Indian Navy News & Discussions

[kurup]

Focus on Navy’s structural reforms

There is some strange logic doing the rounds these days. It is that Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, being the Flag officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Western Naval Command, is somehow “responsible” for the alleged spate of accidents that have afflicted the western naval fleet. By this reasoning, accepting the resignation of Navy chief Admiral D K Joshi was the right step, even though Defence Minister A K Antony has been roundly criticised for accepting his resignation with the alacrity that he did, without waiting for any inquiry, or a formal consultation with the Cabinet Committee on Security.

A news report has suggested that a cable that caught fire may have caused the INS Sindhuratna accident that killed two officers. The responsibility for this does not rest with either Admiral Joshi or Sinha.

Because, if the former Navy chief D K Joshi and Shekhar Sinha are somehow culpable, so is the entire chain of command downward and upward — the Flag Officer who actually commands the western fleet, the Flag Officer Maharashtra Gujarat area, Commodore commanding submarines (west) and the Sindhuratna’s captain. Upwards, it leads to the now departed Chief of Naval Staff, and in parallel to the the Joint Secretary (Navy), the Additional Secretary, Defence Secretary, and then, to the Defence Minister, Prime Minister and, of course, the Supreme Commander of the armed force, the President of India. Clearly, this would be an absurd construction.

The reason why it is being played out is because people fail to differentiate between assuming “moral responsibility” for an accident, and “culpability” or even “constructive responsibility” for it. Neither Admiral Joshi nor Sinha, or for that matter the PM, RM and the President are culpable for the accident, whose causes are yet to be determined. They may share constructive responsibility, though, whether it requires their resignation is another matter. In the past ten years, some 110 Indian Air Force aircrafts have crashed, some due to human error, others due to manufacturing or maintenance defects. During Operation Parakram, hundreds of soldiers died, even though we didn’t have a war. Many were killed by defective mines and fuses. But no one took responsibility, either constructive or moral.

Admiral Joshi has insisted on taking moral responsibility and that is to his credit, but it is a deeply personal decision. He was the one who insisted on the removal of the captain of the INS Talwar after it hit an unlit fishing boat off Mumbai a month or so ago. He has always set high standards, and he probably feels that he needs to live up to it. There was probably another reason. There has been a subtle campaign of trying to show some recent naval incidents as institutional failures, rather than the accidents that they mostly were. Take just one example: earlier in February, a news agency report noted that the defence minister had hauled up the Navy chief over the malfunctioning of a boiler on the INS Vikramaditya that had joined the fleet in January after being refurbished in Russia.

First, this ship has a history of boiler problems — the Ministry of Defence’s poor handling of the deal is the subject of a CAG report no 18, of 2008-09. Second, it had come after an arduous journey of nearly a month, covering 18,000 km. The malfunctioning of one of its eight boilers was hardly unusual, that is why it had a crew of 187 Russians to fix such problems. It could certainly not have been attributed to some fault of the Navy. Yet, read the tone of the report and you will see that it was. What gave the game away was an associated complaint — that the ship’s crew were celebrating its journey through social media.

This sounds very much like the ignorant babus of the MoD, because it betrayed the lack of understanding of what navies do and how they do it. While operations of war are at the heart of maritime strategy, one of its key aspects is to show the flag — awe and impress friends and adversaries through presence. It is for this reason that flotillas visit foreign ports, invite citizens of these countries on board for social functions and participate in activities on-shore. In the last couple of years, the tasks of the Navy have been expanded without a corresponding expansion of personnel or equipment. First came the anti-piracy duties, which India was committed to along with other navies.

Recall that some pirates were even found close to Indian waters during the height of the piracy crisis. Second, after the Mumbai terrorist attack of 2008, in a knee-jerk reaction the government ordered the Navy to take charge of coastal security. There is little doubt that the developments are yet another manifestation of the poor state of the relationship between the civil and military sides of the Ministry of Defence. This is something only the political leadership can resolve through structural reform, as well as knocking a few heads. Unfortunately, the perception is that the only heads being knocked are the uniformed ones. The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Focus on Navy’s structural reforms | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

The real naval disaster

Beginning in August 2013, when the Indian naval submarine Sindhurakshak sank, stories have been appearing about naval “disasters”, culminating with the fire on the Sindhuratna, another submarine of the same class, which resulted in the death of two officers. This led to the resignation of the naval chief, Admiral D.K. Joshi, owning moral responsibility for all the incidents.

This is only the second time that a naval chief has demitted office before time. In the case of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat in 1998, while the majority view of the navy, including retired officers, was that the manner in which he was dismissed was wrong, some believed that he was too autocratic and had overstepped his authority. In Joshi’s case, however, there is unanimity that he was not to blame but has taken a bold, honourable and courageous step on his own, setting a fine example for all.

Amidst the noise and hullabaloo, the “disasters” have not been critically examined to see whether they deserve to be termed as such. Let us get an obvious error out of the way: the incident of the empty gunshell fired from ICGS Sangram that hit the Western Naval Command headquarters in February 2014. Sangram is a vessel of the Coast Guard, which is an independent service and has nothing to do with the navy.

Coming to the navy, the collision of INS Talwar with a fishing vessel in December 2013 could only have been due to misjudgement on the part of the ship’s staff or negligence of the fishing vessel crew. Pending completion of a board of inquiry, the commanding officer has been suspended. For all we know, he may be exonerated, but if found guilty, will be punished. Similarly, the brush of INS Tarkash with the jetty was due to human error, but it was no “disaster”.

