphibious landing roles (with larger helicopters and some amphibious vessels, carried in a dock or on each side of the vessel). The operational need of amphibious vessels in IN is simply limited by the threat potential, compared to what we see from NATO forces.

 

[kaku1]

We have discussed that before and agreed to disagree, because you keep ignoring that the design of modern vessels is flexible and based on the customer requirements. There is nothing that stops a vendor to add RAS capability to and LPD / LHD design as the Enforcer design or similar concepts shows. I even showed you how DCNS easily could modify the Brave class to a JSS, simply by adding a modified rear section of the Mistral class.
Wrt Indian Navy, the limited operational use of INS Jalashwa gives a hint on how usefull amphibious landing capabilities actually are. Four LPD's alone would be far too much for most of the operations (unless China takes over A&N ), but 4 x LHDs with all the necessary helicopters would be an even bigger overreaction. All IN actually needs are a larger fleet of JSS, primarily for the blue water support role, that however could be used in disaster relief, or amphibious landing roles (with larger helicopters and some amphibious vessels, carried in a dock or on each side of the vessel). The operational need of amphibious vessels in IN is simply limited by the threat potential, compared to what we see from NATO forces.

Whats your bottom line? That IN is not going for LHD, but want a Jalaswa like Transport Dock?

Definitely, Juan Carlos should only be bought if India planning to go 20-25 F-35 B/C, otherwise what would be the use of ski-jump. BTW, if we assume that the by 2025 India would have 3 carriers, 2 Conventional 40,000 and 1 65,000 Nuclear. Then that would be enough for any oversees operations.

 

[sancho]

Whats your bottom line? That IN is not going for LHD, but want a Jalaswa like Transport Dock?

INS Jalashwa is a proper LPD and that's most likely what IN was aiming for, but with the requirements so broad the vendors can offer LHDs too, so at the end we can get LHDs too, which would be a huge waste of money.

Definitely, Juan Carlos should only be bought if India planning to go 20-25 F-35 B/C, otherwise what would be the use of ski-jump.

Who said that we would procure the Juan Carlos with a ski-jump at all? There is no requirement for that and it doesn't make sense for IN to operate better fighters (5th gen) on their amphibious vessels than on their aircraft carriers (4.5th gen fighters).

 

[Penguin]

We have discussed that before and agreed to disagree, because you keep ignoring that the design of modern vessels is flexible and based on the customer requirements. There is nothing that stops a vendor to add RAS capability to and LPD / LHD design as the Enforcer design or similar concepts shows. I even showed you how DCNS easily could modify the Brave class to a JSS, simply by adding a modified rear section of the Mistral class.
Wrt Indian Navy, the limited operational use of INS Jalashwa gives a hint on how usefull amphibious landing capabilities actually are. Four LPD's alone would be far too much for most of the operations (unless China takes over A&N ), but 4 x LHDs with all the necessary helicopters would be an even bigger overreaction. All IN actually needs are a larger fleet of JSS, primarily for the blue water support role, that however could be used in disaster relief, or amphibious landing roles (with larger helicopters and some amphibious vessels, carried in a dock or on each side of the vessel). The operational need of amphibious vessels in IN is simply limited by the threat potential, compared to what we see from NATO forces.

You might turn an LPD to a JSS role but decidedly not the other way around. Hence the importance of the RFI specifying a DOCK. > Purpose designed JSS typically do not have a dock. < See Canadian and Dutch cases. See German Berlin class. Hence you cannot use it for amphibious assault , only for strategic sea lift. Brave is an AOR, a replenishment oiler. It wil not take a stern dock: the machinery is located there.

Germany´s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AG (TKMS) and Canadian Procurement Agency PWGSC (Public Works and Government Services Canada) have signed a contract for a multi-phase design study for the Royal Canadian Navy’s JSS (Joint Support Ship) logistic vessel project.
Canada plans to replace its two Auxiliary Oil Replenishment (AOR) vessels with two or three joint support ships. A possible design for the JSS project is the German Navy’s (Deutsche Marine) 20.000 tonnes Berlin Class Type 702 task group supply vessel (Einsatzgruppenversorger-EGV) type modified to meet local requirements.

Note machinery location and shafts.

LPD Rotterdam

JSS Doorman

 

[sudhir007]

hi @sancho @Penguin
I dnt know much about the difference LPD and LHD.
But what do you both think what is better/Suit IN most. from my point of view IN operate INS Jalaswa LPD that is why they go for LPD.

 

[DacterSaab]

if Indian Navy decides to operate LHDs the no. of fighters in the carrier air-wing can be increased....