Ships have been having arguments with jetties from the days of Lord Nelson, and there will be any number of such cases filed away in the archives of not only the Indian navy but navies all over the world. The grounding incidents of Sindhughosh, Betwa, Vipul, Mysore and Airavat look big taken collectively but are not uncommon individually.

A ship can be blamed for grounding if it strays from a marked channel or goes into a charted navigational hazard. But if the incident is attributable to an underwater and unidentified object not marked on the chart, perhaps as a result of silting and lack of dredging, it will be most unfair to levy any blame on the ships’ staff.

All these incidents have been or are being examined thoroughly by the navy and disciplinary or corrective action has or will be taken on completion of the boards of inquiry. In none of the cases discussed so far does the buck travel any further than the captain of the ship.

Here, it is essential to point out that the captain of a ship is a prize appointment and the individual is selected by top officers of the navy after a detailed examination of his service record and proficiency. However, there is no escape from human error. According to reports, the navy chief had already taken corrective action by ordering a reappraisal of the performance of key officers and affected many transfers.

The collision with the jetty and the groundings were not “disasters”, either in the manner in which they happened or for the damages caused, which were not substantial except maybe in one case. These incidents should not even have found their way to the media. The navy would do well to investigate how this has happened. This is not to suggest that they should have been brushed under the carpet.

Proper procedure must be followed and necessary action taken, but unnecessary reporting in the media and painting a frightening picture of naval “disasters” is wrong. Admiral Joshi quite rightly spoke of them as minor incidents, and neither the media nor the ministry of defence had cause to disbelieve him.

We are now left with three incidents that are of a serious nature. The fire on INS Konkan seems to be an isolated incident and one does not have any details to comment on it. It is, however, pertinent to note that this happened on the east coast and, therefore, should not be held against the CinC Western Naval Command, who seems to be in the line of fire. The Sindhurakshak and Sindhuratna incidents have both occurred on Kilo-class submarines and can be grouped together, although the cause may not be the same.

In fact, full details are not yet known beyond the fact that there were some explosions on the former and smoke in a compartment on the latter. The Sindhuratna was on post-refit trials and had on board the Western Naval Command Commodore Commanding Submarines and his inspection team. Any charge of negligence is therefore incorrect. We should avoid passing judgement till we get to the bottom of the matter.

The submarines are old and well past their sell-by date. The navy has repeatedly apprised the defence minister and the MoD of this. The case for replacement of submarines is at least 10 years old. This is the true “disaster”, which has only now been highlighted because these accidents have occurred. It remains to be seen if the MoD makes fast progress on the acquisition of submarines so that such disasters, or worse, do not take place.

On one issue, however, the navy can be faulted. Content with the belief that the incidents were of a minor nature, it allowed the media to hype them and did not make timely efforts to clear the air. Its public relations machine is to blame. To draw an analogy, when a number of MiG-21 incidents were taking place not too long ago, the aircraft were labelled as “flying coffins”. But nobody was calling for the heads of the air force hierarchy.

The mystery behind Admiral Joshi’s resignation remains. What triggered his resignation when he had recently dismissed most of these incidents as “minor”? One can only conjecture that the MoD, if not the minister himself, and the media were hounding him and he was bearing everything manfully till the Sindhuratna incident proved to be the last straw.

The real naval disaster | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

Update on Sindhuratna

Consequent upon Sindhuratna returning to harbour AM 27 Feb 14, a preliminary assessment of damage sustained onboard was carried out by a specialist team of HQWNC. Based on preliminary inspection of third compartment, the likely seat of fire has been indicated as the mess deck, which is located one deck above the battery bit. Certain electrical cables were observed to be burnt/ damaged in this area. The cause for initiation of fire at this location would be ascertained in due course by the high level BoI. The preliminary inspection of third compartment thus indicates that the

Status of Batteries Sindhughosh class submarines carry 240 cells, distributed equally in forward and aft battery pits. The batteries presently installed on Sindhuratna have till date completed about 113 cycles as against 200 cycles available for exploitation. Further, the life of the batteries is valid by date (stipulated life of four years, by OEM). The batteries which were being exploited by Sindhuratna at the time of incident were therefore operationally in-date.fire has emanated from the third compartment mess deck (sailor’s accommodation).

Current Status of Battery Pit As has been brought out above, the battery pit is located in the third compartment below the mess deck. Preliminary inspection of the battery pit and the batteries therein has been undertaken and no damage has been observed thus for. Further, there are no signs to indicate any initiation of fire from the battery pit. The batteries appear to be clear of any damage and would now be put through normal checks and maintenance routines prior operationalisation.

In the meanwhile, a high level Board of Inquiry (BoI) headed by a two star Admiral has commenced the investigation to ascertain the cause leading to the incident.

Update on Sindhuratna | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

Navy must reclaim its ethos



In resigning after the INS Sindhuratna accident, Admiral Joshi has shown a sense of morality that his supporters have lacked

The resignation of the navy chief, Admiral DK Joshi, has stirred a bitter debate even in circles that do not normally follow defence. Critics of Defence Minister AK Antony’s handling of the defence ministry, and of his glacial decision-making, insist the admiral has been sacrificed to hide the ministry’s slothfulness in procuring new equipment. According to this line of argument, two naval officers died, seven sailors were injured and a frontline submarine, INS Sindhuratna, was disabled because delayed procurement had forced the navy to operate obsolete warships. Mr Antony, bay his critics, should have resigned not the navy chief. The near unanimity of this view amongst serving and retired officers, just days after the government courted them by okaying a longstanding demand for “one-rank-one-pension”, shows how completely the Congress has lost this constituency.

Yet this stand is misplaced --- it tries to mask the navy’s carelessness by citing the defence ministry’s ineffectiveness. True, Mr Antony has much to answer for in how he has run his ministry, and good reasons exist separately for demanding his head. But the navy alone is responsible for a safety culture so poor that 10 warships and submarines have suffered mishaps since last August, when another submarine, INS Sindhurakshak, had a catastrophic explosion that killed all 18 sailors on board. Three out of India’s ten Russian Kilo-class submarines have suffered mishaps, while two out of six state-of-the-art Russian stealth frigates have had collisions. These are alarming figures.

It is fallacious to argue, as some have done, that India’s Kilo-class submarines are inadequate or obsolete. Some 50 Kilo class submarines serve in navies worldwide, including those of Russia, China, Vietnam, Algeria, Poland, Romania and Iran. Algeria’s are older than India’s, but have suffered no mishaps. INS Sindhurakshak, which sank last August, had been in service for just 16 years, and had recently returned from a mid-life refit in Russia that made it good for at least another 15-20 years. A service life of 30-40 years is quite normal for submarines. Our Foxtrot class submarines performed yeoman service for over 35 years. The US Navy’s Los Angeles class attack submarines, the mainstay of its underwater force, are 30-35 years old. It is plain wrong to argue, as some have done, that India’s Kilo-class submarines have outlived their utility; the navy itself envisages many more years of service for these potent fighting platforms. To retire the Kilo-class submarines would be to strike a hammer blow to the navy’s Maritime Capability Perspective Plan, which lays out the future fleet. India simply cannot afford that.
Admiral DK Joshi knows this, which is why he resigned. Sailors had died as a result of operational laxity and more would die if the trend were not reversed. While the chief was not personally responsible for this, an eroding safety culture within his service was. In resigning, the admiral has kick-started a corrective process that is essential for the navy. Years down the line, he will be seen as having done far more good for the service than many of his predecessors, and certainly more than those who currently seek to make a martyr of him by passing the buck to the ministry.

The military’s most insidious enemy is a strident new breed of public advocates, who argue in print, television and social media to cover up functional and ethical lapses by the defence services, howsoever inexcusable. From the old soldiers’ community there is less insistence that the military upholds the high standards that it has always delivered. Instead, this brigade of cheerleaders forgets a simple truth --- India loves and respects its military because it is professional, reliable and (mostly) wins the wars that it fights. They would do well to remember that real loyalty to the military tradition is not just about demanding “one-rank-one-pension” and complaining about how bureaucrats and politicians marginalise the services. It is more essential to demand performance standards and upholding a culture of leadership and personal example. Admiral Joshi understands that even if his supporters do not.

To argue that there is little accountability elsewhere in public life is to state the obvious. Is it anyone’s case that the navy chief should shelter behind this broad-based lack of accountability? Generations of soldiers (which includes sailors and airmen) have proudly adopted a code of conduct that sets them above the common citizenry. This exclusivism underlies their readiness to die for izzat, as Indian military tradition terms the potent motivational mix of country, comrades, regiment and self-respect. In resigning, the navy chief has bolstered the notion of izzat and command responsibility. Only the extraordinarily short-sighted would suggest that he should have passed the buck to his boss.

That Admiral Joshi’s resignation will shine the spotlight on operational safety is already apparent. In warships and submarines, like in tanks and aircraft, crewmembers live and operate cheek-by-jowl with large quantities of fuel and weapons. A single deviation from rigid safety procedures can have explosive consequences. To prevent that, the navy has announced a wide-ranging review of standard operating procedures, and audits of weapon-related safety systems. It has ordered that an analysis of all safety-related incidents must be circulated to naval schools and combat units to ensure that everyone absorbs the lessons. It is for the navy to ensure that the painful cost that it has already paid benefits those who continue to serve.

Broadsword: Navy must reclaim its ethos

 

[kurup]

Muddy waters, navy blues

As the initial shock of Admiral D K Joshi’s sudden resignation wears off, the armed forces, and the nation, must applaud a rarity: a man who has held loyalty to service before himself and walked away from high office, following the dictates of conscience. Concerns about the putative ‘line of succession’ exist only in public imagination because there are clear-cut guidelines available to the government for ensuring a smooth and early succession to the navy’s top job.

The dramatic changes in the navy’s upper ranks are bound to unsettle its junior officers and sailors. The new chief’s first major challenge, therefore, will be to restore the confidence of his service and the nation that the Indian Navy remains an efficient and combat-ready regional maritime force. He would be well advised to obtain a swift and authentic evaluation of how operations, maintenance and training are being conducted in the service and to ensure that shortcomings are speedily remedied.

From the freewheeling media speculation underway, we need to pick out three crucial issues for closer scrutiny and separate facts from fiction. The first relates to the succession of accidents that have badly dented the navy’s shining image. Secondly, a widespread impression has taken root that our navy is operating ‘old ships’ and ‘leaky submarines’ that hazard their crews. Last, and most important, is the media commentary about the strained civil-military relationship that underpins the present crisis.

Of the 10 accidents cited, two, involving loss of life on board submarines, are indeed grave and warrant a thorough probe. The remaining eight were of a trivial nature — collisions, groundings and minor fires — that happen frequently in all active seagoing navies. With no common thread running through them, it was just an unfortunate happenstance that they occurred in rapid succession.

In any other country they may have rated passing mention, but India’s intrusive visual media took it upon itself to project each incident as a disaster of Titanic proportions, subjecting it to shrill and ill-informed discussions. There can be little doubt that this sustained media focus panicked the MoD into pressuring the navy, with Sindhuratna’s fire becoming the last straw that led to a despondent chief’s resignation. The indecent haste with which the resignation was accepted clearly spoke of relief on Raisina Hill that a sacrificial lamb had presented itself.

Navies nurture their warships so they can squeeze the maximum life out of them. The USS Enterprise retired in 2012 after 52 years of service and our own INS Viraat will be 57 years old when she is decommissioned. By international standards, the Indian Navy is young. It has a large proportion of modern and newly constructed ships, with some approaching middle age and others nearing their stipulated retirement age. Aging ships are, however, ‘modernised’ and given a fresh lease of life. Moreover, 45 newly cons-tructed warships will join the fleet in the coming decade.

New or old, no Indian Navy warship sails out unless it meets stringent safety and seaworthiness requirements, but accidents will happen at sea. Navies that have zero accidents are the ones that stay put in harbour. However, our Soviet-era vessels are quite old, and the accidents on two kilo-class submarines call into question, not only Russian workmanship, but also our own operating and maintenance procedures.

Since 2008, the navy’s operational tempo has mounted steadily on account of overseas deployments, anti-piracy patrols, tactical exercises and coastal security commitments. If this has brought excessive strain on personnel as well as ships and machinery, something is bound to give. It is the responsi-bility of naval commanders to ensure that commitments remain commensurate with resources and unwarranted pressures are not imposed on men and machines, nor are any safety norms violated.

That brings us to the crucial issue of civil-military relations at the heart of which lies the deeply flawed policy of subordinating the armed forces, not to political control, but to the tyranny of a lethargic and uninformed bureaucracy. Under current rules, the chiefs carry the full burden of responsibility for their service, operational and administrative, but lack standing and authority within MoD.

On the other hand, the defence secretary is vested with authority for ‘defence of India and for the three armed forces HQs’, but has zero accountability — especially when things go wrong. In practical terms, every single decision regarding weapons, equipment, infrastructure and personnel impinging on the navy’s opera-tional efficiency needs the approval of a bureaucrat.

With ministers engrossed in electoral politics and bureaucrats lacking comprehension of complex military issues, critical cases are frequently cast into limbo for 5-10 years. It is the indifference of the politician, bureaucratic inefficiency and the civil-military divide that are stalling armed forces’ modernisation and undermining national security, a $40-billion defence budget notwithstanding.

Like every other major democracy, India must integrate its service HQs with the MoD, and create a chief of defence staff for providing military advice to the government. This would require political sagacity as well as determination so that neither bureaucratic obduracy nor irrational suspicion of the military comes in the way of this long-overdue measure. In a truly integrated MoD the civil and military would accept joint responsi-bility for national security instead of engaging in futile blame games.

Muddy waters, navy blues | idrw.org

 

[Jai_Hind]

System to Keep an Eye on Activities in Indian Ocean Region

Seeking to enhance its influence in the Indian Ocean Region, India today said it has put in place a system along with Sri Lanka and Maldives to keep an eye on the activities there and work together for enhancing maritime security.

“We have a platform in place which will enhance concrete response to situation whether it is piracy, counter terrorism, drug trafficking or human trafficking.

We will pool our capability. This is useful and wanted to join forward,” National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon told reporters. “We can put in place systems so that we can see and share what we see what is going on in the maritime area around us. We have trained our people. We have put in hardware so that we can share that information,” he said. He was briefing on the third NSA-level Meeting on Maritime Security Cooperation between Maldives, Sri Lanka and India held here.

The NSA said while assessing the cooperation and joint activities in field of counter-terrorism, anti-piracy and trafficking, the three sides were satisfied with the work in progress. Menon said the three sides have also held a trilateral exercise called ‘Dosti’ also in the recent past. At the meeting, the Maldivian delegation was led by its Defence Minister Col (Retd) Mohamed Nazim while the Sri Lankan side was represented by its Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

On the part of the new platform, the three countries will share data of the newly-developed Automatic Identification System, which has been built by India for enhancing coastal security. Menon said the three countries had invited Mauritius and the Seychelles as observer countries for this meeting and they have shown interest in participate in it and “we may have to change the name of the meeting”.

The next NSA-level Meeting on Maritime Security Cooperation would be held in Maldives on a date to be decided through diplomatic channels, officials said. Asked whether Sri Lanka raised the issue of a proposal being moved by Mauritius against it in the UN Human Rights Commission, Menon said, “They mentioned that for this kind of cooperation, we need trust and they mentioned that they were concerned that Mauritius is co-sponsoring a resolution in UNHRC and that was it.”

In bilateral discussions with Sri Lanka, they talked about it and told us what they think of these issues, Menon said. On the influence of politics in Tamil Nadu on cooperation with Sri Lanka, the NSA said this cooperation has been going on since October 2011 and politics of it keeps going but maritime security has to be ensured.

The NSA claimed that in the past five years, a lot of things have been changed in the counter terrorism apparatus in the country but there was a scope of doing much more in this direction. He said the incidents of piracy have come down but the source of it has not been addressed and the three countries have discussed the legal and other aspects of the issue.

Menon said as new measures, the three countries have agreed to enhance cooperation in area of hydrography and ties between their think tanks on maritime affairs. On the situation in Ukraine, he said, “We are watching the developments in Ukraine with concern and hope that internal issues there are settled peacefully.”

“There are legitimate Russian and other interests involved and we hope they are discussed and resolved.” The NSA sought to play down reports about hacking of computers in South Block and North Block saying, “There are various forms of compromise and not every leaked password is a big threat to security. A mere fact that .some computer is open in North Block and South Block and is accessible, it doesn’t mean that therefore there is big gap in security.”




idrw.org/?p=34553

 

[kurup]

Indian Navy suffering due to govt apathy

With the Indian Navy’s image nose diving to an all-time low after the string of accidents that culminated in the resignation of Naval chief Admiral D K Joshi last week, the morale of the forces has hit rock bottom. There is widespread anger at personnel being forced to serve on vessels that have long outlived their shelf life, and sadness that their sacrifices are being taken for granted.
While the common complaint against the defence minister on defence-related social networking sites is that he sat on important files related to upgradation, modernization and acquisitions for nearly a decade, senior Naval officials felt Joshi paid the price for government apathy as the procurement, production and maintenance of submarines is the responsibility of the ministry of defence (MoD) and not the Navy.

An agitated commander (Retd) S Chakrapani, who has commanded submarines of the same class as the ill-fated INS Sindhurakshak and INS Sindhuratna, felt Naval personnel were paying the price for the greed and apathy of politicians. “Why should the Navy be held responsible for operating old, substandard and risky submarines? Why is no bureaucrat or politician ever held responsible? Everyone up the line knows these submarines are old and refurbishment and refitting takes place at dockyards that come under the MoD,” he said.

While Commander (Retd) G Eswara Reddy, secretary of Naval Foundation’s Hyderabad chapter, said he was deeply pained at the haste with which Admiral Joshi’s resignation was accepted despite him not being at fault, Commodore (Retd) V Kumar, who served as submarine operations director, pointed out that submarines that should have decommissioned long ago were being given repeated extensions, putting the lives of Naval personnel at needless risk.

Pointing out that the Navy was not to blame for these mishaps, Commander (Retd) TS Moorthy said “How do you expect the Navy to fight with its hands tied and mouth sealed? If the government does not give us submarines and battleships in consonance with the Naval prowess of neighbouring countries and sends us to sea with dangerously substandard and outdated submarines that cause loss of precious lives even in peacetime, how do they expect us to go to war? When was the last time a politician went to Parliament in a car as old as our submarines, which run higher risk?”

Highlighting the apathetic attitude of the government, Moorthy added: “For over 30 years there has been talk of getting Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles (DSRV) but we still haven’t got one.”

Giving an analogy on the condition of Naval vessels, Lt Sandeep Sekhar (name changed), who knew the Sindhuratna victims, said: “You take a horse, make it work like an *** and treat it like a dog. Then if you expect it to roar like a lion, what will happen? Lots of things are wrong and need to change.”

Lieutenant commander Neeraj D (name changed) chipped in caustically: “Have you seen some of the World War II era equipment we use? People who manufacture it keep such stuff in their country’s museums and laugh when we ask for spares. While the armed forces fight without bulletproof jackets and latest weapons, politicians think nothing of spending lavishly on foreign junkets and parties. They don’t value our sacrifices and assume soldiers are born to die as it is their duty.”

“If only politicians would divert to the Navy even a fraction of the public money they siphon off, no Naval chief would be made a scapegoat. While China has accumulated five times our submarine strength, our politicians make false claims and we continue to lose men in peace time. To top it all, nobody is ready to take responsibility even as the confidence and morale of Navy personnel has plunged to an all-time low”, said a senior official.

Indian Navy suffering due to govt apathy | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

Indian Navy Cast Adrift

Admiral D K Joshi’s resigning and the succession crisis it triggered are ultimately minor issues. More basic problems afflict the navy.

For instance, the Indian Navy’s high reputation for seamanship and ship-handling has been sullied somewhat by the spate of accidents involving frigates and destroyers ramming into docks and passing vessels. In a recent conversation with this analyst, Joshi dismissed these mishaps as “tire punctures”. At a minimum, it indicates a decline in ship-handling skills.

I recall, in this respect, the late Admiral S M Nanda, the country’s eighth Naval Chief, telling me of an incident from the 1950s when the navy annually exercised with the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet. In one such exercise, as commander of the cruiser, Mysore, he was asked by the host, who was testing his mettle, to squeeze his large ship into a tight berth alongside British warships in the harbour in Malta. It required intricate docking manoeuvres the British fleet commander was certain Nanda could not pull off and, in trying to bring his ship in unaided crash it into the jetty. But Nanda deftly slid Mysore into the slot without a hitch. The surprised Briton didn’t know, the Admiral told me with a chuckle, that he had captained pilot boats in Karachi harbour in the pre-Second World War days.

The point is that ship-handling skills are learned and the “sea eye” acquired hands-on by subaltern officers (in the rank of sub-Lieutenant and Lieutenant) steering small craft on coastal security duties and skimming in and about crowded harbours, something naval stalwarts will vouch for. It is a hard job, they say, to bring in a 6,000 ton-plus missile destroyer coasting in at 4-6 knots to the quay, and ship commanders lacking sufficient small boat-derived experience often flub this test. Lack of such skills is also reflected in ships running aground, which too has happened lately. Diffident captains opting to have tug-boats escort their vessels in and out of harbours will lack the experience in crisis when ships have to get out to sea in a hurry under their own power.

The trouble is small ship command billets are in short supply because the navy has no more than 20 offshore patrol craft and coastal combatants in its inventory, smaller vessels being monopolised by the Coast Guard (CG) tasked with the coastal security mission. In this respect, the navy has failed to respond to a 10-year-old offer by the CG director-general to sequester six of his vessels exclusively for junior naval officers to command. The skills differential is thus set to widen considering the CG is growing faster with induction of new patrol boats every two-three weeks and, in time, its officers could potentially be better in handling bigger ships than their naval counterparts.

Familiarisation with ships comes, moreover, from pulling time in them. More and more naval officers, however, have ever shorter tenures in rotational posts at sea, affording them insufficient time to familiarise themselves with the ships. It has resulted in an echelon of mid-level officers not quite capable, when commanding ships, of manoeuvring them well or tackling on-board crises and contingencies involving machinery and equipment.

Huge bunches of the navy’s 10,000-strong officer cadre, the smallest of any armed service, moreover, are sucked up for duty in large ships. The first fleet aircraft carrier, Vikramaditya, has 200 officers assigned to it. Because the ministry of defence (MoD) sanctions crew strength virtually at the point of commissioning ships, increases in personnel cannot be schemed too much in advance, making nonsense of manpower planning and compounding the problem of inexperienced officers assuming command of battleships.

The depletion of the submarine arm is especially alarming. In the wake of the Sindhuratna accident, the turgid pace of decision-making in the ministry of defence (MoD) will quicken for a while and bureaucrats, who often wilfully retard military procurement and indigenous production programmes, will frantically clear everything to avoid blame. It is an opportune time for the naval brass to take the seriously big step of embarking on an all-nuclear submarine arm as advocated by the veteran submariner, retired Rear Admiral Raja Menon, and secure two additional Russian Akula nuclear hunter-killer submersibles (SSNs) on lease, including the Iribis already offered to India, to fill the immediate void in sea denial capability. The lesser option is to build a conventional hunter-killer submarine (SSK) from scratch.

To achieve this grand aim, Project 75i, a programme to buy yet another foreign conventional sub at a mind-boggling `55,000 crore, should be altered to obtain an SSK, or SSN, with a production line to complement the one manufacturing the Arihant-class nuclear-powered nuclear missile firing submarines (SSBNs). In either case, it will be a daunting project considering the navy’s design directorate still lacks basic competence. It hasn’t developed the tools and the metrics to validate its own designs. But rather than be deterred by the enormity of this enterprise, the government should sanction this SSK/SSN project in mission-mode, affording it priority and autonomy as was done in the case of the Agni missile and Arihant projects. After all, the country had no experience in producing missiles and SSBNs either.

The navy’s submarine design group has enough insights from the German HDW and French Scorpene projects and long acquaintance with the Russian design philosophy to shake off self-doubt. It is imperative the navy goes all out on this option, seeding a comprehensive submarine and ship-building industry in the process. To ensure its success, it should insist on a private sector combine of majors, such as Larsen & Toubro and Pipavav Shipyard involved in making the Arihant, as prime contractor. This being no time for ethical niceties, the combine should be incentivised to reverse-engineer to the maximum, to rely on indigenous sources and resources, and to obtain the really critical technology and technical assistance from wherever and however it can get it. Commercial-minded corporates, espying nationalism-laced profit, will find a way.

Committed to shrinking the government and the public sector, the likely new prime minister Narendra Modi will welcome such an ambitious and freewheeling initiative to render the country genuinely self-reliant in armaments.

Indian Navy Cast Adrift | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

Indian Navy's 2-Star Submarine Chief Faces Veteran Fire



As Defence Minister A.K. Antony continues to be the object of simmering anger within the navy over what has been a traumatic week with Admiral DK Joshi's resignation, there's parallel fury freshly raging against the navy's serving 'Submarine-in-Chief', the officer currently investigating the INS Sindhuratna accident.

Flag Officer Submarines (FOS) Rear Admiral Soonil V. Bhokare's personal Rediffmail inbox has been invaded by angry e-mails from retired veterans who believe the officer should follow his chief's example and quit service. While veterans, including former submariner Rear Admiral (Retd.) K. Raja Menon believe Antony to be the worst Defence Minister in independent India, others now believe that anger must be directed at those who call the shots within the navy. With Admiral DK Joshi out, that anger is now focused on Western Naval Command chief Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, and now, Rear Admiral Bhokare.

A particularly angry e-mail from a retired Commander-rank submariner to Rear Admiral Bhokare, currently being posted on naval veteran forums says, "I write to you in extreme anguish at the very sad and sorry state of affairs of a once proud and most professional arm of the Navy. Today we hang our heads in shame, both serving and retired submariners, thanks to the legacy left behind by illustrious people like you and a few others who have followed you."

The officer, who has preferred not to be identified, writes, "Today in the Navy sporting a 'Dolphin' [insignia of the submarine service] on your chest is a shame. The mood amongst the men in the arm is absolutely militant and young officers, the leaders of tomorrow are absolutely depressed and disgusted at our dilution of standards and safety norms. (Sindhuratna was sailing with 94 people on board. Were there enough IDA sets on board for all 94.)"
That last point is the subject of Rear Admiral Bhokare's investigation now, and is an aspersion on naval standard operating procedures, adherence to safety protocols and basic training. Part of the buck, angry veterans feel, stops with senior officers in the Indian Navy, whose job it is to ensure laxity never for a moment creeps into daily duties. Several e-mails of a similar tenor to the one quoted above are understood to have been shot off by veterans to those currently making sense of the INS Sindhurakshak and INS Sindhuratna incidents.

The navy sought to dispel anger against the MoD over reportedly expired batteries on the INS Sindhuratna by stating today that, "There are no signs to indicate any initiation of fire from the battery pit. The batteries appear to be clear of any damage and would now be put through normal checks and maintenance routines prior operationalisation. The preliminary inspection of third compartment indicates that the fire has emanated from the third compartment mess deck (sailor's accommodation). The batteries which were being exploited by Sindhuratna at the time of incident were operationally in-date."

While the MoD gets to duck any damage over batteries, at least for the moment, it continues to evade questions over modernisation of the submarine arm at large. As HEADLINES TODAY reported last week, the MoD has sat motionless on a 2010 classified naval report literally pleading for high-level intervention to save the submarine service from a crisis.

Questions over procedure, protocol and training within the navy are likely to take centrestage, with deeply uncomfortable questions emerging. Perhaps in an effort to deflect the adverse publicity playing out in the media and veterans community, the navy yesterday published a statement saying, "The fast pace of operations, accentuated by increasing complexities often puts men and material under strain, thus requiring stringent adherence to safety procedures. The Indian Navy is sensitive of the fact that all naval evolutions need to be effectively undertaken within a well defined safety operating envelope. Accordingly, 'safety culture' as a way of life, amongst personnel, traditionally forms a part of naval ethos, and several initiatives have additionally been introduced based on emerging requirements."

Livefist: Indian Navy's 2-Star Submarine Chief Faces Veteran Fire

 

[kurup]

Indian Navy: 11 accidents, 22 deaths in seven months

There have been 11 accidents invoving Indian Navy ships and submarines since last August. While most of the accidents did not claim any lives, 21 officers and sailors have died in three mishaps.

* INS Sindhurakshak (August 14, 2013) - Eighteen crew members on board – three officers and 15 sailors – were killed when blasts ripped through the torpedo compartment of the INS Sindhurakshak while the submarine was berthed in Mumbai harbour.

* INS Viraat (September 2013) - Fire broke out near the officer’s mess of the aircraftcarrier off the Mumbai coast. No casualties were reported.

* INS Konkan (December 4, 2013) - A minesweeper of the Eastern Naval Command, the vessel caught fire at the naval dockyard at Visakhapatnam while undergoing repairs. The fire engulfed much of the ship’s interiors before it doused. No deaths were reported.

* INS Talwar (December 23, 2013) - A fishing trawler sank after colliding with the frontline frigate near Ratnagiri district, injuring four of the 27 people aboard the trawler. The trawler was operating without lights. There were no causalties onboard the ship.

* INS Tarkash (December 2013) - A stealth frigate which conducted several overseas missions, INS Tarkash suffered damage to its hull when it hit the jetty while docking at the Mumbai. There were no casualties.

* INS Betwa (January 22, 2014) - The indigenously built frigate ran aground and collided with an unidentified object while approaching the Mumbai harbour. The frigate’s sonar system was found to be cracked, leading to faulty readings and ingress of saltwater into sensitive equipment.

* INS Vipul (January 2014) Deployed with the elite 22nd Killer Missile Vessel Squadron, a hole was detected in a compartment, forced it back into the harbour while it was on an operational mission. It had to be sent for repairs.

INS Sindhughosh (January 2014) - The leading ship of her class of diesel-electric submarines, the Sindhughosh ran aground at the naval harbour in Mumbai. The submarine was re-floated and did not suffer much damage. At the time of the incident, it was fully armed, carrying its entire compliment of 70 personnel, all of whom were safe.

INS Airavat (February 3, 2014) - Amphibious ship INS Airavat, the latest of the Shardul class of tank-landing ships, ran aground off the coast of Visakhapatnam. The propellers of the warship were permanently damaged and had to be replaced for the vessel to become operational again.

INS Sindhuratna (February 26, 2014) Two sailors died and seven members of the 94-strong crew were evacuated after inhaling smoke aboard the diesel-powered submarine following a fire. A board of inquiry in its preliminary report, said that fire in some cables led to the smoke in the third compartment.

INS Kolkata (Yard 701) (March 7, 2014) - An officer was killed and a worker injured after inhaling carbon dioxide gas which leaked from a container in the advanced warship at Mumbai’s Mazagon Dock Limited.

Indian Navy: 11 accidents, 22 deaths in seven months | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

India's warship refits suffer lack of quality control

NEW DELHI: India is building a powerful Navy for the future, with as many as 44 warships on order in domestic shipyards at a cost of over 2 lakh crore in a major boost to indigenisation, but huge time and cost overruns have for long plagued the endeavour.

Now, the lack of "requisite quality control", "proper planning" and "effective oversight" is also fast coming into focus in the complex arena of warship construction and refits. On Friday, Commander Kuntal Wadwa was killed after the valves of the carbon dioxide discharging system "malfunctioned" during trials on the new guided-missile destroyer INS Kolkata, which was to be handed over to the Navy in end-April. Both Mazagon Docks (MDL) and Navy will conduct separate probes into the accident.

This comes days after two other officers, Lieutenant Commanders Kapish Singh Munwal and Manoranjan Kumar, were killed after inhaling toxic gases due to "a cable fire" on board INS Sindhuratna on February 26, just two months after the 26-year-old submarine underwent an extensive seven-month refit. The mishap prompted Admiral D K Joshi to resign as the Navy chief within hours.

"The levels of quality control and efficiency are tardy in our defence shipyards and naval dockyards, much like other defence PSUs. Lack of proper infrastructure like paltry dry-docking facilities, timely availability of steel and supply of spares also remain huge problems," admitted a senior official.

The Navy currently operates 145 warships, which includes 50 "major combatants'' and 14 submarines, apart from aircraft, helicopters and spy drones, but many of them will retire in the coming years. Consequently, the force has charted out long-term plans for induction of four to five new warships every year.

But the modernisation of the four defence shipyards - MDL (Mumbai), Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (Kolkata), Goa Shipyard (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard (Vizag) - has lagged far behind what is actually required.

Consider this: There has been a cost escalation of over 225% in the ongoing Project-15A at MDL to build the three Kolkata-class destroyers. The project was first sanctioned in June 2001, with INS Kolkata slated for delivery in 2008. The cost escalation for construction of four anti-submarine warfare corvettes at GRSE, in turn, stands at 157%.

MDL is the largest among the four shipyards, with an order book of around Rs 1,00,000 crore, including the Rs 23,562 crore project for six Scorpene submarines and the Rs 41,007 crore one for seven guided-missile destroyers. But the overall capacity of the four shipyards is limited, forcing the government to explore private shipyards as well as public-private partnerships to meet timelines for ship-building.

Warships on order

1 Indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant—Cochin Shipyard

3 Kolkata-class destroyers (Project-15A) — Mazagon Docks (MDL)

4 Guided-missile stealth destroyers (Project-15B) — MDL

6 Scorpene submarines (Project-75) — MDL

7 Stealth guided-missile frigates (Project-17A) — 4 at MDL, 3 at Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE)

4 Anti-submarine warfare corvettes (Project 28)—GRSE

8 Landing Craft Utility — GRSE

5 Offshore patrol vessels — Pipavav Shipyard

2 Cadet training ships — Alcock Ashdown Shipyard

3 Double-hulled catamarans — ABG Shipyard

1 Naval offshore patrol vessel — Goa Shipyard

India's warship refits suffer lack of quality control - The Times of India

 

[kurup]

Chidambaram's advice echoes in Navy

NEW DELHI: While the defence ministry may not be very amused by P Chidambaram's advice that it must spend money wisely, many among military officers agree with the finance minister's advice.

The finance minister said: "How is that money (defence budget) spent? If Rs 2.25 lakh crore is allotted to defence, how is it spent? Should it be spent on maintenance, acquiring new equipment, training, raising a new battalion — these are questions which are decided by very senior officers of the Army, Navy and the Air Force."

Commenting on the recent submarine accident, Chidambaram said: "I sincerely hope that the defence forces will learn a lesson and make sure that the money allocated to them is spent more wisely and more efficiently on essential matters." He went on to say that "at some point of time the maintenance of the submarine appears to have been neglected. Only an inquiry will prove the fact, from what reports I have read (it) appears to be neglected. There seems to be some problem with the battery that led to the fire, and two precious lives were lost".

The MOD did not offer any direct comment to Chidambaram, but many military officers agreed with the suggestions.

"I don't really know what is going wrong. But what I can say for sure is that most of the problem is within us. We are also playing our own games (within the military)," said a naval officer who has dealt with submarine acquisitions. He said the navy, and the MOD, have not shown enough perspective to create submarine building, maintenance and overhaul capabilities. "From the HDW days (of the 1980s) when we started assembling submarines we have not moved forward much. We are almost where we started," he said. The result is expensive refits, overpriced foreign items and deep-rooted corruption. "The story is not very different in the case of fighters, tanks or any other major platform," he said.

A senior MOD official said what Chidamabaram said in public is what defence minister AK Antony has been repeatedly telling the forces both in public and private. "The minister has been saying this, and pushing to be more financially prudent," he said. That is why Antony appointed independent financial comptrollers in all major departments including service headquarters, and has taken action whenever any wrongdoing was detected. Almost 600 complaints have been sent for vigilance inquiries by Antony and over 100 of them to CBI, he pointed out. Many of the other steps taken by Antony have also been in many senses a response to concerns about possible irresponsible spending, he pointed out.

However, a senior navy officer pointed out that Antony has failed to push the services into embracing indigenisation in a big way, and to clean up the entire place. "The arms dealers are still very busy, India continues to be the biggest importer in the world, and we continue to spend imprudently," he said.

Chidambaram's advice echoes in Navy - The Times of India

 

[Penguin]

Nice shot of JMSDF Shin Meiwa

 

[Penguin]

 

[DacterSaab]

All these continuous accidents can't be co-incidental there's a high chance our ships are being sabotaged